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La tesi analizza le raffigurazioni dell’umano e del rapporto tra sovranità e soggetti-
vità nella letteratura nigeriana anglofona. Concentrandosi in particolar modo sulla 
narrativa di recente produzione, il lavoro parte dall’osservazione di come la Nige-
ria postcoloniale venga dipinta nelle opere in esame quale luogo di eccezione per-
manente, i cui soggetti, più sudditi che cittadini, sono sovente ridotti a quel che il 
filosofo Giorgio Agamben ha definito “nuda vita”: una vita esposta alla violenza 
sovrana, o al sovrano abbandono, che diventa sempre più impunemente uccidibi-
le. La tesi discute quindi le strategie adottate da più generazioni di scrittori nigeria-
ni dal post-indipendenza a oggi per fornire un’elaborazione, estetica ed etica al 
contempo, delle declinazioni possibili del vivere umano nello stato d’eccezione e 
della mancata tutela diritti fondamentali. In questo senso, essa rileva come le opere 
prese in considerazione facciano ampio uso di un immaginario di guerra e conflit-
to e registra non solo la riscrittura, a volte astraente, della sanguinosa Guerra Civi-
le di fine anni Sessanta, ma nota altresì che molti dei momenti (pseu-
do)democratici nella storia del paese vengono configurati in termini che ricordano 
la definizione foucauldiana di politica come “guerra continuata con altri mezzi”. 
La prima parte, “The Exception”, esamina la rappresentazione di momenti 
di emergenza pubblica dichiarati nell’ambito di un confronto armato. Il primo ca-
pitolo si sofferma su una selezione delle molte opere che, fin dagli anni Settanta, 
hanno proposto una narrativizzazione della Guerra Civile. Il capitolo successivo 
fornisce invece una lettura in chiave comparata e interdisciplinare di due brevi ro-
manzi che raccontano un conflitto non nominato e contribuiscono, attraverso la 
descrizione dei due giovani protagonisti, all’acceso dibattito internazionale riguar-
dante la figura del bambino soldato.  
La seconda parte, dal titolo “The Rule”, considera opere che narrano del fal-
limento democratico dello stato nigeriano, sottolineando come l’eccezione e la so-
spensione costituzionale diventino regola nella normale anormalità della Nigeria 
dittatoriale del dopoguerra. Particolare attenzione viene dedicata, in questo conte-
sto, allo studio della raffigurazione di due spazi, quelli della prigione di regime e 
della famiglia postcoloniale, all’interno dei quali questo fenomeno assume evidente 
riconoscibilità.  
La terza parte, intitolata “Camps on the Move”, analizza romanzi che rac-
contano di donne combattive che, vittime o complici di pratiche illegali, tentano di 
contrastare la loro dichiarata superfluità all’interno delle gerarchie biopolitiche che 
si sviluppano nei ‘panorami di guerra’ a cui il titolo della tesi fa riferimento. In 
questo contesto, il capitolo conclusivo rileva come i desideri di mobilità verticale, 
sociale e ontologica, dei personaggi tendano a risolversi in un movimento orizzon-
tale tra ‘campi’ agambeniani, tra condizioni di sostanziale invisibilità, ed abbando-
no, di fronte alla legge. 
Si nota infine che i testi studiati non si limitano a denunciare la riduzione dei 
loro protagonisti a uomini e donne che, secondo la formulazione di Hannah 
Arendt, non avendo “diritto ad avere diritti” sono paradossalmente esclusi 
dall’umanità stessa. Ponendo l’accento sul paradosso, senza peraltro risolverlo, essi 
invitano anche un continuo, ed indispensabile, lavoro di ridefinizione ed espan-
sione delle categorie dell’umano e dell’universale, sottolineando la necessità di ri-
configurare il paradigma dei diritti umani e i rapporti tra individuo e stato. 
* 
This dissertation is concerned with the representation of the human and of the re-
lationship between sovereignty and subjectivity in Nigerian literature. It argues 
that the Nigerian postcolony is portrayed in the texts under investigation as a site 
of perpetual emergency, where a progressively more vivid biopoliticisation of poli-
tics sanctions the reduction of the postcolonial (non-)citizen to what Italian phi-
losopher Giorgio Agamben has termed “bare life” – a form of life that, exposed 
to sovereign violence, or caught in the sovereign ban, may be killed without com-
mitting homicide. Concentrating in particular, but not exclusively, on contempo-
rary fiction writing, this dissertation aims at examining the aesthetic strategies 
adopted by a number of postcolonial writers in order to signify the lack of rights 
protection all too often suffered by the postcolonial (non-)citizen. It will be point-
ed out that an imagery of war is often employed to describe postcolonial Nigeria 
as a country where the state of exception and the withdrawal of constitutional 
protection have become the rule. This study thus will not only investigate the de-
piction of the Civil War of the late 1960s, but will also show that Nigeria’s frac-
tured post-war times are often configured in terms that recall the Foucauldian def-
inition of politics as “the continuation of war by other means.” 
Part One, “The Exception,” aims at analysing the portrayals of moments of 
state emergency declared in the context of armed struggle. The first chapter is de-
voted to the discussion of a selected number among the numerous works that, ev-
er since the 1970s, have enlarged the rich corpus of Nigerian Civil War literature. 
Chapter Two provides a cross-disciplinary, comparative reading of two war novel-
las which narrate an unnamed conflict and which, through the depiction of their 
young protagonists, contribute to the heated debates regarding the figure of the 
child soldier.  
As indicated by the title of Part Two, “The Rule,” I will then discuss how 
war – a period of emergency conducive to the supposedly momentary suspension 
of the rule of law – is presented as becoming the rule in the normal abnormality of 
post-war dictatorial Nigeria. In this context, particular attention will be devoted to 
the literary representation of two sites, namely the autocrat’s overcrowded jail and 
the dysfunctional postcolonial family, where, it will be argued, the phenomenon of 
the perpetuation of the exception acquires great visibility.  
Part Three, captioned “Camps on the Move,” investigates texts recounting 
the lives of combative women who, either victims or accomplices of illegal prac-
tices, do not resign themselves to their superfluous status within the biopolitical 
hierarchies produced in the context of ‘war-scapes’ of unending exception. It will 
be noticed that the characters’ ambitions of upward social and ontological mobili-
ty are often reduced to a horizontal movement between Agambenian ‘camps,’ be-
tween conditions of essential invisibility, and abandonment, before the law. 
The texts under examination, however, do not only protest their protago-
nists’ exclusion from an effective regime of rights, and thus, paradoxically, from 
humanity itself. By highlighting without resolving the paradox itself, they also in-
vite to resignify and expand the concepts of the universal and of the human, un-
derscoring the need for an agonistic, future-oriented reconfiguration of the human 
rights paradigm and of the relationships between the individual and the state. 
In 1966, some time before the eruption of the anti-Igbo riots that, killing thou-
sands, contributed to triggering the Biafran secession from the Federation of Ni-
geria, Igbo photographer Emmanuel Ogbona was abducted and murdered by two 
non-Igbo soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, his body thrown into the bush. Charged 
with the crime, the two ‘suspects’ were to be released without trial a short time af-
terwards, after the case had been withdrawn by the public prosecutor on request 
of the army authorities, who claimed that it came under their jurisdiction. Such a 
prevention of the activation of a machinery of justice – a machinery that still func-
tioned when the victims were not Igbo – assumed exemplary importance in the eyes of 
Wole Soyinka. In his prison memoir, The Man Died, the writer interpreted the de 
facto impunity granted to the two soldiers as “a deliberate, selective decision of 
[General] Yakubu Gowon’s government” (24) explaining the “doctrine of justifia-
ble genocide” (21) underpinning the 1966 massacres and the inevitable war that 
followed. The dramatic episode, Soyinka remarked, emphasised 
what happens to human beings and to a nation when any group within that nation 
is tacitly declared to be outside the law’s protection and is fair game for any man 
with the slightest grudge of fanatical inclination that turns to homicide. (Man 21) 
Soyinka’s caustic words on the consequences of the sovereign’s biopolitical 
power to confine (part of) its populace to a space that is outside the polity clearly 
resonate with the main preoccupation of this dissertation, concerned with the rep-
resentation of the human and of the relationship between sovereignty and subjec-
tivity in Nigerian literature. In what follows, I will argue that postcolonial Nigeria 
is portrayed in the texts under investigation as a site of perpetual emergency, 
where a progressively more vivid biopoliticisation of politics sanctions the reduc-
tion of the postcolonial (non-)citizen to what Italian philosopher Giorgio Agam-
ben has termed “bare life” – a form of life that, exposed to sovereign violence, or 
caught in the sovereign ban, may be killed without committing homicide. Concen-
trating in particular, but not exclusively, on contemporary fiction writing, this dis-
sertation thus aims at examining the aesthetic strategies adopted by the so-called 
“children of the postcolony” (Waberi) in order to signify the lack of rights protec-
tion all too often suffered by the postcolonial subject. An imagery of war is often 
employed to describe postcolonial Nigeria as a country where the state of excep-
tion, and the withdrawal of constitutional protection that goes hand in hand with 
it, has become the rule. This study thus will not only investigate the depiction of 
the bloody Civil War of the late 1960s, but will also show that Nigeria’s post-war 
times are often configured in terms that recall the Foucauldian definition of poli-
tics as “the continuation of war by other means” (Society 15). 
Part One, “The Exception,” has the aim to analyse the literary portrayals of 
moments of state emergency, declared in the context of armed struggle. The Nige-
ria-Biafra conflict, the “season of anomy” (Soyinka, Season) par excellence in Nigeri-
an post-independence history which also initiated the first long-term period of 
military rule in the country, constitutes an apt point of departure in this respect. 
The first chapter is thus devoted to the discussion of a selected number among 
the numerous works that, ever since the 1970s, have enlarged the rich corpus of 
Nigerian Civil War literature. It will be contended that these texts highlight the ex-
istence, both in Nigeria and in runaway Biafra, of a biopolitical hierarchy of prob-
lematic connivances and unexpected oppressions, where sovereign power and pri-
vate interests often mingle to the point of becoming inextricable, even indistin-
guishable. Chapter Two provides a cross-disciplinary reading of war novellas by 
Chris Abani and Uzodinma Iweala, whose unnamed West African conflicts trans-
cend the specifics of the Civil War even as they recall it in many respects. I will 
consider how the depiction of the young combatants who are at the centre of the 
narratives, boys who are both victims and perpetrators, contribute to the heated 
debates regarding the figure of the child soldier and, by means of an in-depth ex-
ploration of questions of agency and responsibility, problematise the post-
industrial Western notion of childhood as a necessarily innocent status. 
As indicated by the title of Part Two, “The Rule,” I will then discuss how 
war – a period of emergency conducive to the supposedly momentary suspension 
of the rule of law – is presented as becoming the rule in the normal abnormality of 
post-war dictatorial Nigeria. The texts studied in this section, while registering the 
process of dehumanisation suffered by the objects of postcolonial terror, highlight 
also the (often ambiguous) strategies of resistance to which they recur notwith-
standing their disenfranchisement. Chapter Three will focus on the aesthetic rep-
resentation of indefinite detention in the autocrat’s overcrowded jail by examining 
texts in which the prison emerges as a metonymy for the Nigeria of the military, a 
site of violence and limited freedoms. In the following chapter, I will then consid-
er novels where the postcolonial dysfunctional family run with a heavy hand by an 
omnipotent paterfamilias may be read as a synecdoche for a fragmented state that is 
similarly characterised by the excesses, or by the uninterested abandonment, of an 
authoritarian sovereign. In this respect, it will be noticed that intergenerational 
conflicts which remain essentially unresolved see the fathers paradoxically repro-
ducing within the private sphere those very same forms of “masculine domina-
tion” (Bourdieu) to which they too are subjected on a national level. 
It thus becomes clear that Nigeria is often presented in contemporary Nige-
rian writing as a locus where the economically disempowered (non-)citizen is ei-
ther reduced to expendable life or, at best, condemned to socio-political and eco-
nomic stasis. Part 3, captioned “Camps on the Move,” recounts the lives of com-
bating women who do not resign themselves to such a condition and rather aspire 
to achieve social and ontological upward mobility within both local and global bi-
opolitical ladders that are founded on the superfluity of those who, like them, oc-
cupy the lower rungs. This last section explores questions of agency and vulnera-
bility as portrayed in three stories of trafficking and smuggling, “narratives of ille-
gality” (Gunning) that suggest that the postcolonial subject’s ambitions of upward 
mobility are often reduced to a horizontal movement between Agambenian 
‘camps,’ between conditions of essential invisibility, and abandonment, before the 
law. The notion of illegality assumes different articulations and different degrees 
of ethical and legal decidability in the texts under consideration here. However, 
what their characters have in common is that they all refuse to be considered 
simply passive victims of exploitation, and rather reassert their agency – either by 
countering the commodification of their bodies, or by attempting to manipulate 
such a commodification to their own advantage. 
The depiction of the postcolonial perpetual exception produces an image of 
Nigeria as an expansive ‘war-scape’ where happiness – and on occasions, mere 
survival – is often configured as a daily struggle in which the subject is forced to 
take up arms, either metaphorically or factually, in order to resist the dehumanis-
ing powers of the sovereign. The term ‘war-scape’ is borrowed from US ethnog-
rapher Carolyn Nordstrom’s 1997 A Different Kind of War Story, her ethnography of 
the Mozambican conflict. Elaborated on Arjun Appadurai’s notion of ‘eth-
noscape,’ Nordstrom’s coinage is there employed to illustrate the interaction be-
tween the local and the global in the development of war situations. The neolo-
gism does not only refer to material translocal processes of movement of people 
and goods, but also, and importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, to the 
continual negotiations of meaning to which the realities of war are conducive, and 
which determine a “cultural construction of conflict that is continually reconfig-
ured across time and space” (37). This concept, Nordstrom argues, allows “to 
transcend individual expressions of the war in particular locales, to understand the 
creation of a culture of war throughout Mozambique” (39, emphasis added).  
Although aware of the risks of essentialising the specificities of both collec-
tive and individual experiences of suffering, I would argue that the “culture of 
war” Nordstrom writes about can be fruitfully read as a peculiarity of the African 
postcolonial existence at large, since, as Ato Quayson warns, 
[w]ar, the ultimate culture of impunity, is only an exacerbation of what is essentially 
an endemic form of social disorder whose spasmodic expressions can be glimpsed 
in the violent land seizures in Zimbabwe today, the chaotic violence on the streets 
of Lagos, and the pillage of natural resources in Sierra Leone, Angola, and other 
places. (Quayson, Calibrations 73) 
Nordstrom’s ‘war-scape’ can thus be expanded as a signifier to include the physi-
cal and metaphysical consequences of the excesses of postcolonial power, and will 
be employed here to identify the aforementioned trend in contemporary Nigerian 
writing, where an imaginary of unending conflict is produced  through the repre-
sentation of the postcolony, and of the postcolonial subject, as locked in a condi-
tion of perpetual exception.  
The Nigerian war-scapes portrayed in the works I will discuss testify to the 
failure of the postcolonial state – or rather, they disclose the overlapping econo-
mies of violence apparently embedded in the history of a (dys)functional, or con-
sistently chaotic, state. Although more or less explicitly considering the causes and 
potential responses to the socio-political crises that have troubled Nigeria since its 
birth, these texts place particular emphasis on the actual consequences that such 
an instability has on the day-to-day existences, on the humanity, of the men and 
women who are caught in the ensuing culture of violence. This dissertation will 
thus investigate images of the human subjected to, but also conniving with, multi-
farious forms of oppression and exploitation. At the same time, it will identify the 
complex, and at times controversial or contradictory, patterns of resistance to bru-
talisation that these narratives tentatively offer as a means to reassert the charac-
ters’ humanity. 
As suggested above, with the exception of the first chapter, this study will 
predominantly concentrate on contemporary fiction writing, and in particular  on 
the works of authors such as Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, Chris Abani, Uzodin-
ma Iweala, Helon Habila, Chika Unigwe and Sefi Atta – all of whom are repre-
sentative voices of what is commonly referred to as ‘third-generation’ Nigerian lit-
erature. These writers have been garnering increasingly appreciative reception in 
the last decade, their texts being part of a rapidly growing corpus of new-
millennium Nigerian fiction that has been almost immediately canonised, particu-
larly in international circuits, and that, because of its challenging breadth, variety 
and beauty, is often perceived as a meaningful template for initiating an inquiry in-
to the field of contemporary African writing (cf. Adesanmi and Dunton “Nigeria’s 
Third Generation” 14-15). Their predecessors – first-generation writers such as 
Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka, Flora Nwapa and Cyprian Ekwensi, as well as 
slightly younger, second-generation writers such as Buchi Emecheta, Femi Oso-
fisan, Festus Iyayi and Niyi Osundare – began to publish their works respectively 
in the period around the country’s independence and during the 1970s. While all 
of them were born into the colonial event, the formative years of second-
generation writers “were mostly shaped by independence and its aftermath of dis-
illusionment and stasis” (Adesanmi and Dunton 14). By such a generational ac-
count, third-generation African literature comprises instead those authors whom 
Djiboutian writer Abdourahman Waberi has called, with a famous formulation, 
“the children of the postcolony”: born after 1960, the emblematic year of African 
independence, their texts began to appear in the mid-1980s – a literary production 
that, in the Nigerian context, was at least for a decade characterised by the domi-
nance of the poetic medium (Adesanmi and Dunton 8). 
This genealogical terminology, which has achieved widespread authority in 
literary criticism, might certainly “lose coherence and lapse into pointillistic ab-
surdity when examined too closely” (Kurtz 24). Nevertheless, it does retain some 
usefulness when deployed to systematise certain aesthetic and thematic trends 
broadly characterising each generation’s production. Critics have generally empha-
sised, for example, that third-generation texts, “born into the scopic regime of the 
postcolonial and the postmodern” (Adesanmi and Dunton 15), exhibit a common 
tendency to avoid counter-discursive aesthetics in favour of textualities which of-
ten assume transnational, on occasions even post-national, contours. Other dis-
tinctive aspects detected in contemporary Nigerian writing include the backward-
looking thematisation of the recent and less recent traumas of the civil war and of 
the dictatorial regimes of the 1980s and 1990s, alongside the fact that these au-
thors labour under a certain “anxiety of influence,” determined by the awareness 
of the long shadows cast by those giants of Nigerian literature who preceded them 
(Kurtz 25). 
Of course, as Harry Garuba has noticed, the messy, if unavoidable, business 
of literary categorisation, while helpful insofar as it provides an interpretive para-
digm that enables strategic generalisation, produces temporal labels which are de-
scriptive rather than prescriptive, and which must in fact be continuously chal-
lenged, the porousness of their boundaries inviting continuous revision, “their re-
versibility inscribed, as it were, at the heart of their making” (“Unbearable Light-
ness” 51). And this is not only, or not so much, due to the fact that individual col-
locations within a strict generational paradigm often remain uncertain,1 but also to 
the awareness that in certain cases it is more useful to recognise common orienta-
tions, rather than concentrating on ruptures, between generations. In particular, 
within the context of Nigerian Civil War fiction, which is what most interests me 
for the purposes of this dissertation, the aforementioned generational differentia-
tion is best substituted in favour of an analytical framework subsuming first- and 
second-generation writers’ war literature under a sole category. As all of these 
writers were adults or young adults when hostilities broke out, their production 
can be analysed along comparable lines, as the different degrees of fictional elabo-
                                               
1 A writer such as John Munonye, for example, is difficult to classify along strict genera-
tional lines: born in 1929, he “qualifies by his age and experience to be classified with the 
older generation except that the bulk of his works were written and published only after 
the Civil War” (Osofisan, “The Alternative Tradition” 174). 
ration and aesthetic success it exhibits do not strictly depend on the individual 
writer’s age or on the chronological distance from the war but rather on the craft 
of each author and on his/her ability to master a traumatic subject matter after 
achieving a certain degree of emotional detachment from it (Feuser, “Nigeria’s 
Civil War in Fiction” 150; Nwahunanya, “Aesthetics”).  
This study will thus not adopt a generational categorisation, and will rather 
refer to the war literature that has been published in the 1970s and early 80s as a 
coherent, if multi-faceted, ‘first-wave’ production. As will be noticed in Chapter 
One, after a decade of relative silence in the 1990s, this first-wave production has 
been followed by a second wave at the turn of the century – a turn that has coin-
cided, amongst other things, with the end of military despotism and with the re-
turn of the genre of the novel to the forefront of Nigerian literature (Adesanmi 
and Dunton 9; see Chapter 1.1). 
The theoretical premises on which this dissertation is founded owe much to the 
endeavour of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, and in particular to his anal-
yses of the state of exception and of the biopolitical hold of the sovereign on 
those homines sacri who are reduced to “bare life” in a modernity of oxymoronic 
perpetual emergency. In his seminal Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
Agamben revises the Foucauldian discussion of bio-power as a practice of state 
discipline marking the transition to modernity. Foucault has famously written that, 
starting from the 17th century, the traditional, ‘negative’ right of the sovereign “to 
take life or let live” when its own survival was in danger was replaced by a regula-
tory, positive “power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Sexuality 
138). The “controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and 
the adjustment of the phenomena of population” thereby ensuing constituted in-
dispensable aspects of the development of capitalism (141), and it was in this con-
text, Foucault explains, that “for the first time in history […] biological existence was 
reflected in political existence” (142, emphasis added). Man, who had been for 
millennia the Aristotelian “living animal with additional capacity for a political ex-
istence,” became thus “an animal whose politics places his existence as a living be-
ing in question” (143). 
Albeit not denying the increased biopoliticisation of modern life, Agamben, 
differently from Foucault, contends that biological life and the political have al-
ways been essentially integrated – so much so that it can even be maintained that 
“the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power” (Homo Sacer 6). 
In other words, he argues that sovereignty is not simply, as Carl Schmitt had de-
fined it, a power external to the law that decides on the exception, thereby sus-
pending law itself. On the contrary, it is the exceptional structure through which 
law refers to life and includes it in itself through its own suspension (28). The 
form of life that is thus produced by the sovereign is called “bare life” by Agam-
ben, and is described as a politicised zone of indistinction that does not conform 
to either ideas of life as retrieved in ancient, and in particular Aristotelian, philos-
ophy: Agamben’s bare life is neither zoē, biological life, nor bios, “the form or way 
of living proper to an individual or group” within the context of the polis (1). Bare 
life, Agamben insists, is rather a form of life that is produced whenever zoē is sepa-
rated from bios, and bios calls zoē into question. It is a life that is simultaneously in-
side and outside the realm of the political, with which it is in a relation of inclusive 
exclusion, of sovereign abandonment, relegated to a space where it is at the con-
stant mercy of sovereign violence. In order to explore the nature of this “bare 
life,” or “life exposed to death” (88), that “constitutes the first content of sover-
eign power” (83), Agamben’s analysis focuses on an obscure figure of Roman law, 
homo sacer, which designated a human being who, having committed a serious 
crime, could not be sacrificed and yet may be killed with impunity. Simultaneously 
excluded from human and divine law, homo sacer is therefore the emblem of the 
human exposed to sovereign exception: because “the sovereign sphere is the 
sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without 
celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life […] is the life that has been captured in this 
sphere” (83). 
Agamben further argues that since modern politics has increasingly turned 
into biopolitics, in parallel with the process by which the exception, as Walter 
Benjamin had predicted, has become the rule (“Theses” 257), late modernity is an 
age in which the founding, intimate relationship linking the sovereign and the bio-
political body has been brought to the fore with extreme, dramatic clarity: in 
Agamben’s words, “our age is that of an unsacrificeable life that has nevertheless 
become capable of being killed to an unprecedented degree” (114). It is in this 
sense that it can be stated that “we are all virtually homines sacri” (115): indeed, 
“[w]hen life and politics – originally divided, and linked together by means of the 
no-man’s land of the state of exception that is inhabited by bare life – begin to be-
come one, all life becomes sacred and all politics becomes the exception” (148). In 
this context, the totalitarian states of 20th-century Europe constitute exemplary 
sites of biopolitical power – a power that has become exclusively thanatopolical – 
while the camp emerges as the hidden matrix of contemporary politics: it is, 
Agamben writes, “the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space (insofar as 
it is founded solely on the state of exception) […], whose metamorphoses and 
disguises we will have to learn to recognize” (123). 
I believe that the Agambenian paradigm offers invaluable resources for in-
terpreting the history, and the aesthetic representation, of the Nigerian postcolony 
– and, for that matter, of a contemporaneity that has all too often seen the violent 
resurgence of a sovereign power that was too quickly declared dead, or dying, on 
the part of hasty analysts. All the same, the literature under scrutiny in this study 
has confirmed that the critic must be ready to contest, or at least complete, some 
of its most generalising contentions. 
In particular, it seems to me that the texts tend to dispute Agamben’s de-
scription of the world of the exception as a polarised one, inhabited by the sover-
eign and its counterpart, in the form of a bare life that is the de-politicised out-
come of its originary biopolitical activity. Such a depiction is for example compli-
cated by the paradoxical alliance between sovereign and non-sovereign actors in 
the exercise of forms of biopolitical and pseudo-biopolitical violence against spe-
cific groups defined along ethnic, class and gender lines. It is therefore no coinci-
dence that Cameroonian scholar Achille Mbembe, one of the major theorists of 
the postcolonial state, has provided an extensive definition of sovereignty. Dis-
tancing himself from traditional accounts based on the Westphalian state-nation-
territory triad, Mbembe “assumes that the ultimate expression of sovereignty re-
sides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and 
who must die” (“Necropolitics” 11). As he has asserted elsewhere, it is indeed es-
sential to remember that in the context of the postcolony thanato-power is often 
diffracted at all levels of society by means of violent practices which are conducive 
to “a confusion between power and fact, […] public affairs and private govern-
ment” (“At the Edge” 260).  
Moreover, the literary corpus of this dissertation seems to resist Agamben’s 
depiction of the subject reduced to bare life as inherently passive, or rather ‘pas-
sivized,’ by presenting the reader with multifarious forms of political agency – ei-
ther resistant or affirmative – that are enacted on the part of presumably de-
politicised subjects. This is an aspect that does not seem to be contemplated, let 
alone presented as potentially effective, within the Agambenian discourse on bare 
life. Indeed, if we intend bare life as an expendable life that has been banned from 
the domains of the legal and the political, then it remains to be explained how 
these non-citizens can, on occasions, manifest forms of social and political agency. 
In what follows, it will be noticed that subjects can (attempt to) contest the very 
original activity of the sovereign, its very right to decide on the lives of its subjects. 
Even more interestingly, first-wave authors have often imagined processes of po-
liticisation of bare life – examples of which could be, as will be seen, Ken Saro-
Wiwa’s Sozaboy’s claims of inclusion within the human family, or the sneers of 
Achebe’s starving refugees. 
It is debatable whether these characters’ actions are effective in questioning 
the biopolitical violence that, Agamben contends, lies at the basis of sovereign ac-
tivity, or whether they, in the final analysis, do not, in fact cannot counter the in-
evitable production of those encamped sites that are created in the state of excep-
tion. As William Walters has put it, talking about the small acts of de facto or “in-
formal citizenship” (Sassen) through which migrants often manage to constitute 
themselves as political agents, followers of Agamben would probably point out 
that such agonistic expressions of agency, while on occasions successful, ultimate-
ly do not dismantle the logic of sovereign power, in that they “do not necessarily 
challenge the space of the camp but […] merely reshape the lines which define it” 
(“Mapping” 204). However, he continues, the appreciation of such acts of affir-
mation, even when not heroic, or radical, has the potential to reveal that “the sov-
ereign lines associated with the camp are more mutable that otherwise might be 
assumed” (206). Judith Butler, herself very much indebted to Agamben’s theorisa-
tions, has similarly observed that forms of performative resistance and affirmation 
such as these do not find easy collocation within the Agambenian (and, for that 
matter, the Arendtian) paradigm and call for the development of a new language 
capable to describe them (Butler and Spivak, Who Sings 62), while at the same in-
viting to oppose any “unacceptable juridical restriction on the political” as simply 
co-terminous with citizenship status (39).2 
The texts under consideration here often resist the seemingly apocalyptic 
tones of certain Agambenian assumptions, leaving space for some forms of re-
sistance in the face of tyranny even when they do not present them as simplistical-
ly successful, let alone decisive. Their characters’ fights do not necessarily suggest 
the need to move into that post-biopolitical world that, for Agamben, is necessari-
ly post-sovereign, and is the only site from where a solution to the historical im-
passe in which our late modernity is currently caught can be imagined. And in-
deed, as Butler has pointed out, it is by no means certain that such a post-
                                               
2 Jenny Edkins and Véronique Pin-Fat have argued that the sole strategies for displacing 
the logic of sovereign power lie either in the refusal of drawing any distinction between 
zoē and bios or in the complementary acceptance of bare life, whereby the subject de-
mands recognition of his/her status as nothing but bare life. Their reading, although ex-
tremely fascinating, is also discouraging, as the examples illustrated to explain its work-
ings are so extreme, or heroic (such as for example the phenomenon of lip sewing among 
asylum seekers) as to raise doubts regarding their feasibility. 
sovereign order is possible, let alone desirable (Who Sings). However, through their 
depictions of the brutal victories of the sovereign, and of their consequences, as 
well as of the tiny successes of its subjects, these works do highlight the need to 
reformulate the categories through which we think of the human, of sovereign 
power, and of the relationship between the two. In so doing, they point at the fact 
that these redefinitions must be accompanied  by the urgent task of rethinking 
human rights discourse as such – a discourse whose legal articulation has too of-
ten proved incapable of protecting human beings from sovereign, as well as non-
sovereign, abuses. So, if they certainly call for a reconfiguration of human rights, 
highlighting many of its founding paradoxes, at the same time they do not (always) 
seem to share Agamben’s scepticism about human rights as a mystification that, 
by positing as object of protection that same bare life that is the first content of 
sovereignty, shares a “secret solidarity” with the powers it seeks to oppose (Homo 
Sacer 133). 
Doubts such as those just outlined suggest that future engagement with 
Agamben’s oeuvre should perhaps be more careful than has so far been. Still, it is 
undoubted that certain concepts, as developed in his political philosophy, have 
proved extremely useful for the analysis of the texts discussed here. For example, 
it will be noticed that traces of Agamben’s morphic ‘camp,’ as the archetypal lo-
cale of modern biopolitics, can be found in different guises in contemporary Nige-
rian writing. Chronotopes such as refugee camps, the prison under despotic rule 
or the metropolitan slum – peripheral topologies at the centre of many of the texts 
under discussion here – although of course exhibiting different degrees of similari-
ty with the historical phenomenon of the concentration camp, similarly epitomise 
the entrenched reality which originates when the exception becomes the rule.  
The Nigerian postcolony is indeed represented in contemporary Nigerian 
literature as a reality that is turning into one of Achille Mbembe’s “death-worlds” 
(“Necropolitics,” 40) – namely, zones where the central project of sovereignty is 
“the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human 
bodies and populations” (14). In other words, the diffuse presence and “necropower” 
of the morphing, opposing “war machines” (Deleuze and Guattari 351-423) 
which will be encountered in these works are not only conducive to, but, more 
importantly, founded on, an axiom asserting the expendable nature of (certain 
forms of) human life. 
In the introduction to their edited volume The Politics of Memory, Ifi Amadiume and 
Abdullahi An-Na’im comment on the importance of the Biafran tragic débâcle 
within the context of Africa’s modernity. “[T]he first expression of massive suffer-
ing inflicted on society by an internal African war” (2), the Civil War has emerged 
as an early symbol of internecine postcolonial conflict, emblematic in that it fol-
lowed Nigerian independence from British rule by less than seven years, resulting 
in the death of estimated one to three million people before its conclusion, in Jan-
uary 1970. Writing in 2000, the editors noticed that the war had paradoxically sunk 
into oblivion in contemporary political discourse. This was a consequence, 
amongst other things, of the post-war governmental invitation to forgive (or ra-
                                               
 Indeed, as Catherine Mills clearly puts it, “for Agamben the camp is a topological figure. 
Rather than describing and delimiting a particular locale, the camp reveals an abstract log-
ic that is by no means limited to the geographical space of internment” (90). 
ther forget) the events of Biafra as the only means to achieve reconciliation (Ama-
diume 41). And yet, Amadiume and An-Na’im add, “30 years later, the ghost of 
Biafra haunts the discourse on social justice and national security in Nigeria” (3) – 
a country that today, more than fifty years after its independence, is torn apart by 
many of the causes that led to the outbreak of the hostilities in 1967. Returning to 
the traumatic past in order to acknowledge, if not exorcise, the haunting of the 
Nigerian Civil War is therefore the responsibility of the intellectual interested in 
countering the “politics of amnesia and selective memory” promoted by much 
post-war governmental policy (Amadiume 41), so as to find a way to “truth, heal-
ing and social justice” (54). The lack of political closure regarding the Nigerian 
Civil War is confirmed, for Amadiume, by the fact that “the unvoiced suffering of 
trauma continues to surface on at critical moments” (41) – a thesis which has been 
recently confirmed by the words of neo-elected President Goodluck Jonathan, 
who in April 2011 described the sectarian violence which followed his appoint-
ment as a “sad reminder” of the political unrest that, decades before, had led to 
the Civil War (BBC News). 
The Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970, also known as the Nigeria-Biafra War, 
began after the unilateral declaration of independence of the former Eastern Re-
gion of Nigeria, which seceded from the federation in the belief that the safety of 
its – predominantly Igbo – population could not be guaranteed in a united coun-
try. The years since independence had been extremely turbulent, as “the federal 
system that had solidified regional divisions in the 1950s devolved into utter dys-
function” (Falola and Heaton 165). The contest among the major political parties 
had assumed indeed a highly confrontational dimension both at the regional and 
the federal levels, reaching critical proportions during the fraudulent 1962-1963 
censuses and, even more, in the following years, when the partially boycotted elec-
tions of 1964 and 1965 were held in a climate of fear, obstruction and intimida-
tion.4 It is no wonder that the coup d’etat of January 15, 1966, when Prime Minis-
ter Tafawa Balewa was killed, alongside two regional premiers and a number of 
northern military officers, was initially welcomed by the majority of the popula-
tion, whose expectations about the democratic process had been bitterly disap-
pointed. However, the central role played by Igbo officers during the killings and 
in the following months corroborated the alarmed views that had emerged in 
many Northern quarters, where the coup had been interpreted as an Igbo attempt 
to seize power. This fomented strong anti-Igbo sentiment in a country that, no 
doubt also as a consequence of the “divide-and-rule” colonial policy which had 
strategically institutionalised and sanctified ethnic diversity (Amuta, “The Nigerian 
Civil War” 87), had thus far been characterised by entrenched regionalism and 
widespread, reciprocal fears of ethnic “domination” (Falola and Heaton 165). In 
the July counter-coup that followed, the Igbo Head of State Aguiyi Ironsi was 
captured and murdered along with numerous Igbo officers, and Lieutenant Colo-
nel Yakubu Gowon succeeded him as supreme commander of the armed forces 
and new head of state.  
Meanwhile, the Igbo and the other easterners who resided in the North had 
been the target of violent attacks which reached an unprecedented peak in Sep-
tember, when they led to the death of estimated thousands, arousing also minor 
                                               
4 These events suggests that, even as the Nigerian Civil War no doubt constitutes an em-
blematic moment, both symbolically and factually, within Nigeria’s history of exceptional 
rule, it is by no means obvious that prior to the events of 1966 constitutional protection 
was intact, or even meaningful, in a country born into the exception of colonial rule. This 
aspect is hinted at in many of the texts taken into consideration here (see in particular 
Chapter Three).  
revenge killings of northerners who lived in the Eastern Region (Stremlau 38). 
When, on May 30, 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, up till then 
the governor of the Eastern Region, unilaterally declared the independence of the 
newly founded “Republic of Biafra,” Gowon’s government proclaimed the state 
of emergency in Nigeria and imposed an embargo on the runaway region. What 
was meant to be a quick “police action” to regain control of the oil-rich eastern 
area turned into a thirty-month-long “total war” (Gowon, qtd. in Uwechue 8) and 
resulted in heavy casualties, concentrated in particular on the Biafran side as a 
consequence of the economic blockade imposed on a progressively shrinking en-
clave. The humanitarian crisis that followed was so devastating that it earned Bia-
fra wide international sympathies on the part of both non-governmental and gov-
ernmental organisations.5 Despite its notable resilience, the defeat of the Republic 
of Biafra proved inevitable, and on January 10, 1970, Ojukwu fled to the Ivory 
Coast “in search of peace” (qtd. in Odogwu 169). Two days later, Major General 
Philip Efiong announced Biafra’s surrender.  
International observers writing in the months that followed tended to agree 
that the aftermath of the war, generally speaking, was “bloodless” and “merciful” 
(de St. Jorre 404). Gowon declared a general amnesty, claiming that there was no 
“victor” nor “vanquished” in what must be considered a “war of brothers” (qtd. 
in Osaghae 69).6 Even as it is undoubted that “several ethnic and regional fissures 
                                               
5 Four African states (Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Zambia) even recognised Biafra 
in 1968, while Haiti’s recognition followed 1989 (Stremlau 127-141). As John Stremlau 
notices, diplomatic recognition did not result in the establishment of normal diplomatic 
relations (128) and should be “best regarded as one more indication of the rising interna-
tional anxiety over the fate of the Ibo people rather than as any endorsement of Biafran 
secession” (141). 
6 In this respect, however, in a polemical passage of his controversial 2012 war memoir, 
There Was a Country, Achebe has written: “There are many international observers who 
continued to exist” in Nigeria, they were temporarily marginalised in the 1970s 
due to the rapid expansion of the petroleum industry, Nigeria’s blessing and curse 
(Falola and Heaton 181). Shortly after the war, Gowon announced that the coun-
try would return to civilian rule within two years, but the state of emergency pro-
claimed in 1966 would not be lifted until 1979, when the new constitution signal-
ling the establishment of the Second Republic was signed into law (Osaghae 95). 
Gowon had been in the meantime removed from power in the 1975 bloodless 
coup that had initiated the so-called Mohammed/Obasanjo regime. 
The short-lived Second Republic exhibited more continuities than disconti-
nuities with the previous military regimes, as it was characterised by “corruption, 
mismanagement of funds, and blatant disregard for the democratic process” (Fa-
lola and Heaton 208). As had happened in 1966, the discontent of civil society be-
gan to be voiced in an apparently paradoxical invocation of military intervention. 
The coup d’etat of December 31, 1983, which ended the Second Republic and 
brought General Muhammadu Buhari to power, ushered in a fifteen-year-long era 
of military rule that reasserted the army’s political hegemony in the country. As 
Marcella Emiliani has noticed, not only had the military acquired such an authority 
that they could pose themselves above law and politics, but “politics itself […] 
was by now becoming an inherently military business” (125, my translation).7 The 
                                                                                                                                     
believe that Gowon’s actions after the war were magnanimous and laudable. There are 
tons of treatises that talk about how the Igbo were wonderfully integrated into Nigeria. 
Well, I have news for them: the Igbo were not and continue not to be reintegrated into 
Nigeria, one of the main reasons for the country’s continued backwardness, in my estima-
tion” (235). A similar contention had been made by Achebe some time before in an arti-
cle titled “The Genocidal Biafran War Still Haunts Nigeria,” which appeared in online 
edition of The Guardian newspaper on October 2, 2012 and which has predictably trig-
gered a veritable cyber-war on many Nigerian websites (see Verissimo). 
7 For an analysis of the militarisation of Nigerian life, see Agozino. 
end of the Second Republic, in other words, confirmed that “[m]ilitary coups and 
military rule (which began as an emergency aberration) [had become] a seemingly 
permanent feature of Nigerian politics” (Siollun 11). 
During Muhammadu Buhari’s dictatorship, after the suspension and modifi-
cation of sections of the 1979 constitution, a series of decrees were adopted that, 
by legitimating any abuse of power – including detention without trial for virtually 
any reason – paved the way for the flourishing of the successive military regimes 
(see Emiliani 129-130). The years of General Ibrahim Babangida’s and General 
Sani Abacha’s dictatorships are indeed remembered as some of the bleakest of 
Nigerian history. Babangida’s supposed commitment to democratic transition 
turned out to be, once again, an unending process which, continuously postponed, 
manipulated and distorted, ultimately seemed to have the only, “circular” aim of 
consolidating what turned out to be a eight-year-long rule, in the tradition that 
Achille Mbembe has recognised as peculiar of (post)colonial commandement (Postcol-
ony 32). The June 1993 presidential elections that should have led to the (in fact 
abortive) Third Republic were de facto annulled by the Babangida junta. Most his-
torians, however, read this event as one that, while thwarting all hopes of demo-
cratic transition in the country, also preluded the imminent end of the dictator’s 
rule. Indeed, in the great unrest that followed the elections, Nigeria appeared to be 
on the brink of anarchy (Falola and Heaton 277) – so much so that not even Ba-
bangida’s apparatus of state suppression proved sufficient to quell the revolts.8 
The spectre of Biafra reappeared with insistence when many activists, particularly 
in the West and in the East, began to threaten secession from the federation if the 
                                               
8 His impotency was confirmed by the dictator’s tragicomic threats to proclaim the state 
of emergency in many areas of the country (Osaghae 257). 
election results were not restored. It was in this context that the dictator agreed to 
hand power to an Interim Governing Council. The latter, however, was soon dis-
solved at the hands of General Sani Abacha, who proclaimed himself head of state 
and was to become the bloodiest dictator of Nigeria’s postcolonial history. 
The events of the post-war context that have been sketched so far provide 
clear evidence of the process which slowly transformed the Nigerian postcolony 
into a country of virtually continual exception, with the figure of the violent mili-
tary autocrat becoming the ultimate embodiment of a form of absolute sovereign-
ty. As Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare have effectively put it, 
From [the 1966 coup onwards], a specific form of local politicised violence – not un-
related to, even if sometimes in opposition to, the old metropolitan and now neo-
colonial apparatuses of political violence – re-defined itself as an elaborate instru-
ment of organising for and against power. […] Whether that violence consolidates, 
re-establishes or attempts to break existing violence; whether it is practised as a 
military coup or counter-coup, a civil uprising or ethno-regional, interethnic, inter-
faith or political violent clashes, hegemonic or counter-hegemonic suppression, 
oppression or revolt, pro-democratic, student and workers’ riots or election vio-
lence, police killings, pogrom, rebellion or civil war, Nigeria has become a perma-
nent state of emergencies with hardly any means, method, or institutions for efficiently 
addressing emergencies beyond more violence. (“Introducing” 391) 
The Abacha regime was emblematic in this sense, as it reached such unparalleled 
levels of suppression of dissent that the country found itself increasingly isolated 
from the international community. The event which is remembered, both in Nige-
ria and abroad, as epitomising Abacha’s utter disregard for justice and human 
rights is of course the execution of writer and minority rights activist Ken Saro-
Wiwa. Saro-Wiwa had been the founder, in 1990, of the Movement for the Sur-
vival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), an organisation which campaigns non-
violently against the pervasive environmental damages caused by oil extraction in 
the area of the Niger Delta. On November 10, 1995, he was hanged alongside 
eight other fellow dissidents for their alleged implication in the killing of four pro-
government Ogoni leaders (Cayford). However, the sanctions imposed on Nigeria 
on the part of the international community following Saro-Wiwa’s death were so 
inadequate that, rather than stimulating a democratising response on the part of 
the regime under attack, they evidenced the weakness of its international counter-
parts (Emiliani 279). Similarly to what had happened during Babangida’s rule, the 
scheduled procedure for the transition to democracy, which should have begun in 
1994, was not being respected, and the sham transition to civilian rule that would 
have led to Abacha being presumably re-elected as the single presidential candi-
date was prevented by his untimely death from an apparent heart attack on June 8, 
1998. 
Power was finally transferred back to a civilian administration in 1999, when 
former military ruler Olusegun Obasanjo became president after severely flawed 
elections. His controversial two-term presidency, while garnering undoubted suc-
cesses at the international level (Alli), has been widely criticised by a number of 
scholars who have argued that this period, expected to lay solid foundations for a 
renewed democracy, is in fact responsible for the stage of suspended democratisa-
tion in which the country is apparently stuck. Said Adejumobi, for example, has 
observed that the “culture of executive impunity” that characterised the Obasanjo 
regime led to the continuous accumulation of power in the hands of a president 
who “became the fulcrum of policies, decisions, actions, and virtually all matters 
of state” (7). More vitriolic analyses, commenting on the autocratic decay of the 
last years of his tenure,9 have gone so far as to emphasise the “astonishing and 
                                               
9 On the occasion of the race for presidency in 2007, Obasanjo was indeed at the centre 
of a fierce controversy as a bill was introduced in the federal legislature for the purpose 
of amending the 1999 constitution so as to allow him to run for a third presidency. The 
chilling similarities between the end of the Abacha inquisition and the tail end of 
the Obasanjo dispensation,” once again indicting the worrisome erosion of demo-
cratic governance in favour of a process where the “normalisation of the abnor-
mal” has taken place (Williams). Femi Falana, amongst others, has noticed that the 
credibility of the Obasanjo administration ebbed also as a consequence of an 
alarmingly poor human rights record, with extrajudicial killings and cases of brutal 
political assassination committed at the hands of the numerous formal and infor-
mal war machines competing for the monopoly of violence in post-military Nige-
ria. A still powerful army, ethnic militias, killing squads hired by prominent politi-
cians, the police: all of these forces have contributed to generating a widespread 
sense of insecurity, fear and latent violence that, Falana suggests, is discernible in 
many areas of the country (see Falana, esp. 134 ff.). 
The appointment of Umaru Yar’Adua as president in 2007, once again after 
massively rigged elections, was nonetheless significant in that it signalled the first 
transfer of power from civilian to civilian in the country. Yet, the post-military era 
has seen the resurgence of  “inter-ethnic and inter-faith low-intensity wars” 
(Adebanwi, “Contesting” 13) that have manifested themselves also in the form of 
terrorist attacks by the jihadist terrorist organisation Boko Haram – a fact that tes-
tifies to the still fractured nature of Nigerian society, where the spectre of the 
emergency represents a palpable threat that, on many occasions, has become, 
again, reality.10 Governmental unaccountability, corruption and power abuses, 
                                                                                                                                     
bill was ultimately not ratified and Obasanjo stepped down from office after the 2007 
elections. Obasanjo has rejected all accusations of being implicated in the so-called 
“Third term agenda,” but the event has received mixed interpretations. 
10 After the transition to democracy, the state of emergency has been proclaimed on sev-
eral occasions in certain states of the federation. Obasanjo declared it in May 2004 (Plat-
eau State), in October 2006 and April 2007 (Ekiti State). President Goodluck Jonathan, 
alongside the extreme poverty of the majority of the putative citizens of Nigeria, 
who have little or no access to infrastructural, medical and educational facilities, 
are only some of the socio-political issues that keep on plaguing the federation 
and that are captured in much contemporary Nigerian literature. This suggests the 
need to be aware of the complex history of the country when reading the beautiful 
literature through which the aforementioned writers describe the failures and resil-
ience, the connivances and humanity of those people who, like their fellow coun-
trymen and women, are forced to live in the exception. If it is true that the Nigeri-
an Civil War “remains perhaps the greatest signifier of what many assume to be 
the irreconcilable nature of the world views and the aspirations of the component 
parts of the Nigerian union” (Adebanwi and Obadare, “Introducing” 392), then 
its imaginative representation and metamorphic reconfiguration in this recent 
writing speaks of a sore that is still bleeding, and of expansive “war-scapes” whose 
biopolitical logic demands to be addressed. 
Writing in the aftermath of the Second World War, Hannah Arendt famously de-
clared that the horrific events that had occurred in totalitarian Europe had sanc-
tioned “the end of the Rights of Man” (Totalitarianism 267). The massive denatu-
ralisations that followed the Great War had shown how the supposedly inalienable 
‘natural’ rights, to which a human being should be entitled for the sole reason of 
being human, “proved to be unenforceable […] whenever people appeared who 
                                                                                                                                     
Yar’Ardua’s successor, after the escalation of religious tensions that took place in De-
cember 2011, declared the emergency in certain Local Government Areas of the Borno, 
Yobe, Plateau and Niger States. The emergency was lifted in July 2012. 
were no longer citizens of any sovereign state” (293). Not only were apatrides and 
refugees not granted the protection of any ‘human’ right as such; it also became 
apparent that the human being deprived of political status, the “man who is noth-
ing but a man,” was destined to lose “the very qualities which ma[de] it possible 
for other people to treat him as a fellow-man” (300).11 In Arendt’s formulation, 
[w]e became aware of the existence of a right to have rights […] and a right to belong 
to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who 
had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situa-
tion. (296-297, emphasis added) 
Arendt writes that such a “right to have rights,” a concept she glosses as “the right 
of every individual to belong to humanity” (298), is one that may be guaranteed 
only by a cosmopolitan community (or rather, by “humanity itself”). However, 
she is quick to warn, “[i]t is by no means certain whether this is possible” (298). 
Arendt thus couples her commentary on the decline of the nation-state with 
strong scepticism about a ‘world government’ as an ideal allowing the promotion 
and realisation of human rights. Thus, saying that the non-citizens living in the 
world of totalitarianism have no “right to have rights” meant that they were granted 
neither the first ‘right’ of Arendt’s phrase, which evokes a universal “moral imper-
ative,” nor the second, where the term is used in its “juridical-civil” meaning 
(Benhabib 56 ff.). 
Merging discourses on citizenship rights and human rights can be seen as an 
                                               
11 Agamben’s “bare life” is indebted to but does not perfectly overlap with Arendt’s no-
tion of the “abstract nakedness of being human” (Totalitarianism 299) since, as Agamben 
warns, “a biopolitical analysis is altogether lacking” in Arendt’s discussion of the perplexi-
ties of the rights of man (Homo Sacer 4). Arendt’s figure of the stateless human being is 
perhaps closer to what Agamben refers to as zoē. The confusion about the two notions 
that plagues many commentaries on Agamben’s oeuvre derives partially from Agamben’s 
own inconsistencies, as he himself at times seems to conflate the two notions of “bare 
life” and zoē (Mills 75). 
inappropriate analytical operation, as it conflates the categories of the particular 
and of the universal. However, it is still very often the case that “although, under a 
mantle of institutionalized human rights discourse, the rights of the person trans-
cend those of the citizen, they are still realized through membership in a state” 
(Soysal 165). In other words, notwithstanding the current expansive redefinition 
of ‘individual’ rights as ‘human’ rights at the transnational level, and the apparent 
crisis of the Westphalian (nation-)state and of the traditional concept of citizen-
ship under the centrifugal politico-economic forces of globalisation (Falk, “De-
cline”),12 human rights are for the most part implemented at the level of the state, 
an institution that is, paradoxically, “both indispensable and at the same time in 
need of deep repair or transcendence” (Benhabib in Gordon-Zolov 277).13 De-
spite the considerable appeal of the inclusive idea that “every person anywhere in 
the world, irrespective of citizenship or territorial legislation, has some basic 
rights, which others should respect” (Sen 315), yet it cannot be denied that supra-
national protection of human rights is on most occasions still very weak. As the 
works discussed in this dissertation suggest, moreover, it is essential to bear in 
mind that the state often remains one of the most virulent perpetrators of human 
rights abuses against its putative citizens. 
                                               
12 More generally, it must be remembered that this discourse on citizenship and its chang-
ing character refers to an essentially Western experience, which “has not taken existential 
hold in non-Western societies nearly to the extent as have such other quintessential 
Western conceptions as territorial sovereignty, international diplomacy, the rule of law, 
and even human rights” (Falk, “Decline” 6). 
13 As some of the novels studied Chapters 4 and 5 make clear, the resilience of Westpha-
lian citizenship is particularly evident in the control of world mobility, which is still an 
eminently statist prerogative (Falk, Achieving 72). The case of the right to asylum provides 
an emblematic example of this: indeed, even if it is recognised as a human right under Ar-
ticle 14 of the UN Universal Declaration, still “the obligation to grant asylum continues to be 
jealously guarded by states as a sovereign privilege” (Benhabib 69). 
It is in this context that Arendt’s discussion of citizenship and human rights 
provides a valuable insight into the encounters, and confrontations, between the 
(non-)citizens of Nigeria and their country in Nigerian writing. The stories told by 
the authors I analyse in what follows can indeed be broadly read as stories of 
statelessness. And this is not only true of the civil war narratives of Part One, 
where competing claims to state sovereignty leave human beings at the mercy of 
the violence of a neo-hobbesian world; nor is this reading limited to the case of 
the undocumented women whose attempts to find happiness abroad will be stud-
ied in Part Three. On the contrary, it will be shown that also the characters of Part 
Two, who either decide or have no choice but to stay put, are in fact depicted as 
“stateless citizens” – an oxymoronic phrase that I employ to indicate the condi-
tion of de facto statelessness that is born in the perpetual exception where constitu-
tional protection is withdrawn.14 
In other words, it will be shown that the characters of these works, in the 
emergency that turns the postcolony into an all-encompassing camp of limited 
liberties and not-so-porous borders, are presented as if they were apatrides in their 
own country. Although formal members of the postcolonial sovereign state, they 
find themselves in a condition of inclusive exclusion in relation with it, as suggest-
ed by Olufemi Taiwo’s provocative claim that “there are no citizens in Nigeria, we 
only have citizens of Nigeria” (qtd. in Adebanwi, “Contesting” 15). As Obadare 
                                               
14 While some scholars are of the view that a person’s nationality can be ineffective both 
inside and outside of his or her country of nationality, in international law, de facto state-
less persons are generally more restrictively defined as “persons outside the country of 
their nationality who are unable or, for valid reasons, are unwilling to avail themselves of 
the protection of that country” (UNHCR, “Expert meeting” 6). The concept of de facto 
statelessness as employed here is thus obviously not rigorous in legal terms and is rather 
meant to suggest the absence of a state-society compact in postcolonial Nigeria. 
and Adebanwi have stated, the concept of citizenship is in fact ideologically vacu-
ous “in a typically African postcolony” such as Nigeria. Indeed, 
[i]f a “citizen” constitutively lacks the modalities and social instrumentalities of 
demanding egalitarian intervention from the state – as it is understood and as-
sumed to exist – and its apparatuses, institutions, and representations, can we rea-
sonably speak of a state, let alone a state-society compact? (Encountering 10) 
Contemporary Nigerian fiction, thus, illustrates the lives of homines sacri (and 
mulieres sacrae) who, borrowing from Agamben’s description of their Roman ante-
cedents, could be defined as being caught in a double exclusion from the realms 
of both domestic and international law. Unable to lay representational claims to 
effective citizenship rights, they rarely, if ever, manage to find shelter in the uni-
versalistic, and still utopian, frame of “world citizenship” (Archibugi). Therefore, 
as sacred life, they are trapped in a limbo of denied freedoms. What is especially 
important about this literature, however, is that it imagines a humanity that does 
not resign to the nihilistic reduction to “bare life” but attempts, at times through 
informal “acts of citizenship” (Isin and Nielsen), at times by admittedly controver-
sial, apparently self-defeating, or even illegal, expedients, to resist, move beyond 
or, at least, circumvent its own disenfranchisement. In so doing, this literary pro-
duction does not uphold the representation of the disenfranchised Other as an ut-
terly powerless victim in need of Western help that undergirds many Western hu-
manitarian texts. 
As will be shown, the representational strategies employed by contemporary 
authors in order to reveal their characters’ sacredness (and their resistance to it) 
vary a lot on the basis of their thematic interests, stylistic preferences and concep-
tion of the potential agency and politicisation of bare life in the face of sovereign 
violence. While some of them make pervasive use of an animalising rhetoric, oth-
ers resist the stark visualisation of biopolitical violence in favour of other stylistic 
and narratological approaches evidencing the changes that the violence embedded 
in the interlacing war-scapes of Nigeria bring about in their characters’ lives. The 
ambivalent use of spectral, angelical and grotesque imagery in the description of 
violating and violated souls and bodies, for example, are but some of the ways in 
which third-generation authors attempt to respond to the controversial question 
of how it is ethically possible to represent the atrocious consequences of biopoliti-
cal excess on humanity, to narrate the unnarratable (Dawes, That the World May 
Know; Agamben, Remnants).  
In the 2006 PMLA special issue on human rights and the humanities, Sa-
mera Esmeir has critiqued the logic of dehumanisation shared by contemporary 
human rights law and humanist critics alike in referring to the subject who is not 
protected by the law as a ‘de-humanised’ one. As she puts it, by configuring a per-
son’s humanity as a (juridical or ‘existential’) status that, as such, can “be recog-
nized and conferred, or seized and taken away” (1544), these discourses are remi-
niscent of colonial rationalities and might carry with them reductionist “closures 
in thinking the parameters of the human” (1547). Although concurring with 
Esmeir’s preoccupations, I would also argue that, as far as aesthetic representation 
is concerned, hardly are there more effective metaphors than that, for example, of 
metamorphic animalisation to illustrate the condition of rightlessness and legal 
abandonment of the sacred human. 
Agamben has remarked that in the state of exception the life of homo sacer 
constitutes a “threshold of indistinction and of passage between animal and man, 
physis and nomos, exclusion and inclusion.” Indeed, homo sacer is, like the morphing 
werewolf at its origin, “the figure of the man banned by his community” (Homo 
Sacer 105).  
And this lupization of man and humanization of the wolf is at every moment pos-
sible in the dissolutio civitatis inaugurated by the state of exception. [...] The trans-
formation into a werewolf corresponds perfectly to the state of exception, during 
which […] time the city is dissolved and men enter into a zone in which they are 
no longer distinct from beasts. (106-107) 
Rather than upholding a vision that endorses the possibility of ontologically losing 
one’s humanity tout court, the imagery of animalisation employed by some of the 
authors studied here speaks of such a zone of indistinction between opposites, 
where the human is simultaneously included in and excluded from humanity itself. 
Similar force imbues other tropological images, such as those of the ghost and of 
the grotesque body, whose emancipatory potential is inherent in their becoming 
nature, in an only apparently self-defeating hybridity. It is also by imagining fur-
ther metamorphoses of these hybrid figures of bare life that one might begin to 
move beyond them, in an ethical, future-oriented quest which might enable us, if 
not to trace the contours of a post-biopolitical world of lives “over which sover-
eignty and right no longer have any hold” (Agamben, Means 114–15), at least to 
configure new form of sovereignty, new “world borders,” as Homi Bhabha would 
have it (212), capable to look into the interstitial, to intuit and recognise the hu-
manity of those “incommensurable elements” who are “neither One nor the Oth-
er but something else besides, in-between” (219). 
As will be noticed, however, since these ambivalent metaphors of indistinc-
tion are constitutively difficult to master, their ineffective handling can indeed 
compromise the legibility of the admittedly complex representation of the ‘not-
quite-human’ human being, thus falling back into an apparently (neo-)colonial 
epistemological framework.15 Still, I believe that the ethical and aesthetic force of 
these depictions, perhaps at its highest in Chris Abani’s oeuvre, might result in an 
even more fruitful cross-fertilisation of the creative arts and human rights dis-
course. 
The connection between human rights and the humanities, as Domna Stanton has 
remarked in her introduction to the aforementioned PMLA special issue, has a 
long history, which goes back at least to the tradition of Western humanism. 
However, it is undoubted that their pairing in scholarly inquiry is a relatively re-
cent development, one which is “rooted in questions and approaches developed 
over several decades in trauma, postcolonial, holocaust and genocide, and feminist 
studies” and that has been aided in the last decades by two converging phenome-
na, viz the so-called ethical turn in literary studies and the specular narrative turn 
in the social sciences (Swanson Goldberg and Schultheis Moore 2, 4). Many 
commentators have moreover emphasised that this interdisciplinary interest has 
received a boost in the post-Cold War era, and in particular following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks,16 when the US administration’s controversial justifications for 
                                               
15 For example, it is telling that Uzodinma Iweala’s Beasts of No Nation, which will be ana-
lysed in detail in Chapter 2, has been often hailed by Western reviewers and readers as a 
brilliant journey into the late modern African “heart of darkness” (see, for example, 
Maslin “Conscripted”). 
16 Such a heightened interest is confirmed by the number of academic journals that have 
recently devoted special issues to the interdisciplinary study of human rights and the hu-
manities: see for example the already mentioned PMLA 121.5 (2006), “The Humanities 
in Human Rights: Critique, Language, Politics”; Peace Review 20.1 (2008); Comparative Liter-
ature Studies 46.1 (2009), “Human Rights and Literary Forms”; Journal of Human Rights 9.2 
(2010), “Comparative Human Rights: Literature, Art, Politics.”  
waging war in the name of human rights and democracy disclosed with unprece-
dented clarity the ambiguity of the emancipatory rhetoric of human rights – a 
rhetoric that, historically, has been often manipulated and usurped to legitimate 
imperialist aggression.17  
One of the fields of interest within this burgeoning interdiscipline, and one 
which is particularly interesting in the context of this dissertation, regards the role 
played by narrative in shaping human rights laws and ideals and, vice versa, the 
impact that human rights culture has had on literary production and consumption 
since modern times. In his 1997 essay “A Question of Narration: The Voice in In-
ternational Human Rights Law,” Joseph Slaughter, elaborating on Elaine Scarry’s 
assumption that violence has the peculiar power to destroy the speaking subject, 
has argued that a human rights abuse can be characterised as “an infringement of 
the modern subject’s ability to narrate her story” (413). For this reason, human 
rights, and human rights law in particular, “can be productively formulated in 
terms of narrative genres and narrative voices” (407). It is therefore no coinci-
dence that, as Slaughter writes in another context, personal stories of human 
rights violations hold the centre of human rights projects, interposing a third ‘ac-
tor,’ civil society, between the two main actors in the human rights arena – the 
state and the individual (“Foreword” xiii). In other words, as James Dawes has 
succinctly put it, human rights work can be described as “a matter of storytelling” 
(“Human Rights” 394). 
                                               
17 This apparent paradox, as Sophia A. McClennen and Joseph Slaughter, among others, 
have remarked, has an evident precedent in the nineteen-century idea of the civilising 
mission, which cloaked the colonisation of Africa under a guise of edifying progress (3). 
Such an ambivalence might in fact be considered a structural aspect inherent in the En-
lightenment roots of the human rights project. 
The development of an interdisciplinary approach in the study of narrative 
and human rights has led to the production of excellent scholarship that has de-
veloped at the junction among the ethical, the aesthetic, the historical, the political 
and the legal realms. To name but a few areas of inquiry that have proved particu-
larly fertile, one might recall Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith’s exploration of life 
narratives as vehicles for advancing human rights claims in their 2004 Human 
Rights and Narrated Lives. Another aspect that has been widely discussed regards of 
course the questions of the ethics of representation, and of the aestheticization of 
violence, in narratives of atrocity authored either by humanitarian aid workers or 
by artists who are neither witnesses nor survivors – questions that are tackled in 
texts such as James Dawes’s That the World May Know (2007) and Elizabeth Swan-
son Goldberg’s Beyond Terror (2007). The means and practices of “mobilisation of 
empathy” in humanitarian intervention have often been investigated with refer-
ence to narrative production, as confirmed by the 2008 collection of essay Human-
itarianism and Suffering, edited by Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown. 
Again, a number of literary critics, such as for example Alexandra Schultheis in 
her “African Child Soldiers,” have been concerned with the literary reproduction 
of West-centric biases in human rights and humanitarian texts meant to be dis-
tributed in global marketplaces. Others have analysed the relationship between lit-
erary forms and human rights problematics, law and practice – a topic which Jo-
seph Slaughter has masterfully examined in relation to the Bildungsroman genre in 
his 2007 Human Rights, Inc. The normative potentialities of human rights narra-
tives, and of cultural production more generally, to endorse or contest certain 
human rights ideas, has been researched as well, and some scholars, such as histo-
rian Lynn Hunt in her 2007 book Inventing Human Rights, have argued that there 
exists an enabling relationship between the rise of the novel, in particular in its 
sentimental variant, and the emergence of the modern human rights sensibility, 
since the former invited forms of empathic identification that lie at the basis of 
the latter. 
As this study will concentrate predominantly on fiction writing, and specifi-
cally on the novel, I would like to pause for a moment on Joseph Slaughter’s 2007 
book Human Rights, Inc.: The World Novel, Narrative Form, and International Law. In 
this seminal text, Slaughter makes the case that the idealist Bildungsroman is the lit-
erary genre whose conventions most clearly overlap with the normative develop-
mental “plot” of human rights law which, as stated in the 1948 Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, aims at achieving the “free and full development” of the 
human personality (Art. 29). The author contends that by fictionalising the incor-
poration of the marginal individual into the rights and duties of citizenship, this 
consensual, reformist genre played an important role in legitimating the institu-
tions of the emerging nation-state. It is for this reason that the historical alliance 
between the Bildungsroman and human rights law “is neither unproblematic nor un-
complicated,” particularly as a consequence of  
the Bildungsroman’s ambivalent capacity to disseminate and naturalize not only the 
norms of human rights but also the paradoxical practices, prejudices, and exclu-
sions codified in the law. (5) 
The reason why Slaughter’s insights are particularly interesting in the context 
of this dissertation lies in the fact that, as has been noted elsewhere (Hron), the 
Bildungsroman is one the most explored genres in contemporary Nigerian literature. 
This trend, variously interpreted,18 is reflected also in the corpus that will be inves-
                                               
 Hron puts forward a number of hypotheses as to the reasons for the prominent pres-
tigated here. Coupled as it is with a thematic preoccupation with the issues of state 
violence and human rights protection, or lack thereof, this generic prevalence ap-
pears to confirm Slaughter’s argument as to the mutually enabling relation be-
tween the Bildungsroman and human rights discourse. However, it is significant 
that, differently from the idealistic Bildungsroman, most of the narratives under 
scrutiny here do not envision the individual’s final incorporation into the (nation-
)state, his or her becoming a right-and-duty-bearing person before the law. 19 On 
the contrary, it will be observed that characters are generally either excluded from 
citizenship tout court or left in a condition of “suspended incorporation” in texts 
whose endings do not provide any reassuring aesthetic closure. And indeed, as will 
be shown in detail in the following chapters, the writers examined here employ a 
multiplicity of stylistic and narratological devices in order to signify the impossibil-
ity of an egalitarian, incorporative imaginary when the state is undemocratic – or, 
in the case of a host country, at best unwelcoming. What is more, by playing with 
the formal conventions of the Bildungsroman, they contest the validity of certain 
human rights and humanitarian notions whose supposed universality in fact belies 
                                                                                                                                     
ence of children in contemporary Nigerian literature: she suggests that the hybrid space 
of childhood is a fertile ground for the exploration of the complexities of postcolonial 
societies and cultures; she also argues that the figure of the child may reflect the young 
postcolonial state that has to “define itself anew in the global world order” (30); further, 
she adds that the Western audiences for whom these texts are mainly marketed “may be 
more easily initiated to the complexities of Nigerian culture or politics through a chil-
dren’s perspective” (29). As Joseph Slaughter reminds us, moreover, it is essential to re-
member that “marginal” literary commodities, and particularly the Bildungsroman as the 
canonised genre for the “historically marginal author,” have been gaining increasing mar-
ket value within the “international marketplace of literature and human rights” (312). On 
this, see also Huggan. 
19 As Slaughter has suggested, the lack of an incorporative imaginary is a very common 
trait of postcolonial Bildungsromane, which “tend to be novels of disillusionment, in which 
the promises of developmentalism and self-determination are revealed to be empty, or at 
least exaggerated” (215). 
an inherently modern Western logic. I am referring to constructs such as the rep-
resentation of the child as a pure repository of passive innocence and vulnerability 
and, more generally, the representation of the ‘victim’ of human rights abuse as a 
passive non-agent whose semi-rationality legitimises Western humanitarian inter-
vention as a form of ‘enlightening aid’ – aspects that resonate with what Makau 
Mutua has described as the ‘savage-victim-saviour’ “damning metaphor” that un-
derlies the “grand narrative” of human rights (201). 
As suggested above, a number of scholars have considered the potential of 
imaginative literature, and of the novel in particular, to foster human rights sensi-
bilities by stimulating the reader’s empathy. Lynn Hunt, drawing from Benedict 
Anderson’s argument on the creation of an “imagined community” following the 
rise of print capitalism, has suggested that the “imagined empathy” (32) that eight-
eenth-century sentimental novels aroused contributed to what she calls the “in-
vention” of human rights. By encouraging their readers’ empathic identification 
with the Others they read about, she observes, novels instilled in them the aware-
ness of the ultimate inner equality of humankind – a necessary condition for the 
birth of the very idea of human rights.20 Similar claims have been made by Martha 
Nussbaum, who has argued that narrative art has the power to “cultivate our hu-
manity” by “mak[ing] us see the lives of the different with […] involvement and 
sympathetic understanding” (10, 88), and, much more problematically, by philos-
opher Richard Rorty, who in his 1993 Oxford-Amnesty lecture has encouraged 
                                               
20 James Dawes has noticed that arguments such as this, similarly carried out also by liter-
ary scholars such as Margaret Cohen and Lynn Festa, have been criticised for relying up-
on the undemonstrated assumption that “literary works perform a cultural labor that can 
bring about broad perceptual shifts.” However, he continues, “whether or not it is true 
that the rise of the novel played a role in causing the changes that made modern human 
rights possible, it is certainly reflective of the changes” (“Human Rights” 397). 
sentimental education as a means through which sympathy can be “manipulated” 
by hearing or reading “sad and sentimental stories” (129, 119) – stories which, 
repeated and varied over the centuries, have induced us, the rich, safe, powerful, 
people, to tolerate, and even to cherish, powerless people – people whose appear-
ance or habits or beliefs at first seemed an insult to our own moral identity, our 
sense of the limits of permissible human variation. (131-132)21 
In contrast with these contentions, however, I would like to argue that the 
peculiar ethical resonance of the works discussed here lies not so much in their 
potential to elicit an empathic response on the part of the readers – a reaction 
that, as will be noticed, is on occasions even provocatively shunned.22 More im-
portantly, by putting a face on human suffering without trivialising, or essentialis-
ing, its diverse articulations, these texts often give visibility to forms of violence 
that are unknown, or meant to remain unknowable, and that have been declared, 
as narratologist Gerald Prince would say, “unnarratable.” This is an important 
epistemological operation in an increasingly biopolitical (or rather, necropolitical) 
world, where there exists a hierarchy that hegemonically establishes which lives are 
worth living (and, one may add, narrating) and which are not. By relocating 
knowledge in the (global) public sphere, recent Nigerian literature therefore con-
tests, and endeavours to modify, presumably stable patterns of differential “alloca-
tion of grievability” of human life (Butler, Precarious xiv). While endorsing the con-
cept of the equal value of all human lives, these texts eschew romanticised visions 
of the universality of what it means to be human. On the contrary, they place par-
                                               
21 This approach has been not unjustifiably criticised by, among others, Joseph Slaughter, 
who sees it as a form of “cosmopolitan solipsism” with a “tendency to become a patron-
izing humanitarianism that is enabled by and subsists on socioeconomic and political dis-
parities” (Human Rights, Inc. 325). 
22 See, in particular, Chapter 2. 
ticular emphasis on the relativistic notion that the actual experiences of being hu-
man vary world-wide, being strictly dependant on the biopolitical contingencies 
that determine the major or minor degree of expendability, or ‘purchasability,’ of a 
certain life – or body – in a certain locale. These narratives, therefore, often high-
light the structural gap between human rights theory and practice by showing how 
the moral postulate of human equality, theoretically a given, rests in fact on the in-
clusion of the individual into an effective regime of rights, be it realised at the 
domestic or at the international level. 
The stories of war and human rights I am about to consider are stories that, 
similarly to human rights themselves, are constantly caught between competing 
polarities: the particular and the universal, the individual and the state, life and 
death, North and South, mobility and stasis, protection and violence, silences and 
voices. The existences they tell us about are at times heroic, other times grotesque. 
I would hardly call them “gay matter” (Bakhtin, Rabelais 195). And yet, these war-
scapes of suffering retain some of the regenerating potential of the Bakhtinian real 
grotesque, for they challenge us to the constant redefinition of our conceptions of 
the human – of human rights, and of human wrongs. It is also by approaching this 
literature of war that we might learn to reconfigure the ever-changing project of 
human rights.
 

 
Nigerian writer and literary critic Obi Nwakanma begins a 2007 review of 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Half of a Yellow Sun remembering how in 2000 he 
was refused publication of a short story that dealt with the topic of the Nigerian 
Civil War. “Thanks very much,” the accompanying note said, “your story is beau-
tiful and touching, but I’m afraid the subject of the Nigerian civil war has been 
exhausted.” In the following years, however, this improbable interpretation as to 
the presumed ‘exhaustion’ of the war story was confuted by the appearance of a 
number of fictional and non-fiction texts that add on to the very rich corpus of 
Nigerian war literature, a corpus to which virtually all major first-wave writers 
have contributed. Adichie’s acclaimed novel is a case in point, being arguably the 
most ambitious attempt to capture the reality of the Biafran enclave written so 
far,1 and exhibiting such “unapologetic Biafran sympathies” (Adichie, “African 
‘Authenticity’” 50) that reviewers have often hailed it as a retrospective war epic 
(see for example Ezard; Maslin “The Complex Business”). Its publication and 
phenomenal world-wide success confirm, and have further enhanced, what Ed-
ward Said would call the “permission to narrate” a story that many myopic ana-
                                               
1 As such, it has achieved a great deal of critical attention since its 2006 publication (see 
Tunca The Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie Website). 
lysts had declared part of a (best-)forgotten past. 
In order to identify the changing fortunes of the Nigerian Civil War as a top-
ic of literary representation, it may be rewarding to cast a glance at the most recent 
comprehensive bibliography of Nigerian war literature, the one drawn by Chinyere 
Nwahunanya in his critical anthology A Harvest from Tragedy, presumably updated 
to 1997.2 Here, out of a total of 150 entries, including novels, plays, poetry, short 
stories and memoirs, less than 20 have been published after 1985, the year that 
signalled the beginning of Ibrahim Babangida’s dictatorship. Of these, only 4 ap-
peared in the years 1990 to 1997. These patterns of publication are of course re-
flective of the “total clamp-down on creative and intellectual activities” in Nigeria 
under military despotism (Egya, “Art and Outrage” 50) – an aspect that, as will be 
observed in Chapters Three and Four, is thematised in much contemporary Nige-
rian fiction. If the literary market did not thrive during the economic recession of 
the 1980s and 90s (Griswold 37), the restrictions on freedom of expression that 
were imposed during the two decades further contributed to silencing aspiring 
writers. It is therefore no coincidence that the literature issued in the 1990s, often 
self-published, consisted almost only of poetry.3 Nigerian poets writing during 
military rule indicted the arrogance of an unbearably violent sovereign, and the 
“aggressive vision” which characterised their compositions, “powered by a righteous 
                                               
2 While the bibliography includes one text published in 1997, the year of the book’s sec-
ond edition, it does not list one 1998 source I am aware of, namely Adichie’s play For love 
of Biafra. It is therefore arguable that the bibliography was not revised for the 2002 edi-
tion. For previous bibliographic accounts, see Amuta “A Selected Checklist,” McLuckie 
“A Preliminary Checklist,” and the Bibliography in Theodora Akachi Ezeigbo’s Fact and 
Fiction in the Literature of the Nigerian Civil War. 
3 For a detailed analysis of the other interlacing reasons that might have contributed to 
the stagnation of the novel in the period, see Adesanmi and Dunton, “Nigeria’s Third 
Generation Writing.” 
rage,” had the immediate, urgent aim “to reclaim [the] nation, its psyche and col-
lective dream, from the claws of the military oppressor” (Egya 50). The subject of 
the war, understandably enough, did thus not feature prominently in this poetic 
output. However, it has acquired renewed importance in Nigerian literature with 
the turn of the century – a turn that has coincided with the transition to democra-
cy and that, as recalled in the Introduction, has also marked a significant shift 
from poetry back to the novel as the predominant genre of Nigerian creative writ-
ing (Adesanmi and Dunton, “Nigeria’s Third Generation Writing” 8). 
In this context then, Half of a Yellow Sun is far from being the only recent ex-
ample of Nigerian war literature. On the contrary, a number of scholars, writers 
and former members of the military establishment have recently authored their 
accounts of the event, demonstrating that the historical and imaginative interpre-
tation of this controversial conflict, still in the process of being written and rewrit-
ten, is far from settled. And in fact, as Nwakanma wonders, “[h]ow could a story 
be exhausted?” (emphasis added). Amongst the numerous recent texts that explore 
the war theme, one might cite Anthonia Kalu’s finely wrought short-story collec-
tion Broken Lives and Other Stories; Dulue Mbachu’s novel War Games; Adichie’s 
short stories “Half of a Yellow Sun” and “Ghosts”; Chris Abani’s narrative poem, 
Daphne’s Lot, a tribute to his British mother’s courage in raising her children in 
shrinking Biafra; again, his novella Song for Night, which will be studied in Chapter 
Two and which, although set in an unnamed country, draws evident inspiration 
from the events of the late 1960s. Adding to these works are the numerous literary 
and political memoirs that have been proliferating and shed new light on the 
complexity of the political choices and behind-the-scenes intrigues that unfolded 
in Nigeria/Biafra during the war, while recalling the hardships suffered by the 
population. Illustrious contributors to this genre are late General Philip Efiong, 
who was second only to General Ojukwu in the Biafran hierarchy, and took his 
place when the latter left the Republic (Diala 114); and, notably, Chinua Achebe, 
whose controversial There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra overcomes the 
author’s past reticence on an admittedly distressing topic.4 Of course, the list pro-
vided here is by no means exhaustive. However, it does give an idea of the rele-
vance that Nigerian war literature has acquired in the last few years, alongside em-
phasising the generic diversity that characterises it. 
The war is not only referenced in those texts, such as those just mentioned, 
that are directly concerned with the representation of the country’s civil strife. On 
the contrary, it appears to be a spectral presence which also haunts a number of 
contemporary works depicting the contradictions and violence of Nigeria’s post-
war society. Indeed, as will be seen in Chapter Four, the theme resurfaces, often 
via the authorial insertion of minor narrative threads, also in novels such as Chris 
Abani’s GraceLand and Helon Habila’s Measuring Time, set during the chaotic years 
that should have led to the re-birth of a peaceful nation but saw it sinking into the 
abyss of military oppression. There, the Civil War is presented as the exacerbation 
of a state of anomy that is constitutive of postcolonial political life, and as such it 
becomes an emblematic reminder of the culture of violence still embedded in con-
temporary Nigeria.  
                                               
4 Chinua Achebe acted as a spokesperson of the Biafran government abroad during the 
three-year confrontation. Until the publication of his memoir in September 2012, he was 
one of the few Nigerian writers who, after witnessing the war, had not tackled the painful 
subject in any long text in prose. Up till then, Achebe’s war production consisted of non-
fiction writing, short fiction narratives such as the short stories “The Madman,” “Girls at 
War” and “Civil Peace,” and the lyrical poems collected in his Christmas in Biafra. On this, 
see Neogy and Achebe 231. See also Lindfords, qtd. in Ogungbesan 50.  
If this study posits as its departure point an analysis of the literary represen-
tation of the Civil War, it is in the belief that the numerous, interlacing war-scapes 
that will emerge, reflective of gender, class and ethnic exclusions, identify a reper-
toire of discriminatory practices that can be recognised, in different forms, in the 
Nigerian literature of disillusionment that is investigated in subsequent chapters. 
The texts under examination here are representative of the multiplicity of thematic 
and ideological approaches that have characterised, not unexpectedly, the litera-
ture inspired by a highly divisive event such as the civil war. Moreover, they are in 
line with the preoccupation, shared by many contemporary writers, with the deep 
fissure existing between an abusive sovereign power and those abused subjects 
who are all too often reduced to expendable pawns in a superior power game. All 
the same, some of them explore another, certainly more controversial, theme that 
also lies at the heart of much contemporary writing. I am referring to the paradox-
ical complicity between certain non-sovereign actors of violence and the powerful 
figures who metonymically embody the sovereign, in their common dehumanisa-
tion and exploitation of fellow human beings. This ambivalence points at the ex-
istence of a shifting biopolitical hierarchy where it is often difficult, if not impos-
sible, to distinguish victims from perpetrators, public from private interests, ene-
my from friend. It thus adds further complexity to the exploration of the complex 
moral and biopolitical landscapes of Nigerian literature. 
Ernest Emenyonu predicted in 1973 that the literary harvest following the Nigeri-
an Civil War would constitute a rich booty for the scholar willing to enter the im-
aginative world “of deep social criticism, aggressive political commitment, and the 
symbolic search or questioning of self” that the harrowing events and dramatic 
resolution of the conflict were bound to generate (“Post-War Writing” 54). And 
he was certainly right, as the thematic and ideological variety of Nigerian war liter-
ature has proved a very fertile ground for investigation, inspiring numerous anal-
yses on the part of fine critics such as, among others, Willfried F. Feuser, Chidi 
Amuta, Craig McLuckie, Theodora Akachi Ezeigbo, Chinyere Nwahunanya and 
Emenyonu himself. Discussing this vast body of literature is thus not an easy task 
– nor is it one to be taken lightly. In this section, I shall endeavour to provide a re-
reading of selected examples of first-wave Nigerian war fiction through lenses that 
are meant specifically to highlight the multi-faceted biopolitical articulations that 
this conflict, like all wars as exemplary moments of declared emergency, inevitably 
manifested. 
First-wave war fiction has often been defined “witness” literature (Eme-
nyonu, “Nigerian Civil War”; Feuser, “Anomy” 121): mainly authored by Igbo 
writers,5 it is generally realistic in mode, and tends to exhibit great historical detail 
and accuracy. Such a “documentary – or near-documentary” (Riemenschneider 
                                               
5 Critic Chidi Amuta has explained the predominance of ex-Biafran, and especially Igbo, 
voices in Nigerian Civil War literature as determined by two reasons: first of all, by the 
fact that the “traumatic impact of the war was relatively evenly distributed among the Bi-
afran populace,” and sensitised their creative instincts; secondly, by “the high level of 
formal literacy among the people of the former Biafra” (“The Nigerian Civil War” 96). 
Notable exceptions to this trend are Wole Soyinka (whose war production includes The 
Man Died, A Shuttle in the Crypt, Season of Anomy and Madmen and Specialists) and Kole Omo-
toso (with his absurdist allegory The Combat). As Amuta has noticed, the other federal 
writers who have tackled the topic have often done so by means of “tangential refer-
ences” to this event as a “significant experience in national life” (96). Examples of this 
trend are Femi Osofisan’s plays The Chattering and the Song and Once Upon Four Robbers. 
61) stance seems to have its roots in a civic urgency in line with Chinua Achebe’s 
contention that African writers “should march right in front” in the battle for the 
necessary, unavoidable task of re-education and regeneration of their own socie-
ties (“Novelist,” 45). In the much-quoted lecture “The African Writer and the Bia-
fran Cause,” which he delivered in Uganda while the war was raging, Achebe fa-
mously claimed: 
It is clear to me that an African creative writer who tries to avoid the big social and 
political issues of contemporary Africa will end up being completely irrelevant – 
like that absurd man in the proverb who leaves his burning house to pursue a rat 
fleeing from the flames. (78) 
Staying with this metaphor, and (poorly) elaborating on it, it appears howev-
er that some federal and former Biafran writers did not manage, after their houses 
had been reduced to ashes, to find a moment in which the loss could be, to echo 
William Wordsworth, “recollected in tranquillity.” Nwahunanya’s study of the aes-
thetics of first-wave war novels has for example confirmed that their admittedly 
cathartic,6 and understandably didactic intents are on occasions unrestrained, as 
the interpretation of plot development is often explicitly provided rather than 
conveyed by means of stylistic or narrative elaboration (“Aesthetics”). Some of 
them are thus marred by excessive sensationalism (Cyprian Ekwensi’s Survive the 
Peace), and melodramatic resolution of conflict (Andrew Ekwuru’s Songs of Steel), 
while others (such as S.O. Mezu’s Behind the Rising Sun) are replete with moralising 
passages which suggest lack of formal control and jeopardise their aesthetic quali-
ty. Flora Nwapa’s 1975 novella Never Again, a semi-fictional account of the au-
                                               
6 For an interesting insight into this cathartic dimension of civil war writing, see for ex-
ample the author’s notes to Buchi Emecheta’s Destination Biafra and Kalu Okpi’s Biafra 
Testament. 
thor’s experiences in beleaguered Biafra,7 is for example often recalled as one of 
the less impressive examples of Nigerian war literature. Yet, if Nwapa’s Never 
Again, albeit interesting in many respects, is certainly not her most successful 
work, still the Nigerian Civil War has inspired the writing of some of the most 
beautiful texts of Nigerian literature, many of which have been canonised as para-
digmatic examples of African war fiction. In what follows, some of the works that 
will be given comparatively more attention than others, as a consequence of a se-
lection informed by both thematic and aesthetic considerations, are Chinua Ache-
be’s short story “Girls at War” (1972), Eddie Iroh’s Toads of War (1979), Buchi 
Emecheta’s Destination Biafra (1982), Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Sozaboy (1985), alongside 
Wole Soyinka’s 1971 play Madmen and Specialists. 
Nowhere is the traditional hold of the sovereign over the lives of its subjects more 
easily detectable than in those contexts where it has the right legitimately to ex-
pose them to death by forcing them to take up arms and fight in order to guaran-
tee its own survival. Michel Foucault, as part of his wider argument concerning 
the evolution of the technologies for the deployment of human bodies and sexual-
ities in Western modernity, has famously contended that modern wars, particularly 
since the nineteenth century, have no longer been founded on the sovereign’s tra-
ditional “right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself” (Sexuali-
ty I 136). Rather, they must be inscribed within the modern process aiming at ex-
                                               
7 Although Nwapa is adamant about emphasising the fictional quality of her text, many a 
commentator have noticed that her own experiences of the war very closely resemble 
those of her heroine Kate (Bryce 30; see also Ezeigbo “Vision and Revision”: 478-480). 
erting a positive control over biological life, which endeavours to optimise and 
multiply it through disciplinary practices. Modern wars, Foucault observes, are 
thus 
no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged 
on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the 
purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of necessity: massacres have become 
vital. (137) 
The Nigerian Civil War appears to occupy an uncertain position within such 
a polarised developmental schema, apparently confirming the difficulty of apply-
ing Foucault’s interpretive paradigm to certain contexts, such as the postcolonial, 
where the sovereign exhibits liminal traits, which tend to blur the divide between 
absolute sovereignty and late-modern, positive bio-power.8 On the one hand, it is 
indeed undoubted that, in accordance with Foucault’s argument, the “naked ques-
tion of survival” (137) played a fundamental role in justifying Biafran secession, 
and as such its rhetoric was widely employed in Biafran documents and propagan-
da. Indeed, on the Biafran side, after the 1966 massacres the perceived reason for 
going to war was, at least initially, not so much the existence of sovereignty, but 
rather the biological existence of a whole population. And yet, many of the former 
Biafran authors who have written about the conflict have acknowledged that the 
war soon acquired the contours of a more traditional form of confrontation, 
                                               
8 Foucault was of course aware of the fact that ancient sovereignty has not been com-
pletely replaced by modern bio-power, and that the two powers to “to take life or let 
live” and to “make live,” and their respective techniques, have on occasions been inte-
grated. Still, Agamben notices, the two remain conceptually distinct in Foucault’s theori-
sation. Agamben argues instead that maintaining such a heterogeneity becomes problem-
atic in the analysis, for example, of the great late-modern totalitarian states, when “an un-
precedented absolutization of the bio-power to make live intersects with an equally abso-
lute generalization of the sovereign power to make die, such that biopolitics coincides im-
mediately with thanatopolitics” (Remnants 83). 
where all able-bodied men were violently coerced into fighting for the mere juridi-
cal survival of the sovereign. At the same time, the gap between those acting on 
behalf of the sovereign and the subjects of sovereign decision widened considera-
bly, to the dismay of those who had hoped they would have seen the birth of a 
country free of corruption and violence.  
Ernest Emenyonu has provocatively commented on the disillusionment that 
followed this turn saying that 
a large population in Biafra, barely half-way through the three-year debacle, wanted 
and prayed for the fall of their dream republic where every Biafran was to be “his 
brother’s keeper”.9 They wished the fall of Biafra not necessarily because of the ag-
ony of starvation, suffering and disease, but because the goings-on in Biafra had 
killed the dream of those who gave their lives for the young republic. Biafra had 
become a terror unto itself and the way its leadership trampled on moral and social 
values of the people left in the common man nothing to hope for. (Emenyonu, 
“The Nigerian Civil War” 90-91) 
Emenyonu’s generalising remarks are probably over-stated. Nevertheless, they 
suggest that one of the major reasons for the Biafran collapse lay in the abyss sep-
arating the tiny elite and the exploited, underprivileged (non-)citizens who were 
turned into animals for slaughter. And this is no doubt a topic of primary im-
portance in first-wave war literature, whose world is inhabited by big warlords, 
petty tyrants and expendable subalterns. 
* 
In a moment of proverbial calm before the storm, Igbo volunteer Agwu Mong, 
one of the characters of Kalu Okpi’s thriller Biafra Testament (1982), mulls over one 
of his “pet theories,” 
                                               
9 This phrase, with evident Biblical undertones, is a quote from Ojukwu’s June 1969 
speech, known as the Ahiara declaration (see below). 
a sure-fire method to end all wars for ever. It went like this: if all the kings and 
presidents and generals and queens and prime ministers and emperors and prem-
iers in the world were to be transported to either the Onitsha or the Vietnam 
fronts, if all those rulers stayed in those mosquito- and death-infested trenches for 
only one week, the planet earth would see and hear a whole lot less about wars. 
The trouble with wars was that they were not fairly fought. They were usually 
fought by the wrong people. (129) 
Minutes later, idealist Agwu will lose his life during the so-called “Abagana mira-
cle,” here fictionalised under the heading “Onitsha … the impossible victory” 
(126), an ambush that has gone down in history as one of the most glorious epi-
sodes of Biafran resistance. The utopian nature of his reflections is thus ironically 
uncovered: not only are wars not fought by kings and prime ministers; what is 
more, the valueless life of the common soldier, like Agwu’s, is lost in the bigger 
picture of a body count that determines victories and defeats. 
The question of the divide between those who risk their lives, on both sides 
of the front line, and the figures of power, who declare wars but never fight them, 
is very common in Nigerian war literature, and it is often dramatised in works that 
reinvent the historical phenomenon of war-front fraternisation. Okpi’s Agwu re-
calls one such episode: 
A young Nigerian soldier, who was obviously fed up with the whole crazy mess, 
had shouted up from his trench across no-man’s land, ‘Gowon and Ojukwu was 
for their house and drinking coffee, and me and you was for here and kill our-
selves! I not know you and you not know me. I get no palaver with you and you get 
no palaver with me, so why we want to kill ourselves...?’ (129) 
In the Biafran headquarters, this “fraternisation thing,” as the Biafran Commander 
of Military Intelligence rather derogatorily calls it a few pages later, is considered 
as a Nigerian strategy for spurring defections on the part of the by now hungry, 
demoralised Biafran soldiers. As such, it must be stopped at all costs: it is the 
“very existence” of the Biafran army that is at stake here, and along with it, the ex-
istence of the Biafran state itself (140). In order to put an end to the threats posed 
by the unacceptable mutual truce, Major Malu, an experienced, Sandhurst-trained 
official, is asked to organise a “brotherhood party” for Biafran and Nigerian offi-
cials, a trap celebration at the end of which all the participants will be arrested. 
The action plan rather unexpectedly turns out successful, to the utter dismay of 
Malu himself, who is left with “an unequal mixture of sorrow, sadness and re-
morse all the way down the pit of his stomach” (159).  
The reason why I have dwelt at some length on this specific, and of course 
highly sensationalistic, incident is that the question of fraternisation is nowhere as 
explicitly tackled in Nigerian War literature. Even a seasoned official like Major 
Malu finds it difficult to carry out an action that negates the brotherhood, and ul-
timately the common humanity, of the fighting men: war, by its own nature, does 
not contemplate, nor does it allow, fraternity amongst fellow human beings. The 
image of the “human family” within which all human beings should act “in a spirit 
of brotherhood” has proved one of the staples of human rights rhetoric to state 
the equality of all human beings and point to the solidarity that should inform the 
relationship among them. It is no coincidence that the first words of the Preamble 
to the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights posit as the recipient of 
human rights “all members of the human family,” whose “inherent dignity and 
[…] equal and inalienable rights” are recognised as “the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world.” A similarly metaphorical language is reinstated in 
Art. 1, which famously reads thus: “All human beings […] are endowed with rea-
son and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brother-
hood.” The repudiation of war-front fraternisation in Okpi’s novel assumes thus a 
double meaning: an undoubted commentary on the state of fratricidal civil strife 
that tropes the de-construction of the mythology of the nation as an inclusive 
family, it can also be inscribed within the wider frame of reference of human 
rights discourse. 
This dual connotation is similarly present in the works that discuss how the 
concept of brotherhood is reduced to mockery, or straightforward insult, in the 
day-to-day life of the common Biafran. The indictment of the unjust relationships 
which developed within the runaway Republic is often carried out by evoking with 
a derisive sneer the grand rhetoric of the so-called “Ahiara Declaration,” a speech 
of socialist inspiration which was delivered by Ojukwu on June 1, 1969. The idea 
of fraternity was indeed a key one in this grandiose document which, drafted by 
the Biafran National Guidance Committee chaired by Chinua Achebe (Ezenwa-
Ohaeto 146), was meant to proclaim the principles of the Biafran revolution while 
listing the qualities that the “Biafran of the new order” should possess. Amongst 
his numerous attributes, it was asserted that the Biafran citizen 
must be his brother’s keeper, he must help all Biafrans in difficulty, whether or not 
they are related to kin by blood. He must avoid, at all costs, doing anything which 
is capable of bringing distress and hardship to other Biafrans. (Ojukwu 50) 
Of course, as is indeed admitted in parts of the document,10 the reality in Biafra 
was (as of yet) far from this idyllic vision. 
* 
Perhaps Eddie Iroh’s novel Toads of War most evidently takes on the moralising 
                                               
10 See in particular the section titled “Shaking off Nigerianism” (24-26), where the cor-
ruption of the new state, as the heading implies, is seen as a hideous remnant of typically 
Nigerian attitudes that must be eradicated. 
task to expose the vulgarity of “the war racketeers and profiteers, the disaster mil-
lionaires, the big shots, the toads of war, civilian and military, who fought their 
own war by proxy” (1), turning the utopia of Biafran fraternity into outright 
mockery. Toads of War is a short novel that, alongside Forty-Eight Guns for the Gen-
eral (1976) and Siren in the Night (1982), composes Iroh’s war trilogy. The story, set 
during the last days of the war, revolves around the figure of Kalu Udim, a young 
war veteran “with an amputated right arm for a medal” (45) who after being dis-
missed from the Biafran army embarks on another, personal mission, a new war 
of his own. As a mild epileptic, Kalu should have been exonerated from conscrip-
tion. However, as the reader discovers in first-person flash-back chapters that are 
interlocked with the main third-person narrative, he was sent to the front by his 
employer as a punishment for a minor act of insubordination – and even more, 
for the laughter with which he greeted his boss’ enraged overreaction (52). After 
losing his right arm in battle – and his mother, who dies of heartbreak when she 
gets news of his son’s misfortune – he begins to keep track of the man who 
caused his suffering so as to get his revenge over him. By recording Kalu’s pere-
grinations, the author offers a cynical portrayal of a corrupt society where lower-
class citizens who want to survive cannot waste their time in recalling the “beauti-
ful platitudes proclaimed at Ahiara a few months [before]” (63). The reader thus 
becomes acquainted with hyperbolic figures of corruption such as Major Mere, 
who holds all-night parties without apparently noticing their incongruity with the 
massacres that are taking place at the front, only a few miles from town; Father 
Nwobi, whose relief centre is run with whips, and who refuses to give food to 
starving people while standing in front of doors that, left ajar, reveal stores where 
cartons of foodstuff are “piled ceiling-high and spilling on to the floor” (66); and a 
civilian Big Man who remains unnamed and who, in a chapter tellingly titled 
“Brother’s Keeper,” hurls to the ground a pathetic couple of soldiers on crutches 
who are asking for a lift. 
Readers are finally introduced to Chima Duke, Kalu’s former employer, who 
works as associate director at the Price Control Directorate. The man is carica-
tured as 
a short, very fat man of middle age and revoltingly prominent features. His head 
was as big as a palm-wine gourd. His stomach protruded like that of a pregnant 
woman on the eve of labour. He had huge, thick-set arms and legs that allowed 
him only a waddle when he walked. His plump face was perpetually greasy from fat 
and sweat. A short, ill-kept goatee below his thick lips certainly did not improve 
things for Chima Duke’s looks. (40) 
This grotesque depiction of a man who used to be called “gorilla,” or “gargoyle” 
before the hostilities (40), but has turned into a “Duke” thanks to the increasing 
power and dubious respectability that the war has conferred him, is purposely ex-
cessive. Iroh’s satire can be considered a textual correlative, and a very Bakhtinian 
one, to Kalu’s mocking laughter in Chima Duke’s face. Through the use of satiri-
cal typification such as this Iroh, “a master in the evocative use of antithesis” 
(Ezeigbo, “War, History, Aesthetics” 70), identifies the Duke and the other char-
acters sketched above as the arch-villains of the novel. The repulsive body of this 
(literally) Big Man, one of the many Big Men who will be encountered in this dis-
sertation, becomes the signifier of the sick fattening of the bloated “toads” who 
gain immensely from the war situation, as opposed to figures such as Kalu Udima 
himself, whose amputation is a metaphorical reminder of his belonging to the 
wider group of the underdogs of Biafran society, those who have lost (nearly) eve-
rything. In other words, Kalu Udima and Chima Duke are presented as “two re-
markably disparate breeds of men” (5) also by means of these visual strategies, and 
they epitomise the opposite poles of the Biafran socio-political spectrum: while 
the first stands as a metonym for a sovereign that has the right to send his subjects 
to death, the other is the victim of such unconditional power. What is more, it is 
essential that this power is here presented as one which only responds to private 
interests, as Kalu’s conscription is by no means justified by the need to guarantee 
the sovereign’s existence, but rather satisfies the omnipotent desires of a corrupt 
petty tyrant. If Kalu in the end manages to get his revenge, the latter is presented 
as cathartic and self-defeating at the same time: after killing his antagonist against 
his loving girlfriend’s pleas, he walks straight to Death Row. The open-ended Epi-
logue sees him in the uncertain limbo of the Biafran prison, coldly awaiting death 
while the radio announces the surrender of the state which should carry out his 
execution. The fate of the subject in Nigeria/Biafra is thus left unclear. 
The emphasis on the body as signifying either biopolitical privilege or sub-
jection to biopolitical violence is similarly present in Chinua Achebe’s short story 
“Girls at War,” which tackles many of the themes present in Iroh’s novel with that 
succinct, understated elegance that only Achebe is capable of. Even as the text will 
be more carefully investigated in the following section,11 in this context I would 
like to comment briefly on a scene, set in front of a refugee centre, where Re-
ginald Nwankwo, a senior civil servant, is caught by sudden embarrassment as his 
driver loads his car with relief food until it overflows. 
[T]he starved crowds that perpetually hung around relief centres made crude, un-
                                               
11 Indeed, it sheds light on the question of gender relationships during the emergency, 
which is the topic at the centre of Section 1.2.2. 
gracious remarks like ‘War Can Continue!’ meaning the WCC!12 Somebody else 
shouted ‘Irevolu!’ and his friends replied ‘shum!’ ‘Irevolu!’ ‘shum!’ ‘Isofeli?’ ‘shum!’ 
‘Isofeli?’ ‘Mba!’ (107) 
As Emenyonu remarks, the irony of this passage lies in the fact that the crowd 
acknowledges that they are considered part of the revolution only insofar as they 
are asked to fight and suffer for the cause. “But to the question ‘Isofeli?’ (‘Do you 
share with them in the eating and feasting?’), the stark reply is ‘Mba!’ (‘Not at all, 
Never!’)” (Emenyonu, “Post-war Writing” 52, emphasis in the text). Achebe adds 
further complexity to this when he writes that 
Nwankwo was deeply embarrassed not by the jeers of this scarecrow crowd of rags and 
floating ribs but by the independent accusation of their wasted bodies and sunken eyes. 
Indeed he would probably have felt much worse had they said nothing, simply 
looked on in silence, as his boot was loaded with milk, and powdered egg and oats 
and tinned meat and stock-fish. […] But what could a man do? (107, emphasis 
added) 
The body itself, through its partial nudity and excessive thinness, becomes a sign 
of the violence that has reduced this “crowd of rags and floating ribs” to a similar-
ly naked, and precarious, life exposed to death. Here, however, the process of re-
duction to bare life is resisted, as the men’s sharp tongues still have the power to 
insult the injustice they are faced with, in a communal act that is essentially politi-
cal and reasserts a humanity that, as Aristotle has taught us, resides in language. 
As Achille Mbembe has pointed out in his discussion of postcolonial sover-
eignty as founded on a representational regime of vulgarity, in a context character-
ised by extreme scarcity such as that of postcolonial Africa the metaphor of food 
                                               
12 This is a reference to the World Council of Churches, the Christian ecumenical organi-
sation which played a major role in transporting and distributing humanitarian relief sup-
plies in Biafra during the emergency. 
(alongside those of digestion and defecation) is an extremely powerful one. “Food 
and tips (pourboire) are political,” Mbembe explains, and “‘food,’ like ‘scarcity,’ 
cannot be dissociated from particular regimes of ‘death,’ from specific modalities 
of enjoyment or from therapeutic quests” (131). The representation of food as a 
metaphor for power is not unsurprisingly employed very often in texts that depict 
the realities of war in Biafra, a runaway state on which a de facto embargo on relief 
flights was imposed. What is more, this metaphor is one that effectively emphasis-
es the relations of force within a mobile biopolitical hierarchy. 
In this context, I would like to recall the story of Biafran Chuma Mong, one 
of the characters in Okpi’s Biafra Testament, who deserts after losing an eye in bat-
tle and becomes involved in the illegal trafficking of relief food within the block-
aded enclave, where he and his collaborators will sell the stolen supplies at the 
black market. Chuma is aware that his activities will cause the death of many. 
However, he decides, this is “none of his business. As Gowon never tired of say-
ing, it was Ojukwu’s war anyway” (210). Episodes such as this, variations of which 
will be analysed in Chapters Four and Five, suggest that when human life loses its 
value, new frontiers of man’s inhumanity to man are opened, as human beings are 
often willing to act on the side of a sovereign powers of which they themselves 
are, paradoxically, victims. Interestingly, it will be during one of his raids at the Uli 
airstrip that Chuma Mong meets his nemesis, when he witnesses the death of his 
beloved former girlfriend Mgbeke, killed in a bombing attack while attempting to 
put to safety starving children on a plane leaving for Gabon. Okpi’s attempt to re-
store some form of poetic justice in the conclusion of this narrative thread is 
therefore partial, and ironically so, in that it emphasises the corruption of ruthless 
Chuma by fictionalising the death of an antithetical character, Mgbeke, an epitome 
of morality. The question as to whether, in the world of exception, the survival of 
the honest is possible remains open. 
* 
The texts commented on thus far provide interesting insights into the biopolitical 
dimension of the Biafran war. However, nowhere is the question of the biopoliti-
cal exploitation of the population more brilliantly fictionalised than in Ken Saro-
Wiwa’s beautiful Sozaboy: A Novel in Rotten English. This novel addresses another 
motif of Nigerian war literature, since through the story of its protagonist it re-
counts the naïve enthusiasm and subsequent disillusionment of the many youths 
who enlisted in the Biafran army out of superficial idealism and vague ambition.13 
This theme is here coupled with a specific preoccupation to give voice, and narra-
tive visibility, to the predicament of the Ogoni, Saro-Wiwa’s ethnic group, “who 
were not only being physically decimated as a people but who had also been rep-
resentationally erased from national and international consciousness” – a “mis-
sion” that, Harry Garuba reminds us, was central to Saro-Wiwa’s activities both as 
an artist and as a minority rights activist (“Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Sozaboy” 26). The 
first-person narrator, Mene, is a boy from Dukana,14 an apprentice driver who 
proudly, and naively, discards his name in favour of the generic “Sozaboy,” sol-
dier-boy, when he begins fighting in a war he does not understand and for a cause 
no one ever bothers to explain to him: “What he mean by we are going for front? 
No be inside lorry we dey?” (80). 
The much commented “rotten English” employed by this anti-heroic pro-
tagonist plays no minor role in the definition of his marginalised social position. 
                                               
13 See the opening of Ike’s Sunset at Dawn; see also Ossie Onuora Enekwe’s Come Thunder. 
14 As Saro-Wiwa has remarked, Dukana is a market in Ibibioland (“English” 17). 
As Saro-Wiwa explains in his oft-quoted Author’s Note, Sozaboy’s language, “a 
mixture of Nigerian pidgin English, broken English and occasional flashes of 
good, even idiomatic English,” 
is disordered and disorderly. Born of a mediocre education and severely limited opportunities, 
it borrows words, patterns and images freely from the mother-tongue and finds 
expression in a very limited English vocabulary. To its speakers, it has the ad-
vantage of having no rules and no syntax. It thrives on lawlessness, and is part of the dislo-
cated and discordant society in which Sozaboy must live, move and have not his being . (emphasis 
added) 
Critic Seiyifa Koroye has rightly noted that Saro-Wiwa is far less concerned with 
the linguistic accuracy of his description of this peculiar brand of English than 
with “the analogy he sees between the syntactical and lexical lawlessness of this 
language, on the one hand, and the social consciousness and experience of its 
speakers on the other.” This implies that “the nightmare of Mene’s life is not lim-
ited to the Civil War period” (89) but must rather be viewed in the light of his so-
cial, ethnic and political disenfranchisement within a country – be it a Biafra that is 
never named or a “Nugwa” (141), Nigeria, whose name is mangled up to the 
point of becoming meaningless – that does not protect his and his fellow villagers’ 
rights. What the texts suggest, therefore, is that the de-politicised condition suf-
fered by his character predates the coups and the emergency declaration, and is ra-
ther inscribed in the very fabric of a dysfunctional country where citizenship rights 
have historically been the privilege of selected groups. 
As Michael North has observed, the lack of specificity deriving from the fact 
that the references to the countries at war remain vague should not be viewed as a 
gesture aimed at universalising the conflict (104). On the contrary, it signals the al-
ienation of the Ogoni within a national sphere where they are caught, and oblite-
rated, between two opposing forces, neither of which can possibly represent them. 
And Mene, tellingly, will fight for both parties: first against what he calls, with an 
abstracting personification, “Mr. Enemy,” who must be a “strong man pass Hitla 
self” (78); then on his side, nursed back to health after being found unconscious 
in the forest where he had fled. It is equally relevant that on both sides he will find 
the same man, an unscrupulous double-crosser he and his friend Bullet christen 
“Manmuswak,” a term Saro-Wiwa glosses as “a man must live (eat) by whatever 
means” (184). Manmuswak has no ideology, but fights and kills, as his name im-
plies, for his own survival. “I am soza and I am war,” Manmuswak says of himself 
(121). And he does indeed embody the very concept of ruthless violence on which 
war is necessarily grounded, whatever the side.  
Manmuswak is coupled with Sozaboy, “an internalizing character” 
(Chukwuma 39), as a figure who exposes him to the realities of war. The way in 
which the events unravel after their first encounter, when Manmuswak, now a 
federal agent, tricks Mene’s battalion into falling out with their commander, will 
lead Sozaboy to recognising that “[e]very soza is dead body” and that “war is very 
bad thing. War is to drink urine, to die and all that uniform that they are giving us 
to wear is just to deceive us” (113). Sozaboy thus slowly enters a world suspended 
between life and death that is more and more often punctuated with images of 
human existence reduced to animality or spectrality, the former recalling the mate-
riality and physical pain of a condition of living death that cannot be reduced to 
some form of impalpable volatility. His nightmarish flight into the forest epito-
mises such a liminal state, as Sozaboy loses his senses several times – his fainting 
associated to death on each occasion: 
I was running until my leg cannot carry me again. And then I just stopped under 
one big tree and just die.  
I don’t know how long I die. But I think I die for a very long time. When I wake 
up, I no fit carry up my hand sef. […] Everywhere na soso water. So I just ask my-
self who born dog? Who born dog? 
[…] I begin to beg God make the rain stop. But impossible. That rain continue 
to beat me and after it have beat me well well, I come consider myself like an 
anmal. Yes, I was like anmal. No shirt, only knicker, would for my body, no food 
to chop, no house to sleep, only inside bush and rain beating me like no man busi-
ness. […] And then I come die again. (113-117) 
Given this pervasive employment of a rhetoric of dehumanisation, it comes 
as a mild surprise that when Sozaboy goes to Dukana in search of his wife and 
mother, the cripple Duzia confidently tells him that “Sozaboy have already dead in 
the army. If he is here, it must be his ghost” (131). The fact that such a tropology 
is employed to describe the figure of this ignorant, naïve soldier, who fights on 
both sides and deserts from both, acquires great relevance in the context of Saro-
Wiwa’s efforts on behalf of minority rights, as it is meant to uncover how the poli-
tics of bare life that emerged during the Nigerian Civil War were informed by 
both class and minority exclusionary practices. The fascinating figuration of bare 
life through images of spectrality does not only have the power to provide a stark 
visualisation of the consequences of biopolitical power on the humanity of those 
who are asked to take up arms for the sovereign’s survival. What is more, this 
spectre, as a visualisation of what, to go back to Garuba’s remarks on subalternity 
and epistemological erasure, has been reduced to nothing, attempts to make know-
able what has been declared non-existent, thereby countering the violence of heg-
emonic discourse. The ethically compelling nature of this imagery derives from 
the fact that it forces the readers to move, albeit only imaginatively, in a space that 
is caught between life and death. And, in Derrida’s formulation, it is in this space 
that one can “learn to live” (xvi) – a homodidactic process that can be achieved only 
by coming to terms with death, “[m]ine as (well as) that of the other” (Specters, 
xvii). If learning “to live – alone, from oneself, by oneself,” as Derrida writes, is 
indeed “ethics itself,” then being faced with this ghost of history, who is one yet 
many, who has died and survived, who occupies multiple temporalities, turns inev-
itably into a call for justice.  
After deserting for the second time, Sozaboy goes on a quest for his beauti-
ful wife Agnes and his mother, whom he has left behind when he joined the army. 
While looking for them in the refugee camp where the Dukana people who have 
survived are now staying, however, Chief Birabee and Pastor Barika, fellow villag-
ers, report him to the soldiers as a renegade, and he is made prisoner of war. It is 
only then that he realises that the two were indeed “very fat like pig” while the 
other refugees looked “thin and hungry” (158). Sozaboy becomes aware that Chief 
Birabee and Pastor Barika are the aberrant “bellymen” (158) the wise Terr Kole 
had warned him about: they trade in Red Cross food and “cloth,” and, as Sozaboy 
beautifully puts it, they “are friends of the sozas and of the politicians and the 
traders. And they are all trading in the life of men and women and children. And 
their customer is death” (156). Saro-Wiwa’s feat, here, consists in managing to 
convey with unprecedented force the expendability and commodification of hu-
man life in the exception. In terms that recall Zygmunt Bauman’s theorisation of 
the concept of ‘wasted life’ (2004), the refugee camp “born by the foolish war” 
(150) is presented as a “proper human compost pit,” a “town of ghost” (148) 
populated by infrahuman, lethargic “rubbish people [who] do not know them-
selves” (149). 
When first entering the camp, Sozaboy compares the life of refugee to that 
of the soldier, whom the war has forced to “live like rat inside pit.” However, 
while he accepts that a soldier may lead such an animalised existence, “because 
sozaman life is nonsense and rubbish. Sozaman can die at any time. Na him 
choose him choice,” the fact that civilians can be reduced to living in similar con-
ditions makes him “ashamed and angry” (153). As noted above, he will soon real-
ise the not all the refugees of the camp are suffering to the same degree: for Chief 
Birabee’s hut may have a leaking roof, but behind it “there are many bags of gari, 
rice, and bundles of stockfish” (158). Yet, if Sozaboy becomes finally able to dis-
tinguish the privileged from those, like the soldiers and the refugees, who are the 
content of sovereign decision, still his increased awareness never goes as far as 
identifying the justifications for a conflict, or for the ensuing biopolitical power 
relations, both of which remain, in the end, unintelligible. Such a dynamic of par-
tial character development, critic Jago Morrison has remarked, inverts the conven-
tions of the Bildungsroman (“Imagined,” 22). Another aspect which counters the in-
corporative imagination of the genre is that Sozaboy has no ‘home’ to return to 
after the war: his wife and mother, he discovers, have died during an air raid, and 
he is rejected by the Dukana community, where everybody believes he is a ghost, 
the cursed bearer of all the misfortunes and epidemics that have devastated the 
village since the beginning of the war. The reconciliation between the interiority of 
a “problematic individual” and “concrete social reality,” which Georg Lucás iden-
tified as a definitional aspect of the Bildungsroman as a genre (132), is not, cannot 
be achieved, and the protagonist’s incorporation remains an impossibility. 
In his fine reading of the novel, Michael North has argued that the phrase 
“my brothers” with which Sozaboy often addresses his audience is an attempt to 
recreate at the level of narration a new community replacing the one has lost for-
ever. In this context, North interprets Sozaboy’s “rotten English” as a proof of 
the character’s positioning within a national frame, “some larger version of the 
multiethnic population that speaks rotten English in the car parks of Port Har-
court” (108), where Sozaboy used to work before the war. North further elabo-
rates on this argument stating that “to propose brotherhood and sisterhood within 
that language is to propose a Nigeria that is not divided along ethnic and linguistic 
lines” (109). It seems to me, however, that this analysis underestimates the fact 
that in this text “we see no process of building, no struggle to articulate the coun-
ter-myths of Biafra or Nigeria as national ideas” (Morrison 21) and that Sozaboy’s 
ostracism from his village community undermines the very foundations of such an 
ideal of national inclusion and fraternity. Moreover, as Saro-Wiwa has observed, if 
Sozaboy were speaking 
to people of his own class, he probably would use Pidgin English throughout, but 
in trying to get to a wider audience, people who know much better than himself, he 
tries to rise to their level and what he achieves is this strange mixture. (“English,” 
13) 
The author’s limited faith in a united, ‘post-ethnic’ Nigerian nation that 
seems to emerge from these observations substantiate Alexandra Schultheis’s con-
tention that Sozaboy’s voice is most effectively situated “in the cosmopolitan 
space of world literature” (“Global Specters” 34), where the novel has, incidental-
ly, achieved great success (Saro-Wiwa, “English” 14). Read thus, then, the second-
person address could be understood as a call for inclusion in that “human family” 
to which Sozaboy should belong by birth but from which he has been de facto ex-
cluded by means of biopolitical practices which have put his very humanity in 
doubt. Still, Sozaboy’s deracination, alongside the fact that his understanding of 
the ultimate causes for the crumbling of his world remain so superficial, provide 
an image of this character as a liminal figure, who has been excluded from the lo-
cal without (yet) finding effective inclusion in a global human rights regime – if 
not by means of a narration which is certainly presented as a first, emancipatory 
step towards actual empowerment but, tellingly, does not attempt to fictionalise its 
achievement. 
Ken Saro-Wiwa’s coupling of the theme of the horizontal divide between the 
higher and the lower classes with a preoccupation for ethnic subalternity draws at-
tention to the multi-faceted nature of the Nigerian Civil War – a conflict that, it 
emerges, was fought on many ideological fronts. Determining the necessary re-
negotiation of the idea of nationhood, the war brought to the fore the exclusions 
that jeopardised the national mythologies of unity and inclusiveness of both par-
ties involved. As many first-wave works show, even the newly founded Republic 
manifested the paradoxical reproduction of those class- and ethnic-based discrim-
inatory practices which had played central role in justifying secession. Amongst 
the different layers that composed the complex conflictual structure of the Nigeri-
an Civil War, the “women’s war,” to borrow a caption from Buchi Emecheta’s 
Destination Biafra, is one that critics have often been reluctant to analyse, as con-
firmed for example by the relative silence on Emecheta’s novel at least until the 
publication in 1996 of the timely volume edited by Marie Umeh and entirely de-
voted to the writer’s oeuvre.  
Generally speaking, female figures have been excluded, or relegated to minor 
roles, in the predominantly male-authored Nigerian war fiction.15 It is for this rea-
son that Theodora Akachi Ezeigbo has rightly acknowledged the importance of 
Flora Nwapa’s 1975 Never Again (“Vision”). Notwithstanding its undeniable 
weaknesses,16 the novella has indeed been a welcome addition to the Nigerian Civ-
il War corpus, as it has authorised women’s presence as both subjects and objects 
of representation in African war literature. The first example of war fiction written 
by an African woman, Never Again has shed light on women’s ability to resist and 
counter the impact of war on their families and societies. Nwapa’s text, Ezeigbo 
writes, was thus one of the first to counter what she considers a problematic trend 
in the fiction authored by male writers, most of whom 
neglected th[e] aspect of women’s contribution but chose to highlight and exagger-
ate women’s moral laxity, forgetting that this was insignificant in comparison with 
women’s efforts towards winning the war, towards survival of the family, and to-
wards the rearing of children. (“Vision” 483) 
It is irrefutable that some of the novels Ezeigbo cites as “exaggerating wom-
en’s moral laxity,” such as Cyprian Ekwensi’s Survive the Peace, or Isidore Ok-
pewho’s The Last Duty, do indeed provide highly masculinist views of gender rela-
tionships that I also find questionable – if not irritating.17 Still, her outrage at the 
                                               
15 Exceptions to this trend are, for example, the figure of Abigail in Andrew Ekwuru’s 
Songs of Steel, or that of Fatima in Chukwuemeka Ike’s Sunset at Dawn. The latter, however, 
is the only relevant female character in a choral novel which depicts the middle-class 
world of Dr Amilo Kanu and his male entourage. 
16 In her 1991 Fact and Fiction on the Nigerian Civil War, Ezeigbo herself defines Nwapa’s 
rhetorical technique “irritating” and criticises her “unmitigated emotional involvement 
and […] tendency to moralise issues” (96). 
17 For example, the protagonist of Survive the Peace, James Odugo, has had many wartime 
girlfriends, one of whom is now pregnant, but once reunited with his adulterous wife, 
who forgets to ask after her children, criticises her behaviour and justifies his own by remem-
bering that, by custom, he is allowed several wives, “conveniently forget[ting] that none 
portrayal of wives who become unfaithful during wartime and of “sex objects 
whose only means of survival is the selling of their bodies to the highest bidders” 
(483),18 although understandably induced by a preoccupation with the rehabilita-
tion of womanhood in Nigerian literature and society, is to my mind overempha-
sised. Ezeigbo seems to ignore the ironies that complicate the politics of gender 
representation in texts, such as Achebe’s “Girls at War,” Iroh’s Toads of War, or 
I.N.C. Aniebo’s The Anonymity of Sacrifice, where women she would not define “re-
spectable” (484) ultimately act as antithetical counterparts to their war-time sugar-
daddies, customers or husbands, either underscoring their myopic self-
righteousness (Achebe and, at least in part, Iroh) or their appalling violence 
(Aniebo).19 In other works, such as Kalu Okpi’s Biafra Testament, or O.O. 
                                                                                                                                     
of the women he has taken were considered as potential wives at the time” (McLuckie 
Nigerian Civil War Literature 41). Isidore Okpewho’s The Last Duty, which Ezeigbo exoner-
ates in part from criticism (“Vision” 495), is to my mind even more problematic, because 
even the only female character subscribes to the vision of women as hysterically weak 
and luxurious shared by all the male voices who narrate the events. Aku, the wife of an 
unjustly imprisoned man, is indeed presented as a victim both of rich, but impotent, Toje’s 
sexual advances and of her own womanly weakness: “If it was now my lot to be Toje’s 
whore, did I not have a right at least to be purged of my desire – unwilling as I might be 
– as often as it suited him to invite me to play the role? […] I found myself wishing that 
someday he would summon up the power to slake the desire that he was continually 
working up on me!” (162). 
18 On this, see also her essay on the short story genre as explored in Civil War literature 
(Ezeigbo, “Taste of Madness” esp. 202-204). 
19 Achebe’s short story will be analysed below. Iroh’s main character, for his part, changes 
his view on the moral corruptibility of women when he meets Kechi, the woman who has 
a number of sugar daddies but falls in love with him: as he puts it comparing his own 
condition with hers, “[t]he big boss could send you to the battle-front and your death 
with a snap of his fingers. The suddenly wealthy toad could send desperate women run-
ning towards him with another snap of his fingers” (104). One of the two main charac-
ters of Aniebo’s novel is Cyril Odumo, an embodiment of blind violence who beats his 
wife “systematically with his leather belt” for “play[ing] around with officers” (28) – an 
insinuation that is not substantiated at the level of the plot. Interestingly, Odumo’s life is 
saved during the anti-Igbo pogrom by a prostitute he has slept with, an old acquaintance 
who “receive[s] a beating on his behalf” for refusing to tell some Northern rioters his 
ethnic origins (25). 
Enekwe’s Come Thunder, female characters are presented as rare examples of de-
cency in a corrupted society. However, they tend to be mono-dimensional and of-
ten abstracted to embody the stereotypical image of the woman at war as nurturer, 
as “Beautiful Soul” (Elshtain x, qtd. in Nnaemeka 236). Male-authored first-wave 
texts therefore, by generally relegating women to playing such minor or instru-
mental roles, ultimately obliterate their suffering, resilience, and agency. Ezeigbo is 
thus right when she asserts the importance of hearing the war stories “from ‘the 
horse’s mouth’”(229), so as to understand what has remained unsaid in the Nige-
rian war literature written by men. 
* 
“I meant to live at all costs. I meant to see the end of the war” (1), says Kate, the 
narrator of Nwapa’s Never Again. What Ezeigbo has called “the poetics of surviv-
al” (“Vision” 483) is indeed a motif that extends through much of Nwapa’s war 
fiction, whose heroines are invariably presented as responsible for the well-being 
of their husbands and children. Nwapa’s depiction of women during the emergen-
cy of war, on the whole, tends to conform to the above-mentioned gendered view 
that opposes the figure of the nurturing woman to that of the fighting man. I 
would however argue that, albeit not abandoning or disputing the traditional di-
chotomies that war discourse associates with gender difference,20 Nwapa also 
highlights how her women characters’ fights for survival, countering as they do 
the death threats of war, have a clear, if understated, (bio)political validity.  
It is true that, as Jane Bryce has observed, in Nwapa’s Never Again there is 
little “of the political rights and wrongs of the War” (30). However, both in Never 
                                               
20 For an interesting analysis of women’s texts that instead attempt to counter such stere-
otypical discourses, see Pape. 
Again, an “anti-war rhetorical text” (Oha 434), and in the aesthetically more con-
vincing short stories collected in Wives at War and Other Stories, the author’s evident 
emphasis on the domestic sphere does not prevent her from depicting her protag-
onists as well-informed, perceptive figures who often have more insight into the 
war situation than their male counterparts. What is more, Nwapa suggests that the 
domestic is inevitably, and painfully, invaded by the political in a world where bio-
logical life is bound to be caught in the sphere of sovereign influence. In Never 
Again, for example, the narrator recounts how a Civil Defender – “the Intruder,” 
she calls him – knocked on her door in the dead of night and started to search her 
house for infiltrators. “Nothing was private anymore,” Kate comments. “We had 
lost our freedom and democracy. We lost them the day that the Army took over” 
(35).  
It is in this context that the ‘mere’ will to survive at the centre of Nwapa’s 
war texts assumes a political dimension, as it is meant to resist the sovereign’s 
right to lead its subjects to wholesale destruction. This aspect becomes all the 
more evident in the short story “A Certain Death,” published in the collection 
Wives at War and Other Stories, where the woman narrator prevents the suicidal con-
scription of her brother, who has not recovered from the gory death of his wife 
and children during an air raid, by paying a young adventurer to take his place. 
The young man has done it on more than one occasion, and has always managed 
to cheat death and flee from the front. Surviving at all costs, then, becomes for 
Nwapa’s women a means of reasserting ownership of their own lives, as well as of 
those of their family members. In Agambenian terms, it can be seen as an attempt 
to counter the tentacular claims of the sovereign over the private dimension in-
habited by zoē, in order to counter the formation of that realm of indistinction be-
tween the private and the public spheres where life is brought into the orbit of 
sovereign power and thereby subdued to the violence of its decision. Nwapa’s 
works, therefore, must be discussed and interpreted not only in terms of the ‘poet-
ics’ of survival, but also in terms of the ‘politics’ of survival, as they manage to 
show that the efforts of women such as her heroines, by countering the sover-
eign’s primary biopolitical activity, attempted to maintain, or rather reconstruct, 
some form of socio-political order so as to “bring normalcy (or the semblance of 
it) to an abnormal situation” (Nnaemeka 253). 
* 
Chinua Achebe’s short story “Girls at War” offers, I believe, the most interesting 
portrayal of a woman figure in male-authored war fiction, as it represents another 
articulation of the women’s war of survival through the story of Gladys, a young, 
beautiful single woman, who becomes the protégée of sugar daddies from the Bia-
fran elite after things start to turn for the worse in the beleaguered enclave. Ache-
be’s tripartite time frame enumerates the encounters between Gladys and the male 
focaliser Reginald Nwankwo, a civil servant working at the Biafran Ministry of 
Justice. In so doing, Achebe identifies the three main phases of the war, which al-
so signal three main changes in the young woman’s life and aspirations. During 
the “first heady days of warlike preparation” (103), Gladys attempts to join the mi-
litias; at the beginning of the war effort, after being told “to go back to [her] 
school or join the Red Cross,” she has “patch[ed] up with Civil Defence” and is 
briefly shown while she carefully inspects the car of irritated Nwankwo, who is 
not granted the preferential treatment he expected because of his status; but it is 
in the “tight, blockaded and desperate world” of a country about to fall that the 
narration develops. Gladys is now “a beauty queen,” Nwankwo says. She wears 
expensive clothes and “a high-tinted wig” (108). 
Nwankwo is portrayed through an intricate web of ironies that are meant to 
underscore the incongruity between his moralising posture, which no doubt ac-
cords with his institutional role (after all, he works at the Ministry of Justice), and his 
and his colleagues’ actual demeanour as “gay bachelors” in the “swinging town of 
Owerri” (110), from which their wives and children have been evacuated on the 
pretext of air raids. It is thus highly ironical that Nwankwo is offended by the ra-
ther coarse phraseology Gladys employs when referring to sex while he is taking 
her to bed; or that he feels entitled to reproach her for dancing during a party to 
which he himself invited her: “‘I am sorry I didn’t dance,’ he said as they drove 
away. ‘But I swore never to dance as long as this war lasts’” (117). Nwankwo is 
thus an unreliable focaliser, in that his comments on the symbolic relevance of 
Gladys as a “mirror reflecting a society that had gone completely rotten and mag-
goty at the centre” (119) fail to recognise the corruption of the powerful, like him, 
as a potential cause of the presumed amorality he so self-righteously indicts when 
he sees it in others.  
The paternalistic civil servant engages in quasi-missionary attempts to save 
Gladys, making her change her countenance, vocabulary and looks (121), while 
kissing her and mumbling “something about victims of circumstance, which went 
over her head” (120). This talk of victimhood, the reader suspects, would have 
probably been rejected by the young woman, as she never feels the need to excuse 
her behaviour, but rather matter-of-factly points out that hers are conscious 
choices determined by need. The time of great expectations, she comments, 
“done pass. Now everybody want survival. They call it number six.21 You put your 
                                               
21 “Number six” is a pidgin phrase meaning ‘intelligence.’ 
number six; I put my number six. Everything all right” (114-115). Achebe’s 
Gladys is thus an independent woman who, after attempting to challenge tradi-
tional gender roles by deciding not to “go back to her school or join the Red 
Cross” (105), finally adapts to the new, wartime ‘law of demand’ and, through the 
strategic use of her body, finds protection “in the keep of some well-placed gen-
tleman” (109). As she reminds Nwankwo, “‘That is what you men want us to do’” 
(114).22 
The short story ends as the young woman, during an air raid, endeavours to 
rescue a disabled soldier from the car where she is travelling with Nwankwo, while 
the civil servant dives for cover in the bush. After the attack, Nwankwo 
woke up to human noises and weeping and the smell and smoke of a charred 
world. He dragged himself up and staggered towards the source of the sounds. 
From afar he saw his driver running towards him in tears and blood. He saw the 
remains of his car smoking and the entangled remains of the girl and the soldier. 
And he let out a piercing cry and fell down again (123). 
The “charred world” of which Nwankwo becomes finally aware is one where 
words have turned to “noises,” and the entangled “remains” of objects and hu-
man beings are so contiguous as to become ontologically almost indistinguishable. 
However, it is telling that the girl, here presented as a non-conventional agent of 
change,23 does in the end not survive the war, while the powerful man does. In 
                                               
22 Indeed, I do not read Gladys’ retorting comment simply as an attempt to put moral re-
sponsibility for her behaviour on Nwankwo. The reason why I rather prefer to see it as 
an explanation of how she has adapted to the new ‘demands’ of war is due to the fact 
that, very interestingly, it echoes the words she said to the annoyed civil servant while, as 
a member of Civil Defence, she was inspecting his car: “‘Sorry to delay you, sir. But you 
people gave us this job to do’” (104). 
23 Not only does she lead Nwankwo to increased awareness of the logic and consequenc-
es of war through her last, self-immolating decision; she is also able to make him con-
scious of his own inconsistent behaviour – so much so that he will ask his astonished 
driver to pick up the invalid soldier, while he had previously left on the roadside an old 
woman asking for a lift: “’I never give lifts these days’” (109). 
this conclusions, both Gladys and the disabled soldier, notwithstanding their dif-
ferent stories, are opposed to Nwankwo as examples of honourable behaviour. 
However, their comparable moral agency becomes self-evident only in an embrace 
of death which, problematically, sees them lose their struggle for survival. 
* 
Buchi Emecheta’s Destination Biafra is probably the Nigerian war novel that has 
most clearly introduced a gendered perspective on the question of biopolitical vio-
lence. The novel is very ambitious in scope, as it “combines issues of gender and 
sexuality with a very detailed negotiation of national formation and the idea of 
community” (Morrison 12). Part One, which begins with the fictionalisation of the 
General Elections of 1959 and ends with the Biafran Declaration of Independ-
ence, aims at exposing the British colonial and neo-colonial influence on Nigeria, 
while pointing out the structural instability of a country where ethnic tensions 
were manipulated and consecrated to the point of preventing any possibility of 
peaceful governance. It is the figure of Alan Grey, a British military training of-
ficer, who embodies his mother country’s interested presence in Nigeria. Alan 
Grey, interestingly, is also the lover of Emecheta’s main character, Debbie 
Ogedembgbe, the Oxford-educated daughter of the Nigerian Minister of Finance. 
The second part of the novel is set during the wartime period and recounts 
the mission on which Debbie, now a soldier in the federal army, embarks. Saka 
Momoh, a thinly disguised allegorical character who stands for the Nigerian leader 
Gowon, has thought of her as the perfect ambassador to convince Eastern leader 
Chijioke Abosi (alias Chukwuemeka Ojukwu) to renounce his secessionist pro-
jects. Interestingly, his motivations for the choice of Debbie as a peace emissary in 
this “delicate mission” (122) is tinged with sexual innuendos that the protagonist 
does not miss: “[Y]ou can use your feminine charms to break that icy reserve of 
his” (123), suggests Momoh. Debbie’s nightmarish, highly symbolical trek in the 
forests and swamps dividing the two warring countries is of particular relevance 
here: accompanied by a peaceful army of women and children, Debbie and the 
Igbo refugees she is travelling with are on a physical and metaphysical quest for 
peace. The “destination” of the title, it soon becomes clear, is not so much the 
geographical country that claims sovereignty, but rather a theorised symbol, a uto-
pian haven, the ideal of a land that has been decolonised, detribalised, and freed 
from gender discrimination. This is what Debbie, who, as an Itsekiri, is “neither 
Ibo nor Yoruba, nor [is] she Hausa, but a Nigerian” and hence an epitome of na-
tional unity (126), aims at achieving by attempting to talk Abosi into surrendering. 
Needless to say, hers is a quest that is bound to fail, as metaphorically confirmed 
by the death of the orphaned baby that Debbie and the other women have collec-
tively adopted and christened ‘Biafra.’ And when Debbie is finally received by 
Abosi, she is confirmed that her efforts have been useless: as the Biafran leader 
says, “I am sorry if you’ve risked your life for nothing. What good could you have 
done, just you, little you?” (239). 
Emecheta provides a complex negotiation of womanhood that is caught be-
tween subversion and tradition. Debbie’s initial attempts to have a career within 
the army represent an unconventional vocation that is determined by her hope to 
serve her country well, while challenging the stereotypical roles that a patriarchal 
society has in store for her. But when the reader is first presented with the woman 
in uniform, Debbie is caricatured as adopting “an uncharacteristically and ridicu-
lously heartless and macho pose” (Porter 321) in order to counter the derisive 
laughter with which her claims to gender equality are met. While on her mission, 
however Debbie progressively undergoes a process of ‘feminisation,’ and as the 
war draws to a close she aligns with a more traditionally feminine role in her desire 
to bring up the orphaned children of Nigeria. Interestingly, her desire to act as a 
nurturer is however not perceived as a natural prerogative based on biological 
considerations, but is rather the rational choice of an autonomous woman who re-
jects her white lover and claims her right to play whichever role she desires within 
her society – as a woman, but emphatically not as a wife. As critic Ann Marie Ad-
ams has argued, indeed, “the fact that Debbie is not married (and has no intention 
to be married) suggests that a patriarchal family structure will not be reimplement-
ed” (297). Emecheta thus proposes a revision of womanhood and motherhood 
that, while rejecting emulative discourses of ‘masculinisation’ as the sole means to 
achieve parity, reinstates gender difference without conforming to its traditional 
articulation. 
This text plays an essential role within the analysis of the portrayal of the 
sovereign’s biopolitical hold on the body because of the centrality that the act of 
raping, as the form of bodily violence and violation par excellence, assumes in the 
novel. Many commentators have noted that rape is a practice that has often been 
erased both in historical and in literary records of the Nigerian Civil War. In par-
ticular, with the exception of texts such as Eddie Iroh’s thriller Forty-Eight Guns for 
the General and Ben Okri’s “Laughter Beneath the Bridge,” rape does not feature in 
male-authored war literature – a silence that is of course telling, operating as it 
does a selective remembrance and fictionalisation of the historical event that re-
fuses to include the fact of gender violence. Approaching Buchi Emecheta’s nov-
el, instead, the reader is confronted with numerous instances of rape, to which 
young, old, pregnant women, and even nuns, are subjected. The heroine herself is 
assaulted on more than one occasion. Just after accepting Momoh’s assignment, 
Debbie is gang-raped by federal soldiers – a scene reproduced in stark detail in a 
passage that Ezeigbo has described as “unprecedented in Nigerian Civil War liter-
ature” (“Horse” 228): 
She could make out the figure of the leader referred to as Bale on top of her, then 
she knew it was somebody else, then another person. . . . She felt herself bleeding, 
though her head was still clear. Pain shot all over her body like arrows. She felt her 
legs being pulled this way and that, and at times she could hear her mother’s pro-
testing cries. But eventually, amid all the degradation that was being inflicted on 
her, Debbie lost consciousness. (134) 
Critic Tuzyline Jita Allan has noticed that the theme of sexual violence is a 
major preoccupation in Emecheta’s oeuvre, evidencing “at once her rejection of si-
lence in the face of gender oppression and the attendant difficulty of fashioning a 
voice of protest” (208). Destination Biafra, Allan argues, “inaugurates Emecheta’s 
attempt to put women into African rape discourse next to the symbolically rav-
ished body of Africa” – an attempt that, she contends, is however only partially 
successful in that it “forc[es] a compromise that undercuts the centrality of wom-
en’s rape experience in the novel” (215). Since Debbie Ogedembgbe, as noticed 
above, is a figure laden with evident symbolic resonance, her rapes in the novel no 
doubt signify the violation of the ideal of a peaceful, united Nigeria. However, it is 
relevant that Debbie is not the only woman who is raped in the text. Moreover, 
also in the light of the above-mentioned considerations on Emecheta’s innovative 
depiction of womanhood and motherhood, I would argue, with Ann Marie Ad-
ams, that the author manipulates the traditional trope of ‘Mother Africa,’ employ-
ing it 
not as an unproblematic symbol […], but as a positive (and greatly refigured) alter-
native to the neo-colonial ploys of the British and the separatist drives of Nigerian 
males who have torn apart the country in their quest to control the fatherland. 
(288) 
In this context, Adams notes for example that the fact that that the sexual inter-
course between Debbie and Alan is consensual is quite relevant, as it confirms 
that Emecheta, who at times no doubt abstracts the experiences of Debbie’s rapes 
so as to reduce them to violent acts lacking a wholly convincing “emotional cor-
relative” (Allan 216), refuses to conform in toto to the traditional iconography that 
has the raped woman embodying exploited Africa/Nigeria (Adams 298). 
What is more, Emecheta in Destination Biafra introduces another important 
variation to the traditional handling of the rape theme in African literature that 
specifically positions it within the context of war discourse: the perpetrators of 
rape in the novel are indeed not only men, but male soldiers, and they even assault 
a fellow (female) soldier, Debbie herself. This underscores a very important aspect 
in terms of Emecheta’s representation of the biopolitics of the Nigerian Civil War: 
the Nigerian sovereign is invariably, inescapably, male. In this context, women’s 
claims to equality, inclusion and participation within the nation-state are met by 
mockery or outright violence. Emecheta therefore, although not repudiating tout 
court the trope of Mother Africa, appropriates and re-writes it from a perspective 
that aims at highlighting the gendered practices of biopolitical power. Such a 
counter-discourse confronts the personification of the (mother)land as a womanly 
body that, as Florence Stratton has famously argued, “implicitly gives men license 
to exploit, rape, oppress, and dominate nations” (54), and that, by reducing the 
female body to a mere embodying symbol, ultimately “justifies and therefore 
serves to perpetuate the status quo of male domination” (55). Debbie might be a 
symbol, an ideal, but her characterisation is on the whole convincing. In other 
words, she, alongside the other women trekking through swampy lands, is not on-
ly a symbol, but also a human being, a woman – and a woman who has learnt to 
become one. However, the fact that Emecheta, at the end of the novel, positions 
her heroine in a site of uncertain inclusion within the future state testifies to the 
difficulty of imagining an active role for women in a Nigeria that is still far from 
Debbie’s theorised ideal. The Biafra of Debbie’s dreams remains, it seems, a fara-
way destination. 
The powerful opening of Wole Soyinka’s Madmen and Specialists introduces the au-
dience to a play that provides the most challenging re-figuration of biopolitical 
power of Nigerian Civil War literature. Four disabled characters, a choric presence 
known collectively as the Mendicants, are intent on gambling parts of their already 
maimed bodies in a game of dice: 
AAFAA. Three and two, born loser. What did you stake? 
GOYI. The stump of the left arm. 
CRIPPLE. Your last? 
GOYI. No, I’ve got one left. 
BLINDMAN. Your last. You lost your right stump to me yesterday. 
GOYI. Do you want it now or later? 
BLINDMAN. Keep it for now. 
CRIPPLE. When do I get my eye, Aafaa? (223) 
Aafaa, a former chaplain, and the other three, former soldiers, pleaded in-
sanity after narrowly escaping death at the front, and are the by-products of an 
unnamed conflict, the grotesque spectacle met by the passer-by who walks on the 
roadside before the home and surgery of Dr Bero, the Specialist. The latter, as 
stage directions explain, has “lately returned from the wars” (223, emphasis added) 
– a plural that encapsulates and supersedes the Nigerian Civil conflict as the im-
mediate context for dramatic action. A medical doctor in times of peace, after en-
rolling Dr Bero has become a ‘specialist’ in the military Intelligence Section, where 
he will manage to satisfy his desires of total control over the human body. His fa-
ther, Old Man, used instead to be in charge of a convalescent home for those, like 
the Mendicants, whom the war had forced into the threshold between life and 
death. There, to Dr Bero’s dismay, not only did Old Man cure what was left of 
their bodies, but he also took care of their minds: in Dr Bero’s words, “he began 
to teach them to think, think, THINK! Can you picture a more treacherous deed 
than to place a working mind in a mangled body?” (253). Old Man has indeed ini-
tiated the Mendicants into the mysteries of “As,” of which he himself is an “iro-
nizing evangelist” (Jeyifo 152). The man is the founder of this enigmatic pseudo-
religion, whose nature is never explained but rather hinted at in excruciatingly 
fragmentary, elusive, and tautological form throughout the play: “As Was the Be-
ginning, As Is, Now, As Ever Shall Be, World Without” (289). Critics have gener-
ally noted that As defies unambiguous definition: its meanings remain purposely 
vague, being displaced as they are by means of interlacing, baffling metonymic 
chains. In its most easily recognisable articulation, however, As seems to signify 
the faith in the power deriving from the ruthless manipulation of human life, an 
ubiquitous creed that the war(/s) has(/have) only brought to the fore, and of 
which Bero, an agent of the System, has become the epitome. 
In fact, As seems to have no real content, no meaning as such – hence the in-
appropriateness of calling it, as many commentators have done certainly for want 
of a better term, an ‘ideology.’ Exactly as the conjunction of the Christian doxolo-
gy it clearly echoes and mangles (“Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to 
the Holy Ghost; as it was in the Beginning, Is Now and Ever Shall Be, World 
Without End”), it is purely instrumental and constitutively lacks any referent. 
However, by becoming the grammatical subject in the mantra-like formulations of 
its followers, As becomes a simulacrum, a fetish, an all-powerful, if empty, divini-
ty, the brutal force that lies at the basis of all human enterprises: as Old Man ex-
plains, “the System is its mainstay though it wear a hundred masks and a thousand 
outward forms” (287). In a way, thus, As represents the natural human instinct for 
prevarication. It seems therefore coherent that what is sacrificed at its altar (or ra-
ther, at its table), in a grotesque Eucharist that is in fact a cannibalistic – or rather, 
necrophiliac – feast, are the bodies of the soldiers who lost their lives in battle. 
Old Man, indeed, left for the front provocatively stating that he was willing “to try 
and persuade those fools not to waste all that meat” (250), and he then served 
human body parts, after blessing them, to the table of unaware officers, including 
his son – a last supper after which he would be declared insane. Old Man will later 
explain the perverse rationale underlying his ambiguously subversive acts in a 
mocking clue that addresses the audience directly (Harding 93), implicitly assimi-
lating it to the shocked officers to which he offered the delicacy:  
OLD MAN. Your faces, gentlemen, your faces. You should see your faces. And 
your mouths are hanging open. You’re drooling but I am not exactly sure why. Is 
there really much difference? All intelligent animals kill only for food, you know, 
and you are intelligent animals. Eat-eat-eat-eat-eat-Eat! (267) 
Madmen and Specialists, thus, appears to be the dramatic correlative of Soyinka’s be-
lief that “human beings are simply cannibals all over the world, so that their pre-
occupation seems to be eating up one another” (Soyinka in Duerden and Pieterse 
173) – a belief that the Civil War dramatically confirmed. 
Dr Bero is now holding his father captive in his subterranean surgery room, 
an inferno entered after a katabatic voyage which is a constant metaphor in Soyin-
ka’s war literature (Whitehead). There, Old Man is the victim of psychological tor-
ture on the part of his son, who wants him to explain and systematise the contents 
and meanings of a doctrine of which he is, evidently, an unwitting disciple. The 
audience soon comes to know that the officers whom Old Man tricked into the 
cult of As refused to come to terms with the fact of cannibalism as the ultimate 
form of human exploitation representing their role in the war(s): “Oh yes, you 
rushed out and vomited,” Old Man recalls in a conversation with his son. “You 
and the others. But afterwards you said I had done you a favour. Remember?” 
(267). And as Bero himself admits, indeed, 
Afterwards I said why not? What is one flesh from another? So I tried again, just to 
be sure of myself. It was the first step to power you understand. Power in the pur-
est sense. The end of inhibitions. The conquest of the weakness of your too human 
flesh with all its sentiment. (252) 
Old Man’s feast becomes for Dr Bero a gory variation on the theme of the Bak-
thinian banquet, where man triumphs over the world through the act of swallow-
ing – an act that, in this context, denies the difference between human and other 
forms of animal life. 
Old Man is presented as a character who aims at deconstructing the System, 
exposing its violence by forcing its agents to a cannibalism they find repulsive. All 
the same, he does not seem to deny that he “worship[s]” the new god, who 
“abominates humanity – the fleshy part, that is” (266). Furthermore, as Ato Quay-
son has noted in his excellent reading of the play, the gory feast he puts up does 
not counter, nor does it negate, “the mindless illogicality of war, but rather [ex-
tends] that illogicality toward the annulment of all sentiment about what it is to be 
human” (Nervousness, 137). The two figures, father and son, are thus far from anti-
thetical. In Quayson’s words, Old Man’s hospital is in fact 
not diametrically opposed to Dr. Bero’s laboratory as such, but is rather dialectical-
ly related to it. It represents an overlap and counterpoint to Bero’s torture cham-
ber, and each of them represents the instrumentalization of biopower […] for dif-
ferent effects. (134) 
Indeed, what Bero calls his father’s “bed-ridden audience” (252), here repre-
sented by the Mendicants who have been under his care, have not been taught to 
“think” for self-emancipatory purposes.24 On the contrary, the Mendicants are 
meant to be employed by Old Man as instruments of subversion. The coupling of 
their disabled bodies, signs of the consequences of a war logic, with their thinking 
minds explains why the Mendicants are the only who are able to challenge the 
workings of the System – from within, of course, since, as Old Man clearly states, 
there is no way out of the System. To quote again from Quayson, their condition 
“helps them articulate the dominant logic of war within their own bodies and to 
subvert this logic by the resituation of their fragmented bodies as sites of thought” 
(Nervousness, 136). The Mendicants are therefore “the cyst in the System that irri-
tates, the foul gurgle of the cistern, the expiring function of a faulty cistern” (287), 
the “heresiarchs of the System arguing questioning querying weighing puzzling in-
sisting rejecting” (288). In a hammering, climactic passage which leads to the open 
                                               
24 In fact, they claim that it was his proselytising that, paradoxically, made them insane 
(253-4). 
ending of the play, Old Man rehearses the epithets that identify such “heresi-
archs,” literally deconstructing the language on which all human ideologies, reli-
gions, and institutions are founded: 
OLD MAN (his voice has risen to a frenzy). Practise, Practise, Practise . . . on the cyst 
in the system. […] you cyst, you cyst, you splint in the arrow of arrogance, the dog 
in dogma, tick of a heretic, the tick in politics, the mock of democracy, the mar of 
marxism, a tic of the fanatic, the boo in buddhism, the ham in Mohammed, the 
dash in the criss-cross of Christ, a dot on the i of ego an ass in the mass, the ash in 
ashram, a boot in kibbutz, the pee of priesthood, the peepee of perfect priesthood, 
oh how dare you raise your hindquarters you dog of dogma and cast the scent of 
your existence on the lamppost of Destiny you HOLE IN THE ZERO of 
NOTHING! (292) 
Old Man is here interrupted by Cripple, a figure who articulates a voice of 
internal dissent and who now repeatedly says he wants to ask a question. The par-
adoxical nature of Old Man’s dogmatic resistance to the dogmatic violence of the 
System becomes finally manifest when he orders the Mendicants to “shut that 
gaping hole or we fall through it” (292). Old Man, after putting on the surgeon’s 
coat, cap, and gloves, picks up a scalpel and approaches the table where Cripple is 
now hold down by the others, in a synaesthetic will to “taste just what makes a 
heretic tick” (293). When he is about to cut him open, however, Dr Bero enters 
the surgery and shoots him. Old Man “spins, falls face upwards on the table as the 
CRIPPLE slides to the ground from under him” (293), substituting his designated victim 
on the altar of As. This enigmatic open ending resists univocal interpretation, but 
might be read as suggesting that Dr Bero, by preventing his father’s act of annihi-
lation, aims to reassert his own exclusive power to “control lives” (279), thereby 
reclaiming his quasi-divine right to decide on the life of human beings, while also 
getting rid of “the last proof of the human in [him]” (265), of the man who kept 
on reminding him he was not omnipotent (282). Viewed this way, the play would 
therefore reinstate at the level of the plot the god-like power of an unrestrained 
sovereign that cannot, will not be countered – not even by a similarly biopolitical 
form of resistance. However, the very fact that Dr Bero seeks validation of his 
power seems to hint at an ultimate, if well-disguised, powerlessness. And, as 
Achille Mbembe has remarked, it is from powerlessness that the most vicious sit-
uations of violence arise (Postcolony 133). 
Ato Quayson has argued that the representation of disability triggers a short-
circuit in the dominant protocols of literary representation – a process he has 
termed “aesthetic nervousness,” whereby the reader is forced to negotiate the rela-
tionship between the domains of the ethical and the aesthetic, which become ana-
lytically inseparable. Indeed, he remarks, since the re-presentation of the disabled 
is something “always having an ethical dimension that cannot be easily subsumed 
under the aesthetic structure,” it inevitably orients towards the “active ethical 
core” of the literary text (19). Given these considerations, it is no surprise that Ni-
gerian Civil War literature is replete with crippled bodies and demented minds, as 
their very presence in a narrative of war, the ‘maiming’ human activity par excellence, 
has of course the disturbing potential to elicit ethical reflection over the conse-
quences of biopolitical violence on humanity as such. Mainly through the typolo-
gies of disability representation that Quayson has called “disability as moral test” 
(37),25 “disability as the interface with otherness (race, class, sexuality, and social 
identity)” (39)26 and “disability as moral deficit/evil” (42),27 a number of first-wave 
                                               
25 Suffice it to recall the invalid soldiers of Eddie Iroh’s Toads of War and of Chinua 
Achebe’s “Girls at War,” or the figures of the crippled Job and Duzia in Andrew 
Ekwuru’s Songs of Steel and Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Sozaboy respectively. 
26 A telling example might be Odibo, in Isidore Okpewho’s The Last Duty, a cripple who 
is constantly brutalised by his powerful uncle, Toje. A character like Saro-Wiwa’s Sozaboy 
somehow invites this kind of reading as well, because even if he states that he was good 
authors have indeed confronted the ethical quandaries that became manifest with 
the traumatic madness of war. 
Madmen and Specialists is the most thoroughgoing attempt to view the war(s) – 
that is, war discourse – through the prism of disability. Not only does it feature 
the most numerous group of physically disabled characters of Nigerian war fic-
tion; it also presents madness as the pervasive, if ambivalent, condition of a socie-
ty at war – a condition from which only the women of the play seem to be, at least 
in part, excluded. When Si Bero, the Specialist’s sister, discovers how her brother 
has desecrated the earth by consuming human flesh, she is told that she should 
stay in her “little world” of ignorance: “Don’t come out from where you’re safe. 
(Quietly.) Or sane,” Dr Bero warns her (252). It also bears noting that in the play 
insanity, as a status, is at times pleaded (as is the case for the Mendicants), other 
times feigned (as Aafaa’s St Vitus spasms seem to be), or again imposed and re-
jected (as in the case of Old Man).The concept thus assumes multiple connota-
tions that problematise the possibility of individuating with clarity each individu-
al’s role within the play, and the power relations by which he lives. What is more, 
it is difficult to understand to what extent the ‘madness’ of the title overlaps with 
those ‘specialised’ practices of violence on the body that, far from being Dr Bero’s 
exclusive prerogative, are perpetrated by all the male characters in the play. This is 
confirmed by Aafaa’s words in a scene where, presumably aping Dr Bero’s acts of 
torture, he provides a disturbing pantomimic reproduction of the Latin dictum 
                                                                                                                                     
at school (11), the reader often has the feeling that his naïveté is the result not only of 
poor education and alienation, but also of “limited intelligence” (North, 102). 
27 Of which two examples are the above-mentioned Toje, the exploitative, and impotent, 
Big Man of Okpewho’s The Last Duty, or the figure of one-eyed Chuma Mong in Okpi’s 
Biafra Testament. 
“Rem Acu Tetigisti” by threatening Goyi with a ‘needle’ while at the same time 
appropriating Old Man’s philosophising vocabulary. He then tells Goyi: “[t]hink 
not that I hurt you but that Truth hurts. We are all seekers after truth. I am a Spe-
cialist in truth” (230). In other words, it looks as if all the male characters of the 
play, in different guises and for different reasons, are both madmen and special-
ists.  
In this context, the representation of the Mendicants is particularly complex, 
as it does not portray them simply as victims of the Beros, but rather emphasises 
their corruptibility and connivance with the very powers they are subjected to. 
Aafaa might well state, referring to Old Man, that “if we have anything to thank 
it’s him down there” (241), but it is they who, on Dr Bero’s request, imprisoned 
him “down there.” Cripple, “the dreamer” (292), admits that he collaborates with 
Bero in the hope that he will perform a miracle on his disabled body (260), and 
while Goyi and Blindman meet this revelation with consensual silence, Aafaa, 
their leader (or the “quickest of the underdogs” [268], as Old Man used to call 
him) is puzzlingly outraged by it. This leaves the audience wondering what are the 
reasons that lead him to obey Dr Bero: while claiming independence from his will, 
still – perhaps out of fear, or ambition – he remains his greatest supporter. The 
Mendicants’ inconsistent attitude towards the Beros is confirmed when it becomes 
clear that, if on the one hand they hope that the Specialist will give them back ful-
ly-abled bodies, on the other they also fantasise about the day when Old Man will 
take them on a circus world tour, as he once promised: a “Travelling Exhibition of 
As Grotesques.” They do not appear to grasp the instrumental violence that 
would be implied by this display of their disabilities in a freak show, and Cripple, 
the only one who was offended when Old Man first told them about his project, 
apologised straight after being explained that “Grotesque only meant Greatest” 
(284). Ultimately, what emerges from the portrayal of the power relationships be-
tween the Mendicants and the Beros is that, either as Dr Bero’s “watchdogs” or as 
Old Man’s “underdogs” (268), they nevertheless remain confined to a status of ex-
ploitable sub-humanity. And in both cases, they are only partially aware of their 
condition.  
Disturbingly, however, shared sub-humanity is not equated with solidarity. 
The politics of representation of the play are indeed further complicated by the 
self-defeating violence that characterises the relationships within the group of the 
Mendicants. Although Aafaa reminds Bero that they are “a team – one for all and 
all for one” (241), in fact they continuously threaten each other, either verbally or 
physically, in pantomimic or actual fights where rattles, staffs, and crutches, signs 
of common disability, become the very weapons they use against one another 
(238). The Mendicants thus constitute a nervous site of “failed synthesis between 
opposing ideological standpoints” (Quayson, Nervousness 144), figures who fail to 
articulate a counter-discourse but are in fact liminally standing between different 
discourses of prevarication, and participative of both. The stark depiction of this 
violence-dominated world recalls Achille Mbembe’s theorisation of postcolonial 
sovereignty as an intimate mode of domination, where the belonging of both 
dominated and tyrants to the same episteme requires the analyst to go beyond the 
binary categories used in standard interpretations of regimes of power so as to de-
tect its convivial nature (Postcolony, ch. 3). A conviviality that, in Madmen and Special-
ist, is cannibalistic – or rather, as seen above, necrophiliac. 
Quayson, following Foucault, has argued that bio-power as portrayed in 
Madmen and Specialists has the aim of producing docile bodies (Quayson, Nervousness 
134). However, it seems to me that the peculiar brands of postcolonial violence on 
the body that Soyinka dramatises here teeter on the fine line dividing two different 
forms of power on human life, which are interwoven so as to become virtually in-
distinguishable: on the one hand, we see Old Man’s Foucauldian attempts to posi-
tively discipline his apostles; on the other, we see Dr Bero’s absolutistic will of to-
tal control, manifested through the power to give death and make the most of it 
through the consumption of human flesh. Interestingly, Old Man’s regulatory en-
terprise proves ultimately unsuccessful, as the Mendicants are unpredictable and 
unreliable, certainly the objects of his manipulative practices but in fact not so 
docile, changing, as they do, allegiances with the wind. Similarly, Dr Bero’s dis-
turbing, unrestrained practices of power for power’s sake produce no real victor, 
resulting in a mutual “zombification” (Mbembe’s term) that leaves all actors impo-
tent. No one sheds a tear at Old Man’s sacrifice: after a “momentary freeze on stage,” 
the Mendicants “break gleefully in their favourite song” (293). Dr Bero is thus for a 
moment at the centre of the postcolonial universe. Still, one cannot help but think 
that his triumph is bound to be ephemeral, his death perhaps soon met with equal 
mirth. This is confirmed when the Old Women, herbalists who have shared their 
knowledge of the secrets of the earth with Si Bero, throw glowing embers into the 
store where Si Bero has collected her herbs and roots. Their wisdom cannot be 
shared with dangerous Dr Bero. As the Old Women walk away, all the other char-
acters, innocent Si Bero included, are in the subterranean surgery that will soon 
burst into flames. As Jane Wilkinson has beautifully put it, in this “apocalyptic 
conclusion”  
good and evil are finally put to the test of fire. […] What will now emerge is once 
again left open, but the seeds for the resurgence of a new, more human existence 
from the ashes of the purificatory fire have at least been sown. (“Daring” 610) 
Biafra surrendered on January 13, 1970. The armistice that followed, however, did 
not lead to the restoration of an unproblematic normality in the country. On the 
contrary, it ushered in a season of uncertain peace, whose more or less latent vio-
lence has been often depicted in post-war Nigerian literature as becoming a con-
stitutive trait of the country’s society. Unsurprisingly then, while certain first-wave 
works, such as Elechi Amadi’s Estrangement and Kalu Okpi’s Biafra Testament, end 
imagining symbolic gestures of inter-ethnic understanding and mutual help, thus 
hinting at the need to overcome divisiveness so as to recreate a peaceful commu-
nity, a great number of first-wave texts tend instead to resist such a conciliatory 
rhetoric. In this section, I would like to examine briefly some of the narrative and 
thematic strategies employed by first-wave writers in order to signify the perpetua-
tion of the exception in a state where the “continuation of civil war by other 
means” took place (Feuser, “Nothing” 72). 
On some occasions, this idea of unending conflict is conveyed formally, ei-
ther by means of narratological choices that prevent aesthetic closure or through 
the narration of a plot whose time frame is not co-extensive with the duration of 
the war but is rather embedded in it, so that the narrative closure chronologically 
precedes the end of the war. Exemplary instances of the first category are works 
such as O.O. Enekwe’s Come Thunder, or Chukwuemeka Ike’s Sunset at Dawn, 
whose open endings leave the narrative suspended at a time when the Biafran de-
feat is clearly looming but the war is still going on. Enekwe’s main character, the 
boy soldier Meka, is portrayed as he starts a presumably suicidal run under federal 
fire, while Ike’s text draws to a conclusion with the image of Mr Akwaelumo div-
ing for cover under a bed during a very violent Nigerian air raid.28 Aniebo’s novel 
The Anonymity of Sacrifice, for its part, is perhaps the clearest representative of the 
second category, as it recounts the clash between two members of the Biafran ar-
my who both die way before the end of the hostilities. Their personal conflict, the 
main object of narration, has been resolved in death, but the last words of the text 
hint at the fact that a bigger, bloodier conflict extends outside the boundaries of 
the text: “[m]eanwhile, the civil war continued” (Aniebo 115). These novels, by 
portraying the war as a non-entirely-finite phenomenon, structurally hint at the 
state of permanently deferred normalisation which was the hallmark of Gowon’s 
post-war rule and that, during the military dictatorships of the following decades, 
would become the sign of a country steeped in a perennial war-like condition. As 
Andrew Ekwuru writes by way of conclusion of his Songs of Steel, indeed, “alt-
hough the fighting was over, the conflict still remained. And that, in fact, was the 
trouble” (160). 
                                               
28 Ike’s last chapter is followed by a one-page “Postscript” (246) where the author does 
tell of the Biafran surrender: “From Biafranism back to Nigerianism. Each person sought 
his own hideout, to bury his discarded Biafran skin.” Hugh Hodges has read the post-
script as emphasising an underlying desire, which this work shares with “much Biafran 
War fiction, to close the book on the episode – a desire encapsulated in the title of Flora 
Nwapa’s Never Again” (11). I would argue, however, that the postscript is much more 
ambivalent and open-ended than that. Indeed, Ike also recounts that the fighting madly 
continued in certain sectors even after the sun of the Biafran flag had set forever. Moreo-
ver, he conveys the pain, and difficulty, of this “instant moulting,” the tone being rather 
grim – particularly if compared with the very ironic, even sarcastic, narrative voice that 
has been employed so far. In this regard, it is telling that even Never Again, notwithstand-
ing its outspoken title, does in fact not portray a fictional pacification but ends as the war 
is still going on. The “desire” for closure that Hodges talks about is there, of course, but 
the absence of any facile cathartic reconstruction of a national community at the level of 
the plot must be registered.  
The theme of the perpetuation of the emergency has been on occasions ex-
plored explicitly by first-wave authors. This is the case of texts such as Achebe’s 
“Civil Peace” or Cyprian Ekwensi’s Survive the Peace, whose oxymoronic titles are 
per se evocative of a situation where ‘war’ is only formally replaced by ‘peace,’ but 
an informal war of survival still rages on. Ekwensi’s novel Survive the Peace, for ex-
ample, opens with the symbolic portrayal of civilians picking up the guns and 
ammunition that Biafran soldiers have promptly discarded after the Biafran sur-
render (11). The obsession for the phenomenon of armed robbery that pervades 
this work and that, by means of this image, is directly connected to the war, is also 
at the centre of Femi Osofisan’s play Once upon Four Robbers, which dramatises this 
same theme defining it as “an apt metaphor of our age” (Osofisan, “Notes”). The 
continuity between the war and the post-war uneasy peace is made evident in 
Osofisan’s work through the display of violence, the still powerful presence of the 
military, and the representation of the life of the postcolonial subject as waste, as a 
condition of living death. As one of the characters, Angola, tells Major, employing 
an imagery of decay and filth that will be on occasions retrieved in contemporary 
Nigerian writing, 
What are you if not a corpse? Tell me. You were born in the slum and you didn’t 
know you were a corpse? Since you burst out from the womb, all covered in slime, 
you’ve always been a corpse. You fed on worms and left-overs, your body nude 
like a carcass in the government mortuary, elbowing your way among other corpses 
and the stink is all over you like a flodded [sic] cemetery in Lagos . . . (10) 
Chinua Achebe’s short story “Civil Peace” is also concerned with the repre-
sentation of post-war violence. The main character, Jonathan Iwegbu, is robbed of 
the twenty-pound ex-gratia award he has just received for turning in all his Biafran 
money. And in the night when this happens, while the gentlemen thieves patiently 
wait outside Jonathan’s house to be given all his money, the leader tells their un-
fortunate victim: “We no be bad tief. We no like to make trouble. Trouble done 
finish. War done finish and all the katakata wey de for inside. No Civil War again. 
This time na Civil Peace. Na be so?”(87). The man’s poor pun, alongside his 
threats to call the soldiers to settle the dispute between him and Jonathan, encap-
sulate some of the paradoxes of post-war Nigeria. And yet, notwithstanding this 
little tragedy that befalls him, Jonathan Iwegbu does not lose heart: not only, he 
reasons, has he come out of the war with “five inestimable blessings – his head, 
his wife Maria’s head and the heads of three out of their four children” (82), but 
the blood-soaked earth is also metaphorically returning what it took during the 
war. The bicycle Jonathan had buried a year before “in the little clearing in the 
bush where the dead of the camp, including his own youngest son, were buried” is 
still intact when he digs it up again (83). And the land is also tellingly fertile, in a 
world where life and death are contiguous and inextricably linked, in a cyclical al-
ternation of mortality and consumption that might restore, in the long run, some 
form of normality: 
His children picked mangoes near the military cemetery and sold them to soldiers’ 
wives for a few pennies – real pennies this time – and his wife started making 
breakfast akara balls for neighbours in a hurry to start life again. (84) 
“Civil Peace” is thus a tribute to the resilience of the vanquished, to the courage 
of those who, despite all odds, were willing to fight this new war of survival in an 
unjust state.  
The texts discussed so far have pointed out that connivances and what Mbembe 
has defined as the people’s “desires for majesty” (131) problematise any facile de-
scription of the power relationships emerging out of the postcolonial exception as 
a polarised spectrum of stable positionalities. Also, they have highlighted that the 
Agambenian discussion of bare life, not contemplating the possibility of resistance 
in the face of sovereign violence, seems to underestimate the potential of those 
small acts of defiance that, albeit perhaps incapable of subverting the logic of ex-
pendability on which sovereign power rests, have nonetheless the potential to 
suggest that such a logic is less incontrovertible than generally believed. 
Chimamanda Adichie’s Half of a Yellow Sun is a novel that can be usefully inscribed 
in this discussion on resistance and non-citizenship, the shattered dream of a Bia-
fran republic being re-imagined through the depiction of acts of survival in a con-
text where the happy pre-war existence of its predominantly upper-middle-class 
characters is put to the brutal test of war. Weaving together questions of gender, 
class, race and ethnicity, this Orange prize-winning novel is a character-driven nar-
rative that covers the time span of a decade, from the early years of Nigerian in-
dependence to the immediate aftermath of the war. The events narrated in the 
novel are seen through the eyes of three different focalisers: Ugwu, a child from 
the village who at the outset starts working as a houseboy for university lecturer 
Odenigbo; Olanna, Odenigbo’s beautiful and gentle girlfriend, the daughter of a 
wealthy Igbo businessman; and Richard, the Englishman who has fallen in love 
with Igbo-Ukwu art and with Olanna’s confident, if less pretty, twin sister, 
Kainene.29  
The carefully structured plot is divided into four parts, the first and third of 
which are set in the early 60s, while the second and fourth are set in the late 60s. 
Such a juxtaposition interrupts the linearity of narrative development, thus em-
phatically pitting the relative quiet of the pre-war life against the horrors that take 
place on a wider national scale and are recounted in Parts Two and Four. The 
second section of Half of a Yellow Sun begins on the day of the first 1966 coup, an 
event that is seen as throbbing “with possibility, with newness” (126). The politi-
cal situation, however, soon deteriorates as Adichie depicts, in quick sequence, the 
gory death of Olanna’s relatives in Kano at the hands of a Muslim neighbour dur-
ing the anti-Igbo riots, the arrival of the first Igbo refugees, “limping and defeat-
ed” ciphers of bare life (145), in the Eastern Region, the Biafran secession and the 
beginning of the war. As the federals enter the university town of Nsukka, the first 
of a series of displacements force Odenigbo, Olanna, little Baby and Ugwu to 
move progressively towards the heart of Biafra, in a shrinking territory that gets 
increasingly crowded and punctuated with refugee camps. While in the third sec-
tion Adichie takes her readers back in time to explain the reasons for the hostility 
among her main characters that has been perceptible in Part Two, the fourth, and 
longest, section of the book is set again during the war. Then, familial unity is re-
stored while the conflict rages on and finally draws to a close, very much to the 
bewilderment of Adichie’s patriotic characters, who up to the very last believe that 
they “will win this thing” (397). It is in this section that Kainene forgives Olanna 
                                               
29 For an analysis of the relationship between Richard and Kainene in terms that recon-
sider how the construction of the postcolonial exotic is reworked in the novel, see Krish-
nan, “Abjection.” 
and Richard’s intercourse – an act that, for its part, was Olanna’s revenge against 
Odenigbo, who had betrayed her with Amala, the village girl who later gave birth 
to his baby girl (250).30 The highly traumatic events that both twins witness after 
the beginning of the war will indeed lead Kainene to recognise that “[t]here are 
some things that are so unforgivable that they make other things easily forgivable” 
(347). 
The fact that Adichie’s main characters are educated, upper-middle-class 
members of the Nigerian elite when the war breaks out clearly posits them as fig-
ures whose chances of surviving in Biafra are much higher than those of the ma-
jority of their fellow countrymen and women. They can rely on high-placed con-
nections and have friends and family who send them money and goods from 
abroad. Their social status guarantees per se their entitlement to a number of privi-
leges: at the beginning of the war, for example, Olanna manages to skip the cue at 
the hospital by only “keep[ing] her English accent crisp and her head held high” 
(263). Like the other Biafrans, Adichie’s characters are de facto citizens of nowhere: 
targeted as expendable lives on the part of the federals, they emphatically reject 
their Nigerian identity and citizenship to embrace proudly the Biafran dream, sup-
porting a fledgling country that, however, is in fact a stillborn and does not, will 
never, grant them any form of rights protection. They refuse to abandon the new-
ly proclaimed country using their Nigerian passports, as Olanna and Kainene’s 
parents have done, her mother “wip[ing] her eyes with her palm, although there 
were no tears” (189). Still, also as a consequence of the above-mentioned expedi-
                                               
30 For interesting interpretations of the centrality that love relationships and the language 
of sex and intimacy play in a novel that Adichie has provocatively defined “more a love 
story than a war story” (“African ‘Authenticity’” 53), see Norridge and Strehle. 
ents to which they can resort, none of them dies the undignified death of the 
camp inhabitant, as they manage to circumvent the reduction of their families to 
those extreme forms of bare life that, on the threshold between human and inhu-
man, are inevitably doomed to death. This does not mean that Adichie’s work re-
jects the Agambenian discussion on the exception and bare life tout court, as John 
Marx seems to suggest in his analysis of Half of a Yellow Sun as an example of 
failed-state fiction (612). Rather, it registers, contra Agamben, the importance of 
factors such as class and education in aiding the deferral of the transition to in-
creasingly pathetic forms of bare life. Moreover, it sheds light on the ways in 
which non-citizens can performatively reassert their right to a decent, happy exist-
ence – an aspect that, as noticed in the Introduction, is one of the blind spots of 
Agamben’s oeuvre. 
In this context, it is particularly women who are seen as capable, if not of in-
terrupting, at least of delaying such a continuous process of brutalisation of the 
human. Kainene’s entrepreneurial spirit is not dampened in the emergency: the 
woman, who used to work as an army contractor with a licence to import stock-
fish, is now in charge of a refugee centre, to which she delivers the precious pro-
tein- and salt-rich food (343). Olanna manages as well, initially with some difficul-
ty, to adapt to her new condition, in the process becoming increasingly independ-
ent from her partner, the self-confident Odenigbo on whom she relied blindly be-
fore the war. The decision that marks her transition into a sphere of self-reliant re-
sistance is so distant from any rhetorical depiction of the war heroine that it might 
appear, at first sight, even trivial: she makes soap. This happens after a series of 
very violent federal air raids, when Olanna comes to realise that 
[i]f she had died, if Odenigbo and Baby and Ugwu had died, the bunker would still 
smell like a freshly tilled farm and the sun would still rise and the crickets would 
still hop around. The war would continue without them. Olanna exhaled, filled 
with a frothy rage. It was the very sense of being inconsequential that pushed her 
from extreme fear to extreme fury. She had to matter. She would no longer exist 
limply, waiting to die. Until Biafra won, the vandals would no longer dictate the 
terms of her life. (280) 
And to confirm all this, she makes soap. The odd-smelling mash made of ashes, wa-
ter and palm oil becomes a veritable symbol of resistance, marking a victory 
against the logic that has declared her expendability. However tiny, this success is 
indeed emblematic in that Olanna refuses to consider waste as something that – 
like human lives in the exception – is “inconsequential.” On the contrary, it gives 
it another, useful, shape, while positing Olanna as a self-sufficient agent who does 
no longer rely on class prerogatives.31 
The importance of this episode becomes evident if compared with Olanna’s 
early reactions to the violence of war in the form of bitter regret for the bourgeois 
normality left behind. The first air raid she is victim of, for example, takes place – 
ironically enough – during her open-air wedding reception. The white dress that 
should be a signifier of happiness metamorphoses into a threat, an easy target that 
her friend Okeoma covers up with his army shirt.32 During this symbolic scene, 
that concludes Part Two presaging the bleak, abnormal times lying ahead, Olanna 
remains numb, as if she was not willing to acknowledge, as if she could not come 
                                               
31 It is thus significant that some time later, when Olanna puts on her wig in an attempt 
to impress the soldier she is bribing to prevent Ugwu’s conscription, Ugwu notices that 
the wig, “which she hardly wore these days[,] […] was lopsided on her head” (351-
352).This vaguely grotesque detail signifies not only her progressive avoidance to rely on 
her privileged status, but also the incongruence inherent in attempting to do so in a con-
text where people are dying of starvation. 
32 The character of Okeoma is inspired to the figure of poet-soldier Christopher Okigbo, 
who died in Nsukka in 1967 during military action. 
to terms with, the enormity of what has happened. She neatly folds Okeoma’s uni-
form and puts it on a chair, and as the chapter ends she is still wearing her dress, 
cutting a slice of the wedding cake that no one but her has been willing to taste 
(204). This character has little in common with the combative woman who, some 
time later, will make soap, delighted by “the sweat that trickled under her arms, 
[…] the surge of vigour that made her heart thump” (280). And it is telling that 
the agonistic development of Olanna’s character is emphatically pitted against 
Odenigbo’s change – a change which proceeds in the very opposite direction. The 
once charismatic man who exuded self-confidence and revolutionary enthusiasm 
is confronted, after his mother’s death, with a human vulnerability he had never 
experienced before. Odenigbo, differently from Olanna, does not manage to adapt 
to the disorder of the emergency, and will never find a role in an increasingly de-
politicised environment that challenges and asks to find alternatives to any re-
ceived notion of the political and of political agency. 
It is evident that Adichie, through the depiction of her central characters, 
does not acquiesce to the representation of life in the exception as inevitably, or 
homogeneously, reduced to its most debased state. However, she does provide 
some images of a life that has been stripped bare of any human semblance, in par-
ticular towards the ending of the book, when Kainene shows Olanna what she 
cynically calls “the Point of No Return” (347) – the rooms of the school convert-
ed to refugee centre that are inhabited by the moribund. 
[Olanna] didn’t know what the smell was but it was enlarging and she could almost 
see it, a foul, brown cloud. She felt faint. They went into the first classroom. About 
twelve people were lying on bamboo beds, on mats, on the floor. No one of them 
reached put to slap away the fat flies. The only movement Olanna saw was that of 
a child sitting by the door: he unfolded and refolded his arms. […] 
‘That woman is dead. We have to get her removed,’ Kainene said. 
‘No!’ Olanna blurted, because that woman with the steady stare could not be 
dead. But Kainene meant another woman, who lay face-down on the floor, with a 
thin baby clutching her back. Kainene walked over and plucked the baby away. She 
went outside and called out, ‘Father! Father! One for burial,’ and then sat on the 
steps outside and held the baby. The baby should have cried. (348) 
The author avoids lingering too long on similar scenes – the one just reported, the 
most explicit of the book, consists of a couple of pages in a paperback edition of 
more than 400. Moreover, Kainene’s pragmatic comments function as counter-
points to such emotionally charged images – a choice that aims at preventing ex-
cessive sentimentalism in the portrayal of a condition that, as Agamben has 
shown, is on the limits of the testifiable (Remnants). In so doing, Adichie provides 
a negotiation of the complexities inherent in the ethics and politics of representa-
tion of the de-humanised human that, very importantly, goes hand in hand with 
an explicit point often reiterated in the novel and concerning the instrumental, and 
dubiously cathartic, Western depiction of Africa through an iconography of sa-
credness (cf. Palmberg and Petersen 96). Therefore, I do not agree with Brenda 
Cooper’s claims that Adichie, while “outraged by the distorted representations of 
Africa[,][…] is sucked into the discourse which produces them” (150) because of 
her graphic portrayals of starving refugees, or of the gruesome events of 1966. 
Cooper argues that passages such as the one reported above contribute to the 
Western archive of negative images of the continent, and do not add to the read-
er’s knowledge of Africa. On the contrary, it seems to me that Adichie’s feat lies 
in the fact that she resists fetishisation and essentialisation by juxtaposing images 
of powerlessness and violence with equally true images of resistance and solidarity. 
Thus, for example, during the Northern pogrom portrayed in the second section 
of the book, while Hausa Abdulmalik brutally slaughters Olanna’s relatives, crying 
that “It was Allah’s will!,” Hausa Mohammed brings Olanna to safety, murmuring 
that “Allah will never forgive this” (148). 
As Ugwu writes in the book where he recounts the story of the Biafran na-
tion, of a nation that never was, the fact of starvation as an indecent but legitimate 
federal weapon of war heightened the visibility of the civil conflict on the interna-
tional stage. In one of the eight snippets from Ugwu’s book that are interlaced 
with the main narrative line, the reader is told that it was starvation that “made the 
people of the world take notice,” that “made Zambia and Tanzania and Ivory 
Coast and Gabon recognize Biafra,” that “brought Africa into Nixon’s American 
campaign.” Again, it was starvation, Ugwu/Adichie more polemically adds, that 
“aided the careers of photographers” (237) – a connection between fame of the 
Self and death of the Other that is, to say the least, problematic.  
The aspect of the Western humanitarian depiction of Africa is altogether 
missing in first-wave war fiction. The importance it is accorded in Adichie’s text 
no doubt derives from her a posteriori awareness that Biafra marked a pivotal mo-
ment in the formation of the stereotypical “iconography of famine” (Campbell) 
that has been increasingly employed in Western humanitarian circuits to mobilise 
shame by means of the metonymical portrayal of African food crises through fig-
ures of children with bloated bellies and large, supplicating eyes. Indeed, the pic-
tures of the “starving children of Biafra war” made it to the front cover of the US 
magazine Life on July, 12 1968, once the humanitarian crisis had achieved alarming 
proportions.33 Adichie writes in an era in which the language of human rights has 
                                               
33 The feature on Biafra was written by journalist Michael Mok, who later published his 
account of the war in Biafra Journal, a book illustrated with black-and-white pictures taken 
by photojournalists such as Hubert le Campion, Terence Spencer and others. 
become increasingly dominant in international politics, and which has seen, not 
incidentally, a proliferation of such depoliticising representations of the African 
continent. In her novel, she thus takes on the task of exposing the paradoxes in-
herent in humanitarian projects that, ostensibly aimed at resolving the predica-
ments they represent, deny the agency to their silent objects of representation. It is 
thus unsurprising that Half of a Yellow Sun is the first Biafran novel to pay consid-
erable attention to the phenomenon of humanitarian journalism, the encounter 
between two US reporters and Richard being devoted an entire chapter. The two 
reporters, “Charles the plump one” and “Charles the redhead” (368) are two rep-
resentatives of the same category, epitomes of Western views of Africa that are 
different but, the author suggests, similarly suspicious. The former, more sympa-
thetic, gives candies to children, takes pictures of “lovely smile[s]” (270). The latter 
is an outright racist and staunch supporter of the US policy of non-intervention in 
Nigerian internal affairs. What the narrative implies, however, is that the two share 
equally superficial, if divergent, views of the peculiarities of the country’s situation 
– views that are either pseudo-missionary, as is the case of “the plump one,” or 
pseudo-imperialist, as in the case of his colleague. 
Interestingly, the chapter ends with a poem, penned by Ugwu, that addresses 
a US (/Western) readership reminding them of the Life pictures, taken in Biafra by 
the likes of the two Charleses. Adichie is probably not at her best when writing 
poetry. However, the relevance of these verses lies in the fact that they suggest 
that the explicit portrayal of the spectacle of starving children has voyeuristic un-
dertones. The author thus points out the dangers of the stark representation of 
bare (and often literally naked) life as a form of silencing violence, of epistemologi-
cal “pornography” (Omaar and de Vaal; Halttunen):  
Imagine children with arms like toothpicks, 
With footballs for bellies and skin stretched thin. 
It was kwashiorkor – difficult word, 
A word that is not quite ugly enough, a sin. 
 
You needn’t imagine. There were photos 
Displayed in gloss-filled pages of your Life 
Did you see? Did you feel sorry briefly, 
Then turn round to hold your lover or wife? (375, emphases added) 
These pictures, Adichie implies, did not leave anything unsaid, showing in minute 
detail the deformed, suffering bodies of human beings who were thereby turned 
to fetishised objects of representation – arms, bellies, skin, body parts whose hu-
manity was effaced behind the hyper-visibility of the gloss-filled magazine. The 
ambiguously cathartic pleasure deriving by the sight of these children is not explic-
itly sexualised in the poem. Nevertheless, its sensuous nature seems to find an 
oblique correlative in the embrace between the two Western lovers, which func-
tions as a response to the sight itself and signifies a disinterested retreat into an 
everyday, and tellingly sensual, normality. 
The very title of Ugwu’s book, The World Was Silent When We Died, speaks 
therefore of the divide between the two poles of the spectrum of the potential ob-
jects of biopolitical decision. On the one hand, we find homines sacri, those who are 
exposed to death, those who are voiceless and therefore represented; on the other, 
the rest of the “world,” the space inhabited by homines sacri who are only “virtual-
ly” so (Agamben, Homo 115), those who either represent or are spectators, those 
whose silence is a choice and not the marker of subalternity. Hence, Ugwu’s title 
is one that hints at how power “functions differentially, to target and manage cer-
tain populations, to derealize the humanity of subjects who might potentially be-
long to a community bound by commonly recognized laws” (Butler, Precarious 
Lives 68) – a function that, Butler argues, Agamben does not elucidate with suffi-
cient clarity. Half of a Yellow Sun thus provides the reader with a compelling repre-
sentation of that biopolitical hierarchy that has often been mentioned in this chap-
ter, in that it articulates at all levels – from the local, to the national, to the trans-
national – the complex patterns of privilege and dispossession that determine its 
(more or less) mobile nature.  
Uzodinma Iweala’s Beasts of No Nation and Chris Abani’s Song for Night are two war 
novellas that share a similar concern for the consequences of violence on young 
combatants.1 More or less evidently drawing from the events of the Nigeria-Biafra 
war (see Section 2.3), the texts are indeed part of a vast corpus of child-soldier 
narratives that has recently gained great popularity and increasing critical attention 
in international literary and academic circuits. This body of works includes mem-
oirs,2 as well as memoir- and non-memoir-style novels,3 whose success parallels 
that of a vast documentary, humanitarian and dramatic film production.4 
                                               
1 Although the protagonists of Iweala’s and Abani’s novellas carry weapons and take a di-
rect part in hostilities, it is worth recalling that the most recent nomenclature regarding 
the involvement of children in armed conflict tends towards a more inclusive designation. 
According to the guidelines drafted during an international conference which was organ-
ised by the French government with the support of UNICEF and was held in Paris in 
2007, a child “associated with armed forces or armed groups” (that is, with state armies 
or non-state armed entities) is “[a]ny person below 18 years of age who is or who has 
been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but 
not limited to children, boys, and girls used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies 
or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken direct 
part in hostilities” (UNICEF, “The Paris Principles” 7). 
2 Such as for example China Keitetsi’s Child Soldier: Fighting for My Life (2002), Ismahel Be-
ah’s best-selling A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier (2007) and Emmanuel Jal’s War 
Child: A Boy Soldier’s Story (2009). 
3 Apart from the two texts analysed here, other child-soldier novels include Ahmadou 
Kourouma’s Allah Is Not Obliged (2000), Emmanuel Dongala’s Johnny Mad Dog (2002), De-
lia Jarrett-Macauley’s Moses, Citizen and Me (2005) and Dave Eggers’ What is the What: The 
Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng (2006). 
4 A (by no means exhaustive) list would include films as different as Invisible Children: 
Rough Cut (2003); War Child (2008); Johnny Mad Dog (2008); and the extremely controver-
Such an artistic and documentary interest, for its part, mirrors, and speaks 
to, the lively debates that the figure of the child soldier has generated amongst in-
ternational legal scholars and social scientists since the 1990s, and which were par-
ticularly heightened after the 1996 United Nations report Impact of Armed Conflict on 
Children by Graça Machel. The analyses that fictional works such as Iweala’s and 
Abani’s are eliciting emphasise the potential of cross-disciplinary approaches that 
mutually enlighten fields such as human rights and humanitarian studies,5 the so-
cial sciences and the humanities. At the same time, they also underscore the need 
to understand the dynamics of global marketing and “humanitarian consumption” 
(Schultheis, “African Child Soldiers” 31) of postcolonial stories which for the 
most part come from, or represent, the African continent.6 It is thus relevant to 
                                                                                                                                                      
sial short Kony 2012. 
5 The classic distinction between human rights and humanitarian law posits that while 
“human rights are understood to regulate the relationship between states and individuals 
under their jurisdiction in every aspect of ordinary life,” humanitarian law, also known as 
the law of war, is a set of rules that govern “the wartime relationship of belligerent states 
and of states and protected persons, which include enemy persons and neutrals, but not a 
state’s own nationals” (Provost 7). The discourses associated with the two disciplines 
have been overlapping particularly since the end of the 1960s, when humanitarian prac-
tice has been thoroughly redefined with the development of human-right based, and in-
creasingly politicised, humanitarian NGOs. It was at this time, and primarily in response 
to the 1968 Biafran famine, that relief NGOs began to move “from emergency humani-
tarian aid to long-term developmentalism” (Chandler 682). For a discussion of humani-
tarianism as an ethos, see Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown’s Introduction to 
their edited volume Humanitarianism and Suffering. 
6 It is generally estimated out of the 300,000 (or less, see Drumbl 26) children directly in-
volved in hostilities today, 40% are in Africa. As cultural anthropologist David M. Rosen 
has recently noticed, the reasons explaining why the contemporary gaze remains fixed on 
Africa, notwithstanding the deployment of young boys and girls in wars worldwide, are 
unclear (Child Soldiers 23). While certainly due to the fact that Africa seems to be “a place 
already prepared in the Western imagination for the African child soldier as a subject of 
violence in need of human rights intervention and rehabilitation” (Moynagh 41; see also 
Rosen, Child Soldiers 23 ff.), such emphasis may also have to do with the visibility that 
several recent African conflicts, to wit, the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, and Sierra Le-
one, have obtained as a consequence of having become internationally judicialised 
(Drumbl 5). 
define how these works position themselves within the Western human rights and 
humanitarian paradigms, so as to comprehend the strategies through which they 
give voice to, or contest, some of their essential propositions. The insights into 
young soldiers’ minds that Abani and Iweala imagine also ask us to engage in a 
compassionate quest into the recesses of humanity – trying to grasp what it means 
to be human in contexts where human life has in fact no value. 
It has often been noticed that the definition of childhood in human rights 
doctrine is generative per se of a thorny set of paradoxes, insofar as it is posited as 
a state “romanticized and utopianized and at the same time peculiarly disenfran-
chised and disempowered” (Bhabha J. 1528). The post-industrial Western notion 
of childhood as an innocent state that must be sheltered from violence and exploi-
tation is indeed coupled with a developmental rhetoric that sees the child, a “hu-
man being below the age of eighteen years” (Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, CRC, Art. 1),7 as not yet having achieved the “full and harmonious devel-
opment of his or her personality” (CRC, Preamble). Childhood thus becomes a 
condition that, as opposed to adulthood, is denied a “capacity for agency and enti-
tlement to autonomy, subjecthood, and voice” (Bhabha J. 1528). Moreover, as po-
litical scientist Vanessa Pupavac has forcefully shown, implicit in the international 
children’s rights regime is the universalisation of a Western social construct that 
pathologises the South, since “in the absence of the universalisation of the condi-
tions upon which the model arose, non-Western societies where the Western 
model of childhood has not been realised become delegitimised as moral agents” 
                                               
7 “Unless,” it is then said, “under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earli-
er.” For a detailed analysis of the discrepancies in the definition of the child status in in-
ternational humanitarian and human rights law, see Breen. See also Rosen, “Who Is a 
Child?”. 
(103). 
Given these controversial issues, it comes as no surprise that the phenome-
non of children’s participation in armed conflicts, which nowadays occurs pre-
dominantly, but not exclusively, in non-Western countries, 8  has spurred con-
trasting analytical interpretations. Indeed, it is often stated that “[t]he binary child-
soldier produces an oxymoron” (Honwana, Child Soldiers 33) between the (problem-
atic) fiction of childhood as a utopian state of innocence and the child soldier’s 
capability of commit crimes – an irreconcilability that, as works such as the ones 
studied here show, is of course only illusive. Therefore, one of the most hotly dis-
cussed themes by legal scholars and social scientists alike regards the capacity for 
agency of the children involved in war, and, consequently, their accountability for 
the possible crimes committed.9 
As Myriam Denov has remarked in her 2010 study on the “making and un-
making” of Sierra Leonean child soldiers, even though the question of child sol-
diering has increasingly moved to the forefront in political, academic and humani-
tarian agendas, its iconography in the media and in policy discourse is still for the 
most part superficially bound to what she terms an “(il)logic of extremes” (5). 
This means that child soldiers are invariably presented as either hapless, passive 
                                               
8 For a recent geographical overview on the use of child soldiers worldwide, see Denov 
21-33. See also Drumbl, Chapter 2. 
9 For an excellent analysis of how the accountability of child soldiers for involvement in 
acts of atrocity is conceptualised in the international legal imagination, see Drumbl, Chap-
ter 4. The scholar notices that although the criminal prosecution of child soldiers for acts 
of atrocity “is permissible under international law, it increasingly is viewed as inappropri-
ate and undesirable” (102). This impulse is per se “both laudable and appropriate,” but it 
“has come to hollow the rigor of transitional accountability mechanisms from outside the 
criminal law” (133) – accountability modalities, such as endogenous ceremonies, truth 
commissions, reparative mechanisms and community service, which should instead be 
encouraged as a means to re-establish post-conflict justice (see Drumbl, Chapter 6). 
victims, dangerous and disorderly bandits, or redeemed heroes (5-10) – depictions that 
purposedly ignore the ambiguous, interstitial “triad of victimization, participation 
and resistance” (185) in which the child soldier’s life, as sundry ethnographic ac-
counts have demonstrated, is caught. Legal scholar Mark A. Drumbl, while adding 
a fourth representational category to Denov’s iconographic classification – namely 
the one defining child soldiers as “irreparable damaged goods” (7) – has emphasised 
that there exists a clear hierarchy among the four “with regard to their operational 
influence in shaping official policies and sculpting conventional wisdom” (8). In 
this context, it is “the faultless victim image” that “has achieved widespread trac-
tion within – and is avidly disseminated by – influential intergovernmental organi-
zations and UN agencies, along with NGOs and other actors that populate global 
civil society” (8) and that, as such, dominates international discourse.10 
The success of this representation is partly determined by its top-down port-
ability. This makes it an extremely effective ‘mythological’ figure to fill the role of 
the victim, object of Western help, in the moral “humanitarian story” that the so-
called ‘new’ humanitarianism (see note 5) often promotes for the purposes of 
marshalling resources and extending the terms of protection to a given category. 
The humanitarian “fairy tale,” political scientist David G. Chandler explains, gen-
erally features three main actors: the unfortunate victim in distress – in this case, 
the prelogical, prepubescent child who is forced to fight because easily manipulat-
ed; the villain – here, in the form of the non-Western army or armed group that 
abducts the child; and the saviour, namely “the external aid agency, the interna-
tional institution, or even the journalists covering the story whose interests [are] 
                                               
10 Drumbl examines the reasons for the ascension of the image of the faultless passive 
victim as the archetypical representation of the child soldier in Chapter 2. 
seen to be inseparable from those of the deserving victim” (Chandler, “The Road” 
690). In this context, cultural anthropologist David M. Rosen’s polemical com-
ments on the “politics of age” that shapes the concept of childhood in interna-
tional law require special attention. Indeed, they emphasise how the representa-
tions of childhood authorised on the part of different local and international ac-
tors, and particularly on the part of increasingly politicised humanitarian groups, 
“are political constructs used to support legal and political agendas, and they dis-
count the more varied and complex local understandings of children and child-
hood found in anthropological research” (“Child Soldiers” 296). According to 
Rosen, it is the so-called “straight-18” position that is utterly problematic: ad-
vanced by advocates of an international legal ban on child soldiers, it “seeks to 
prevent the recruitment and use of children (any person under 18 years of age) in 
armed forces or groups and to bar the criminal prosecution of children for war 
crimes” (“Child Soldiers” 296). Thus intended, Rosen argues, the “straight-18” 
position ultimately counters the possibility of developing a “more nuanced view of 
both the vagaries of war and the contextual definition of childhood” (304). It thus 
prevents the formation of more fine-grained approaches capable to both protect 
the most vulnerable members of society and restore some form of post-conflict 
justice for the victims of war, thus paving the way for the reconstruction of a 
peaceful community. 
The image of the child soldier as a hapless victim, albeit certainly reflecting 
the real experiences of those children who are forcibly recruited all over the world, 
ultimately constitutes a “legal fiction,” and one that Mark A. Drumbl has recog-
nised as a “neglective” one (19, terms borrowed from Lon L. Fuller and Hans 
Vaihinger respectively).11 Hence, it becomes important to discuss the modes in 
which such an abstractive fiction is either problematised, or upheld, by the recent 
– and similarly fictional – literary portrayals of child soldiers, in the attempt to de-
fine the discursive formation of an image that occupies such an uncertain position 
within the human rights paradigm. This is a task that has recently been taken on 
by a number of literary scholars who have produced excellent interdisciplinary 
readings of child-soldier narratives (see especially Moynagh, “Human Rights” and 
Schultheis, “Global Specters”) and whose analyses have not only been limited to 
content and characterisation, but have also investigated the authors’ formal choic-
es in terms of genre. 
As will be noticed below, the works studied here invite the reader to delve 
deep into the complex moral world of war, to consider the themes of the individ-
ual’s agency and responsibility in conflict. They thereby examine the parameters 
through which we define the persona ficta that is the object of children’s (/human) 
rights protection. In this sense, they complicate the current “international legal 
imagination” – a notion that Drumbl has glossed as the “normative, aspirational 
and operational mix of international law, policy, and practice” (9) – in particular, I 
would argue, concerning the question of the moral and legal culpability of child 
soldiers involved in acts of atrocity. More generally, by experimenting with, and 
contesting, the formal characteristics of the Bildungsroman genre, these works also 
investigate the consequences of the lack of human rights protection during the 
                                               
11 Lon L. Fuller has defined a fiction as “either (1) a statement propounded with a com-
plete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having 
utility” (qtd. in Drumbl 19, n. 38). Moreover, citing Hans Vaihinger, Fuller adds that fic-
tions of the “neglective” type constitute “a series of methods in which the deviation from 
reality manifests itself specifically as a disregard of certain elements in the fact situation” 
(qtd. in Drumbl 19, n. 40). 
emergency of war. If, as Joseph Slaughter has argued, the Bildungsroman gives legi-
bility to the human rights narrative of the free and full development of the human 
personality by fictionalising the incorporation – that is, the legal personification – 
of the subject as a right-and-duty-bearing unit into a regime of rights and citizen-
ship, corruption of the Bildungsroman form signifies some form of corruption of 
the norms of human rights (Slaughter, Human Rights, Inc. 29). Moreover, the use of 
other generic forms, such as the picaresque or the ghost story, to recount the 
(non-)development of the child’s personality can also point to the impossibility, 
for the subjects represented, of aspiring to the promotion to the status of a person 
before the law in the absence of a state capable of acting as human rights protec-
tor (see Section 2.3). 
In what follows I will discuss Iweala’s and Abani’s explorations of the am-
biguous terrain of children’s (and, more broadly, human) agency and responsibility 
in war situations, and shall argue that their writings comment on the complex eth-
ical foundations of normative discourses (legal, but also religious) that are predi-
cated upon notions of culpability and punishment. Moreover, I shall contend that 
their texts can be more widely interpreted as ‘explorations in humanity’: explora-
tions of a continuum of human feelings and relationships that reminds us of the 
fact that mercy, love, hate and ‘bestiality’ are similarly valid, equally true expres-
sions of what it means to be human – however disturbing this might seem. 
Neither the protagonist of Iweala’s Beasts of No Nation, Agu, nor Abani’s My Luck 
conform in toto to the romanticised trope of the faultless victim that has gained 
currency in much humanitarian literature (see Moynagh). However, it is undoubt-
ed that the politics of representation of the two novellas exhibit different degrees 
of distancing from the conventions that have been rehearsed above – and this is 
particularly true as regards the agency of their fictional child soldiers. Agu and My 
Luck, as will be shown, are two apparently incomparable representatives of a cate-
gory that moral philosopher Jeff McMahan has described as composed by “people 
who have a diminished capacity for morally responsible agency and who act in 
conditions that further diminish their personal responsibility for their action in 
war” (34). This brings the reader to confront the thorny ethical quandary, which 
also has a strong legal counterpart, concerning the different degrees of moral 
agency that child soldiers have/retain in contexts of war. 
Mark A. Drumbl, relating to the ethnographic accounts on the (more or less 
limited) capability to act that most children involved in hostilities manage to main-
tain, notwithstanding the constraints imposed on them,12 has proposed to ap-
proach the question of the individual responsibility of child soldiers through a 
model of “circumscribed action.” A “circumscribed actor,” he explains, 
has the ability to act, the ability not to act, and the ability to do otherwise than what 
he or she actually has done. The effective range of these abilities, however, is de-
limited, bounded, and confined. Yet, the abilities themselves are neither evanescent 
nor ephemeral. Circumscribed actors exercise some discretion in navigating and 
mediating the constraints around them. Circumscribed actors dispose of an en-
closed space which is theirs – the acreage of which varies according to an oscillat-
ing admixture of disposition and situation – in which they exercise a margin of vo-
lition. Within this space, they make short-term decisions. […] Although acted upon, 
[circumscribed actors] also act upon others. (98) 
                                               
12 The literature on the topic is very extensive. For a select number of representative, and 
authoritative, examples, see Utas; Honwana, “Innocent and Guilty”; Shepler. 
Intended not as a status, but rather as a “continuum that embraces the inherent 
diversity among the individuals aligned along its axis,” this model has the ad-
vantage of providing an interpretative paradigm adaptable to figures as different as 
the fictional Agu and My Luck, to understand and interpret the multiple articula-
tions that the phenomenon of child soldiering can assume depending on the con-
text. The child soldiers at the centre of the two novellas studied in this chapter can 
be positioned at the two extremes of the spectrum, being a ‘minimal agent’ and a 
‘maximal agent’ respectively. As will be shown, however, although exhibiting dif-
ferent levels of moral agency, neither can be considered simply a victim. 
Beasts of No Nation is a memoir-style first-person tale in which young Agu re-
counts his experiences as a fighter in the rebel militias of an unnamed country in-
volved in a civil conflict. The figure of this boy soldier might be reminiscent, at 
least at first glance, of the humanitarian archetype of the very young, exploited 
child who is barely able to carry his kalashnikov: Agu is violently conscripted after 
witnessing his father’s gory death at the hands of a bunch of enemy soldiers; he is 
very young, so small that he has to fold the sleeves of his shirt “a whole six time” 
(44); he is perceptive, but evidently young and immature; he has been thoroughly 
indoctrinated. Also through the consistent employment of a naïve narrative voice, 
Agu is therefore characterised as a victimised boy who most of the times is co-
erced into perpetrating the crimes he commits.13 However, while it is undoubted 
that Agu is portrayed as a victim of the circumstances, and of his violent superior, 
                                               
13 The simplified, repetitive “adaptation of pidgin English” (Iweala, “Uzodinma Iweala”) 
that the author employs also seems to contribute to the characterisation of Agu as a naive 
child (see Hron 41). Many commentators have pointed out that Iweala’s language in 
Beasts is reminiscent of the (undoubtedly more articulated) “rotten English” that Ken Sa-
ro-Wiwa forged in his Sozaboy (see Lambert). 
he is certainly not an in-nocent one. Beasts of No Nation refuses to offer a ‘sanitised’ 
portrayal of the main character. On the contrary, countering potential forms of 
unrestrained empathy, Iweala disturbingly details the scenes of active violence fea-
turing his protagonist, and gives them great prominence within the narrative line – 
differently from what happens in most humanitarian records, where, as Maureen 
Moynagh has shown, active violence tends to be glossed over or tacitly acknowl-
edged (44-45).14 Agu’s ambivalent wartime status as both a victim and a perpetra-
tor is conveyed through disquieting, graphic fragments where the boy recounts the 
brutalities he commits and suffers in the present. Importantly, these scenes are in-
terlaced with the boy’s nostalgic memories of his peaceful pre-war life. 
Norwegian philosophers Helene Ingierd and Henrik Syse, in an essay where 
they provide a philosophical background for the debate on the ethics of war, have 
argued that “to be morally responsible for a given action, one must somehow have 
the character of a decision-maker” (95). In other words, a morally responsible 
agent, one who can be considered accountable for the crimes he or she might 
commit, is defined as a person who “could have acted differently, but made the 
decision not to” (86). Given the centrality assumed by the elements of free choice 
and volition to evaluate a person’s responsibility, the dilemma arises as to whether 
a child like Agu can be said to be a full moral agent. Indeed, particularly as a con-
sequence of his very young age, Agu often does not seem to be in the position to 
decide freely about his actions. As a person who “lacks the moral resources to re-
sist the command to fight,” he should therefore be considered, in McMahan’s 
                                               
14 As regards child-soldier memoirs, Moynagh notices that even while they “cannot en-
tirely uphold the vision of childhood innocence, they do often exploit it to point up the 
injustice of the child-soldier experience” (48). 
terms, “a nonresponsible threat” (33). All the same, Agu is not completely de-
prived of the capacity to think and act morally, the clearest example of which be-
ing his decision to refuse protection to his superior when Rambo, a fellow soldier, 
threatens to shoot him. Agu’s action is, no doubt, a conscious one entailing con-
sequences of which the child is fully aware: 
Rambo is sliding his finger to the trigger of his gun and I am sliding my finger to 
my own trigger because I am fearing what Commandant will be doing to me if I am 
not protecting him, but then I am remembering how much he is hurting me when 
he is chooking me and I am saying never. Never will I be feeling sorry for him. 
Never will I be helping him. I am lowering my gun. (152) 
Even if we concede that Agu is a ‘pure’ non-agent in the scenes where, 
without being ordered to, he and his comrades rape and kill indiscriminately, still 
Beasts delineates a provocative ethical conundrum: the child, ostensibly deprived 
of free will, is nevertheless presented as the perpetrator of atrocious, revolting 
crimes. The novella thereby elicits shifting empathic responses on the part of a 
reader who does not easily identify with a figure portrayed in such ambivalent 
terms. Thus, even admitting that the majority of Agu’s deeds might not be ‘ac-
tions’ as such, but rather ‘reactions’ to outside stimuli or constrictions, still Beasts of 
No Nation raises the question of the attribution of responsibility for the terrible 
suffering these alleged ‘non-actions’ produce. So, while being in line with a num-
ber of child-soldier memoirs in pointing up “the injustice of the child-soldier ex-
perience” (Moynagh 48), the novella, by giving visibility to the consequences of 
child soldiers’ crimes, also asks how justice for their victims might be restored. 
The perception of the problematic nature of Iweala’s main character is fur-
ther intensified when the reader realises that Agu, once initiated into the brutalities 
of war, alternates mantra-like attempts to confirm his self-contested morality – 
such as when he repeats “I am not bad boy. I am not bad boy. I am soldier and 
soldier is not bad if he is killing” (29) – with moments of undeniable, if at times 
drug-induced, pleasure deriving from his murderous ‘non-acts.’ The following 
passage, for example, reports the predictable ending of a chilling sexual assault 
perpetrated by Agu and some fellow soldiers, who have found a mother and her 
daughter hiding under a bed during the looting of a semi-abandoned village: 
You are not my mother, I am saying to the girl’s mother and then I am raising my 
knife high above my head. I am liking the sound of knife chopping KPWUDA, 
KPWUDA on her head and how the blood is just splashing on my hand and my 
face and my feets. I am chopping and chopping and chopping until I am looking 
up and it is dark. 
Another night. (63) 
The very long rape scene that introduces this excerpt is emblematic in that 
each of Agu’s violent actions, alongside the woman’s curses that follow, finds a 
contrapuntal echo in a self-assuring response meant to confirm the child soldier’s 
moral nature. What makes the passage even more provocative is that Agu appears 
to be aware of the innocence of the two women, as he implicitly compares them 
to his own mother and sister, whom he has not seen since the beginning of the 
hostilities.  And still this boy, who attempts to attest his humanity by claiming 
that he cannot be a Devil as he had a father, and a mother, and he comes from 
them, is here severing the only familial ties that have survived the total war of 
Beasts. What is more, he “lik[es]” doing it (63). The same strident overlapping of 
remorse and pleasure is visualised in the boy’s contradictory physical reactions to 
his first killing, a perverse rite of passage that is meant to sanction his transition 
                                               
15 In another passage, this parallel becomes all the more evident, as Agu admits that 
“[e]very time we are seeing woman or girl, I am looking at them well well to be knowing 
if they are my mother or my sister” (45). 
into the sphere of soldier life. 16 Then, Agu has an erection just after “vomiting 
everywhere,” and is left wondering: “[i]s this like falling in love?” (26). The co-
nundrum regarding the moral responsibility, and the accountability, of child sol-
diers is here brought to the fore in all its dramatic force. 
Chris Abani’s Song for Night similarly problematises notions of innocence and 
guilt through its narration of the experiences of mine diffuser My Luck. In a 
much-quoted passage that is reminiscent of the one just commented on, Abani’s 
protagonist sardonically asks: 
If we are the great innocents of this war, then where did we learn all the evil we 
practice? […] Who taught me to enjoy killing, a singular joy that is perhaps rivaled 
only by an orgasm? (143) 
My Luck’s self-conscious, blunt refusal to accept victimhood as a justification for 
those “sins” that, he muses, are “too big even for God to forgive” (79) is substan-
tiated by Abani’s depiction of his fifteen-year-old character through the lyrical 
voice of a mature adolescent who appears to be (almost) always in charge of his 
own destiny and claims full responsibility for his acts. My Luck, in other words, is 
undoubtedly a ‘full’ moral actor. Far from being abducted, or forcibly recruited, he 
and his comrades enlisted voluntarily, at a time when “there was a clear enemy, 
and having lost loved ones to them, [they] all wanted revenge” (19).17 My Luck is 
                                               
16 Transition to military life is not presented as co-terminous with transition to adult 
manhood here, as is often the case in traditional societies (Honwana, Child Soldiers 52). 
On the contrary, as Maureen Moynagh, amongst others, has noticed, war casts the pre-
pubescent Agu into “a kind of developmental limbo” (51), as his forced conscription has 
occurred before he was eligible for the traditional ritual initiation to manhood: as he mus-
es some time after his abduction, “if war is not coming then I would be man by now” 
(70). Instead, all he knows now is that “before war we are children and now we are not” 
(46). 
17 Mark A. Drumbl, amongst others, has remarked that while “the international legal im-
agination disclaims the possibility that children, including older adolescents, can be found 
to exercise initiative or actually volunteer to join armed groups and, increasingly, even 
aware of having exhausted his “appetite” for death “somewhere along the line” 
(92), but he is still “fighting” (60), at least metaphorically, in a quest for his lost 
platoon whose metaphysical nature will be confirmed in the open ending of the 
book. The last lines indeed reveal that Song for Night is the parable of a ghostly soul 
who is seeking to come to terms with his dark past, finally accepting his own 
death and finding rest in his late mother’s arms. 
As critic Daria Tunca has noticed in an essay where she draws on Dominik 
LaCapra’s notion of “emphatic unsettlement” to examine the nuanced strategies 
Abani employs to circumvent unrestrained sentimentality in the text (“We Die 
Only Once”), My Luck is adamant about emphasising that killing has been, on 
some occasions, a “pleasure” for him (79), and does not apologise for this. His 
“personal cemetery” (38), a field of cross-shaped scars he has carved onto his own 
forearms as a constant reminder of the lives that have been lost during this three-
year war, is thus divided into two parts: on the left, the loved ones; on the right, 
those men and women he “enjoyed killing” (39). The patent complexity of the 
task of ethical questioning that Abani takes on in Song for Night becomes all the 
more thought-provoking when one considers that the types epitomised by the vic-
tims of My Luck’s unrepentant killings, far from inviting the reader’s sympathy, 
are bound to be viewed as morally repulsive. The boy soldier enumerates them: 
‘John Wayne,’ the cowboy-booted officer “who was determined to turn [him and 
his comrades] into animals – until [he] shot him” (39); the four old cannibal wom-
en he caught feasting on a dead baby; and a step-father who used to beat him hard 
                                                                                                                                                      
armed forces,” child soldiers, in fact, often are not forcibly recruited (Drumbl 62). The 
figure of adolescent My Luck also reminds us of the fact that most child soldiers are not 
young, pre-pubescent children like Agu – an instrumental portrayal that, Drumbl writes, 
is “simply not indicative of the norm” (12). 
because My Luck, a crochet lover, “didn’t play the rough games like other boys” 
(63). My Luck’s reactions to hyper-masculine cruelty and, perhaps more problem-
atically, to the taboo of cannibalism as an extreme manifestation of (in)human ex-
ploitative behaviour, constituting an unsettling satisfaction of the reader’s revenge 
fantasies, further complicate the moral economy of the text. 
In a 2009 essay, presumably alluding to his prison experience,18 the author 
admitted: 
My knowledge of blood, of the terrible intimacy of killing, has taught me that 
though I have never killed a man, I know how, I know I could. The only thing that 
terrifies me is that I may not feel sorry. (“Ethics” 168) 
This preference of revenge over justice that My Luck and the reader plausibly 
share carries profound implications for the inquiry into the ethical landscape of 
the novella, as it uncovers the fact that war, the ultimate form of enmity, inherent-
ly compromises the utopia of the “human family” (UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Preamble) within which all members are supposed to act “in a 
spirit of brotherhood” (Art. 1). This is a fiction that, Abani suggests, loses much 
of its narrative force in the face of the unspeakable. In other words, the unpre-
dictable, changeable paths of empathy and repulsion that have been detected so 
far are meant to guide us into the recognition that we all might be standing “at the 
edge of the same abyss” (Abani, “Ethics” 168). 
Abani seems to mark certain conducts, such as John Wayne’s, as inexcusa-
ble, in that their main aim is that of depriving human beings of a dignity that 
                                               
18 During the regime of Ibrahim Babangida, Abani was imprisoned on several occasions 
for his subversive literary production. His prison experiences are recorded in the poetry 
collection Kalakuta Republic, which will be given due attention in Chapter 3. 
should be inalienable. All the same however, the novel refuses to resort to easy 
certainties and tends to invite abstention from judgement, as exemplified by Aba-
ni’s complex engagement with the theme of sexual violence. My Luck, remember-
ing his traumatic discovery of the “taste for rape” that all wars apparently induce 
in men in arms (86), recounts how once, under John Wayne’s order “[r]ape or 
die,” he reluctantly “climbed” onto his victim, hurt by the perception that “some 
part of [him] was enjoying it.” But My Luck recalls: 
The woman’s eyes were tender, as if all she saw was a boy lost. She stroked my hair 
tenderly, whispering as I sobbed: “It’s all right son, it’s all right. Better the ones like 
you live.” (85) 
This poignant reinvention of the act of raping is one that cynics might de-
fine utterly unrealistic, but it confirms that Song for Night is an exploration of the 
ultimate impossibility of articulating an absolute truth regarding the morality of 
children – or, more generally, of human beings – in extreme situations. In legal 
terms, My Luck commits the crime in conditions of ‘duress,’ as he is threatened 
with execution and therefore deprived of free choice. He could not have acted dif-
ferently. For this reason, in a hypothetical trial he would presumably be exempted 
from legal responsibility, which “may result in partial or full exculpation” (Mæland 
59; see also Ingiers and Syse 94). In moral terms, My Luck is forgiven by his vic-
tim, and even while committing the crime. However, this does not necessarily en-
tail that the boy, in fact, is not morally culpable for his actions: after all, as he ad-
mits, “some part of [him] was enjoying it.” Even more importantly, the victim’s 
forgiveness has not freed My Luck from the feeling of being morally guilty – at least 
until he re-lives the episode and, still perceiving the woman’s eyes on him, he “de-
cide[s] to rest” (86). This passage “reminds us of the fact […] that the absence of 
clear-cut legal culpability does not take away moral responsibility or moral culpa-
bility altogether” (Ingiers and Syse 97). Song for Night is thus a sorrowful journey 
that explores the boundaries of the human – of human suffering, and of human 
bestiality. 
Comparable perspectives of ethical undecidability can be found in Iweala’s 
novella, where the ambivalent quality of the child soldier’s identity as both a vic-
tim and a victimiser is extended to describe the condition of all men at war, irre-
spectively of age and fighting side. Ethical distinctions collapse as both parties in-
volved in the archetypal civil war of Beasts are exposed to incessant reversals from 
the status of victim to that of perpetrator, and vice-versa. The regular soldiers who 
raid Agu’s village, for example, are at first portrayed as indecent beings who 
“smile” widely, and keep on “laughing,” while reducing the civilians they massacre 
into grotesque, semi-human stumps who run “with no head like chicken,” or, like 
Agu’s father, “dance everywhere” when caught by deadly bullets (89). In the 
above-mentioned passage recounting Agu’s first killing, however, it is the rebels 
who become embodiments of obscene violence. Their enemies, now filled with 
fear “like they are already dead” (20), are disarmed, forced to strip, tortured and 
finally slaughtered in cold blood by Agu and his comrades, who, exactly like their 
opponents in the scene commented upon above, smile, laugh and mutilate, cutting 
their victims’ arms and “using [them] to beat somebody else’s head” (27). This 
parallel, belittling the strategic validity of ideological discourses based on the defi-
nition of Manichean opposites epitomising good and evil to justify the acts of war, 
shows that human beings can easily become blind to human commonalities in ex-
treme contexts that have the power to turn them into bestial butchers – or into 
animals for slaughter. 
Similarly to Abani’s John Wayne, in Beasts of No Nation Agu’s superior, simp-
ly called “Commandant,” appears to be uncompromisingly refused the chance to 
engage the reader’s sympathies. Commandant is markedly different from all the 
other fighting men: the only “real soldier” (43) in an armed group of starving 
wretches, he walks “like his leg is a wooden pole that is not bending for anything” 
(42). His imposing, towering bearing is a metaphorical confirmation of the promi-
nent position of this Big Man and is contrasted with the small size of those men 
and children who live in his shadow, and whom the war has equally reduced to 
something ‘less’ than they used to be: as Agu explains, “this war is coming to 
make most men small like children and children small like baby” (42). The parallel 
between children and men is particularly interesting insofar as it counters the “ex-
cessively idealized version of adult autonomy” that humanitarian narratives tend 
to propose to contrast the alleged irrationality of children to the independent 
agency of their adult counterpart (Rosen, “Child Soldiers” 299). 
Commandant, an embodiment of unrestrained necropower (see Mbembe, 
“Necropolitics”), seems to be the only one who has the right to decide over the 
life and death of his subordinates – at least up till the day when he is killed by 
Rambo, the rebellious soldier, with Agu’s collaboration (152). Iweala’s pervasive 
deployment of imagery denoting filth when describing him distances the reader 
from this figure right from the very beginning of the novella, and even before the 
discovery of the repeated rapes to which Agu, alongside other fellow soldiers, is 
subjected in exchange for small favours. And yet, it is exactly after a sodomy scene 
that we are allowed a brief glimpse into the psychology of an apparently mono-
dimensional character. It is indeed in this context that Commandant, putting his 
hand on Agu’s back, softly says to the boy: “Let me tell you something [...]. Agu. I 
am not bad man” (107-108) – in a sentence whose phrasing echoes Agu’s excuses 
for his own acts of violence and violation. This analogy complicates the terms of 
the debate over the attribution of responsibility for the crimes depicted in the no-
vella, as it demands to define the parameters that might entail the culpability or 
the exculpation of neither, one, or both of these allegedly very different perpetra-
tors, both in moral and in legal terms. 
Although very different, the portrayals of child soldiers that Abani and 
Iweala offer disrupt the fiction of childhood innocence by presenting the reader 
with young boys who are indeed capable of committing atrocious acts of violence 
against fellow human beings. These texts, therefore, dismantle the idea of the ir-
reconcilability of the notions of childhood and active violence to show that the 
term ‘child-soldier’ might indeed not be an oxymoron. As Mark Sanders has re-
cently remarked in an essay where he invites a psychoanalytical reading of child-
soldier fiction and memoirs, these novellas highlight that it is essential to recog-
nise that, “[i]f there is a capacity for violence, it is at the origins” (204). In the 
words of Birahima, the protagonist of Ahmadou Kourouma’s novel Allah is not 
Obliged, “[c]hild-soldier or soldier-child is kif-kif, same difference” (45) – a chiastic 
construction that, by providing an “alternation […] between mutually implicated 
meanings, as substantive takes the place of modifier, and modifier the place of 
substantive” (Sanders 203), cautions against the utopia of childhood as a neces-
sarily innocent state. All the same, the two novellas do remark the difficulty of as-
sessing the moral and legal culpability of child soldiers, but also, if to a lesser ex-
tent, of adult agents, implicated in war crimes. The texts show that human beings 
under eighteen can exhibit degrees of moral agency comparable to those of adults, 
while also recalling that adults, on the contrary, might not be as independent and 
rational as the international legal imagination assumes. It is for this reason that 
Beasts of No Nation and Song for Night constitute ‘explorations in humanity’: texts 
that force the reader to move beyond the ideal moral ‘comfort zone’ of the fairy 
tale, where the distinctions between heroes and villains, victims and perpetrators, 
are clear, to come to terms with the complex moral universe of war. 
The universe of the exception is not only a space where the above-mentioned 
moral distinctions can lose their meaning. It is also a space where the axiom of the 
individual as a being whose dignity and self-respect cannot be put into question is 
disrupted. Its representation thus forces the reader to negotiate the ethical validity 
of concepts that are seen as unequivocally constitutive of what it means to be hu-
man. The process of tropological ‘dehumanisation’ to which the human is subject-
ed when reduced to bare life is conveyed through different rhetorical strategies in 
the two texts. In this section, I will thus attempt to examine the polysemous met-
aphorical clusters that Iweala and Abani employ to explore the consequences of 
brutality and statelessness on the humanity of their characters. 
In a short chapter of Homo Sacer titled “The Ban and the Wolf,” Giorgio 
Agamben provides a suggestive analysis of the figure of the werewolf as a meta-
morphic creature whose inclusive exclusion from the polity effectively illustrates 
the structure of the ban, a central concept in Agamben’s political philosophy. As 
the author explains, indeed, the werewolf at its origin is the bandito, the man who 
is banned from his community as a consequence of sovereign decision. It is deci-
sive, Agamben remarks, that the werewolf is defined not simply as a wolf, but ra-
ther as a wolf-man, a form of life in which the feral and the human become indis-
tinct. Indeed, such an ambivalent overlapping shows that 
[t]he life of the bandit, like that of the sacred man, is not a piece of animal nature 
without any relation to law and the city. It is, rather, a threshold of indistinction 
and of passage between animal and man, physis and nomos, exclusion and inclusion: 
the life of the bandit is the life of the loup garou, the werewolf, who is precisely nei-
ther man nor beast, and who dwells paradoxically within both while belonging to nei-
ther. (105) 
Neither bíos, social/political life, nor zoē, biological/animal life, the werewolf, like 
homo sacer, inhabits a zone at the limits of the ethical and political realms, caught in 
the sovereign ban and thus simultaneously included and excluded from the city. 
In the light of these considerations, Agamben reconsiders Thomas Hobbes’s 
“mythologeme” of the state of nature – a state where man, tellingly, is said to be a 
wolf to man – and provides a reading that is meant to dehistoricise it. The Hobbes-
ian state of nature, writes the philosopher, should not be regarded as a real epoch 
chronologically preceding the foundation of the state. On the contrary, it is “a 
principle internal to the state” that becomes manifest in the moment in which the 
state is considered, as Hobbes himself put it, “as if it were dissolved (ut tanquam 
dissoluta consideretur)” (Hobbes, De Cive 79-80, qtd. in Homo Sacer 36). Hobbes’s my-
thologeme does not identify, Agamben insists, a prejuridical condition inherently 
indifferent to the law of the city, but rather “the exception and the threshold that 
constitutes and dwells within it” (106). Rather than being glossed as a war of all 
against all, the state of nature thus intended should therefore be more precisely 
recognised as an exceptional circumstance, “in which everyone is bare life and a 
homo sacer for everyone else” (106), and thus can kill and be killed without the oc-
currence of homicide. It is essential to recall, he continues, that in European folk-
lore the werewolf is generally perceived as a figure whose metamorphic nature is 
temporary in character, whose transformations from one status into the other are 
limited in time and, importantly, reversible. The transformation of man into a 
werewolf, thus, “corresponds perfectly to the state of exception, during which 
(necessarily limited) time the city is dissolved and men enter into a zone in which 
they are no longer distinct from beasts” (107). 
I have dwelt at length on Agamben’s interpretation of the figure of the 
werewolf as I believe it emphasises the potential of the tropological use of the im-
agery of metamorphic bestialisation as employed in some of the texts discussed in 
this dissertation, and in particular in Beasts of No Nation. Rhetorical animalisation is 
the most pervasive strategy through which Iweala signals his characters’ entering 
into an Agambenian zone of indistinction between animal and man. Tropological 
clusters indicating animalisation are on occasions combined with similes indicating 
the spectralisation and reification of human beings – figurative images that similar-
ly signify their simultaneous expendability and brutality, their becoming limit con-
cepts that are only illusively ‘inhuman.’ All these are effective strategies to illustrate 
the consequences of the condition of rightlessness and legal abandonment to 
which the sacred human is exposed in the neo-hobbesian dissolutio civitatis inaugu-
rated by the total war of Beasts. In the novella, men are likened to dogs (3) and 
ghosts (4). They are reduced to things (6). One soldier is portrayed as he runs “like 
mad horse,” his gun “banging against his back” (17) as if it were a whip.19 Sodomy 
scenes are also reproduced by means of animal similes: Commandant, Agu says, 
                                               
19 The reification and animalisation of human beings often find an inverted correlative in 
the personification of objects, and particularly of weapons. Another example of this has 
Agu saying that his gun “rides my back like it is king and I am servant to be doing what-
ever it says” (160). 
“is entering inside of [him] the way man goat is sometimes mistaking other man 
goat for woman goat and going inside of them” (104). Again, when high on “gun 
juice” (54), Agu feels “like man with big muscle and small head, [...] like leopard 
hunting in the bush” (56), and imagining himself as a predatory animal, he goes on 
a killing rampage with his comrades.20  
The scene of raping that follows is intertwined in the narrative with the tale 
of the Ox and the Leopard, the founding myth of Agu’s village which the boy re-
calls on hearing the screams of the women he is attacking: “AYIIIEEE, like it is 
the creation of my village when long ago great warrior and his army are just 
fighting fighting enemy in the bush near my village” (60). The myth recounts the 
fratricidal fight against two twins who, having the power to metamorphose into 
whichever animal they desired, one day took the appearance of an ox and a leop-
ard respectively, engaging in a mortal fight during which they did not realise that 
“they are brother and not enemy” (62). As Alexandra Schultheis has noticed, 
however, “the folkloric narrative fails to provide that critical distance on the vio-
lence at hand, and instead seems to displace its material effects onto an imagina-
tive realm for which Agu feels no responsibility.” Indeed, while “[t]he creation 
story links the placement of the village to mythic parents of the village mourning 
over the ‘abomination’ [62] of their sons killing each other” (“Global Specters” 
38), Agu insists “I am grabbing the woman and her daughter. They are not my 
mother and my sister. I am telling them, it is enough. This is the end” (60). Once 
again, the fiction of human brotherhood proves unfeasible when men become 
wolves to men – homines sacri who are disposable, but certainly not necessarily in-
                                               
20 Such a metaphorical self-depiction becomes all the more interesting in the light of the 
fact that, as many critics have recalled, the name ‘Agu’ means ‘leopard’ or ‘lion’ in Igbo. 
nocuous. 
By figuring the human as beast the text disrupts the common, sentimental 
image that posits bare life as a good and hapless form of life. It is the figure of 
Strika that most clearly embodies this seeming paradox. The voiceless boy, who 
will become Agu’s best friend, is presented at the outset of the novella through an 
iconography that clearly recalls the often-mentioned humanitarian depiction of the 
starving African child. At first, Strika is not described as a human being, but is 
metonymically reified as “a short dark body,” a body 
with one big belly and leg thin like spider’s own. The body is so thin that his short 
is just blowing around his leg like woman’s skirt and his shirt is looking like dress 
the way it is hanging from his shoulder. His neck is just struggling too much to 
hold up his big head that is always moving one way or the other. (3) 
But Strika is far from harmless: on the contrary, he has feral “yellow eyes,” and, 
“sniffing like a dog,” he approaches Agu and starts beating him, dragging him out 
of the shack where he is hiding. Agu is thereby conscribed and becomes an unwill-
ing fighter in the rebel militias.  
It is thus apparent that the boys and men of Beasts of No Nation are both hu-
man and ‘bestial’ – and are so at the same time, in the form of bare life whose de-
piction forces the reader to reconfigure what is generally considered bestial, vio-
lent (in short, ‘inhuman’) as a potential articulation of humanity itself. In other 
words, the reader must recognise that the so-called ‘inhuman’ in fact lies at the 
core of the human. The (I insist, figurative) bestiality that defines these human be-
ings thus holds multiple, ambivalent significations: it emphasises their ruthless vio-
lence, while also pointing up their condition as subjects who, cast outside of the 
political, become expendable to an unprecedented degree. It is thus telling that 
Strika, for example, after deserting with Agu and his companions, will also die like 
a dog, his grotesque body left on the roadside, “looking like one piece of refuses 
on this road” (164). Beasts of No Nation delineates a zone of the human where con-
cepts such as dignity, self-respect and, to a certain extent, mutual help, make little 
or no sense. However, as Giorgio Agamben reminds us, 
if there is a zone of the human in which these concepts make no sense, then they 
are not genuine ethical concepts, for no ethics can claim to exclude a part of hu-
manity, no matter how unpleasant or difficult that humanity is to see. (Remnants, 
63-64) 
The multi-faceted symbolic representation of animality in the novella ac-
quires a further semantic layer if one considers the intertextual dimension evoked 
by its very title. The phrase “Beasts of No Nation” is indeed borrowed from the 
lyrics of the eponymous hit by iconoclastic musician Fela Kuti,21 an indictment of 
those bestial politicians disguised in smart suits who, Fela sung, “wan dash us hu-
man rights”
 
even as “human rights na my property / You can’t dash me my prop-
erty.”22 It is significant to recall that the song explicitly referred to a 1986 state-
ment by then South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha, whom Kuti quotes as 
claiming that he would be forced to react violently if the protracted rebellions 
against the apartheid regime did not stop: “this uprising will bring out the beast in 
us.” Botha, alongside English Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President 
Ronald Reagan, is caricatured on the album cover as a predator whose long, ani-
mal fangs are covered in blood. Such a depiction draws on “a long-standing tro-
                                               
21 It is therefore not, or at least not primarily, a quote from Wole Soyinka’s Season of Ano-
my, as Coundouriotis conjectures. 
22 As glossed by Michael E. Veal, “want to bribe us with human rights” even as “human 
rights are my property / You cannot bribe me with my own property” (210). 
pology of beastly sovereignty” (Menely 568) which is here turned against itself to 
protest against the exceptional force that lies at the basis of the sovereign right to 
kill – or to connive at consigning to death. The aesthetic domain, in this context, 
emerges as a site from which the artist launches an offensive against what Derrida 
has called the “irresponsibility” of bestial sovereignty – an irresponsibility that is 
one of the causes determining the failure of the human rights regime as config-
ured today. Indeed, Derrida explains, the sovereign, similarly to the animal, 
does not respond, he is the one who does not have to, who always has the right not 
to, respond [répondre], in particular not to be responsible for [répondre de] his acts. He 
is above the law [le droit] and has the right [le droit] to suspend the law […]. He has a 
right to a certain irresponsibility. (Beast 57) 
The sovereign, thus, has the feral right to kill indiscriminately and with impunity. 
However, as critic Tobias Menely has observed discussing Thomas Hobbes’s the-
orisation of the relationship between sovereign and subject, 
[t]he paradigmatic act of sovereign violence […] is not the killing but the naming 
that precedes the killing. The role of the sovereign, according to Hobbes, is to de-
termine who is and who is not human – which is to say, who is and who is not pro-
tected by the law. (569) 
It is in this sense that title of the novella can be read as obliquely indicting, by 
means of its reference to Fela Kuti’s lyrics, the right that sovereign actors at the 
top of global political hierarchies hold in either determining or supporting exclu-
sionary policies that ostracise large portions of humanity from humanity itself – 
from the realm of those who should have a ‘right to have rights’ simply by virtue 
of being human. As there is no recognisable, or legitimate sovereign in the un-
named, dissolved country of Beasts of No Nation, the novella is hence to be read 
more generally as a cry against current global inequalities that perpetuate the dif-
ferential allocation of ‘humanity’ on which racist, colonial and neo-colonial sys-
tems have historically been founded. As will be noticed below, however, the ab-
straction from historical specificity that Iweala carries out for the purpose of fo-
cusing exclusively on the question of human rights protection is in fact one of the 
weakest points of Beasts of No Nation, as it runs the risk of replicating the very a-
historicising, de-humanising discourses it aims at deconstructing. 
The fact that Iweala’s symbols of animality refer to both the dominated and 
the dominating reflects Agamben’s argument that the sovereign and homo sacer, 
dwelling “at the two extremes of the order,” are in fact 
two symmetrical figures that have the same structure and are correlative: the sover-
eign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo 
sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns. (Homo Sacer 84) 
In keeping with the tropology of animality, the sovereign can thus be identified as 
a predator that retains its “natural right to do anything to anyone” (Homo Sacer 
106). His counterpart, homo sacer, is similarly beastly, a creature who has undergone 
a figurative metamorphosis as a consequence of a sovereign abandonment that 
has cast him outside the political – outside humanity itself. 
* 
In contrast to Iweala, in Song for Night Abani has his protagonist, My Luck, actively 
contrasting the (proto-)sovereign violence meant to reduce him to a less-than-
human being.23 This is most clearly confirmed by the above-mentioned act of in-
subordination, when My Luck shoots his commander, the soldier who was like an 
                                               
23 Although Abani resists the use of a tropology of animalisation in Song for Night, he pro-
poses images of bestialisation in other works, such as for example Becoming Abigail and the 
poetry collection Dog Woman. Becoming Abigail will be taken into consideration in the last 
chapter of this dissertation. 
“animal” (41) and was willing to turn him and the members of his platoon into 
“animals” (39) as well.24 Abani’s main character manages to retain a complex, mul-
ti-faceted personality even in the midst of horror: even in the midst of horror, he 
loves and hates, he is capable of sorrow and shame. As suggested by the title of 
the novella, in Song for Night the writer explores such a wide spectrum of human 
feelings by means of a symbolic interplay of darkness and light, the metaphysical 
relationship between which constitutes one of his central preoccupations. Under-
standing “how far into darkness” human beings can go “and still find their way 
back to light,” and perhaps even more importantly “how much [it is] necessary for 
there to be darkness for the concept of light to exist” (Abani, “Chris Abani”) is 
indeed one of the main themes that Song for Night seeks to examine. Abani’s com-
passionate exploration of the humanity of the young My Luck cautions that guilt 
and redemption are two sides of the same coin. Put differently, the beauty of the 
redemption he writes about is inextricably linked to the darkness of his main char-
acter’s guilt. 
As argued above, Abani invites the reader to complicate the view of ethical 
opposites as mutually exclusive, and rather attempts to emphasise their constant 
interlacing, which points out the essential complexity of human existence. Living 
is never, the writer suggests, a black-or-white affair, and the story of My Luck’s 
nightmarish adventure is a constant reminder of this. At the beginning of his met-
aphysical trek into the painful memories of his life, My Luck gropes in the dark. 
“Night blends into day blends into night, seamlessly” (65), but “even in daylight 
                                               
24 John Wayne can indeed be seen as a metonym for aspiring sovereignty in that, similarly 
to Iweala’s Commandant, he is a real, trained soldier, one of the few official representa-
tives of the rebel army that is contesting the legitimacy of the status quo. 
[…] [he is] plagued by vivid nightmares” (66, emphasis added). Although he man-
ages to sleep, still rest eludes him – an interior peace he has not been able to attain 
since the day when, witnessing the old women’s cannibalistic feast, he discovered 
that man can, indeed, be wolf to man (27-29). My Luck, however, slowly comes to 
realise that even sins can be “luminous” (157), thus learning to forgive his weak-
nesses and errors to proceed towards redemption – that is, towards (perpetual) 
rest: 
This morning, unaccountably, I am filled with an almost unbearable lightness. This 
light comes not from a sudden wholeness on my part, but from the very wounds I 
carry on my body and in my soul. Each wound, in its particular way, giving off a 
particular and peculiar light. (151) 
In Song for Night, thus, darkness and light are inseparable, truth and falsity are the 
same (69), and even life and death overlap, as confirmed by the depiction of the 
protagonist’s journey, during which My Luck’s ghostly nature becomes, paradoxi-
cally, progressively more visible to the reader. 
The author’s interest to explore the meanings of ambivalent hybridity is con-
firmed by his characterisation of the protagonist: both in the past he remembers 
and re-lives and in his present quest for the acceptance of death, My Luck is pre-
sented as standing on the threshold between many contrastive worlds. He is part 
of them all, and yet does not fully belong to any. In this context, it is meaningful 
that before joining the army My Luck lived in a Northern Sabon Gari, the 
strangers’ quarters inhabited by the Christian Igbos who, like him, resided in the 
predominantly Muslim North of a country that, albeit unnamed, is clearly recog-
nisable as Nigeria. And it is even more telling that he is the son of an imam, a 
“gentle” Igbo (64) who decided at a very young age to embrace the Muslim reli-
gion. My Luck’s father will be repeatedly punished for daring to challenge estab-
lished social categories: not only with the resented exclusion from both religious 
communities, but also, and finally, with death. Indeed, My Luck reflects, it was 
a terrible thing in this divided nation, even in its infancy, for an Igbo man to be a 
Muslim. […] Everyone hated the mosque, sitting as it did by decree of the Sar-
dauna in the midst of the Christian enclave. Everyone hated my father. […] For a 
long time I hated my father too, but since he died, I have been trying to love him. 
(92) 
My Luck’s father is murdered, as the Igbo press says, at the hands of “other Mus-
lims because he married a Catholic” (110). He is killed in his deserted mosque while in 
a trance that has put him in “communion with angels and jinn” (155). The 
mosque, in this sense, becomes a quintessential site of hybridity, a camp within the 
camp, a locus twice excluded from the city, a space whose sacredness does not 
constitute a sufficient deterrent against committing a homicide. My Luck recalls 
that on that day, following his mother’s premonitory dream, he went to the holy 
place to warn his father about his imminent death. However, on seeing the shapes 
of his sword-carrying assailants, he panicked, “ran and hid in the courtyard.”  
When they fled, I came out to him. He smiled at me and touched my face, smear-
ing his blood on my cheek. He tried to speak, but only blood came. I pushed back 
from him and he died in the sand like a dog. (157) 
My Luck will soon be cleansed of a sin that he perceives as being unforgivable: 
when he got back home his mother was indeed “waiting with a bowl of water and 
a rag and she washed my face and said nothing” (157). 
The unacceptable hybridity that has determined My Luck’s father’s death 
will however prove a source of salvation for the boy during the anti-Igbo riots 
that constitute a clear, if loose, reinvention of the massacres that took place in 
Northern Nigeria from 1966 onwards, triggering Biafra’s secession. Abani here 
draws on, and revises, a recurrent image of Biafran war fiction: a number of first-
wave writers have indeed recounted how during the disturbances victims of vio-
lence were often requested to demonstrate to be members of the same ethnic or 
religious group as their aggressors by speaking a certain language or reciting a cer-
tain prayer. Abani’s rewriting of this highly symbolical moment of intercultural 
tension takes place when My Luck is attempting to flee to safety by reaching the 
train station in a city “alive with mobs” (96) chasing the Igbo infidels. The Igbo 
boy, who speaks fluent Hausa, is asked to prove that he really is a believer by sing-
ing the Muslim call to prayer: failure to do so would mean certain death. It is only 
by virtue of being his ‘hybrid’ father’s son that he survives: 
[i]n my best voice I began the call to prayer. A hush descended on the crowd as my 
voice went from a childish soprano to a cracked and smoky alto and then back 
again. The cracks teased some with memories of loves lost and dreams turned ran-
cid. To others it was a caress that burned. Finally, unable to stand it any longer, a 
man screamed: “Stop! Somebody tell him to stop!” (97) 
The “cracks” in My Luck’s voice are reminders that the boy is singing from a 
space that is inherently hybrid: the space of the child who is becoming a man. And 
these “cracks” in someone’s being, Abani suggests, allow a glimpse into a com-
mon humanity of loves, dreams and caresses. My Luck’s ‘broken’ singing has 
therefore the implicit power to indict the madness of the horrific bloodbath that is 
going on – so much so that the boy is asked to stop with an anguished scream. 
Abani’s complex representation of the relationship between My Luck and 
his father recalls that hybridity, “the in-between space […] that carries the burden of 
a culture” (Bhabha H.K. Location 38), is often a space of sorrow. Postcolonial 
thought has rightly acknowledged, and praised, the resistant and creative potential 
of the hybrid subjectivity. However, on many occasions it has done so at the risk 
of minimising, or even forgetting, the suffering that hybridity can be conducive to. 
Abani suggests that hybridity can be, and indeed most of the times is, a painful 
condition. And this is not only due to the fact that, like the intertwining of ethical 
light and darkness, it forces one to the constant, and difficult, re-negotiation of 
one’s identity. Hybridity is also feared, despised, excluded, killed, and often with 
impunity, for being a threat to the maintenance of a supposedly ordered society. 
However, it is also through the narration of My Luck’s survival and the celebra-
tion of his father’s smile in death – along with the recognition that people like him 
are always hated “because their kindness makes us recognize the shits we are” 
(110) – that Abani forcefully highlights the potential strength inherent in human 
becoming and hybridity. 
Neither Abani nor Iweala ever mention the name of the country in which their 
post-national novellas take place, although the setting of Song for Night, as seen 
above, is clearly a Nigerian one and Iweala has undoubtedly drawn much inspira-
tion from his cultural and familial heritage in the definition of the unnamed coun-
try of his text.25 The abstraction from the specifics of a univocally recognisable 
                                               
25 While certain commentators have argued that the author “offers the best Biafran war 
novel to date by raising the war above the specifics of the historical setting […] and im-
plicitly comparing it to wars that have passed and that are ongoing” (Hawley 22), others 
have on the contrary remarked that Beasts of No Nation is not “a novel about Biafra that 
speaks implicitly about other wars; it is a novel about African wars in the 80s and 90s that 
speaks implicitly about Biafra” (Hodges 7). While the latter interpretation is perhaps the 
most convincing, still the very fact that such a debate has arisen testifies to the malleabil-
ity of a post-national text that is purportedly written as to be adaptable to different con-
texts because of its historical indefiniteness. 
conflict, which is at its extreme in Iweala’s fictional “no nation,” is ostensibly 
meant to transcend the local while encompassing it at the same time, and hence to 
underscore the global relevance of the issues addressed.26 
The two novellas, however, have been criticised for being conducive to what 
critic Eleni Coundouriotis has termed “arrested historicization.” A characteristic 
they share with many human rights narratives tackling the question of child sol-
diering in Africa, “arrested historicization” determines “a narrowing down of the 
historical scope of a long-standing convention in African literature, the war novel” 
(192). Indeed, Coundouriotis contends, works such as Beasts of No Nation and Song 
for Night propose an abstracted figure of the child soldier that, “cast against a 
background of the ‘dark continent’ revisited,” has been problematically “commod-
ified as the new authenticity out of Africa” (203). Anthropologist David Rosen 
has made the related argument that “recent novels of war and, especially, novels 
of children at war in contemporary conflicts completely remove war from the 
world of politics” (“The Child Soldier in Literature” 124). Child soldier narratives 
would thus endorse an image of Africa as a prelogical locus – one that Hegel fa-
mously described as “the land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-
conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of Night” (The Philosophy of His-
tory, 109). For these reasons, the texts can be potentially perceived as perpetuating 
the colonial trope of Africa as an ahistorical “heart of darkness” inhabited by less-
than-human beings, or by beings whose humanity, albeit recognised, remains 
nonetheless ‘other’ – “ugly,” as Conrad’s Marlow (in)famously put it (63). The 
                                               
26 For a recent ethnographic study of the memory of the Nigerian Civil War, and of the 
role played by children as combatants, spies and messengers in particular within the Bia-
fran army, see Uchendu, esp. 400-407. 
preoccupations manifested in commentaries such as those just rehearsed do in-
deed point out one of the major weaknesses of Iweala’s work, which lends itself to 
simplistic interpretations because of its overtly didactic aims. Abani’s feat, on the 
contrary, lies in the fact that since he “insists on literary and historical specificity 
as a condition for meaning, even when he places historical materiality out of his 
character’s reach” (Schultheis, “Global Specters” 25), the tensions between the lo-
cal and the global that come to the surface in his work do not allow a reductionist 
reading of his depiction of Africa as ontologically childish – that is, apolitical and 
ahistorical. 
Beasts of No Nation has been often criticised for its ahistorical abstractedness. 
David Rosen, for example, has observed that the “universal ‘everyman’ quality” 
that this text shares with a number of child soldier narratives, albeit ostensibly 
serving notions of the “greater good – ending children’s involvement in war” 
(125), has the effect of 
stripping the story of any social and cultural context. The story unfolds both no-
where and everywhere. There is no history and no meaning to anything that is go-
ing on. Strongly paralleling the humanitarian understanding of war, it portrays peo-
ple simply dying for nothing. (Rosen, “The Child Soldier in Literature” 119) 
The apolitical stance adopted by Iweala in the novella is determined primarily by 
the characterisation of his protagonist as a boy who conforms in many respects to 
the humanitarian trope of the victimised non-agent. Agu, particularly as a conse-
quence of being an extremely young combatant, has a very limited understanding 
of the reasons which led to the outbreak of the war – an ignorance that contrib-
utes to the portrayal of his conscription as an essentially violent imposition. 
Iweala’s abstracting intentions, however, transcend characterisation, as confirmed 
by the fact that he does not allow any explanatory passage to find its way into the 
narrative either through dialogue or other narrative devices. It is also for this rea-
son that the fictional war of Beasts of No Nation does indeed run the risk of endors-
ing the Western conception of postcolonial wars as inherently devoid of meaning, 
as phenomena that, like the behaviour of those “beasts” who fight them, are irra-
tional.  
The perception of the similarity between Iweala’s representation of Africa 
and colonialist discourses has no doubt been enhanced also by the author’s em-
ployment of the rhetoric of animalisation commented upon above. The use of an-
imal metaphors can indeed recall colonial epistemologies, which, as Frantz Fanon 
famously remarked in his seminal The Wretched of the Earth, had the aim to strip the 
colonised of their humanity. As I have attempted to show above, however, in 
Iweala’s book bestiality is not presented as the ontological characteristic of a black 
man who must be enlightened by means of a Western civilising mission, but is ra-
ther a tropological strategy meant to shed perturbing light on the consequences of 
statelessness, and of the ensuing human rights deprivation, on human behaviour. 
It is therefore no coincidence that the disquieting savagery of the human in war 
situations is emphatically pitted against the harmonious familial and communal 
context of pre-war society. The continuous alternations, in the narration of Agu’s 
story of war, between passages where humanity becomes feral and moments of 
ordered, if abstracted, social existence, remind us that the condition of indistinc-
tion between man and beast in which the abandoned man finds himself should be, 
like the metamorphosis of man into a werewolf, temporary, exceptional (107). 
Still, it is undoubted that these nuances have often been missed by Western 
reviewers and readers, many of whom, even in otherwise perceptive pieces, have 
hailed Iweala’s text as a brilliant journey into the late modern African “heart of 
darkness” (see for example Maslin, “Conscripted”). Parallels such as these, implic-
itly likening Beasts of No Nation to the conradian novella whose “racism” was se-
verely critiqued by Chinua Achebe (“Image”), hint at the fact that the provocative 
use of the imagery of animality as employed in Beasts is not inscribed within the 
economy of the text with sufficient clarity. In other words, Iweala’s didactic 
choices in terms of characterisation and narrative style have in the end produced a 
text that lends itself to over-simplified misreadings which confirm that, in Western 
circuits, the African continent is still imagined, and marketed, along lines defined 
by a (neo-)colonial aesthetics postulating the West’s own inevitable righteousness 
within the “savage-victim-savior” paradigm that functions as a subtext for much 
human rights discourse (Mutua). 
While Iweala problematically prevents the emergence of ideological justifica-
tions to the horrors of the civil conflict he portrays, Abani, more subtly, claims 
their remoteness and ultimate irrelevance in the face of human pain: “the price of 
coming this far,” My Luck reflects, “has been too much. […] [T]here has been 
nothing but blood since the night my mother died” (93), since the anti-Igbo riots 
that claimed her life. 
It has been three years of a senseless war, an though the reasons for it are clear, and 
though we will continue to fight until we are ordered to stop – and probably for a 
while after that – none of us can remember the hate that led us here. We are simply fighting 
to survive the war. (19, emphasis added) 
In Song for Night, Abani does not erase the historicity of the events he fictionalises, 
but rather reinvents contexts that are historically and socially recognisable, even as 
historical accuracy is certainly not his greatest concern. Coundouriotis is thus right 
when she states that the lack of historical specifics in the novella suggests “the 
kind of flattening out of time that occurs in memory where the past is part of the 
present consciousness” (195). Contrary to her view, however, I would not inter-
pret Abani’s choice as delegitimising the novella’s historicity tout court. In other 
words, it seems to me that the fact that “there are references to Lexus cars” does 
not constitute sufficient evidence to claim that “it cannot be Biafra in 1967” 
(Coundouriotis 195, emphasis added). Song for Night, I believe, remains an (admit-
tedly loose) artistic reinvention of a historical event – even as there is no doubt 
that, by matching its fictionalisation with a preoccupation for other phenomena 
which have not been exclusively Nigerian, such as child soldiering and inter-ethnic 
strife, the writer invites to its transcendence. 
The interpretation of My Luck’s war is further expanded as a consequence 
of its double nature as an experience that is both physical and metaphysical, be-
coming the hyperbolic representation of an existential condition where the hu-
manity of the child, a human being in fieri, is put to the test. Indeed, alongside ex-
plicitly referencing the ethnic and religious complexities that contributed to the 
outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War, Song for Night is the story of a soul at war who 
finally manages to lay down his weapons following the remembrance of those 
“gentle, soft, almost invisible acts of compassion” (Abani, “Chris Abani”) and 
love that, even while fighting, he was capable of doing and receiving. In other 
words, while Abani’s war does retain a historical and social dimension that I 
would not be as ready as Coundouriotis to dismiss, the author focuses primarily 
on the ultimate ways in which our (in)humanity can be contested, or confirmed, 
while insisting on the difficulty of classifying certain behaviours within normative 
discourses based on the attribution of responsibility and guilt. Abani’s song, thus, 
“resonates both locally and globally” (Schultheis, “Global Specters” 41), both his-
torically and allegorically, both physically and metaphysically.  
Given these considerations, it appears that the metaphorical night that en-
gulfs My Luck at the outbreak of the hostilities should not be confused with that 
“one long night of savagery” that Chinua Achebe sees in colonialist discourses on 
Africa (“Novelist” 45). On the contrary, it is a darkness that may, and must, be re-
lived and released in order to move on (104). It is one of those many moral nights 
that befall a fragile humanity that will nonetheless be given the chance to find its 
way back to light – however ambiguously. It is for this reason that My Luck’s 
night is still “full of stars” (79), of tiny dots of light that, like beacons, will help 
him retrieve the path he has lost.  
* 
Beasts of No Nation ends as Agu and his platoon desert and start an exhausting 
march back “home” (153). The last section of the book, however, does not envi-
sion the restoration of ‘normality’ for Agu, but is set instead in a rehabilitation 
centre, where the former child soldier is undergoing treatment. Alexandra Schul-
theis has argued that Iweala’s novella ultimately conforms to the Bildungsroman nar-
rative structure that, as Joseph Slaughter has shown, underlies human rights law, 
since the child soldier has apparently moved beyond the limbo of war to proceed 
towards “physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration” (CRC, Art. 
39; see Schultheis, “Global Specters” 40). Agu is indeed presented as having be-
gun to reassert his agency, also in the form of narrative authority. Yet, it must not 
be ignored that the ending does not provide any reassurance as to the effective-
ness of the rehabilitation process, let alone of the reintegration of the child-soldier 
in a post-war (either national, or global) community. Agu has moved from one 
limbo to another, and is now caught in a certainly more pleasant, but still sus-
pended, condition. The boy’s suspended Bildung seems to derive also from the fact 
that the therapist Amy, the “white woman from America” with whom the West-
ern reader presumably identifies, is “like small girl” (175), a dubious agent who 
remains speechless, with “water […] just shining in her eye” (177) while Agu is 
telling her his experiences. This ironic image is in clear contrast with the humani-
tarian self-representation of the rational West as the saviour of an infantilised 
South and seems to undermine, without however going so far as rejecting it in full, 
the conception of therapy as the optimal (Western) way to recovery for former 
child soldiers. I would argue therefore that such lack of aesthetic closure, which 
has been noted elsewhere (Krishnan, “Biafra”), at least partially problematises the 
interpretation of an otherwise apparently linear ending. In his last words, Agu 
does not negate his having been “some sort of beast or devil” (176). At the same 
time however, he reclaims the normal beauty of his pre-war existence: “[F]ine. I 
am all of this thing,” he says, in a declaration of responsibility which, once and for 
all, reverses his wartime non-agency. “I am all of this thing, but I am also having a 
mother once, and she is loving me” (177, emphasis added). It seems to me that 
this positive assertion, far from “secur[ing] Agu’s innocence as a child” (Schulthe-
is, “Global Specters” 40), reinstates his ambivalent nature, eliciting an undoubted 
empathic response while at the same time underscoring the suffering that has 
been produced by his actions. 
Readers of Abani’s novella will understand only on the very last page that, as 
they suspected, the author has offered them a “ghost story” (Schultheis, “Global 
Specters” 28) in place of a Bildungsroman. Schultheis’s remarks are once again use-
ful here: as the critic has observed, by confirming that the protagonist has lost his 
life in the mine explosion with which the narration began, the ending shows that 
Abani “writes out of the failure of the public sphere” (Schultheis, “Global Spec-
ters” 25), and therefore 
refutes the implication that the bildungsroman can secure a viable future for a 
(former) child soldier in either national or global literary terms. This clears a space 
for other narratives and negotiations of modern subjectivity that might 
acknowledge if not embrace the ethical injunctions of that subject’s ghosts. (Schul-
theis, “Global Specters” 36) 
Even more explicitly than Iweala’s post-national novella, Song for Night does 
not simply depict the conflict between (non-)citizens and (non-)states. More prob-
lematically, the state is no longer there, it is no longer presented as a site for the 
promotion of human rights, as a site where the full development of one’s person-
ality can occur. The difficult (Iweala), or unimaginable (Abani), incorporation of 
the represented subject into a regime of citizenship and rights uncovers the limits 
of human rights within the context of sovereignty. In other words, it recalls the 
well-known fact that human rights are “not yet the rights of humanity in general” 
but rather “the rights of incorporated citizens – the rights of persons acting in 
their corporate capacity as state” (Slaughter, Human Rights, Inc. 89). And when the 
state is simply not there, or where it functions as a human rights abuser rather 
than as a human rights protector, human rights become an outright impossibility. 
What is more, by positing the young character clearly beyond the sphere of 
legal accountability, Abani confirms that his central preoccupation remains that of 
assessing the moral implications of his character’s enlightenment and progressive 
‘re-humanisation’ in death. The fact that My Luck’s spiritual search is one that 
does not aspire to the benevolence of a forgiving God, being rather an attempt to 
look for grace that is grounded in a more humanistic sense of compassion, sug-
gests that the writer is sceptical of those grand narratives that endeavour to ac-
quire moral certainty through concepts of guilt, punishment or forgiveness. The 
novella thus puts to the test the reader’s capability for mercy with a beautifully un-
settling force. 

 
As Malawian poet Jack Mapanje writes in the introduction to his edited collection 
of African prison writing, Gathering Seaweed,1 the “defiant recasting of African his-
tory through the eyes of some of its finest hostages” (xiii) has been one of the 
most fascinating, and ethically compelling, consequences arising from the count-
less accounts of prison experiences by African intellectuals since the 1950s. Not 
only do these texts provide an indictment of the brutality of colonial and post-
colonial regimes of violence predicated upon disregard for the value of human life 
– both in Africa and elsewhere, but they also constitute “an indelible record of the 
origins, growth and maturity of the struggle for the restitution of human dignity 
and integrity, justice and peace on the African continent” (xiv). It is for this reason 
that Mapanje vehemently rejects “the subtle neocolonial view that the publication 
of African prison writing fabricates yet another negative image of the continent” 
(xiii). 
Following Mapanje’s lead, this chapter aims at investigating how Chris Abani 
(Kalakuta Republic, 2000), Helon Habila (Waiting for an Angel, 2002) and 
                                               
1 The phrase “gathering seaweed” is drawn from an episode Nelson Mandela recounts in 
his memoir Long Walk to Freedom, excerpts of which are collected in Mapanje’s edited vol-
ume (194-202). 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (“Cell One,” 2007) have approached the theme of 
state violence through their portrayals of indefinite detention in Nigerian prisons. 
It argues that the Nigerian cell is presented in the examined texts as an extra-
juridical locus embodying the concept of the Agambenian ‘camp.’ I shall also at-
tempt to show that the prison, functioning as a metonymy for the postcolony it-
self, figuratively indicates the generalised condition of permanent exception in 
which Nigeria, and in particular the Nigeria of the military, was caught. We are 
thus slowly moving into a literary space where the exception has manifestly be-
come the rule, and the country is cast in an apparently never-ending war-like con-
dition of state-sanctioned terror. 
The works that will be studied here do not only recall, through their portray-
als of experiences of detention, the cruelty of the Nigerian dictatorships of the 
1980s and 90s, recreating the oppressive atmosphere in which Nigerians were 
forced to live. They also serve as testimonies to the different, at times ambiguous, 
strategies of resistance to dehumanisation that ostensibly helpless victims of sov-
ereign decision can, and indeed do, adopt while also complicating the rigid divide 
between victim and perpetrator that the Agambenian paradigm often seems to 
imply. However, it is essential to point out at the very outset of this chapter that 
while Abani’s poetry collection is considered to be largely autobiographical and 
can thus be viewed as an addition to the vast body of prison writing that Mapanje 
comments on,2 Habila’s and Adichie’s texts are fictional reinventions of the phe-
                                               
2 The author’s accounts of his imprisonments are, however, at the centre of great contro-
versy. Many commentators, basing their claims on the lack of archival evidence regarding 
Abani’s periods of detention, and on Abani’s own apparent inconsistencies in recounting 
his experiences during interviews and public talks, have contended that the author has 
constructed a fictitious public persona, the details of his biography being embellished at 
best, at worst invented. While it is not within the scope of this chapter to address the 
doubts that have been raised on the truthfulness of Abani’s autobiographical works and 
nomenon of indefinite detention, where the prison cell emerges as a powerful lit-
erary symbol signifying, and interrogating the legitimacy of, a state that claims in-
finite rights for itself and denies all rights to its (non-)citizens. Albeit different in 
terms of genre (see Section 3.2), the three works will be taken into consideration 
together, as more productive objects of analysis than other recent fictional and 
non-fictional texts that similarly explore the question of incarceration in Nigeria.3 
This choice has not only been determined by their aesthetic quality, but also, and 
importantly, by the fact that they exhibit comparable representations of the hu-
man held captive in inhuman conditions. 
Historians have often pointed out that it was during the short rule of dictator Mu-
hammadu Buhari (1984-1985) that the foundations for the increasing despotism 
of military governance of the 1980s and 1990s were laid. After the proscription of 
political parties and the suspension of certain sections of the 1979 Constitution in 
1984, a number of severe decrees followed that limited the liberties of citizens 
while at the same time heightening the repressive powers of the head of state, the 
army, and the police. As Egosa E. Osaghae has written, a “particularly monstrous” 
decree, 
                                                                                                                                     
accounts, I refer to some Web sources that can be of help in order to understand the 
terms of the debate: see in particular Ikheloa et al. and Emetulu. 
3 Sefi Atta’s Everything Good Will Come (2005) and Kachi A. Ozumba’s The Shadow of a Smile 
(2009) are two of the most interesting representatives of contemporary fictional texts that 
more or less expressly tackle the topic of detention in Nigeria. Recent autobiographical 
prison writing, instead, include Christine Anyanwu’s The Days of Terror (2002), Kunle 
Ajibade’s Jailed for Life (2003) and Ogaga Ifowodo’s “A Room of my Own” (2002). 
which remained the major instrument of state repression in the later regimes of 
Babangida and Abacha, was the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree of 
1984 which authorised the chief of staff at supreme headquarters to detain for up 
to three months (renewable), without trial, anyone deemed to be a risk to state se-
curity or to have contributed to the country’s economic crisis. […] The wide-
ranging powers given to the National Security Organization (NSO) to hunt for, de-
tain and deal with enemies of the regime, even within the armed forces, combined 
with this decree to unleash a reign of terror[.](Crippled Giant 179-180) 
The press, which had been relatively free up till then, was not exempted from re-
strictions, either: with the infamous Public Officers (Protection Against False Ac-
cusations) Decree no. 4 of 1984, the regime “authorised the arrest, detention and 
trial of journalists and the closure of any medium making ‘any false statement’ or 
rumour embarrassing to public officers or calculated to subject them to ridicule or 
disrepute” (Osaghae 180). In the first period of his rule, Ibrahim Babangida culti-
vated a populist image of his governance as informed by freedom of thought and 
expression, also through the – albeit “cosmetic” (Osaghae 196) – repeal of Decree 
no. 4. However, he was soon to assume an extremely despotic posture, compara-
ble to that of his predecessor. The tragic death of the editor of the magazine 
Newswatch, Dele Giwa, who was killed by a letter bomb in 1987,4 is in this sense 
symptomatic of the attempt to gag the press that was carried out in the later years 
of the Babangida era.5 During the Abacha days, as is well known, dissent contin-
ued to be harshly suppressed, while the Nigerian society experienced increased 
militarisation. It thus comes as no surprise that the silencing of intellectuals and 
artists emerges as an almost archetypical motif in the literature that recreates the 
                                               
4 This episode is recounted in Habila’s Waiting (196-197), which is however set in the 
Abacha years. 
5 As Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, among others, have noticed, “[t]he timing of 
his death, just days after an interrogation by government operatives, led many to believe 
the Babangida regime may have been responsible” (History 224). 
authoritarian ‘relapse’ which followed the short-lived Second Republic. 
In the light of these considerations, life in jail as portrayed by Abani, Habila 
and Adichie predictably resembles a vivid nightmare. Indeed, far from having the 
aim of disciplining docile bodies through the regulative, ordered carceral institu-
tion famously theorised by Michel Foucault, the Nigerian prisons described by the 
above-mentioned authors constitute exemplary sites for the unrestrained exercise 
of an absolute form of sovereign power. In his seminal Discipline and Punish, Fou-
cault traced the development of the penal system in Western Europe from a high-
ly spectacular demonstration of unrestrained violence to an internalised form of 
control based on perpetual surveillance. However, as many commentators have 
observed, Foucault’s text omits to consider how “the very governments that be-
gan to frown on torture and public execution within Europe’s borders continued 
to use such tactics systematically in colonies throughout the world, well into Fou-
cault’s lifetime” (Graham 230).  
Human rights scholars and activists concur in noticing that, among the rea-
sons explaining the appalling human rights abuses suffered by prisoners in post-
colonial Africa,6 it is essential to recall the permanence of the colonial idea of pen-
itentiary confinement as having coercive, rather than reformative, aims. Indeed, 
                                               
6 In Stephen Peté’s words, “[c]rumbling infrastructure and chronic overcrowding, politi-
cal oppression and economic collapse, the continued use of corporal and capital punish-
ment, long delays in awaiting trial, a lack of separate facilities for juveniles, the activities 
of prison gangs, the ravages of HIV/AIDS, and rampant corruption have all exacted a 
terrible toll on the human rights of the prisoners in post-colonial Africa” (Peté “Brief 
History” 52). All these issues are given due attention in Jeremy Sarkin’s edited volume 
Human Rights in African Prisons. For “a social context perspective of the origin and devel-
opment of Nigeria’s Criminal justice system,” see Otu. For a recent account of the still 
critical living conditions in Nigerian prisons, see also the 2008 Amnesty International 
document “Nigeria: Prisoners’ Rights Systematically Flouted.” 
[f]rom the time that the colonial powers introduced and disseminated this alien 
form of punishment across the length and breadth of the African continent, it was 
inextricably bound up with aims and ideals that had far more to do with the subju-
gation of the indigenous population and the maintenance of white sovereignty than 
with the reform and reintegration of the offender. […] This social control function 
continued into the post-colonial period, with political dictators making full use of 
the coercive traditions embodied within these institutions. (Peté, “Brief History” 
60)  
And in the works examined here, the penitentiary is evocative of the pre-modern 
dark, overcrowded dungeon rather than of Jeremy Bentham’s panoptical architec-
ture – a characteristic that confirms that the colonial conception of the carceral in-
stitution has survived well into postcolonial times. If it is true that “[a] society’s 
human rights record is mirrored in the state of human rights protection in its pris-
ons” (Sarkin 2), then there is no doubt that the Nigeria portrayed in recent prison 
literature is a country that has a long way to go in terms of realising and respecting 
the rights of its citizens. 
Discourses on exceptionalism, the carceral and processes of dehumanisation 
of detainees have acquired renewed importance, particularly in American Studies, 
in the wake of the US “war on terror” that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
putting notorious detention centres such as Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib to the 
forefront of contemporary debates regarding the policies of the Bush and, more 
recently, the Obama administration. A number of the critiques of rights depriva-
tion in the “global war prisons” (Gregory) – spaces inhabited by persons who, in 
Judith Butler’s words, cannot be considered “subjects in any legal or normative 
sense” (Precarious xvi) – have drawn on Agamben’s political philosophy in an at-
tempt to define the supposedly anachronistic nature of this new, terrifying peni-
tentiary regime. Critic Caleb Smith, however, commenting on recent studies of 
Guantánamo Bay detention camp, has argued that the emphasis they place on the 
“unprecedented” violence against, and desubjectivation of, the detainees held 
there, risks “normalizing all that came before,” tempting us to wrongly assume 
that a ‘pure’ Foucauldian disciplinary regime was, “until quite recently, the actual 
order of things” (244). The phenomenon of “detention without subjects,” he ob-
jects, has in fact a long history, the legal fiction of “civil death” constituting one of 
the main premises on which the nineteenth-century US carceral system was 
founded. In what he calls the “poetics of the penitentiary – the images and tropes that 
give meaning to the violence of detention – enlightened sentimentality is bound 
up with the violent and ghostly nightmares of the gothic” (248), as the prisoner 
has to undergo a ritualised death as the inevitable premise for the resurrection of a 
reformed, redeemed subject.7 
Caleb Smith’s disquieting observations are useful insofar as they evidence 
the need to recognise how the allegedly ‘normal’ western modernity has been in-
formed by so-called ‘exceptional’ practices much more often than generally 
acknowledged. But what most clearly distinguishes the legal “civil death” Smith 
writes about from the dehumanisation of the person subjected to violent forms of 
indefinite detention, be it in Guantánamo or elsewhere, lies in the fact that such a 
dehumanising detention holds no ‘corrective’ objective. The postcolonial prisons 
of the texts studied here, for example, are presented as essentially necropolitical 
spaces of punishment and interrogation: there, reformation of the prisoner is not 
                                               
7 Such a ritualised death includes a number of different but mutually reinforcing practices: 
“[t]he prisoner is severed from the social world in which his old identity was grounded; 
he loses his name and is called by a number; his clothes are confiscated and replaced with 
a uniform; his hair is cut and shaved – through ‘a series of abasements, degradations, 
humiliations, and profanations of self’” (Goffman 14 qtd. in Smith 248). 
even contemplated, and survival becomes, as it were, almost accidental. In this 
sense, the postcolonial jail is evocative of Agamben’s discussion of the ‘camp’ as 
the space that is opened when suspension of the rule of law is no longer excep-
tional. In other words, these detention islands are not simply reformatory sites 
whose functioning is regulated by prison law, which “only constitutes a particular 
sphere of penal law and is not outside the normal order” (Homo Sacer 20) – albeit, 
as Caleb Smith contra Agamben warns us, this does not necessarily mean that their 
workings are entirely incomparable. Still, it is undeniable that the Nigerian prison 
is here presented as an extra-juridical locus. Beyond its walls and barbed wire, the 
traditional power of the sovereign over the existence of its subjects is carried to 
such extremes that the detainees are reduced to a form of ‘bare life’: “the object of 
a pure de facto rule of a detention that is indefinite not only in the temporal sense 
but in its very nature as well, since it is entirely removed from the law and from 
judicial oversight”8 (State of Exception 3-4). These prisoners can be killed without 
committing homicide. They can be disposed of without leaving traces, as “the fact 
that atrocities may or may not be committed does not depend on the law but ra-
ther on the civility and ethical sense of the police that act temporarily as sover-
eign” (Means Without End 42). No ‘resurrection’ is in sight for their victims. 
These Nigerian cells, therefore, are not panoptical sites of surveillance “in-
duc[ing] in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures 
the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 201). On the 
contrary, they are ‘black holes’ which threaten to swallow the poor – those who 
cannot bribe – and the troublesome – those who speak up. They are spaces where 
                                               
8 In this passage, Agamben is referring to the Guantánamo detainees. 
all the regime’s personae non gratae can simply be made to disappear. The moral, and 
political, relevance of the texts discussed here then becomes evident if we consid-
er that, by giving visibility to hidden, spectral lives that are suspended between life 
and death, they reassert their essential humanity, thus reassessing the paradigms of 
what Judith Butler has called the “grievability” of human life (Precarious Lives 
2004), while importantly exposing the mechanisms of biopolitical power. As will 
be noticed, moreover, the postcolonial prison as depicted by the authors under 
consideration functions as a metonymy for Nigeria, and particularly for the coun-
try during military rule, which is thereby presented as a site of permanent excep-
tion. 
In this context, it is however essential to remember that postcolonial African 
prison writing, be it autobiographical or fictional, manages to complicate the very 
possibility of thinking the oppositional differentiation between postcolonial ‘nor-
mality’ and postcolonial ‘exception’ by suggesting that the postcolony, founded on 
the colonial regime of exception, is inherently, inevitably, steeped in the abnormal. 
In this regard, the continuity between colonial and postcolonial rule has often 
been emphasised on the part of postcolonial writers by evidencing how “African 
leaders seem to have copied only the brutality, corrupt practices and selfish indi-
vidualism from their colonial masters” (Mapanje xiv). This paradox, Chris Dunton 
has remarked, is nowhere more clearly revealed than in a passage from Ngugi Wa 
Thiong’o’s prison memoir, Detained: A Writer’s Prison Diary, where the writer re-
calls having scornfully posed “the following challenge to a prison warder: ‘The 
British jailed an innocent Kenyatta. Thus Kenyatta learnt to jail innocent Ken-
yans’” (Ngũgĩ 4 qtd. in Dunton, “Chris Anyanwu” 113). 
The ‘derivative’ relationship between colonialism/imperialism and the vio-
lence of the postcolonial military regime is made evident also in the texts by Abani 
and Habila studied here. The years of the dictatorships of Generals Ibrahim Ba-
bangida and Sani Abacha, which constitute the historical background for the two 
works, emerge therefore as exemplary manifestations of the prerogatives that men 
of power in the (post)colony have, not only to suspend, but also to interpret and 
apply differentially (that is, unjustly), the law – a characteristic that is presented as 
painfully embedded in the postcolonial state via colonial rule.  
Notwithstanding their common thematic preoccupations, the texts examined here 
are very different from one another, particularly in terms of style and genre. Kala-
kuta Republic (2000) is a poetry collection authored by Chris Abani, and is inspired 
by the writer’s experiences as a political prisoner in Nigeria during the rule of dic-
tator Ibrahim Babangida. Its title, Kalakuta Republic, refers to the Lagos residence 
of Afro-beat star and activist Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, a fortified commune which 
was given its name in 1975, when the iconoclastic musician declared it a Republic, 
independent from the Nigerian state (Veal 2000: 142-3). The denomination was 
intended as an ironical reference to Alagbon Close, one of the many police cells 
Fela inhabited in Lagos, which was called “the Kalakuta Republic” by the con-
victs, possibly drawing from a Swahili word that means ‘rascal’ (Collins 72).9 Aba-
ni recounts that he met the artist, a “regular [n]icknamed ‘Customer’” (27), during 
his first stay in prison, and the title of his collection, besides paying a literary trib-
                                               
9 As Fela reasoned, “if rascality is going to get us what we want we will use that name, 
because we are dealing with corrupt people so we have to deal rascally with them” (qtd. 
in Collins 72).9 
ute to the late Fela, affirms the urgency to deride the vanity of the sovereign by 
proclaiming autonomy from it, while at the same time more implicitly evoking the 
enclosed self-sufficiency of the prison cell. As the author writes in “Rasa,” a poem 
dedicated to Fela Kuti himself, ‘Kalakuta Republic’ is a name that has the power 
to honour the death 
of conscience, 
 
to ridicule them, those despots 
swollen by their putrescence. (27)  
The poems collected here constitute an intimate reflection on the ultimate essence 
of the human in inhuman conditions, and are tinged with touches of dark irony 
that bitterly disclose the baseness of those who participate in this absolutist sover-
eign project of human annihilation. 
Helon Habila’s novel Waiting for an Angel is based on vaguely autobiograph-
ical details as well, as its central character, Lomba, is a columnist and aspiring poet 
who writes for a Lagos newspaper – like Habila, who in the late 1990s moved to 
Lagos to work as a journalist (Habila “Everything Follows”).10 However, differ-
ently from Habila, who emigrated to the UK and now resides in the US, the fic-
tional Lomba never leaves Nigeria, and is jailed on a false charge of organising an 
anti-government demonstration. Waiting does not revolve around the sole figure 
of the Nigerian intellectual, though: originally appearing “in somewhat different 
form” (Publisher’s Note) as a short-story collection in 2000, the novel still retains 
                                               
10 Commenting on the autobiographical aspects of Waiting, Habila stated in a 2003 inter-
view: “I created this character who is a journalist like me, and an aspiring writer like me – 
young like me […]. The novel is set during the Abacha years, but I wasn’t a journalist 
during the Abacha years. So all those things he went through I imagined. […] But that is 
the way I would have behaved if I had been there, I think” (Habila “Everything Fol-
lows”). 
a loose narrative structure, and is in fact a choral narration recounting the lives of 
some of Lomba’s friends and acquaintances – people who live in the poor, chaot-
ic, vibrant city of Lagos. The only section set in a prison cell is the first, which 
won the Caine Prize for African Writing in 2001 with the title “Love Poems” and 
is told partly in diary form by Lomba himself, partly through the third-person nar-
rative voice of a biographer whose identity remains unknown. 
Finally, the short story “Cell One,” by Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, first 
published in The New Yorker in 2007, draws onto the writer’s teenage memories 
and is set in the university campus of Nsukka, where Adichie used to live in the 
1990s (Adichie “An Interview”). “Cell One” imagines the story of a privileged 
family forced to come to terms with the iron fist of contemptuous state officials: 
Nnamabia, a spoiled, charming boy, has been mistakenly arrested and is detained 
for being part of a “cult,” a criminal confraternity.11 The short story was included 
in the 2009 collection The Thing Around Your Neck, where it occupies a prominent 
opening position. The author explained in a recent interview that the process of 
completing this narrative was particularly difficult, as it reached its definitive form 
only four years after its first draft (Adichie “An Interview”). It is therefore no sur-
prise that Adichie’s approach to the topic of detention is hesitant, more ‘reluctant’ 
than her colleagues’. The writer’s choice to rely on a first-person narrator who is 
not the prisoner himself, but the prisoner’s younger sister, is telling in this respect, 
as it allows her a certain degree of narrative distancing from her subject matter. 
The relative brevity and immediacy that these works share could thus be interpret-
                                               
11 For a recent account tracing the development of the phenomenon of cultism in Nigeri-
an universities from the peaceful confraternities of the early 1950s to the increasingly vio-
lent cults founded from the 1970s onwards, see Ellis, “Campus ‘Cults’ in Nigeria.” 
ed as a formal correlative to the sense of confinement that is conveyed by the con-
tent. Put differently, these short stories and narrative poems, like the prisons they 
encapsulate, are cellular, fragmented, limited, but dense, intense, full – full of bod-
ies, lives, and stories – stories of survival, and stories of death. 
One of the aspects that makes the reading of these texts, and of prison liter-
ature more generally, especially challenging is indeed the pervasiveness of deadly 
violence, and, even more, the description of the debasing consequences of such 
violence on the bodies and souls of both prisoners and state officials. The impris-
oned self is often reduced here to its bodily dimension, to a grotesque, entangled 
mass of body parts, of offshoots and cavities that swallow and eject. In Bakhtinian 
fashion, these depictions are predicated on a logic that “ignores the closed, 
smooth, and impenetrable surface of the body and retains only its excrescences 
(sprouts, buds) and orifices, only that which leads beyond the body’s limited space 
or into the body’s depths” (Rabelais 318). Lomba, for example, illustrates the con-
ditions of debasement to which he is forced as follows: 
What is left here is nothing but a mass of protruding bones, unkempt hair and tear-
ful eyes; an asshole for shitting and farting, and a penis that in the mornings grows 
turgid in vain. This leftover self, this sea-bleached wreck panting on the iron-filing 
sand of the shores of this penal island is nothing but hot air, and hair, and ears 
cocked, hopeful. (Habila 23-24) 
The notion of the “penal island” alluded to in this passage evokes the finiteness 
and alleged self-sufficiency of the ‘Prison Republic’ mentioned above, highlighting 
the isolation of a space which is so disconnected from the rest of the world that it 
perversely functions on its own, preventing those who inhabit it from establishing 
communication with the outside. 
Chimamanda Adichie’s elegant, polished prose indulges less than Habila’s on 
grotesque imagery. Still, her narrator too provides a description of the progressive 
brutalisation of her handsome brother, the self-confident Nnamabia. During the 
first visits his family pays after his incarceration, the boy does not seem perturbed 
by what is happening to him in jail, as he awaits his parents’ questions with his 
usual self-confidence, like “an entertainer about to perform” (Adichie 10, emphasis 
added). The decay of his body, however, starts slowly to become perceptible, at 
first affecting only his skin. Some days after his arrest, the narrator’s attention is 
captured by the sight of her brother’s forehead, which is covered in bumps 
“tipped with pus the colour of cream” (13). She is annoyed to realise that Nnama-
bia’s tone is, however, still irritatingly “histrionic” (13), even while describing the 
debasing conditions in which he is forced to live: “I had to shit in a waterproof 
bag today, standing up. The toilet was too full. They flush it only on Saturdays” 
(13). Nnamabia’s attitude will appear to become more subdued only with the arri-
val in his cell of an old man who has been arrested in place of his son. The boy 
sorrowfully recounts how one day 
the policemen had splashed detergent water on the floor and walls of the cell […] 
and […] the old man, who could not afford water, who had not bathed in a week, 
had hurried into the cell and yanked his shirt off and rubbed his frail back against 
the detergent-wet floor. The policemen started to laugh when they saw him do this 
and they asked him to take all his clothes off and parade in the corridor outside the 
cell, and as they did they laughed louder and asked whether his son the thief knew 
that papa’s penis was so shriveled. (16) 
It is the spectacle of the senseless ridiculing of a helpless, innocent human being 
who is reduced to a grotesque shadow of his previous self that will, in the end, 
change the demeanour of this theatrical, “wordly” boy (16), redeeming him in his 
sister’s eyes.12 Needless to say, Adichie’s descriptions are less explicitly grotesque 
                                               
12 The language so far employed by Nnamabia for lying, for what his sister calls his “the-
than Habila’s. However, the excerpt reported above shows that she too resorts to 
the visualisation of graphic details to comment on the violence that is perpetrated 
at the hands of omnipotent prison officials. She thereby emphasises the gratuity of 
a humiliating process that exemplifies Achille Mbembe’s notion of colonial and 
postcolonial commandement as a “circular” phenomenon (Postcolony 32): a demon-
stration of power for power’s sake. 
It is worth noticing that Adichie’s choices in terms of characterisation of her 
fictional convict sets her short story apart from the other two texts analysed in 
this chapter. Nnamabia is not a political activist, he has not been imprisoned for 
his writing. Quite the contrary, he is one of those young boys who, like the narra-
tor – and like the writer herself – grew up in an affluent, cosmopolitan environ-
ment, “watching Sesame Street, reading Enid Blyton, eating cornflakes for break-
fast, attending the university staff primary school in smartly polished brown san-
dals” (5). Paradoxically, however, Nnamabia and his friends contribute to height-
ening the climate of fear and insecurity that can be so clearly perceived on a wider 
national scale: they break into their neighbours’ houses, they become part of the 
above-mentioned violent confraternities. However, even as Nnamabia’s detention 
(which, it is revealed, is unwarranted) was not determined by immediately political 
reasons, the story of his imprisonment soon assumes a clear political connotation. 
Indeed, even this spoiled boy cannot keep silent in the face of the unreasonable 
indecency of the prison system he comes to know. But speaking one’s mind is an 
                                                                                                                                     
atrical” performances (4), was English: when, for example, he staged a burglary at his 
parents’ house after stealing and selling his mother’s jewellery, he spoke “with dramatic, 
wounded eyes […], using unnecessary words like ‘terrible pain’ and ‘violate,’ as he always 
did when he was defending himself” (4). But when he recounts the episode of the old 
man that has been just reported, the narrator notices that her brother’s “Igbo was even-
toned, his voice neither raising nor falling” (15, emphasis added). 
extremely dangerous action in times of tyranny, and Nnamabia is first taken to the 
dreaded “Cell One” of the title, and then transferred to “another site,” an aban-
doned-looking compound which the narrator describes as a place “like where they 
kept people who would later disappear” (21). When he is finally released, his inno-
cence confirmed, the boy is still apparently “unchanged” (19). A closer look at 
him, however, reveals that his arms are covered in “soft-looking welts,” while 
“dried blood [is] caked around his nose” (20). His explanation of the facts is sur-
prisingly succinct, almost understated: 
“Yesterday the policemen asked the old man if he wanted a free bucket of water. 
He said yes. So they told him to take his clothes off and parade in the corridor. […] 
I shouted at the policeman. I said the old man was innocent and ill and if they kept 
him here they would never find his son because he did not even know where his 
son was. They said I should shut up immediately or they would take me to Cell 
One. I didn’t care. I didn’t shut up. So they pulled me out and beat me and took 
me to Cell One.” (20) 
The verbal economy of this passage, in clear contrast with the boy’s previous ver-
bosity, is the final proof of his change of attitude: there is no more room for ‘act-
ing,’ it seems, when one becomes aware that one’s right to life is firmly in the 
hands of a despotic sovereign. 
If Adichie refrains from employing bluntly grotesque imagery in “Cell One,” 
Chris Abani’s use of the grotesque in Kalakuta Republic is instead extremely perva-
sive. Its variety is best illustrated by resorting to a selected set of examples drawn 
from some representative poems in the collection. One of the most striking ways 
in which Abani handles grotesque realism contributes to the vivid portrayal of 
what may be termed the ‘intimacy’ of torture, and ultimately of the carceral, show-
ing the close, inevitable contiguity and interconnectedness of the bodies of victim 
and perpetrator. As for example at the beginning of “Casual Banter”: 
Sergeant Adamu Barkin Zawa 
rammed the barrel 
 
of a rifle – Lee Enfield – up my rectum 
maintaining casual banter; 
 
‘How is your mother? How is she  
finding our lovely country?’ interrupted only 
by the blood spraying from my backside, 
 
baptising his heavily scarified face, 
empty ancient mask. (53) 
At other times, grotesque realism identifies instead a survival strategy. This is the 
case of “Paper Doll,” the poem about the imprisoned transvestite who sells him-
self for ten cigarettes because, as he says, “idle hands is the devil’s workshop” 
(47): 
Christiana we call him, 
the caricature who wears 
prison shorts torn into a skirt and stains 
himself with plant dye. (47, emphasis added) 
The nickname “Christiana,” while playing humorously on the transvestite’s moral 
self-justification, has of course salvific echoes. Grotesque imagery is a signifier of 
survival also in the darkly ironical “Killing Time,” where the uncontrolled bodily 
reaction that follows a random execution means survival: “I know I am alive / be-
cause / terror drips down my legs” (40).  
The reduction of the human being in the hold of biopolitical power to what 
Bakhtin would call the “bodily lower stratum” is far from being carnivalesque, tri-
umphant “gay matter” here. True, Abani, employing yet another grotesque image, 
insists that “[h]umour here swells, filling our nostrils. / Percolating senses” – but 
he then adds that “[l]aughter is the same as crying, / only there are no tears” (84). 
Indeed, while dark irony and sarcasm feature prominently in these texts, joyous, 
relieving laughter is very rare – if present at all. And yet, grotesque realism still re-
tains some of the ambivalent regenerative power that Bakhtin detects in the medi-
eval and Renaissance grotesque: the most explicit example can be found in Aba-
ni’s “The Box,” a poem that recounts a form of torture consisting in locking the 
victim in a coffin-like “wooden frame with skirt of sheet metal” (42). The poem 
ends as someone, 
[…] too impatient 
to reach the hole in the floor 
stands arms akimbo 
splattering my face with urine. 
 
‘Thank you, thank you … ’ I mumble 
as the hot ammonia stings me 
 
into life. (44) 
The grotesque appearance of these bodies in chains indicates that they, like 
Bakhtin’s bodies, are open, non-finite, and thus continuously becoming. They are 
vulnerable of course, but also resistant; invaded, violated, but also expanding, pro-
truding, moving forward; suffering “tiny daily deaths” (Abani 111), but being con-
stantly reborn from their own ashes. Put differently, it is as if they were seeking, 
also through grotesque ‘expansion,’ to move beyond the boundaries of the meta-
phorical penal ‘island,’ of the insular camp to which they are confined. It is in this 
context that it becomes clear that amputations are metaphors for the painful im-
possibility, or incapacity, to do this. Abani’s prison mates are indeed often 
maimed, at times at the hands of guards and torturers, at others, even more dis-
turbingly, by themselves – the description of self-inflicted mutilations being evi-
dence of the very anti-heroic, and very human, inability of the convict to cope 
with his circumstances. This is the case of “Passion Fruit,” a poem about homo-
sexual desire which Abani concludes by writing that 
[s]ome, unable to stomach 
the truth that all love is light 
amputate their own penes [sic], laughing insanely 
as they bleed to a stump. (33) 
Or, similarly, of the man portrayed in “Eden,” who, in an alliterative gesture, 
“drops a heavy / concrete block crunching toes to mush” (45, emphases added), in 
order to eschew a graveyard shift. 
When the human being is continuously becoming, in a condition of  living 
death in which opposites become unstable and tend to overlap, death does not 
necessarily signify the defeat of  the self. This is what Abani suggests in “Job”: 
Here death is courted. Welcomed. 
Not in defeat. Or cowardice, 
but as a statement 
of our 
 
Discontent 
with this state of barbarism we 
live 
Under 
 
the shade of a tree 
executions are mercifully shielded 
from the harsh sun. (38-39) 
Death, therefore, may turn out to be an ambiguous means of resistance, a means 
through which the prisoner reasserts ownership of a life that the sovereign has 
appropriated and deprived of meaning. It is therefore no coincidence that the 
“Angel” of Habila’s title, an angel that is awaited almost impatiently, is “the Angel 
of Death” (37). Its anticipated appearance is narrated in the second chapter, which 
begins with a premonitory “[t]oday is the last day of my life” (37). Here, the angel 
assumes the form of a soldier, an epitome of sovereign power in the postcolony 
under military rule, and Habila’s unnamed character, even after realising that the 
man is a harbinger of inevitable death, will purposely provoke his enraged reaction 
by refusing to obey his peremptory order to leave the semi-empty bar, as there is a 
curfew on: 
‘It is not six yet,’ I reply, glancing at the clock. The soldiers look surprised at my 
bold response; they whisper together, then the short one stands up and swaggers to 
my table. […] 
But when I turn it is not a soldier standing there. It is an angel. It opens its 
enormous wings and closes them again in a clapping motion. The air from the 
wings lifts me up and carries me out through the door. I land with a splash on the 
wet street. I am bleeding from the chest. I feel life draining out of me – through 
the haze I make out a huge bird shape flying out of the bar and ascending with the 
sound of a thousand wings. Then it is gone. (43-44) 
In contexts such as this, readiness to face death testifies the (non-)citizens’ indis-
position to be subdued, to renounce rights that should be universally recognised 
but that are de facto withdrawn from them, as the suspension of constitutional pro-
tection inevitably excludes them from the franchise of citizenship. 
Death, Habila says, “hangs around […] like a mist” (37) in the streets of  the 
Lagos of  the 1990s, where killings follow one another, looming like so many an-
gels. These works show that chaos and unrestrained violence are not only charac-
teristic of  the enclosed space of  the penitentiary, but permeate the entire state, 
threatening even the most protected sites. Adichie’s narrator, from her upper-
middle-class perspective, ironically highlights how even “on our serene Nsukka 
campus,” the “season of  thefts” (5) is followed by the “season of  cults” (7). The 
cyclical regularity of  seasonal time is thus substituted by periodical peaks of  vio-
lence, in an escalation leading to the brutal murders of  cult members, after fights 
that soon turn into blood feuds, into “cult wars” proper (7). As the young narrator 
comments, “[i]t was so abnormal that it quickly became normal” (8).13 Thus, like 
the prison, the Nigerian postcolony is characterised by the normalisation of  the 
abnormal, the perpetuation of  the exception.14 The metonymical relationship be-
tween the Nigerian cell and the Nigerian postcolony is suggested in Adichie’s 
short story when a still unshaken Nnamabia begins the account of  his first days in 
prison with words evidently meant for effect: 
“If we ran Nigeria like this cell,” he said, “we would have no problems in this 
country. Things are so organized. Our cell has a chief called General Abacha and 
he has a second in command.15 Once you come in, you have to give them some 
money. If you don’t, you’re in trouble.” […] He bit into a fried drumstick and 
switched to English. “General Abacha was impressed with how I hid my money. 
I’ve made myself amenable to him. I praise him all the time.” (10-11) 
The irony, of  course, lies in the fact that Nigeria is indeed run like the cell: a mili-
tarised, corrupt, highly hierarchical state where the citizens’ survival is strictly de-
pendant on two factors: having the money to bribe and being willing to incessant-
ly praise men whose power must never be questioned.16 
                                               
13 The Nigerian ‘war-scape’ Adichie delineates in this short story is portrayed as meaning-
less for a number of reasons: first of all, it is partly caused by privileged boys who have 
no apparent reason to fight and kill; moreover, the government’s response to the ‘cult 
emergency’ proves equally absurd, with random arrests and the proclamation of a curfew 
establishing that “everyone had to be indoors after 9 p.m.” – even while the shooting that 
occasioned it had happened “in sparkling daylight” (9).  
14 For an analysis of the diffusion of the carceral in Waiting as engendering a state of ex-
ception, see Erritouni (149).  
15 In Nigerian prisons, the ‘chief’ of a cell – the inmate who has been there the longest – 
often assumes the fictitious name of an important political personality, generally a mem-
ber of the army. 
16 In this respect, it is telling that the narrator notices how, after her brother’s arrest, her 
parents’ behaviour towards the police at checkpoints changed, if only subtly: “My father 
no longer delivered a monologue, as soon as we were waved on, on how illiterate and 
corrupt the police were. […] My mother did not mumble, they are symptoms of a larger 
malaise. Instead my parents remained silent. It was as if refusing to criticize the police as 
usual would somehow make Nnamabia’s freedom imminent” (13). 
Habila, for his part, makes the parallel between the prison and the state even 
more explicit in his Afterword: in the Nigeria of dictator Abacha, he writes, 
“[e]very day came with new limitations, new prisons” (224). It is hence worth re-
membering that the original title of Habila’s short story collection was Prison Stories 
– a plural that extended the idea of carceral constraint to the chapters that, unlike 
the first, are not set in an actual cell. Morgan Street in Lagos, which is the setting 
for many other chapters, is itself a site of reduced liberties. Tellingly rechristened 
“Poverty Street,” it is a “paradigmatic locale” (113) where people do not simply 
live, but rather already and always sur-vive, in the form of a bare life that is “the sur-
plus body (indeed, the surplus life/ la sur-vie) of Man” (Margaroni 30). The great-
ness of the ordinary men and women sur-viving in Poverty Street, then, lies in 
their small acts of mutual care, in their capacity to love, dream, and crack up at 
bleak jokes in a state of exception where they are continuously “exposed to death” 
(Agamben, Homo 88) – a death that may be the product of sovereign decision, as is 
the case for political prisoners, or may more banally derive from the legal aban-
donment of subjects who are forever negated constitutional protection. 
In a recent essay on Habila’s novel, critic Ali Erritouni draws on Herbert 
Marcuse’s definition of death as “a token of unfreedom, of defeat” (236 qtd. in 
Erritouni 154) to contend that in Waiting for an Angel “safeguarding one’s life in the 
face of brutality is […] a triumphal act of resistance” (154). While this is generally 
true, I would argue that Erritouni’s study constitutes a partial reading of death as 
intended by Habila. Indeed, as has been shown above, on some (admittedly few) 
occasions death is presented as inescapable, and is faced with courage, waited for, 
even actively sought. It seems to me that by ignoring the ambivalence Habila at-
tributes to the concept of death, Erritouni underestimates the pervasive presence 
of death in life – a pervasiveness that is so evident that the opposites become the 
same, the dividing line between the two being blurred by the violence that is the 
originary prerogative of sovereign power. The Lagosians of Habila’s work, in sum, 
do not simply shun death. More subtly, they are capable of living in death, of “del-
egat[ing] death while simultaneously and already experiencing death at the very 
heart of [their] own existence[s]” (Mbembe, Postcolony 201). How then, Achille 
Mbembe asks, 
does one live when the time to die has passed, when it is even forbidden to be 
alive, in what might be called an experience of living the “wrong way round”? 
How, in such circumstances, does one experience not only the everyday but the hic 
et nunc when, every day, one has both to expect anything and to live in expectation 
of something that has not yet been realized, is delaying being realized, is constantly 
unaccomplished and elusive? […] In other words, how is it possible to live while 
going to death, while being somehow already dead? (201) 
The answer to this apparent impossibility, Mbembe argues, lies in being “sev-
eral in a single body,” not only proceeding to a “constant enlargement of the limits of 
one’s identity,” but also “experienc[ing] the possibility or actuality of several types 
of being” (202). This image captures Lomba’s unknown biographer’s supposition 
that the journalist, while in prison, must have learnt to survive “in tiny atoms, 
piecemeal, a day at a time” (32). These phrases, for their part, asserting the frag-
mented multiplicity of the surviving identity, reflect Bakhtin’s theorisations of the 
real grotesque, which 
seeks to grasp in its imagery the very act of becoming and growth, the eternal in-
complete unfinished nature of being. Its images present simultaneously the two 
poles of becoming: that which is receding and dying, and that which is being born; 
they show two bodies in one, the budding and the division of the living cell. At the 
summit of grotesque and folklore realism, as in the death of one-cell organisms, no 
dead body remains. (That is, when the single cell divides into two other organisms, 
it dies in a sense but also reproduces; there is no departure of life into death.) (Ra-
blelais 52) 
That is why human mortality, as Abani puts it in his Author’s Note, is “truly 
ephemeral” (9) – in a formulation that leaves some hope as to the possibility to re-
sist the reduction to the most extreme forms of bare life even in the biopolitical 
sites that most clearly approximate the Agambenian camp. 
* 
The combined presence of life and death sheds light also on the importance as-
sumed in these works, and in particular in Abani and Habila’s texts, by the angeli-
cal and spectral dimensions. The contrastive connotations that are attributed to 
angels and ghosts in Kalakuta Republic and in Waiting confirm the argument carried 
out so far that life and death, freedom and chains, are inherently polysemous phe-
nomena for these authors. In a 2005 essay on Chris Abani’s novel GraceLand and 
Helon Habila’s Waiting, critic Chielozona Eze has somehow hastily conjectured 
that “[a]lthough not explicitly stated, there is sufficient indication that Liberty is 
the angel referred to in the novel title” (102). This interpretation is based on a 
reading of the passages concluding the section recounting Lomba’s detention, 
where the narrator explains that there is no available record of the journalist after 
he was transferred from his cell first to Ibadan, and then to another penitentiary in 
a small desert town. “But somehow,” the narrating voice continues, “it is hard to im-
agine that Lomba died.” It is instead “probable” that he was amongst those political 
prisoners who were released with the transition to democracy (32, emphases add-
ed). 
This might have been how it happened: Lomba was seated in a dingy cell in Gashuwa, his 
eyes closed, his mind soaring above the glass-studded prison walls, mingling with 
the stars and the rain in elemental union of freedom; then the door clanked open, 
and when he opened his eyes Liberty was standing over him, smiling kindly, ex-
tending an arm. 
 And Liberty said softly, ‘Come. It is time to go.’ 
 And they left, arm in arm. (32-33, emphasis added)17 
Contrary to Eze’s reading, I would contend that the passage above is utterly am-
biguous, as Lomba’s survival and liberation are presented as hopeful, but dubious, 
fantasies, conveyed as they are through a lexicon that clearly denotes uncertainty. 
Moreover, the nature of the metaphorical “Liberty” that Lomba finally meets is 
left purposely unspecified – it might even be interpreted as corresponding with his 
death, the end of all suffering. There are numerous angelical presences in Habila’s 
text, and the Angel of Liberty as defined by Eze may, of course, very well be one 
of them. However, I would suggest that an examination of Habila’s narratological 
choices, which are extremely nuanced in a novel that resorts to a number of narra-
tive modes in each of its chapters, would somehow complicate Eze’s analysis. In 
this regard, it seems to me that it is telling that while the encounter with the Angel 
of Death is told in the first person, the Angel of Liberty that frees Lomba of un-
just pain is beautifully imagined by the journalist’s biographer. It is also for this 
reason that Eze’s reading of Waiting for an Angel as an “unapologetically hopeful 
narrative” (101) is, I believe, disputable. 
This is substantiated by an account of the many expectant fantasies of hap-
piness that Habila recounts in the book. The journalist Lomba, for example, has 
“waited” for the beautiful Alice for a long time (99). The woman, however, mar-
ries a man she certainly does not love, but who can and does provide for her 
mother, paying the expensive fees of the first-class hospital where she is dying of 
cancer. But Lomba is not the only character who is waiting. “Brother” is waiting 
                                               
17 Tellingly, Eze does not report the sentence with which I begin this quotation, which is, 
to my mind, essential to grasp the ambivalence of the episode recounted. 
as well. A popular personality in the neighbourhood thanks to the heroic story 
which, in five different versions, recounts how he lost his leg to a soldier’s bullet 
during the post-June 12 riots,18 he now sits in his shed, wooden leg and all, look-
ing out “at the fighting women and the refuse heaps and the passing mongrel 
dogs” (126) and dreaming to become rich and throw a farewell party for Poverty. 
He imagines “inviting the Governor, hiring the seats, buying the food and drink, 
and, of course, the trip to Jamaica to buy A-grade marijuana” (128). One day, 
however, upset by the graffiti of Nancy, who has written the phrase “Poor Man’s 
Paradise” on the wall of Madame Godwill’s restaurant, he confronts her. By way 
of response, she upturns a dish of “mucilaginous” (134) soup on his head. Kela, 
the narrator of this passage, reacts to the grotesque, heart-breaking image of 
Brother with embarrassment, 
haunted by the infinitely sad expression on his face just before he left the restau-
rant: the theme of sadness emblazoned on every inch of his skin, every wrinkle, 
every hair on his face – it was so impossibly perfect it looked inhuman, like a tragic 
mask. (135) 
Nancy, the waitress, is as well expecting someone: the man she calls “my 
man,” the father of  her three-year-old son, who promised to come back but has 
disappeared since the day she became pregnant. When she flees from Lagos, Kela 
tries to visualise different pictures of  her, imagining her in Port Harcourt 
with the tattered letter from Her Man, with the streets directions to his house. I 
pictured her seated by the roadside on a bench, with Mark in her lap, tired of 
searching and looking into every face that passed, hoping to see Her Man. No. This 
picture was too dismal. I didn’t want Nancy ever to be in such a situation. So one 
                                               
18 The de facto annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections, which should have 
led to the restoration of civilian rule in the country, brought about great unrest, particu-
larly in the south western part of Nigeria, birthplace of the Yoruba businessman M.K.O. 
Abiola, who is generally regarded as the presumed winner. 
of the passers-bys would pause after passing, he’d look back. ‘Nancy, is it you?’ It 
was Her Man. She hadn’t recognized him because he had grown a beard, and he 
was taller, and . . . The dogs howled me to sleep. (156) 
The episodes just sketched confirm that there is undoubted hope in Waiting for an 
Angel and they emphasise that the characters’ wishful reveries, at times met with 
gentle irony, are never derided by the author. Still, it must be registered that these 
Lagosians’ fantasies keep being grounded by reality, while their occasional deci-
sions to react to tyranny lead even more sadly to their imprisonment, death, un-
happiness – as shown by the disastrous outcome of the anti-government peaceful 
march that Joshua, the teacher, is asked to lead. Nigeria is a country at war with 
itself, where normality is but a dream: as Joshua muses, 
‘In a normal country there wouldn’t be a need for revolutions; there wouldn’t be a 
Poverty Street; well, not like ours, anyway. People like me would be able to teach in 
peace, live in peace and. . .’ he turned to [Kela] and smiled, ‘and maybe fall in love 
and marry and have kids and die old.’ (159-160) 
Similarly to Habila’s, Abani’s work, too, is punctuated by appearances of an-
gels and ghosts, ambivalent symbols signifying the continuity between life, death, 
and their respective worlds. Violent state officials are presented as seraphs, the 
highest-ranking celestial beings within the Christian angelic hierarchy, who encir-
cle the throne of God praising His majesty. “Killing Time,” for example, a poem 
that resonates with biblical imagery and lexicon, narrates how winged guards, sus-
picious Good Shepherds, “herd” the sacrificial lambs of an imminent execution, 
the redness of violence staining feathers that should remain immaculate: 
Killing time. 12. Anointed. 
Blindfolded. Herded by seraphs 
wings tinged rusty by innocent blood. (40) 
The darkly satirical imagery of this poem, coupled with the disturbing incongru-
ence between its elevated style and harrowing content, calls to mind Agamben’s 
admonition about the questionable ethical appropriateness of “covering with sac-
rificial veils” the indiscriminate killings of men and women who, reduced to “bare 
life,” are in fact exterminated as ‘lice,’ as Hitler notoriously said of the Jews (Homo 
114). It is thus telling that these Angels of Death have in fact lost their original, et-
ymological role as heralds of a superior entity in Habila’s and Abani’s texts. On 
the contrary, they are presented as essentially autonomous, as their actions are not 
motivated by any ideological, let alone moral, agenda, but are entirely self-
referential. In keeping with the angelical metaphor, it could be maintained that the 
throne around which they sing is empty, devoid of meaning – it might certainly be 
occupied by the figure of the dictator, but he himself is a simulacrum that has no 
message to deliver, apart perhaps from his will to maintain his place at the centre 
of this postcolonial universe. But the prison is also inhabited by other angels, “the 
few, the chosen” (Kalakuta 73) who have lost their lives because of sovereign vio-
lence and who “stalk” the prisoners in sleep. The poet’s sleep, for its part, is one 
that often is at one and mingles with reality, as suggested by the chiastic construc-
tion in “Mantra”: “I dream myself awake, // dreaming myself asleep” (88). 
The ghostly dimension, unsurprisingly, is also very much present in the col-
lection, assuming great relevance in the last poems, where the poet is released 
from jail and flies to London in search of salvation and recovery. In “Jacob’s Lad-
der,” which closes the third section of the collection, signalling the end of his last 
long-term incarceration, the poetical voice describes his first feelings of uncertain 
liberty: 
[…] you are afraid 
to proceed more than a few 
 
steps from the gate. Convinced you 
will be shot in the back, 
 
or that people will recoil from you 
knowing you carry the stench 
 
of death on your now paler skin. (97, emphasis added) 
Abani suggests that spectral invisibility is not only limited to the enclosed space of 
the prison, but becomes instead the potentially all-encompassing condition of the 
human in a liquid modernity of mutual indifference. Hence, the third point of the 
list-like poem titled “Things to Do in London When You Are Dead” reads: 
“Stand in the centre of Oxford Circus and scream. No matter. No one will see 
you” (106).  
It is thus evident that the question of the visibility of the ghost as figuratively 
representing of the human deprived of her rights emerges as a central preoccupa-
tion in the works analysed so far. These texts contribute to the difficult task of 
‘cracking’ the prison wall, so as to allow the establishment of communication be-
tween worlds that are kept separate, while reasserting the humanity of the ghostly 
humans, the homines sacri, who live at the mercy of sovereign decision. Moreover, 
they indicate that there are other small acts that are able to compel ‘outsiders’ to 
recognise what happens beyond the wall. Abani, for example, mentions the power 
of Fela’s saxophone, whose notes “wove / themselves into a terror that carried // 
on the wind, disturbing evil’s sleep” (27). Habila, for his part, emphasises the force 
of the love poems that Lomba is asked to write for the superintendent’s fiancée – 
poems where the journalist encodes an S.O.S. message that the woman promptly 
deciphers. (It is thus deeply ironical that his jailer considers them “harmless” [16].) 
Adichie sees change, and redemption, in the courage of her narrator’s spoiled, 
“charming brother” (21) who finally rebels against the arrogance of the sovereign 
at the risk of his own life. Art, love, and acts of resistance such as this are means 
through which reciprocal sight, and recognition, can occur between those who live 
on the two sides of the wall. And the interstitial spaces thus created, by showing 
what happens within the penal island – or, at least, by “imagin[ing]” it, as the more 
reticent Adichie does (21) – operate an epistemological reversal that relocates 
knowledge in the (global) public sphere, thus spurring ethical reflection on the 
value of the human and on the abuses of power in contemporary sites of chaos. 
In one of the most beautiful passages of his prison memoir, Wole Soyinka has re-
flected on how the humiliating sight of his chained ankles constituted a painful ep-
iphanic moment – the contradiction inherent in the idea of a chained human be-
ing allowing him to formulate a ‘negative’ definition of humanity: 
I defined myself as a being for whom the chains are not; as, finally, a human being. 
In so far as one may say that the human essence does at times possess a tangible 
quality, I may say that I tasted and felt this essence within the contradiction of that 
moment. It was nothing new; vicariously, by ideology or racial memory, this con-
tradiction may be felt, is felt, with vivid sufficiency to make passionate revolution-
aries of the most cosseted life. Abstract, intellectual fetters are rejected just as pas-
sionately. But in the experience of the physical thing the individual does not stand 
alone, most especially a black man. I had felt it, it seemed to me, hundreds of years 
before. (40) 
This understanding of freedom as an essential characteristic of the human is here 
presented as grounded in what Soyinka calls “racial memory”: a traumatic memory 
that speaks of slavery and imperialism and that, centuries after, resurfaces – in 
fact, keeps resurfacing – at the view of chains that deny the convict’s humanity. If 
such a memory is inevitably collective, and racial, rather than individual, Soyinka 
suggests, a similarly collective scope has the proud rejection of those “fetters” – 
concrete, but also abstract – that (post)colonial regimes of violence like the one 
that demanded his incarceration impose on their silenced subjects. 
The actual and metaphorical enchainment to which the writer is subjected in 
times of tyranny, and the collective dimension that the resistant response to such 
cruelty must assume, are tropes of fundamental importance in much prison litera-
ture. In particular, Barbara Harlow has noticed, these aspects acquire almost ar-
chetypal relevance in the prison memoirs of political detainees, of those detainees 
who “did not simply ‘discover’ their writing selves while in prison, but were often 
incarcerated because they wrote” (Resistance Literature 120). These same themes are 
effectively fictionalised in Habila’s Waiting. In particular through the narration of 
the life of journalist and aspiring writer Lomba, the novel is indeed interspersed 
with images signifying the brutality which frustrates, debases, or violently impedes 
the efforts of the intellectual: scattered papers covered in muddy footprints of 
soldiers’ boots (71); the figure of the novelist in perpetual struggle with the writing 
of a narrative that is destined to remain incomplete (106);19 the burning of The Di-
al’s headquarters, the newspaper where Lomba works (199-200); or the equally 
symbolic death of Dele Giwa, the above-mentioned editor of Newsweek who was 
                                               
19 In a 2012 essay, critic Sule Egya has pointedly observed that the metafictional trope of 
the unwritten novel signifies in texts such as Habila’s Waiting and Maik Nwosu’s Invisible 
Chapters “the spatiotemporal absence of textuality” in the interregnum of the military dic-
tators of the 1980s and 1990s, signalling “the inability of the novelist, as representative of 
artists and critics more generally, to engage in his craft in a turbulent season of survival” 
(“Idiom of Text” 110). 
killed during the Babangida years (196-197).  
As pointed out in passing at the end of the previous section, writing, the ul-
timate reason for Lomba’s incarceration, turns into a means of resistance while he 
is in prison. There, the journalist re-appropriates the expressive power he had 
been deprived of, and punished for, when the superintendent gives him paper and 
pencil commanding him to write love poems he will ‘borrow’ in order to charm 
his poetry-loving Janice. The woman, however, is not easily fooled: she notices the 
repetition of the words “save my soul, a prisoner” in some of the pieces his fiancé 
has given her and asks to meet the real author. Lomba, notwithstanding the ex-
ceptional circumstances under which he is forced to write, manages to turn a con-
strained act into a creative cry for help, manifesting the artist’s superiority in the 
manipulation of the wor(l)d. The author here provides a fictional version of  Bar-
bara Harlow’s pointed observations regarding the resistant potential of  the act of  
writing in prison. The writing prisoner, she argues, is a remarkably dangerous fig-
ure for the establishment, as s/he appropriates that “power of  writing” which, as 
Foucault has remarked, is supposed to remain firmly in the hands of  prison au-
thorities: “a system of  intense registration and of  documentary accumulation” 
(Discipline and Punish 189), which “functions as a procedure of  objectification and 
subjection” of  the detainee (192).20 The “power of  writing” held by the writing 
prisoner, on the contrary, “is one which seeks to alter the relationships of  power 
                                               
20 It is worth pointing out, however, that in Waiting the portrayal of the establishment’s 
“power of writing” departs slightly from Foucault’s theorisations, as Lomba’s biographer 
keeps pointing out the lack of archival information regarding Lomba after the last epi-
sode he recounts in his diary. This contributes to the depiction of imprisonment in Nige-
ria as a phenomenon that is not inscribed within the juridical order. In this context, the 
official “power of writing” is rather reduced to the “power of preventing the prisoner’s 
writing.” 
which are maintained by coercive, authoritarian systems of  state control and dom-
ination” (Harlow 133). In this sense, Lomba’s love poems are simultaneously sub-
versive and derisive of  a superintendent who acts in what he calls “my prison” (8) 
as an omnipotent petty tyrant would in his feud. 
Still, Habila does not present writing as an easily successful way of contest-
ing the violence of the postcolonial state. In Waiting, the artist’s imagination, de-
spite its liberating potential, is not presented as a sufficient force to regain actual 
freedom. On the contrary, it is exactly because of Lomba’s writing abilities that 
the warder does not give his name to those Amnesty International representatives 
who visited the prison in the attempt to pressure the government towards the re-
lease of political detainees in the country.21 As he tells Janice, pathetically justifying 
his choice, “‘I didn’t. Couldn’t. You know . . . I thought he was comfortable. And, 
he was writing the poems, for you . . .” (31). Lomba’s reaction is not marked by 
rage, but rather by utter contempt that spurs him to denunciate coolly the base-
ness of this man of power, who, he ponders, is “just Man. Man in his basic, rudi-
mentary state, easily moved by powerful emotions like love, lust, anger, greed and 
fear, but totally dumb to the finer, acquired emotions like pity, mercy, humour and 
justice” (31). However, it is this “rudimentary” breed of humanity which survives 
in the Nigeria of the militaries, while the poet’s fate remains unknown. Lomba’s 
biographer writes that “[t]here’s no record of how far the superintendent went to 
help him” following Janice’s dignified request to either find a solution to Lomba’s 
predicament or forget her forever. Still, he adds, 
                                               
21 During the human rights crisis of the 1990s, the non-governmental organisation kept 
urging the Nigerian government to release prisoners of conscience, while also publishing 
informative documents detailing governmental suppression of dissent and the human 
rights abuses suffered by detainees in the country. 
there was very little to be done for a political detainee – especially since, about a 
week after that meeting, a coup was attempted against the military leader, General 
Sani Abacha […]. There was an immediate crackdown on all pro-democracy activ-
ists, and the prisons all over the country swelled with political detainees. (31-32) 
History, it seems, is forever repeating itself, in a circular motion that leaves little 
room for tangential flights. 
I would argue, however, that the disillusioned recognition of the limits of the 
artist’s power of writing does not mean that Habila tout court “rejects the public 
function of intellectuals […] as the nerve-center of [their] society,” as Ali 
Erritouni has suggested in his piece on the author’s postmodern stance in Waiting 
(157). While it is true that the narrative gives great prominence to the role of ordi-
nary people in articulating utopian fantasies of the common good, still the intellec-
tual’s work is seen as a force that can give a collective dimension to forms of dis-
sent that are no less important, or right, for being often unsuccessful, or even 
conducive to suffering and death.22 Similarly to Soyinka, Habila resorts to racial 
memory in order to emphasise the importance of the right to speak, and of the act 
of speaking the truth, in configuring a struggle which resists the negation of sub-
jecthood suffered by (certain sectors of) humankind in the exception. Indeed, 
overcoming his initial reluctance, Lomba will consent to Joshua’s request to cover 
the demonstration he is organising after a trip to the Badagry slave dungeon, 
                                               
22 The importance of artists and intellectuals is emphasised also in his two other major 
works, the novels Measuring Time, which will be studied in the next chapter, and Oil on 
Water, set in the region of the Niger Delta. Habila’s interest in the role played by these 
categories does not mean that he depicts its representatives as homogeneously heroic. On 
the contrary, in Waiting the author levels scathing attacks against the self-congratulatory 
hollowness of putative ‘artists’ who even advise Lomba, while he and James are being 
pursued by the police, to “try and get arrested – that’s the quickest way to make it as a 
poet. You’ll have no problem with visas after that, you might even get an international 
award” (218). 
where he is taken by The Dial’s editor, James Fiki. James’s didactic words evidence 
the aforementioned continuity between imperial and postcolonial incarceration in 
order to emphasise how exercising one’s freedom of speech is a duty, a potential 
way out of terror and enslavement. 
‘It was in the ships that the mouth-locks were used, so that [the slaves] couldn’t 
console each other and rally their spirits and thereby revolt. To further discourage 
communication, no two persons of the same language were kept together: Mandin-
go was chained to Yoruba, Wolof was chained to Obo, Bini was chained to Hausa. 
You see, every oppressor knows that wherever one word is joined to another to 
form a sentence, there’ll be a revolt. That is our work, the media: to refuse to be si-
lenced, to encourage legitimate criticism wherever we find it.’ (196)23 
Still, as Erritouni notices, Habila (and this time, differently from Soyinka) 
registers the failure of revolutionary activism in recounting how Joshua’s demon-
stration, which was meant to be peaceful, was actually crushed in blood The ques-
tion regarding the possibility of finding a way, as individuals, to subvert a tyranni-
cal regime that has infinite power to administer death is thus purposely left open 
in the text.24 On the fateful day, Brother, Lomba and Mao, the revolutionary lead-
er, disappear; other die – like Hagar, the prostitute Joshua is in love with; the lat-
ter’s fate is uncertain as well: his young, imaginative student, the narrator Kela, 
                                               
23 At the beginning of the novel, the reader was told in passing that Lomba had been to 
Badagry years before, but “halfway through the tour [he and his two friends] wandered 
off, depressed by the guide’s mournful and vivid descriptions of how the chains and 
mouth locks had been used on the slaves” (37). Lomba was thus very well aware of the 
history of slavery, but it is only as a mature man, after realising the connection it has with 
his present, that he is finally shaken into awareness of its implications, of the enormity of 
it: “James’s lesson is direct and effective, like a blow to the stomach” (196). 
24 This undecidability as to the actual possibility of resistance is most clearly confirmed 
after Kela’s aunt warns him to not let the brutes of the establishment know he is intelli-
gent, otherwise he will get killed: “Don’t you know that lightning only strikes the tallest 
tree?” (183), she cautions. Reflecting on this, Kela will recall one of Joshua’s teachings: 
“that some day I too would have to stand up for something. But did that mean I’d be 
pulled down when I stood up? I toyed for the question for hours, but I was unable to 
solve it” (184). 
pictures him “standing on some shore in America” (184), because, as he says to 
the two men who interrogate him about his mentor’s whereabouts, “that is where 
people go to when they can’t live in their own country” (182). The chapter on the 
Poverty Street march, however, closes on a hopeful note: “[a]fter all,” Kela writes, 
“the world isn’t as big and impossible as we have been taught to believe” (184). 
Still this ending is one that, once again, does not envisage the incorporation of the 
citizen as a human rights bearer in the Nigeria of Abacha, but which rather imagi-
nes the happiness of the human rights bearer as dependent on a freedom to move 
that is in fact increasingly restricted for the ‘non-citizens’ of the world. And yet, 
the small acts of resilience of those who stay put, point to the need to move on, 
notwithstanding the painful memories of the past. During the curfew declared af-
ter the demonstration, Madame Godwill, Kela’s aunt, refuses to open her restau-
rant for some policemen after cryptically reminding them of their mortality: “‘I 
thought you people didn’t need food and water like the rest of us’” (179). She then 
cleans her house, removing layers of age-old dust and thereby ending her appar-
ently infinite mourning period for her husband, who died during the civil war. 
In Kalakuta Republic, Abani does at times do a similar job in reconnecting the 
disjointed histories of colonialism/imperialism and postcolonial oppression. Critic 
Kwame Dawes has rightly noticed that the author tends to refrain from grand dis-
courses on ideologies, concentrating instead on “the raw and simple vocation of 
the artist searching out words” (18). Still, the very few occasions in which the po-
etic voice does indeed assume a polemical tone in highlighting the humiliations 
suffered at the hands of colonial and state officials by colonial and postcolonial 
subjects alike acquire prominence, to my mind, precisely because of their occa-
sional, and revelatory, nature. For example, in “Concrete Memories,” a poem de-
scribing an interrogation room, the poet’s gaze lingers on a 
[r]usty 
cold 
barrel of Winchester 
bolt-action Mark IV rifle; 
retired right 
arm of imperialism. 
Enema. Rammed 
up rectum, repeatedly; 
twirling cocktail 
swizzle-stick. 
Extremely effective, they say 
at dislodging caked-in conspiracies. (35) 
The connection with colonialism is similarly evidenced in “Job,” where the epon-
ymous prisoner, “[o]lder than any of  us / remembers / this prison run by British 
soldiers” (38). The rifle (or rather, its emasculating barrel), as well as the prison 
building itself, are presented as threatening weapons, older than the postcolonial 
state itself: they represent sovereign force and confinement, the “right / hand[s]” 
of  the colonial enterprise which have survived into postcolonial times – “rusty,” 
but still in use; “retired,” but functionally unchanged. In the two lines that close 
the poem after the disconcerting image of  the twirling rifle likened to a swizzle-
stick, the incidental “they say” makes clear that the poetic voice does not sub-
scribe to ‘their’ opinion that the ultimate aim of  torture is indeed to “dislodge 
[presumed] caked-in conspiracies” (35). The phrase therefore protests against the 
obscenity of  an operation which, as Elaine Scarry has famously shown, has in fact 
not the purpose “to elicit information but visibly to deconstruct the prisoner’s 
voice” (20). And indeed, it is “they,” who “say,” while the tortured man remains 
speechless.  
And yet, one of  the main feats of  Abani’s work lies in its nuanced portrayal 
of  the men who are, as Scarry would say, at the two “end[s] of  the weapon” (59): 
the vulnerable, those who feel pain, and the invulnerable, those who produce and 
administer it. Indeed, the collection complicates any simplistic depiction of  the re-
lationship between jailers and prisoners as an inevitably antagonistic one. ‘Hori-
zonal’ support and empathy amongst prisoners sharing a similar condition is not 
to be taken for granted either.25 In other words, the poet suggests that recognition 
of  common vulnerability can cut across status lines, as the occasional lack of  soli-
darity among inmates finds a contrapuntal echo in the depiction of  prison guards 
who manage, want, to be humane. Referring to Scarry’s paradigm, it could be stat-
ed that the process of  converting the prisoner’s pain into insignia of  the regime’s 
power through its objectification in the form of  weapons and wounds is not al-
ways completed, or carried out effectively. When this happens, however, the inef-
ficient official, the official who for some reason does not manage to become a 
spokesperson of  the regime by carrying out the task of  silencing the imprisoned, 
and his guilt, is bound to meet some form of  punishment.  
Such a punishment, the poet suggests, can be either self-inflicted or inflicted 
by others. The first is for example the case of  the figure of  Sergeant Adamu, who 
has been mentioned in the previous section of  this chapter. A pitiless torturer, he 
is portrayed in a fatal moment of  doubt while sitting under the mango tree that 
grows in the execution yard. His breath is “heavy with local gin […] / to scare 
demons, guilt, into lonely / dark corners” (53). 
Haunted by screams, 
                                               
25 See for example the poems “Oyinbo Pepper” (28), “Tequila Sunrise” (36) and “An 
English Gentleman” (50). 
John James dying shamelessly,26 
 
he sits under the moon howling, torn apart. 
Compassion cups my hands through the bars 
to try and console, 
 
or is it kill, 
this man. 
 
Sergeant Adamu, decorated murderer of Biafra, 
specialising in women, children. 
  
We find him leashed to the execution tree 
by leather army-issue belt, 
smelling faintly  
 
of mangoes. (53-54) 
“[T]his man” who howls at the moon is another werewolf  unable to couple two 
apparently incompatible dimensions of  his being, that of  the man who feels com-
passion and guilt and that of  the ‘beast’ who tortures and kills. Through window 
bars that keep victim and perpetrator forever separate, the prisoner’s capability for 
mercy is tested as his cupped hands attempt to reach out and touch a creature 
who, however obnoxious, remains nonetheless a “man.” But an answer to the eth-
ical conundrum regarding the possibility of  the poet’s forgiveness is ultimately not 
provided, as his hands might be consoling, but also ready to strangle the drunken 
official. Yet if  Abani leaves the question open, Sergeant Adamu on the contrary 
seems more resolute as he decides to hang himself, leashing the ‘beast’ in him to the 
execution tree with that same leather belt that, ironically, is confiscated to all in-
mates once they enter prison. The sarcastic epitaph that follows recalls the dubi-
                                               
26 The poet recounts how this fourteen-year-old inmate was tortured to death in “Ode to 
Joy” (62-63), the poem that has attracted perhaps the most virulent criticism on the part 
of Abani’s detractors for what is deemed to be an implausible, and excessively graphic, 
portrayal (see note 2). 
ous heroism of  Sergeant Adamu’s deeds during the Nigerian Civil War – he is, ox-
ymoronically, a “decorated murderer” – and adds a further layer to the complexity 
of  the poem by juxtaposing recent and less recent moments of  violence in the 
history of  postcolonial Nigeria. The war, in this sense, becomes the emblem of  a 
violence that seems to be constitutively embedded, and endlessly perpetuated, in 
the postcolonial state, and that finds different articulations as time goes by. What 
is more, the fact that a man whom Abani uncompromisingly defines a ruthless 
“murderer” has in fact received official recognition and praise for his brutality 
hints at the conflicting interpretations that the phenomenon of  the civil war has 
historically elicited. 
While the collection is replete with the narration of  cruel acts of  torture, the 
poet also gives recognition to those merciful officials who do not comply with the 
demands of  the establishment they should epitomise. This is the case of  Lt Emile 
Elejegba, a man who let the poet re-write the ‘power script’ that Foucault has so 
convincingly analysed by asking him to do some “paper-work” and leaving the 
room, “[a]fter cautioning me not to read / under any circumstances the copy of  / 
Anna Karenina on his desk” (58-59). The reader is told that Lt Elejegba’s career in 
the army, rather unsurprisingly, has been far from distinguished: unlike Sergeant 
Adamu, he was posted to the Kiri-Kiri prison after being “demoted, as / punish-
ment for his refusal to // lead a troop into Ogoniland to / murder fellow compat-
riots” (58, emphases added). The poem “Passover” recounts how the man is 
transferred (yet again) to another penitentiary for, indeed, “fraternising with the 
prisoners” (76, emphasis added): the recognition of  shared humanity has no place, 
must have no place, in the exception of  the dictator’s prison – as it must have no 
place in the oil-rich Ogoniland of  the rebels. Before leaving, however, Elejegba 
visits the poet. 
Wrinkling his nose against the 
 smell 
and trying hard not to cry, 
 
he handed me a slim worn 
 volume 
with the picture of a smiling white girl 
 on its cover. The Diary of Anne Frank. 
 
‘This might help,’ he said gently. 
 ‘I hear 
Nelson Mandela read it on Robbens [sic] Island.’ (76) 
Once again, commonality amongst human beings is symbolically confirmed 
through the shared experience of writing – and reading. In this context, the refer-
ence to the diary the Jewish girl wrote while hiding from Nazi persecution, and to 
the fact that another illustrious prisoner read it while in detention, makes it clear 
that the Nigerian prison can really be interpreted as a ‘camp’: it is one of those 
many sites of extra-judicial violence that, in different guises and reaching different 
levels of atrocity, have punctuated our late modernity. The works that have been 
discussed here, however, remind us of the fact that violence can be resisted, even 
if by means of ambiguous, small, or apparently self-defeating acts. And if this is 
not enough to subvert the hideous regime, still it can be a way to cheat the death it 
is founded on, manipulating its meanings and functions – attempting to be happy, 
struggling to maintain human dignity, even when sur-viving. 
 
 
And my traveling companions 
Are ghosts and empty sockets 
I’m looking at ghosts and empties 
But I’ve reason to believe 
We all will be received 
In Graceland 
—Paul Simon, “Graceland” 
The texts discussed so far testify to the highly combative nature of human exist-
ence in the postcolony, a locus where power is acquired, maintained and resisted 
through actions that obey a logic of reciprocal enmity. War and warlike relation-
ships among individuals are not only defining traits of the works studied in the 
first part of this dissertation, which depict “nations-in-(de)formation” and “no na-
tions” caught in civil wars – moments in which competing sovereignties engage in 
“hostile confrontations of forces, […] acts of destruction involving human losses 
on battlefields” (Mbembe, “On Politics” 299). More generally, it has been noticed 
that also the Nigeria of the imprisoning dictators, selected textual representations 
of which have been examined in Chapter Three, is presented as steeped in a con-
dition of normal abnormality, of silencing killings and intimidating curfews. Simi-
larly, postcolonial Nigeria as portrayed in the works which will be discussed in this 
chapter, some of which are set in part during the short-lived Second Republic of 
1979-1983, emerges as an exceptional site where the Foucauldian insight into the 
nature of politics as “the continuation of war by other means” (Society 15) acquires 
almost self-evident visibility. In the lectures he delivered at the Collège de France 
in 1976, Foucault indeed suggested the need to invert Carl von Clausewitz’s well-
known formulation,1 proposing an analytical approach meant to emphasise the la-
tent violence of the struggle for political hegemony that follows the establishment 
of a certain relationship of force “in and through war at a given historical mo-
ment” (Society 15). According to this hypothesis, “the role of political power is 
perpetually to use a sort of silent war to reinscribe that relationship of force, and 
to reinscribe it in institutions, economic inequalities, language, and even the bod-
ies of individuals” by means of a series of practices and disciplines (Society 16). 
Even within this “‘civil peace,’” adds Foucault, employing a phrase that interest-
ingly echoes the title of one of Chinua Achebe’s post-civil-war short stories, 
“clashes over or with power […] must be interpreted as a continuation of war” 
(16). 
This conception of politics as war, Achille Mbembe has effectively demon-
strated, becomes apparent in those necropolitical contexts where sovereignty be-
comes the systematic power to consign to death (“Necropolitics”). Postcolonial 
power as necropolitics, however, cannot always be aligned with the Foucauldian 
idea of a “silent,” if ruthless, conflict. On the contrary, Mbembe has magisterially 
unveiled the spectacular, obscene, lecherous, carnivorous aspects of the manifesta-
tion of sovereignty in Africa (Postcolony), while also pointing out how the phenom-
                                               
1 In his On War, Clausewitz famously argued that “[w]ar is a mere continuation of policy 
by other means. […] War is not merely a political act, but also a truly political instrument, 
a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means” (qtd. in 
Foucault, Society 21). 
ena of the “dispersion of state power and the diffraction of society” have been conducive to 
a series of economic – but also social and cultural – practices that are informal in 
character and have amplified the aforementioned socio-political imaginary, in 
which the “central signifier is war, that is to say, the capacity to take away the life 
of the enemy” (“On Politics” 310-311). 
The works under consideration in this chapter are novels where the violence 
and abandonment suffered by the postcolonial subject in the warlike atmosphere 
of post-Civil-War Nigeria is both explicitly thematised and conveyed through an 
allegorical fictionalisation that more or less loosely reproduces the workings of 
postcolonial power within the context of the patriarchal Nigerian family.2 This is 
done in particular through the representation of the hostile, but at times ambiva-
lent, relationships between abusive or uncaring sovereign fathers and their ‘sub-
jects’ – their sons and daughters. Adichie’s Purple Hibiscus (2003), Abani’s 
GraceLand (2004), and Habila’s Measuring Time (2007) can be defined as (equivocal) 
Bildungsromane, as they imagine the coming-of-age of young figures who attempt, 
with different degrees of success, to find their place and voice in relation to a fa-
milial and societal context of severe limitations. Interestingly, in the three texts the 
protagonists’ Bildung is in some ways connected with, if not enabled by, the death 
                                               
2 The homology between the figure of the sovereign and that of the father is one of the 
founding, and most ancient, axioms of Western political thought. One of its most famous 
theorisations can be found in Thomas Hobbes’s De Cive: as Hobbes writes, “Children are 
subject to Fathers no less than slaves to Masters and citizens to the commonwealth” (107). The 
father/children coupling is only one of the numerous parings structuring a configuration 
that is “both systematic and hierarchical: at the summit is the sovereign (master, king, 
husband, father […]), and below, subjected to his service, the slave, the beast, the wom-
an, the child” (Derrida, Beast 55-56). As Foucault, amongst others, has noticed, the sover-
eign’s right to decide over the life and death of his subjects can be seen as deriving “from 
the ancient patria potestas that granted the father of the Roman family the right to ‘dispose’ 
of the life of his children and his slaves; just as he had given them life, so he could take it 
away” (Foucault, Sexuality 135). 
of an oppressive paternal figure. Kambili, Elvis and Mamo, the three main charac-
ters, act from within, and endeavour to enfranchise themselves from, a dysfunc-
tional nuclear family where the patriarch assumes traits mirroring those of the 
omnipotent Nigerian sovereign.  
This chapter’s focus on the relationships within the nuclear family might ap-
pear to accept uncritically the normality of what is in fact a Judeo-Christian norm 
that has been imposed on African societies during colonial times. What John Co-
maroff has termed the “sanctification” of the nuclear family, “with its engendered 
division of labor, the distinction between public and private domains, and other 
familiar signs and practices of a rising capitalist order” (666) was indeed one of the 
central tenets of the Christian missionary activities in colonial Africa. The authors 
under consideration write of a postcolonial context in which the Western idea of 
the nuclear, patriarchal family as the organising social principle has no doubt al-
tered traditional family patterns. Therefore, the accent they put on the fa-
ther/children relations must be inscribed within an epistemological framework 
that has in part incorporated and naturalised this model. All the same, and inter-
estingly, the description of the highly dystopian nuclear family is often coupled 
with a negotiation of the harmonising role played by members of the kin group, 
and in particular by female relatives, in protecting the children abused by the vio-
lent paterfamilias. As will be noticed below, this is for example the case of Mamo 
and LaMamo’s aunt Marina, or of their uncle Iliya, who act as surrogate parents 
for Habila’s twins; Elvis’s grandmother, along with his aunt Felicia, similarly rep-
resent vigilant sources of stability in Abani’s GraceLand; Aunty Ifeoma becomes a 
role model for the coming-of-age children of Adichie’s text.  
The novels might be interpreted as registering how the colonial introduction 
of a nuclear family system to the detriment of traditional conceptions of family 
order and solidarity has contributed to the fragmentation of the postcolonial soci-
ety: Elvis’s world will crumble once and for all after his relocation with his wid-
owed father in Lagos, when the last bonds with his kin group are severed. Again, 
Adichie’s description of a nuclear household that is characterised by unspeakable 
violence is in line with her indictment of the patriarch Eugene’s fundamentalist re-
jection of his own Igbo culture, and of his “heathen” relatives. In Habila’s text, 
the nuclear family emerges as the main (dis)ordering principle as well: as will be 
noticed below, there is no functional nuclear family in the fictional world of Meas-
uring Time. And yet, the authors do not simplistically retreat into an idealised past, 
contrasting it with a present whose dystopian character is assumed to derive solely 
from the colonial imposition of alien norms. On the contrary, the kin group is on 
occasions presented as the source of oppression as well: it is telling, for example, 
that the worst acts of abuse to which Abani’s Elvis is subjected are not perpetrat-
ed at the hands of his father, but of an uncle.3 
The obliteration of the feminine principle within the nuclear family is one of 
the common traits exhibited by the three novels, where mothers are presented as 
only partially capable to restrain the violence of the sovereign fathers. Following 
the lead of Igbo scholar Nkiru Uwechia Nzegwu, in the Igbo novels of Abani and 
Adichie the disempowerment of women characters may be read as a consequence 
of the alteration of family practices following the colonial transposition of a hier-
                                               
3 In this context, it is essential to remember that “[l]inguistically, the terms ‘sister,’ ‘broth-
er,’ ‘aunt,’ ‘uncle,’ ‘niece,’ ‘nephew,’ and ‘cousin,’ as well as the relational family separation 
they defined, did not exist in Igbo language and society” prior to colonial times (Nzegwu 
32). In the Igbo language, the same term, nna, classifies the father, the father’s brother, 
and the mother’s brother. 
archical ethos privileging the dominance of a “sovereign patriarch” in a previously 
non-patriarchal society (57).4 What is undoubted is that in the works under exami-
nation there appears to be little or no contrapuntal maternal restraint to the fa-
thers’ (often hyper-masculine) violence, or to their painful indifference: while 
Mamo’s mother loses her life in the act of giving birth to her twin sons, Beatrice, 
Elvis’s mother, dies of breast cancer when her son is still a little boy. Kambili’s 
mother – interestingly, another ‘Beatrice’ – is for her part a silent, battered wom-
an, whose free will is apparently annulled in the presence of the god-like figure of 
the patriarch Eugene – at least until she starts poisoning his tea. These absent, dis-
empowered, or only potentially insurgent mothers are thus prevented from, or in-
capable of, protecting their children from a violence that appears to be endemic in 
the modern phallocratic Nigerian family – and state. 
While it is tempting, and of course legitimate, to read these tales of (as will 
be seen, dubious) liberation in allegorical terms, still it must be recognised that 
the narratives present the reader with essential gaps and fissures that emphatical-
ly prevent the total assimilation, or conflation, of the private with the public. By 
means of different strategies, the authors underscore that their fictions cannot be 
read exclusively as wholly representative allegories of the postcolonial state. In 
this chapter, thus, I will not only investigate their depiction of the synecdochical 
family as state, but also the entangled, and not necessarily consensual, relation-
ships between the familial and the public, between the sovereign father and the 
sovereign state. When the parallels between the socio-political formations of the 
                                               
4 I am not aware of any extensive study on the development of family relationships 
among the Tangale of north-eastern Nigeria, the ethnic group which has presumably 
constituted the major source of inspiration for the Keti community in Habila’s novel (see 
note 20). 
family and the state, at first sight specular, clash against one another, the allegory 
short-circuits: the reader’s attention is thus drawn to the more intimate aspects 
of the characters’ lives, and the political, at least temporarily, fades from view – 
or is rather temporarily moved into the background. These reproductions of fa-
milial relationships are thus to be read as what may be called a purposely ‘loose,’ 
or ‘imperfect,’ parable of the postcolonial state, and do not conform in toto to 
Fredric Jameson’s “national allegory” claim, which (in)famously posited that 
[t]hird-world texts, even those which are seemingly private and invested with a 
properly libidinal dynamic – necessarily project a political dimension in the form of 
a national allegory: the story of the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embat-
tled situation of the public third-world culture and society. (69) 
As will be noticed below, indeed, even Adichie’s Purple Hibiscus, the novel that is 
perhaps more clearly invested with allegorical resonance,5 resists the reduction of 
the conflicts represented as entirely, and exclusively, metaphorical.6  
To sum up, it may certainly be argued that there exist (some forms of) alle-
gorical implications in the portrayal of the highly complex, and generally antago-
nistic, intergenerational relationships in the texts under consideration here. It is 
similarly admissible to contend that the uncertain Bildung these children achieve 
mirrors the condition of the citizen/subject in the postcolonial state, the absence 
                                               
5 A number critics have more or less explicitly recognised the text’s allegorical implica-
tions (see for example Hewett, Hron, Stobie). Others however, such as J. Roger Kurtz, 
resist tropological interpretations and claim that Kambili “is less a metaphor for the na-
tion than she is an autonomous being in whom the prevailing social and political tensions 
and contradictions of the day manifest themselves” (Kurtz 37; see also Kearney 142). 
6 As Joseph Slaughter has pointed out, Jameson’s claim was partly determined by the fact 
that the Bildungsroman genre has generally been read by Western critics “through the lens 
of the allegory, […] [and] the ‘first meagre shelf of “Third World Classics” that Jameson 
proposed to read as national allegories ‘consisted almost exclusively of bildungsromane’” 
(113-114, quoting Jameson “On Literary and Cultural Import-Substitution” 172). 
of a functional family lamenting the failed promise of the creation of a functional 
public sphere and of an inclusive regime of rights. At the same time, one must of 
course be wary of inscribing these narratives solely within a “national allegory” 
scheme – an approach that is ultimately reductionist in that it may diminish the 
thought-provoking beauty of the individual stories of suffering, hate and love that 
the authors offer. 
The representation of conflict in these novels, however, is not only limited 
to the Foucauldian idea of politics as war continued by other means. On the con-
trary, in GraceLand and in Measuring Time some of the wars that have plagued the 
Nigerian state, but also the African continent as a whole, find their way into the 
narrative as well, identifying exemplary moments in which the aforementioned 
hostile character of postcolonial power confrontations is dramatised on actual bat-
tlegrounds. In both works, the presence of the Nigerian Civil War as a painful 
memory that cannot be erased or exorcised suggests that the most traumatic epi-
sode of communal strife in the country’s history remains unresolved. Embodied in 
figures such as Mamo’s uncle Haruna, the soldier who had never returned from 
the front and had been mistakenly considered dead, or Elvis’s cousin Innocent, 
the soldier who did return, but then disappeared again in mysterious circumstanc-
es and is now best forgotten, the spectre of the Nigerian Civil War asks to be 
properly addressed. Either in the form of a silent presence (Haruna), or in the 
form of a silencing absence (Innocent), the spectre haunts the main characters’ 
contemporaneity – a contemporaneity of guilt and things unsaid. In this sense, the 
texts underscore the confrontational nature of Nigerian society, where, to para-
phrase Saro-Wiwa’s famous description of Sozaboy’s predicament, the coming-of-
age protagonists live, move, and – again, if for different reasons – have not their 
being. The Civil War as a revenant, by highlighting the continuities between the his-
torical phenomena of the war, the post-war military rule and the brief, pseudo-
democratic Second Republic, present unrestrained violence as an ever-present 
threat in postcolonial Nigeria. The texts thus describe a country that is always on 
the brink of degenerating into open hostility and war, and where human life, once 
again, loses much of its supposedly inalienable, intrinsic value. Habila’s Measuring 
Time, moreover, extends such preoccupation at the transnational level by present-
ing the reader with some of the sites of destruction and massacre that tore apart 
other African countries in the 1980s. This question is brought to light in the text 
through the letters that the protagonist receives from his twin brother, LaMamo, 
the increasingly disillusioned boy who became a mercenary soldier on a romantic 
quest for liberty and fame. 
The intertwining of past and contemporary moments of local and continen-
tal armed struggle with the narration of everyday life in a Nigeria that is either un-
der military rule or temporarily in the hands of a civilian administration configures 
the political in the country as a war-scape that severely puts to the tests the pro-
tagonists’ ideals and resilience. The three novels thus fictionalise these children’s 
attempts to find their place in the crumbling kingdom of the father – while also, in 
the case of GraceLand, recognising the impossibility, for the protagonist at least, of 
(re)constructing a meaningful existence in the country of birth. Both (re)con-
struction and flight, however, are chances whose success is not taken for granted, 
as hope for the redemption that might lie ahead is tinged with the ambivalence of 
undecidability. As will be seen indeed, Purple Hibiscus, GraceLand and Measuring 
Time are Bildungsromane where “the sovereign, undivided human personality re-
mains a vanishing (plot) point beyond the frame of the text” (Slaughter, Human 
Rights Inc. 215): “a ‘not yet,’ a ‘what is coming,’ which – always – separates hope 
from utopia” (Mbembe, Postcolony 206). 
“HATE THY FATHER, MAKE HIM PAY” is the first commandment record-
ed in Mamo’s imaginary diary, “the contents of which only his twin brother 
could fathom” (24). It was to the most intimate recesses of his mind that 
Habila’s protagonist, Mamo, a meditative boy suffering from sickle-cell anaemia 
and thus often bedridden and “measuring time,” entrusted his dreams of survival 
and revenge. The “seed of hatred” (19) for their father had been planted in the 
twins’ hearts when, at three, they discovered that Iliya, the gentle man they had 
been in the care of since their birth, was not their biological father, but an uncle. 
Their self-centred father, Lamang, had indeed abandoned Mamo and LaMamo 
after his wife’s death, reappearing some years later only to shatter his children’s 
illusion of happiness. Lamang, whose fame as “the King of Women” (15) the 
teenage twins would read as a proof of the disinterest and maltreatment to which 
their deceased mother Tabita and themselves were subjected, became thus their 
number one enemy on the very day in which they learnt of his existence.  
Differently from Mamo, Purple Hibiscus’s heroine, Kambili, does not re-write 
the Decalogue imagining reversed commandments mandating filial hatred. Even 
as she and her brother Jaja are punished severely and often beaten for the slightest 
failure to meet their father’s expectations, the girl does not quite hate him. On the 
contrary, her feelings amount to an ambivalent mixture of terror and proud admi-
ration for a figure who is similarly Janus-faced. The nuanced portrayal of a very 
complex father/daughter(/son) relationship constitutes undoubtedly one of the 
most remarkable feats of Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s highly praised debut nov-
el. Since its 2003 publication, Purple Hibiscus has indeed attracted great public and 
critical appraisal (see Tunca, The Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie Website). Set in a dicta-
torial Nigeria that the author has defined as a meld of the Babangida and Abacha 
juntas (Adichie and Ondaatje), Purple Hibiscus is a first-person tale where teenage 
Kambili recounts retrospectively her first falling in love and her discovered liberty 
from an oppressive family context where, alongside Jaja and her mother Beatrice, 
she used to live in the shade of the towering, menacing paterfamilias Eugene. 
The relationship between the protagonist of Abani’s GraceLand, Elvis, and 
his father Sunday is very nuanced as well. As will be seen below, Sunday is a man 
whose violence towards his only son seems to constitute a reaction to the many 
failures of his life, in primis to his inability to come to terms with his wife’s death. 
Similarly to Kambili, however, Elvis does not simply, or not only, hate his father. 
He is no doubt terrified by him during his childhood, terrified by his frequent 
surges of anger. And he is relieved by his death. At the same time, he seems to be 
continuously seeking, without quite succeeding, to establish some form of com-
munication, an affective bond with him.  
The confrontational relationships between these sovereign fathers and their 
‘subjects’ could not be more varied, and complex. What they all have in common, 
however, is that they speak of the painful frustration of an all too human desire 
for happiness and protection. 
* 
An almost archetypical Fanonian white-masked black man who “conceives of Eu-
ropean culture as a means of stripping himself of his race” (Black Skin 174), Kam-
bili’s father, Eugene, rejects all that is “native” (4) to the point of neurosis. A 
Christian fundamentalist, he has repudiated his own “heathen” father and exhibits 
great anxiety for the sinful (black) body, which must be continuously covered, 
controlled and mortified, also through violently punitive practices. He speaks only 
English in public, his diction becoming unnaturally British-accented when con-
versing with white people, and reverts to Igbo only in his many moments of pri-
vate, uncontrollable rage. Eugene requires his children to achieve excellence, and 
imposes on them a tight schedule, whose “meticulously drawn lines” (23) separate 
“study from siesta, siesta from family time, family time from eating, eating from 
prayer, prayer from sleep” (24). The majestic Enugu mansion of the Achike fami-
ly, a compound whose high walls are “topped by coiled electric wires” (9) and 
whose doors cannot be locked – as it is the father-jailer who keeps the keys – be-
comes a suffocating Foucauldian penitentiary.7 Notwithstanding its elegant décor, 
the house has as its main aim that of producing docile, terrorised Catholic bodies 
in perpetual fear of physical and psychological punishment and hellfire.  
But the most disquieting aspects of Eugene’s character are known only 
within the walled compound. On the outside, Kambili’s father is praised as a 
God-fearing man. He is an honest, affluent entrepreneur in the food industry. 
What is more, he is the liberal owner of the Standard, the only newspaper that 
still speaks out for freedom in a country of military terror – his personal com-
mitment on behalf of human rights protection and free speech having even won 
him an Amnesty World award. He gives huge donations to charity, and his life is 
                                               
7 Adichie’s description of such “palatial homes” ruled by a “proverbial oppressive Gothic 
patriarch” is seen by critic Lily G.N. Mabura as one of the traits allowing a postcolonial 
Gothic reading of a text that, she argues, encompasses “a larger palette of […] Gothic 
stock features” (205-206). 
considered an exemplum of Christian perfection – so much so that Father Ben-
edict, during his sermons, refers to “the pope, Papa, and Jesus – in that order” 
(4). In short, even as his sister Ifeoma suspects that people tell him “only what 
he wants to hear” (96), so as to become legitimate recipients of his ‘for-
Christians-only’ generosity, he nevertheless remains one of the most respected 
and admired men of his community. 
The liberal promoter of a free public sphere, Eugene tyrannically imposes 
consent in the privacy of his house, where he beats his ‘subjects’ to uncon-
sciousness for the slightest form of presumed disobedience. He asserts his sov-
ereignty within his private kingdom exactly like the dictatorial regimes he public-
ly – and indeed courageously – opposes: through violence. As critic Cheryl 
Stobie has remarked,  
[v]arious systems that reinforce patriarchal power work in concert in this portrayal 
of the sovereign male individual who attains a quasi-divine status: Catholicism that 
(like many other religions) privileges masculine authority, the Western model of the 
self-made man and the specifically Nigerian embodiment of the Big Man. […]  
In Purple Hibiscus Adichie illustrates the links between the institutions of the 
family, the church, education and the state by showing the pernicious effects of ab-
solutist patriarchal control in each. (424-428) 
The hiatus between Eugene’s two apparently incompatible personae, the public 
and the private, finds textual unity by means of Adichie’s careful manipulation of 
the polysemous concept of fatherhood. By blending together the manifold con-
notations that the idea of the paternal can assume – in particular, the strictly bio-
logical one, the religious and the political – the author creates a fictional demi-
God whose omnipotence with respect to the lives of his subjects mirrors that of 
the dictator in the political arena. Images of the Christian God, of the Nigerian 
patriarch and of the postcolonial tyrant are evidently superimposed in moments 
where Eugene, supposedly on God’s behalf, punishes H/his children for resist-
ing H/his will. For example, when threateningly reproaching Kambili for com-
ing second in her class, he tells her that “[b]ecause God has given you much, he 
expects much from you.” However, he then adds: “I didn’t have a father who 
sent me to the best schools” (47, emphases added). As Eugene moves from the 
religious to the biological in identifying the source of the “gifts” he mentions, he 
conflates the idea of an omnipotent Christian God with himself – the father 
who, differently from his own “pagan” one, has materially given his children the 
chance to attend the most prestigious educational institutions in Nigeria. Jaja and 
Kambili, petrified by terror and silenced to the point of appearing “abnormal” 
(141), are thus the nervous output of the violence of the sovereign F/father. 
It is in this context that the sharing of food in the Achike household as-
sumes a clear Eucharistic value, becoming a ritual moment of familial thanksgiving 
and validation of Eugene’s power. During their meals together, Kambili, Jaja and 
Beatrice are always asked to taste – and, inevitably, to praise – the new product 
samples coming from Eugene’s factories. Food is thus associated with fear (High-
field 48), and the imposition to eat becomes yet another form of violence perpe-
trated by the sovereign paterfamilias on his subjects (cf. Stobie 424). In this con-
text, it is no wonder that the oft-quoted incipit of the novel, where the narrator, 
with a nod to Achebe, writes that “[t]hings started to fall apart at home when […] 
Jaja did not go to communion” (3), signals how the disruption of the kingdom of 
the F/father was first manifested by a refusal to eat, to receive the host. The sig-
nificance of Jaja’s gesture clearly extends the boundaries of the religious as it is 
followed, at lunch, by the boy’s silence on the new juice the family tastes (13). 
When Jaja explains that he did not go to communion because “the wafer gives me 
bad breath” (6, emphasis added), his choice to call the host ‘wafer,’ and not ‘host,’ 
against his father’s orders, is another sign of his rebellion. As Kambili says, “Papa 
insisted we call it the host because ‘host’ came close to capturing the essence, the 
sacredness, of Christ’s body. ‘Wafer’ was too secular, wafer was what one of Papa’s fac-
tories made” (6, emphasis added). This lexical distinction does not only show, as 
Anthony Chennells has rightly written, that “Eugene’s God can never manifest it-
self in the ordinary, or more precisely the Nigerian ordinary” (18). It also high-
lights, once again, the parallel between Eugene and God the Father, while Jaja’s 
act is reconfigured as a form of resistance that protests his father’s self-elevation 
to a quasi-divine figure: Jaja refuses to eat both the (Father’s) ‘host’ and the (fa-
ther’s) ‘wafer.’ 
The scene just described is reported in the short section, titled “Breaking 
God: Palm Sunday,” that begins the text. Jaja’s erstwhile unthinkable rebellion, 
however, couldn’t have been possible without Nsukka, without the life “Before 
Palm Sunday” that is told in the section that follows. Kambili explains that 
Nsukka started it all; Aunty Ifeoma’s little garden next to the verandah of her flat in 
Nsukka began to lift the silence. Jaja’s defiance seemed to me now like Aunty 
Ifeoma’s experimental purple hibiscus: rare, fragrant with the undertones of free-
dom, a different kind of freedom from the one the crowds waving green leaves 
chanted at Government Square after the coup. A freedom to be, to do. (16) 
It is indeed their visits to Aunty Ifeoma’s place that enable Kambili and Jaja to 
recognise and voice the violence they have been subjected to since their birth. 
An independent woman who is raising her three children on her own after her 
husband’s death, Ifeoma is a lecturer at the University. Her essential house, 
whose rough cement floors, Kambili recalls, “did not let my feet glide over them 
the way the smooth marble floors back home did” (116), resonates with the 
laughter and the witty arguments of an intellectually stimulating environment. It 
is in Nsukka that Kambili falls in love for the first time with young Father 
Adami, and it is in Nsukka that she slowly begins to open up to her cousin 
Amaka, her first friend. In Nsukka she learns to prepare the orah leaves, and in 
Nsukka she laughs for the first time. While in Nsukka, Kambili realises her al-
ienation from her extended family, from a culture she feels excluded from, and 
she begins to reclaim it.  
The twins’ first stay at their aunt’s place is interrupted by an unexpected 
phone call: Eugene, enraged after discovering that his children have been living 
under the same roof as their “heathen” grandfather, now seriously ill, wants 
them to go back home. “Aunty Ifeoma shook her head as if the way Papa felt 
was just a minor eccentricity,” and she adds that Eugene has managed to get his 
editor, Ade Coker, out of prison (181). Kambili, however, “hardly hear[s]” this 
second comment, as she knows what is bound to happen when she and Jaja get 
back home: “My head was filling up quickly with blood or water or sweat.” And 
in fact, by way of punishment, Eugene will pour boiling water on his children’s 
feet: “‘This is what you do when you walk into sin. You burn your feet’” (194), 
he tells Kambili. Imagining this dramatic phone call and Kambili’s panic, which 
downplays her father’s pro-democracy commitment, Adichie once again skilfully 
juxtaposes Eugene’s two selves, drawing however the reader’s attention decided-
ly towards the private sphere. 
Yet, the author’s choice not to portray Eugene simply as a stereotypical vi-
olent patriarch prevents the suffocating household from completely overlapping 
with the dictatorial regime it might be said to represent. This means not only 
that Adichie refuses to reduce her story to a simple allegory of postcolonial des-
potism – one where the figurative deprives the private of all meaning. It also 
means that she opens a space of possibility and resistance even from within im-
perfect, to say the least, contexts such as that of the Achike family.8 As Brenda 
Cooper has noticed, red, the colour of the hibiscus that blossoms in the garden 
of Eugene’s Enugu compound and that is thus symbolically associated with him, 
is certainly a signifier of violence, but holds also a positive, resistant connotation: 
it is not coincidental that the government agents who tried to bribe the incor-
ruptible Eugene with a truckful of dollars yanked at the hibiscus after being 
asked to leave (9, 200). In other words, if the purple of the experimental hibiscus 
flowering in Aunty Ifeoma’s garden signifies Kambili and Jaja’s discovery of a 
“freedom to be, to do” (16) they had not even dreamt of thus far, still Adichie 
insists on the importance of individual freedom in the private sphere alongside the 
political freedom that the Government Square demonstrators are demanding. 
She insists, Cooper writes, “on the necessity of red as well as purple” (126).9 
In conjunction with the increasingly brutal military clampdown on the Ni-
gerian public sphere, Eugene’s physical and mental health begins to deteriorate. 
He is portrayed as he drinks unusual amounts of water at dinner (201, 258, 262), 
while Kambili watches him, “wondering if his hands were really shaking or if 
[she] was imagining it” (202). After Ade Coker is murdered by a letter bomb,10 
                                               
8 In a much-quoted interview with Wale Adebanwi, Adichie has remarked that “Kambili’s 
father, for all of his fundamentalism, at least has a sense of social consciousness that is 
expansive and proactive and useful, so while his character may be seen as a critique of 
fundamentalism, the God-fearing public in Nigeria can learn a bit from him as well” 
(“Nigerian Identity”). 
9 Recognising some of the intertextual references that this symbolism invite to notice, 
Cooper adds that Adichie insists on the necessity of “Ngũgĩ wa Thiongo’s petals of red, 
along with Alice Walker’s purple fields” (126). On the womanist aspects of Purple Hibiscus, 
cf. note 15.  
10 Ade Coker’s death is certainly another fictional recreation of Dele Giwa’s 1986 murder. 
his physical and mental breakdown become increasingly perceptible: 
there was a slowness in his movements, as though his legs were too heavy to lift, 
his hands too heavy to swing. […] But he prayed a lot more, and some nights when 
I woke up to pee, I heard him shouting from the balcony overlooking the front 
yard (208).  
As the narrative progresses, the reader discovers that his wife at this stage had 
presumably started to poison his tea, “his quintessential British passion” (Strehle 
“Decolonized Home” 110).11 The slowness in Eugene’s movements and his un-
quenchable thirst assume a new meaning in the light of this disclosure, becoming 
a potential allusion to Beatrice’s rebellion – one that, paradoxically, combines 
with Eugene’s anxiety for his defeats against the oppressive regime in consuming 
his once strong body. The body he has so mortified is giving Eugene signals he 
cannot read as he becomes weaker and, like the Nnamabia of “Cell One,” he 
starts suffering from a skin rash which appears almost repulsive to Kambili: the 
pimples “covered the whole of his face, even his eyelids. His face looked swol-
len, oily, discolored. I had intended to hug him and have him kiss my forehead, 
but instead I stood there and stared at his face” (252). Eugene’s increasingly gro-
tesque appearance signals therefore his failure both in the context of the family 
and in that of the state. It signals the disempowerment that preludes, but also al-
ready encompasses, death. And Eugene will indeed be found “lying dead on his 
                                               
11 Beatrice’s symbolic choice to kill Eugene by poisoning, of all things, his tea, is however 
problematical, as Jaja and Kambili are often asked by Eugene to drink from his cup, sharing 
what he calls “a love sip” of his “always too hot,” tongue-burning tea (8). In fact, Kambili’s 
reaction when she learns of the poison is one of shocked disbelief: “My voice was loud. I was 
almost screaming. ‘Why in his tea?’” (290, emphasis added). In Beatrice’s act one might even 
hear a distant echo of Toni Morrison’s Beloved, the stunningly beautiful narration of a mother 
reclaiming her agency by refusing to consign her children to slavery. Read thus, this might be 
an imperfect articulation of what Paul Gilroy has called the “turn towards death as a release 
from terror and bondage” (The Black Atlantic 63). 
desk” (286) a short time afterwards – a death that sanctions the collapse of the 
private kingdom of a presumably “immortal” father (287), but also puts an end 
to Eugene’s pro-democracy efforts.  
By strategically centring the short-circuiting of her allegory on the very piv-
otal aspect regarding the violent denial of the subject’s right to speak up – some-
thing which makes Eugene both a human rights activist and a human rights abuser 
– Adichie draws attention to the (Western liberal) normative distinction between 
public and private sphere that lies at the basis of the construction of the modern 
state. In particular, she emphasises the potential dangers deriving from the exclu-
sion of domestic and family matters from the public sphere and hence from the 
realm of human rights protection. This is a preoccupation Adichie shares with 
those feminist thinkers who have emphasised how the two spheres have been tra-
ditionally “accorded asymmetrical value: greater significance is attached to the 
public, male world than to the private, female one” (Charlesworth, Chinkin and 
Wright 626), in a dichotomy that leaves the private world uncontrolled and thus 
potentially at the mercy of unrestrained patriarchal dominance. The different im-
portance attributed to the two ends of the public/private divide becomes evident, 
for example, when one considers how “[t]he right to freedom from torture and 
other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is generally accepted as a 
paradigmatic civil and political right” (Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright 627)12 – 
                                               
12 And indeed, torture is defined in the UN “Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” as “any act by which severe 
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, pun-
ishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having com-
mitted, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity” (Art. 1, empha-
sis added). 
while, as Adichie shows, degrading violence against the individual is not only a 
means of state-sanctioned terror, but also, and very often, behind the closed doors 
of a private house. 
Adichie’s emphasis on the mutual necessity of freedom and human rights 
protection both in the public and the private sphere is confirmed in the last sec-
tion, titled “A Different Silence – The Present,” which is set when Kambili and 
her mother get news of Jaja’s imminent release from prison. The boy has indeed 
been in jail for thirty-one months after falsely confessing the murder of his fa-
ther in order to prevent Beatrice’s conviction. However, the “new hope” and 
“peace” that Kambili and her mother have felt lately have not (only) been ena-
bled by the end of the private regime of terror: the other conditio sine qua non was 
the end of the dictatorship. Indeed, it was only after the Head of State “died 
atop a prostitute, foaming at the mouth and jerking” (296-297)13 that pro-
democracy groups began to insist on the need to re-open Eugene’s file in order 
to investigate the old regime’s alleged implications in his death. Jaja’s name is fi-
nally on the list of those “prisoners of conscience”14 who will be released soon 
by the interim civilian government, and Kambili and Beatrice’s hope becomes 
“concrete for the first time” (297). 
Kambili thus “can talk about the future now” (306). However, notwithstand-
                                               
13 This description echoes the rumours about the Viagra-induced death of General Sani 
Abacha in 1998. 
14 As defined in Peter Benenson’s 1961 article “The Forgotten Prisoners,” a prisoner of 
conscience is “[a]ny person who is physically restrained (by imprisonment or otherwise) 
from expressing (in any form of words or symbols) any opinion which he honestly holds 
and which does not advocate or condone personal violence.” It is thus evident that Jaja 
can not quite be considered one: as will be noticed below, even as his imprisonment is 
unjust, the reasons for his release are therefore wrong as well – something that points out 
the maladministration of justice in the country.  
ing the hopeful note on which Adichie’s last chapter closes, this ending is (once 
again) a transitory, ‘liminal’ and centrifugal one: Ifeoma and her children have em-
igrated to the US; Father Amadi has been sent to Germany; Beatrice has suffered 
from a nervous breakdown and is perhaps only now starting to recover. Even 
more problematically, gentle Jaja appears to have been irremediably changed by 
guilt, by the fear of having done too little to protect his mother and sister, and by 
his prison experience. “Those shoulders that bloomed in Nsukka, that grew wide 
and capable [143, 154], have sagged” (300), and the once expressive eyes which 
communicated when words could not be spoken “have hardened a little every 
month he has spent here” (305). Now, Kambili says, “they look like the bark of a 
palm tree, unyielding,” so that she even wonders “if we ever really had an asusu 
anya, a language of the eyes, or if I imagined it all” (305). Liberated from the op-
pressive father, Jaja’s encounter with state violence has led to the arrested devel-
opment of the budding womanist brand of masculinity Kambili saw in her broth-
er’s broadening shoulders while he was carefully tending his aunt’s garden. The 
“sensitive” boy who “loves beautiful flowers” and was supposed to become “a 
role model for the future” (Cooper 127) has perhaps been deprived of the possi-
bility of playing such a role.15 In other words, as Susan Strehle has remarked, even 
                                               
15 As Cooper has rightly noticed, it is essential that “the purple hibiscus is Jaja’s rather 
than Kambili’s passion, in a novel which focuses on the growth of Kambili’s ability to 
develop a voice as a woman oppressed by her father.” It is also for this reason that the 
colour purple of Adichie’s title can be read as a nod to Alice Walker’s Pulitzer prize-
winning novel, calling the need for a womanist stance that “recognises the mutual suffer-
ing that black men and women together have endured, be it at the hands of the slavers or 
the colonisers” (127). 
as “the corrupt head of state and the father interpellated by the West are gone,16 
and Kambili plans to plant purple hibiscus after Jaja is released,” it seems that “the 
flowering of Nigeria [and of his sons and daughters] is deferred to another day” 
(“Decolonized Home” 125).  
Purple Hibiscus holds undoubted emancipatory connotations as a narrative 
that confirms, with its very existence, the newly found voice of a young woman 
who was previously silenced by violence and fear. However, silence still hangs 
over Kambili’s fragmented family. It certainly is “a different kind of silence, one 
that lets [Kambili] breathe” (305), but it is also one that problematically emphasis-
es how the happiness mother and daughter can now imagine is essentially private, 
deriving from privilege, and cannot be extended to describe the future of the 
country as a whole.  
There is so much that Mama and I do not talk about. We do not talk about the 
huge checks we have written, for bribes to judges and policemen and prison 
guards. We do not talk about how much money we have, even after half of Papa’s 
estate went to St. Agnes and to the fostering of missions in the church. (297) 
Even after the end of the dictatorship, Nigeria is portrayed as a country the en-
counter with which can be resolved only in the form of a pseudo-citizenship dis-
tributed along economic lines. In other words, in the uneven confrontation with 
the state, hope remains the privilege of those who can buy it – so much so that, 
ironically, even the restoration of poetic justice that Purple Hibiscus tentatively 
proposes would not have occurred without Eugene’s money. Kambili places her 
arm around Beatrice’s shoulders and, she writes, for the first time in years her 
                                               
16 Strehle is here recurring to Althusser’s notion of the “‘interpellated’ subject, one hailed 
or called by the Logos and, with his obedient response, one who inscribes that Western 
Word in every aspect of his being – and then interpellates his family as well” (108). 
mother “leans toward [her] and smiles” (307). This beautiful recreation of a min-
imal tie between Kambili and a woman who had previously “moved away” from 
Jaja as he attempted to include her in a familial embrace (291) seems to point to 
the recreation of a functional family in the future. Whether the state will follow, 
the novel does not say. 
* 
It is telling that the incipit of Measuring Time, Helon Habila’s second novel, is de-
voted to the description of the figure of Mamo and LaMamo’s father, the King 
of Women. Even as the development of the relationship between Lamang and 
his sons constitutes only one of the manifold narrative threads that the author 
weaves together in the text,17 the prominence it acquires because of its opening 
position marks it as one of the central ones – and no doubt one of the most nar-
ratively convincing in a text that in some respects is not entirely successful.18 In 
the first pages of Measuring Time the reader understands that this King of Wom-
en’s “desire for majesty” (Mbembe, Postcolony 110) and success was hallowed in 
the popular songs and folktales of his native Keti way before his decision to pur-
sue a political career in the democratic Nigeria of the early 1980s.19 Young 
                                               
17 For a thematic analysis of the novel, see Anyokwu. 
18 At times the author seems at pains to draw together the many narrative threads that 
compose the text, so that the structure becomes on occasions hesitant and there are some 
inconsistencies (for example, one of LaMamo’s letters, dated 1990, wishes Mamo a happy 
25th birthday, while LaMamo’s headstone marks 1963 as the twins’ year of birth). Occa-
sional redundancy and an often problematic representation of women characters are, to 
my mind, other unconvincing characteristics of a novel that has, however, some very suc-
cessful aspects – the depiction of the character of Lamang being one of them. 
19 Differently from much contemporary Nigerian literature, the novel has a rural setting. 
Measuring Time thus partakes of a long-standing tradition of Nigerian village fiction, but 
also expands the genre by focusing on the Northern part of the country, a “still relatively 
unexplored territory in English-medium Nigerian fiction” (Adesanmi and Dunton, “In-
troduction” viii).  
Lamang, “the handsome ravisher” (15), was indeed remembered as a rich, ambi-
tious and self-confident man who did not even glance at his sons after the tragic 
death of his unloved wife in childbirth, and who did not attend what turned out 
to be her “lonely” funeral: 
most people assumed he was too heartbroken to come, but some, those who still 
hummed the song about the King of Women, said he might have been with his 
lover Saraya, and couldn’t be bothered. (18) 
It is particularly because of the indifference of an absent father, who gives them 
everything “except [his] love” (68), that the twins dream of leaving their village and 
becoming soldiers. They will be heroes: men whose fame, Mamo reasons, is an-
yway the only antidote to being forgotten after his probable early death. But 
while the healthy LaMamo manages to flee the paternal house and becomes in-
deed a mercenary, a bout of fever forces Mamo, his alter ego, to stay put. 
In the solitary years that follow, Mamo becomes a keen, detached observer 
of the reality that surrounds him. After coming across Reverend Drinkwater’s A 
Brief History of the People of Keti, he starts developing the project to write a counter-
text, a “‘biographical history’ of [the] nation” (180)20: juxtaposing “the stor[ies] 
of ordinary people, farmers, workers, housewives,” his work is meant to produce 
“a single overarching story” (195) that, however humble, must not be forgotten. 
Mamo’s grand project begins to take (a somewhat different) shape as the novel 
draws to a close. There, he decides that each of the fifteen-to-twenty chapters of 
                                               
20 As Habila explains in his Acknowledgements, the passages from fictional Reverend 
Drinkwater’s book that are reported in Measuring Time are in fact quotations from Rever-
end John Stevenson Hall’s Religion, Myth and Magic in Tangale – a recently published text on 
Habila’s ethnic group, the Tangale of north-eastern Nigeria, where Hall worked between 
1917 and 1933. The Northern village of Keti can thus be seen as a fictional recreation of 
Habila’s native Kaltungo. 
his book “Lives and Times” (14), which the narrator often mentions in retrospect 
as the narrative progresses, will cover the life of an individual who, in some way 
or another, has affected him (358). And once again, Lamang’s is the first name 
Mamo notes down on his chapter list: because, even after spending almost his 
entire life in his house, “he still didn’t know who is father was, or what had driv-
en him and others like him” (358) to satisfy their ambition of political success.21 
Measuring Time, recording Mamo’s life – and, inevitably, his endeavours to 
reconstruct the story of his family and village – becomes thus the fictionalised 
biography of a biographer.22 Giving voice to its main character’s intellectual pre-
occupations, the novel is primarily a meditation, at times perhaps exceedingly di-
dactic, on the meanings and practices of historiography and/vs. biographic writ-
ing. Habila adopts a metafictional perspective to reflect on the possibilities and 
potential of the ex-centric “artistic project of revisionism” (Anyokwu 21) he is 
carrying out. The author thus invites to read the familial, the local and the na-
tional as they reciprocally illuminate and mirror one another, in a synecdochical 
chain where the tiny details of ordinary life are determined by, but also shed light 
on, the wider local and national history. 
In a context in which the familial and the local are so evidently invested 
                                               
21 This unbridgeable fracture between Mamo and Lamang is confirmed in Measuring Time 
both at the level of the plot and at the narratological level. The reader is never given an 
insight into Lamang’s mind by a third-person narrator who tends to cling to Mamo as the 
main focaliser. Lamang, for his part, never feels the need to explain to anybody, and cer-
tainly not to his son, the reasons behind the controversial choices he has taken in his 
eventful life. He therefore remains an essentially inscrutable character – both to Mamo 
and to a reader who can rely only on Mamo’s own interpretation of the events he re-
counts. 
22 As has been noticed in the previous chapter, Habila’s interest for biographical writing 
emerges also in his Writing for an Angel. The author himself, like Mamo, began his writing 
career with the biography of a local Mai, Mai Kaltungo. 
with wider national resonances, an assessment of the confrontational dynamics 
that take place within the family assumes central importance, in that it might il-
lustrate the notion of the political as represented in the novel. It thus becomes 
interesting to notice that the main reason explaining the twins’ resentment for 
Lamang, one that develops into a desire to harm him (24), is primarily induced 
by his unwillingness, or perhaps incapacity, to (re)create a functional family unit 
after Tabita’s death. Lamang is presented as an archetypal uncaring father: he has 
failed to give his sons protection and love, as his role would imply, and has thus 
prevented them from living a normal childhood. The depiction of the hostility 
between the twins and Lamang, beside “examin[ing] the age-old theme of gener-
ational conflict” (Anyokwu 6), can thus be viewed as more widely pointing to 
the dysfunctional character of the postcolonial state-society compact. Just as the 
derisive, disinterested paterfamilias fails to raise his own children in an environ-
ment where they enjoy his protection and care, so Nigerian citizens are de facto 
excluded from the state they are part of.  
There are virtually no happy families in the world of Measuring Time. The 
generous Zara, Mamo’s beloved girlfriend, used to be severely beaten by her phi-
landering army husband, and after she decided to leave him, her unsympathetic 
mother let him take away their baby from her while she was at the market (124). 
The story of Marina, Mamo’s aunt and surrogate mother, is similarly the story of 
a “failed life”: 
her abusive husband who had infected her with gonorrhea, and who, when she couldn’t give birth, 
had married a younger woman to whom she had to defer, turning her into a maid in her own 
house. Cleaning, cooking, farming, and there were also the nightly beatings . (22)23 
Again, uncle Iliya’s son Asabar, an alcoholic braggart, is asked to leave his fa-
ther’s house after getting a young woman pregnant and refusing to marry her 
(183). Even as there are manifestations of support coming from relatives outside 
the nuclear family, so that Iliya and Marina try to fill the void left in the twins’ 
lives by Lamang and Tabita respectively,24 still there is no doubt that Mamo’s 
“biographical history” of Keti as a microcosm of the nation must have recorded 
much suffering and conflict. Antagonistic family relationships emerge therefore 
as a symbol of the country’s socio-political disorder – a question that, as will be 
seen below, is also explicitly thematised in the narration of Lamang’s disastrous 
political career. 
The stories of shattered families just recalled emphasise the fact that that 
Habila’s generational conflicts are never simplistically resolved in favour of the 
younger generation: on the contrary, both parents and children seem to have 
something to learn from one another, in a dialogue between tradition and inno-
vation that rejects a linear, developmental conception of time. The “children of 
the postcolony,”25 entrusted with the responsibility to construct a new world or-
                                               
23 This passage, an excerpt from Mamo’s biography of his mother, is in italics in the text 
(20). 
24 An noticed above, this reminds the reader of the importance of the kin group in a 
number of African cultures and can also be viewed as placing hope in those highly moral 
individuals who struggle to maintain some form of order within a fragmented society 
notwithstanding the many centrifugal forces that tend to disrupt it. Still, there is no dobt 
that the nuclear family is presented as the basic social (dis)organising principle within the 
fictional community of Measuring Time. 
25 This phrase is meant as a (non-literary) echo of Djiboutian writer Abdourahman 
Waberi’s formulation regarding the Francophone writing produced in Africa by authors 
born after independence. Mamo and LaMamo were indeed born three years after their 
country’s independence, in 1963 (363).  
der, seem to fail – exactly like their parents: Asabar, in this sense, is of course a 
case in point, but the same can be said of the twins, if for different reasons. 
LaMamo, after spending his entire life on the battlefield fighting for various lib-
eration armed groups, returns to the highly idealised ‘home’ he wrote about in all 
his letters only to be killed while leading an insurrection against the local Mai. He 
nobly claims that he is fighting for his future wife and child (349), but history 
crushes his dream of creating a ‘home’ free of tyranny for the new family he is 
willing to start: Bintou, his fiancée, will have to raise their child on her own. 
Mamo and Zara’s relationship has been interrupted as well, and even though the 
novel ends as Mamo is going to her place, the narrative is left suspended and the 
reader wondering whether they will indeed manage to overcome their old grudg-
es, whether Zara will recover from the severe depression she is suffering, wheth-
er she will be able to rebel from her mother’s control.  
Measuring Time thus manipulates the conventions of the idealistic Bildungs-
roman as “the traditional conclusive event of social, civil, and self-integration is 
perpetually postponed” (Slaughter, Human Rights, Inc. 215) – at times to the point 
of becoming an impossibility. It is thus relevant that none of the new genera-
tion’s family stories end in a marriage – something that would of course sanction 
the restoration of social order and the individual’s incorporation within such or-
der. As Franco Moretti has famously remarked explaining why the traditional 
Bildungsroman recurrently, and almost necessarily, ended in marriage, 
from the late eighteenth century on, marriage becomes the model for a new type of 
social contract: one no longer sealed by forces located outside of the individual 
(such as status), but founded on a sense of ‘individual obligation.’ […] It is not only 
the foundation of the family that is at stake, but the ‘pact’ between the individual 
and the world, that reciprocal ‘consent’ which finds in the double ‘I do’ of the 
wedding ritual an unsurpassed symbolic condensation. (22) 
But unions, reconciliations and (re)births, forever expected, do not find their 
way into the text: Habila imagines no perfect marriage “as a metaphor for the so-
cial contract” (22), and even Bintou’s pregnancy remains, as it were, ‘suspended.’ 
Similarly, although the narrator tells the reader that Mamo will complete his book 
in the years that follow,26 “in the narrative proper this never occurs; the biography 
he is hired to write for the Mai is never written and the story of Keti is never told” 
(Krishnan, “Biafra” 191). It is also for this lack of an ending fictionalising some 
form of restoration of a harmonious familial context that the novel can be seen as 
pointing to the lack of inclusiveness to which the Nigerian (non-)citizens are sub-
jected in their being simultaneously included and excluded from a dysfunctional, 
divided country that is emphatically not an “imagined community,” as Benedict 
Anderson would say. The realisation of the characters’ dreams, the completion of 
their Bildung and thus their incorporation as right-and-duty bearing units within 
the state remain so uncertain as to prevent their narrativisation. 
In this context, the figure of Lamang emerges as the most emblematic of 
the failed promise of democratic, inclusive participation that should have been 
granted with the end of colonial – and later, democratic – rule. As noticed 
above, this does not only derive from the tropological implications of his role as 
an uncaring father, but also from his disastrous career as a politician during the 
Second Republic. In 1982, against his brother’s advice, Lamang indeed abandons 
a highly lucrative business as a cattle merchant in order to run for the general 
elections that will take place the following year (84). Habila thus fictionalises the 
1983 electoral campaign and the elections that followed, which were massively 
                                               
26 At least on two occasions, the narrator also reproduces excerpts from Mamo’s work 
(20-22, 135-136). 
rigged and would lead, in a few months’ time, to the coup d’etat that ushered in 
the Buhari regime. There is no ideological commitment at the basis of the politi-
cal confrontation depicted in Measuring Time: the dissimilarities between the two 
competing political factions, the fictional “Victory Party” and “New Victory Par-
ty,” amount to a slightly different denomination that ironically suggests a com-
mon desire for political power, for “victory.” Desire for power and lack of ideo-
logical commitment characterises also Lamang’s own behaviour: he leaves the 
Victory Party twice, first after being stolen the idea around which his successful 
electoral campaign had been centred (135-137), and then (and this time, he 
threatens, for good) after being denied a decent post within the party’s ranks. He 
then accepts the New Victory Party’s delegates’ offer and contests the elections 
as their chairman (181).  
The brief democratic interlude of the Second Republic is evidently pre-
sented as a Foucauldian war by other means in a country where struggle for po-
litical authority keeps on being organised as a competition in which force is nev-
er abandoned as a regulatory medium. It is Asabar who becomes an epitome of 
this when, as a leader of the VP (/NVP) youth wing, he takes to dressing “in a 
camouflage combat jacket and trousers and thick army boots” (113), becoming 
“an instant general” whose “own personal army” (183) fights against the party’s 
“enemies” (182). On the election day Asabar, alongside some fellow thugs, is 
shot by the police during a failed, dope-induced attempt to ambush the election 
officials carrying the ballots boxes that would sanction the victory of the VP. 
While Asabar remains paralysed, Lamang is jailed for election rigging and is re-
leased a week later, looking small and bruised (211). 
It is from this day that Mamo watches Lamang “gradually lose his swag-
ger.” Deserted (yet again) by friends and fellow party members in a state of mo-
bile political alliances, he is portrayed as he pathetically waits for a welcoming 
delegation from the NVP headquarters, “pretending to be reading or listening to 
the radio” (212). Lamang’s failure prompts the author to a more careful explora-
tion of his character. His double “abandonment” (212) and political delusions 
are an ironic nemesis by means of which this figure of paternal disinterest met-
amorphoses from a potential allegory of abandoning sovereignty and political 
corruption to a more psychologically complex, if still for the most part inscruta-
ble, one: that of an unsuccessful old man who suffers and pays for the many 
mistakes he has committed in his life. The stroke that hits him is the last straw 
signifying the decline of the ‘Lamang era’: this once vain “ravisher” now often 
“falls asleep in his chair, his head hanging toward his chest, a trickle of saliva 
making a thin line down his chin” (214). And yet, even as Mamo and his father 
begin to “tentatively open up to each other” (215) in apparent reconciliation, 
their relationship is bound to turn sour again with the spiteful confession of old 
lies. It is in such a context that, in a moment of vengeance, Mamo gives to his 
father the letters he had received from his brother over the years and had never 
shown to him: 
“All this while . . .” Lamang whispered hoarsely. 
How does it feel? Mamo wanted to scream. He wanted to reach out and grab his 
father’s heart and break it into bits. 
Lamang quietly retired for the night. (220) 
The following day, aunt Marina discovers that Lamang has died in his sleep, his 
arms folded over his chest: “[o]n the table beside the lamp were LaMamo’s let-
ters, and on top of them were his father’s reading glasses” (220). Perhaps reading 
LaMamo’s letters has really broken Lamang’s heart, satisfying Mamo’s desire for 
a death he has dreamed of his entire life but had never the courage to seek ac-
tively. At this stage, however, hardly can this death be read symbolically as an 
emancipatory one: Lamang is no longer the self-centred King of Women, a met-
aphor for the abandoning sovereign – or for a Freudian primal father. As the al-
legory crumbles, there remains simply a man defeated by time. The conflict be-
tween father and son is therefore left essentially unresolved: even as a biog-
rapher, Mamo is presented as he immortalises the worst moments of Lamang’s 
life “in the starkest words possible” – as if attempting, the narrator muses, to ex-
act some form of vengeance upon him even after his death (135). And yet, Ma-
mo’s book is no longer written in order to get immortality through fame. It ra-
ther becomes an attempt to make sense of the disjointed times that have been 
lived, endeavouring to produce some form of unity through aesthetic systemati-
sation. 
* 
The texts examined thus far, as has been seen, prevent the achievement of a sense 
of narrative closure: Mamo’s book project is only incipient when the novel draws 
to a close, and in the conclusion of Adichie’s text the release of Jaja is said to be 
imminent but is in fact never fictionalised. The fate of the sixteen-year-old pro-
tagonist of Chris Abani’s novel GraceLand, Elvis Oke, is similarly left uncertain in 
a much-commented ending that leaves the narrative, as it were, “suspended” in a 
quintessentially liminal locus.27 Sitting in a waiting lounge at Murtala Muhammed 
                                               
27 Critic Sarah K. Harrison has recently written a pointed essay on Abani’s “formal and 
thematic elaboration of the ‘suspension’ leitmotif” (95) in GraceLand as metaphorically 
suggesting the protagonist’s incomplete Bildung and the instability of the postcolonial na-
tion-state. 
International Airport, Elvis is ready to leave Lagos for good and board a plane to 
the US on his friend Redemption’s forged passport. In this yet unrealised attempt 
to leave a metropolitan slum where he cannot aspire to a “full and happy”28 life 
for a country where his survival is admittedly far from obvious (318), Elvis’s flight 
is configured as a voyage between (either certain, or potential) camps – a transna-
tional search for human rights whose success is in doubt. What is more, the in-
between “non-place”29 of the airport in which the conclusion is staged is a threat-
ening site of violence too, as it participates of the “blind, unreasoning power” 
(306) Elvis has come to know all too well without promising certain release from 
it. “[S]oldiers, armed for battle, [crawl] everywhere like an ant infestation” (319), 
asking travellers to inspect their passports, “even though [they] ha[ve] no legal 
right to do this,” and forcing them to move from one seat to the other for no rea-
son but alleged suspiciousness.  
Primarily set in the Lagos shantytown of Maroko in 1983, but also moving 
backwards in time to the rural Afikpo of the 1970s-early 1980s, Abani’s GraceLand 
tells the story of teenage Elvis, a boy who struggles to survive through increasingly 
ethically problematic means in the “half slum, half paradise” (7) context of the in-
formal settlement after his relocation there with his father. Sunday Oke, a former 
district education inspector, has proved unable to cope with his wife Beatrice’s 
death from breast cancer in the mid-1970s. In the flashback chapters that alternate 
with the main narrative line in the first part of the book, it emerges that what must 
have been for some time a harmonious family is increasingly fractured as Sunday 
                                               
28 Abani’s formulation recalls the often mentioned teleology of the “free and full devel-
opment” of the individual’s personality expressed in many human rights documents. 
29 George Benko has defined the “non-place” as a site “devoid of the symbolic expres-
sions of identity, relations and history” (23). 
resorts to violence in an attempt to reassert his role as the head of a household 
that is falling apart. Elvis’s female relatives function, at least in some measure, as 
comforting, centripetal centres of order: Oye, Elvis’s Scottish-accented grand-
mother, who manages “to hold a circle of sanity” in Sunday’s compound (176); 
Felicia, the aunt whose reproaches, Oye tells her grandson, are “trying to make 
you forget tha’ you lost your mother so young” (172); and even Efua, the young 
cousin who consoles Elvis in times of common distress – although, Elvis later 
muses, he should have been the one taking care of her (315). 
As Elvis, Efua and her older brother Godfrey are however soon to experi-
ment, these women’s efforts are insufficient to grant the family’s children protec-
tion from the abuses of the sovereign fathers – Sunday and, even more evidently, 
his brother Joseph. In this context, the fact that both of them are widowed is rele-
vant, as their violence finds little or no maternal contrapuntal restraint: as has been 
remarked above, this narrative choice configures a patriarchal society where the 
obliteration of the feminine is one of the major causes of the social disorder in 
which the country is steeped.30 Indeed, the maternal deaths in the text can be read 
as textual correlatives for the disenfranchisement and invisibility suffered by 
women in modern Igbo society – a condition that, as has been noticed by scholars 
such as Ifi Amadiume and Nkiri Iwechia Nzegwu, has its origins in the colonial 
imposition of patriarchal, Judeo-Christian gender norms in a culture where gender 
                                               
30 While the figure of Oye, Beatrice’s mother, has clearly the function of restraining Sun-
day’s excesses, Joseph’s (way more brutal) violence remains unchecked in the narrative. 
The question regarding the crumbling of the family following the death of the mother is 
addressed directly in the novel when Beatrice, already severely ill, asks Oye whether she 
thinks “dere is something strange with Joseph and Efua’s relationship? Since his wife has 
died he hasn’t been right. Why do all de wives die young in dis family?” Her reflections 
remain however unanswered as Oye, asking “Which question do you want me to answer, 
lass?” (38), recognises only implicitly the enormity of the issues she is being faced with. 
attitudes had previously been more flexible than is now generally acknowledged.31 
This process does of course recall Pierre Bourdieu’s observations regarding the 
structures of masculine domination, which are “the product of an incessant (and there-
fore historical) labour of reproduction, to which singular agents (including men, with 
weapons such as physical violence and symbolic violence) and institutions – fami-
lies, the church, the educational system, the state – contribute” (34). In the context 
of the narrative, the fathers’ efforts to maintain a presumed social ‘order’ that re-
asserts a patriarchal ideology are increasingly presented as deplorable, in that they 
sustain a culture of violence that is presented as one of the major causes for the 
dysfunctional character of the state itself. For example, a declaredly masculine 
(219) sense of honour for a paternal name that “is associated with failure” (188) 
but must nonetheless remain untainted at any cost becomes the reason for having 
Godfrey, the unrespectable son and troublemaker, killed by the distant cousin In-
nocent. The many quotidian manifestations of hyper-masculine brutality the read-
er is confronted with might thus be viewed as reflecting a tenet of modern Igbo 
patriarchy. Such manifestations, moreover, are certainly amplified through a de-
fensive mechanism meant to compensate for the relative erosion of the paterfa-
milias’ authority in a society where the father often can no longer exercise the 
power to provide and, even more importantly, there occurs the ascendance of a 
culture of militarism. The latter, “rest[ing] on an ethic of masculinity that assigns a 
large place to the violent and public expression of acts of virility,” prompts an in-
tensification of the brutal assertion of masculine power also in the domestic 
                                               
31 For example, Amadiume remarks, they could purchase wives and achieve certain forms of 
political empowerment as male daughters or female husbands (Male Daughters). For an excel-
lent summary of the recent debates regarding the effacement of the feminine following the 
advent of colonialism in Igboland, see Krishnan, “Mami Wata.” 
sphere, in order to counter the threat of feminisation and disorder perceived by a 
father who is comparatively delegitimised as a social and political agent (cf. 
Mbembe, “On Politics” 326-328; cf. Ouma).  
It is in the light of these comments that the portrayal of the first vicious 
beating Elvis receives can be examined. The episode takes place one year after Be-
atrice’s death, when Elvis, in an attempt to catch his distraught father’s attention, 
runs to meet him, proud of his appearance after Felicia and some friends of hers 
have jokingly plaited his hair and put some lipstick on him. 
Sunday stopped and squinted as Elvis approached, face changing in slow degrees 
from amusement to shock and finally to rage.  
Elvis ran straight into the first blow, which nearly took his head clean off. […] 
Too shocked to react, still out of breath from his sprint, Elvis gulped for air as his 
father chocked him. Suddenly, Oye towered beside them. Sunday glanced at the 
steel of her eyes and dropped Elvis like a rag. […] 
“No son of mine is going to grow up as a homosexual! Do you hear me?!” he 
shouted at [Felicia]. (61-62) 
The scene later assumes quasi-farcical tones as Oye, believing Sunday is threat-
ening her with a razor, “pincer[s] her fingers into a vise around his scrotum” – 
attacking his male body only to discover that he simply wanted to shave Elvis’s 
head. Tension is finally relieved as the boy relaxes into his father’s careful grip, 
the pull of the razor soothing him “like the rough lick of a cat’s tongue” (63). 
“Stupid child, make sure you don’t fall asleep,” his father said gently. “For your 
own good,” he continued under his breath. “I’m only doing this for your own 
good. It’s not easy to be a man. Dese are trying times. Not easy.” (63) 
Narrative tension is instead never released in a passage, set some time afterwards, 
that recounts Sunday’s reaction when Elvis tells him that Efua has been raped by 
her father Joseph, in an act suggesting, through the violation of an essential taboo, 
the absolute disintegration of any form of familial and social harmony and the 
moral bankruptcy that goes hand in hand with it. On hearing Elvis’s words, Sun-
day menaces his son pointing at his temple his old service revolver – an obvious 
metaphor for phallic domination which, differently from the razor in the scene 
commented on above, is here meant to be employed as a proper weapon. The pet-
rified Elvis, accused of being a “stinking liar,” will be able to leave the room only 
after the disturbing description of his incontinent terror (145). 
Sunday’s unwillingness to acknowledge the need to check and restrain the 
excesses of his brother, the ‘sovereign’ male adult, over his ‘subject’ Efua, emerges 
in the novel as a self-defeating stance that will lead to furthering the collapse of 
the family itself. Elvis will be indeed subjected as well to his uncle’s abuse (196-
199), in a scene that is of course in clear contrast with Sunday’s anxieties about 
homosexuality. When in Maroko, years later, Elvis reveals to his father that he too 
was raped by Joseph, Sunday’s wordless reaction implicitly marks the recognition 
of his failure as a paterfamilias – a recognition that, however, does not prompt a 
reconciliation that is by now presented as unattainable: 
Sunday stared at Elvis, mouth open, searching for the possibility of a lie. But there 
was none. The sound, when it came from him, was nothing Elvis recognized. It 
was a howl. All animal, all death. It propelled Elvis off the veranda. This was not 
the comfort he wanted, needed. He could deal with all his father’s anger, but not 
this. […] As he walked, he realized, the only way out of this life was Redemption. 
(189) 
The fact that the awareness of common pain prompts an infuriate, animal reaction 
that separates rather than unites signals the impossibility for the author to find 
what, in an interview with Amanda Aycock, he has called “the language that al-
lows […] tenderness amongst men.” Even as GraceLand configures a constant at-
tempt to bridge the gap of silence that keeps father and son apart, looking for “a 
way that masculinity can be obtained through tenderness, rather than through […] 
violence” (9), such an aesthetic and ethical reinscription of the masculine, one 
Elvis himself painfully strives for, is destined not to succeed in the space of the 
narrative.  
Similarly to the scenes of violation analysed in Chapter Two, Elvis’s rape has 
the effect of problematising any straightforward divide between the ethical oppo-
sites of innocence and guilt: Elvis, whose reaction to the sight of his cousin’s rape 
was a problematic mixture of “hatred,” “revulsion” and “lust” (64-65), becomes a 
victim of the very same violence that had been a problematic source of pleasure. 
By fictionalising the victimisation of a (potential) victimiser – or rather, of a char-
acter who is aware he has somehow been complicit in the abuse perpetrated 
against his cousin – the novel explores the ambivalent agency of individuals who 
are simultaneously victims and (potential) agents of bodily exploitation. GraceLand 
also investigates how similar patterns of disenfranchisement and conniving exploi-
tation are configured at the larger scale of the state, particularly through the en-
counters between the protagonist and the Colonel, an epitome of Lagosian mili-
tary omnipotence. The latter, who has almost had Elvis killed for bumping into 
him in a crowded nightclub, and who, towards the end of the narrative, will su-
pervise Elvis’s torture following his participation in a pro-democracy perfor-
mance, is also at the head of the illegal network Elvis himself was part of up till 
some time before – even as he, differently from his subaltern, is not aware of this. 
Heads of State and family heads, thus, do not recognise their subjects, they do not 
recognise them as persons entitled to the protection that should derive from their 
inclusion in the city, or in the family itself. Yet they keep reasserting their owner-
ship of them, reclaiming their power over their lives. In this context, Abani pre-
sents therefore the masculine subject as both complicit with and a victim of mas-
culine domination (cf. Bourdieu 69), in the private as well as in the public sphere. 
This is not only true of Elvis, who is painfully aware of this apparent paradox and 
keeps interrogating its disturbing ethical implications – implications he cannot ac-
commodate with (65, 311). Sunday, too, occupies such an undecidable ethical po-
sition, as his encounters with a sovereign violence he opposes, but reproduces and 
excuses as a paterfamilias to the point of self-destruction, will result in political 
failure and, later, in an ambivalent death. 
As was the case in Measuring Time and Purple Hibiscus, in GraceLand too the 
crumbling of private harmony reflects the democratic fiasco of the Nigerian state 
– a parallel that is made explicit through the narration of Sunday’s political debacle 
when, persuaded by some fellow Afikpo villagers, he resigns his job and runs for 
the National Assembly elections.32 Differently from Lamang’s, Sunday’s commit-
ment does not seem to be motivated only by personal ambition. Instead, his grass-
roots campaign configures a dissensual reaction against a system where economic 
power, and brutality, either determine or impose political credibility by force – an 
attitude that will characterise also his more successful, but ultimately suicidal, lead-
ership during the resistance to the 1983 Maroko eviction.33 Sunday retrieves some 
                                               
32 Albeit taking place in 1981 in the novel, the first general elections after the military 
stepped down from power were held in 1979. Abani thus conflates the 1979 and the 1983 
elections in a single event. Moreover, since the Second Republic in the text is said to last 
only a few months (204), it becomes clear that even if set in 1983, when the country was 
still, at least nominally, democratic, GraceLand is meant to fictionalise the years of military 
rule that followed. For a concise analysis of the political events of the Second Republic, 
see Osaghae, ch. 4. 
33 The slum was evicted in 1982, in 1983 and, finally, in 1990, with the forced ejection of 
300,000 people. For a discussion of the causes and consequences of the policies of forced 
of “his fire, some direction” (216) after his candidacy, and democratic hope even 
spurs the ephemeral establishment of a minimal family bond as he begins to spend 
time with Elvis, “even if it was to ask questions about what he had read” in the 
newspaper (176). Sunday’s defeat in favour of Chief Okonkwo, however, signals 
the unfeasibility of his project of a ‘non-warring’ politics. Future voters are in fact 
only momentarily scared by the trucks and helicopters that the parties Sunday op-
poses use during their campaigns, even as they tellingly remind them of the reality 
of the civil war they experienced not so long before (178). Realising that the heli-
copters and trucks are loaded with the gifts and coins with which their votes will 
be bought, the villagers choose to ignore the implicit threat of a form of politics 
that is presented, both aesthetically and factually, as a war-like activity, and grant 
their support to the highest bidder. Political participation is thereby reconfigured 
as a lucrative, uncontrollable game that leaves behind not human beings, but 
fragmented bodies, “dust-teared eyes, torn clothes and an arena swept clean by 
scrabbling fingers” (178). In this contest, Sunday’s inevitable failure sanctions, 
once and for all, his family’s disruption: his impossible aspiration to citizenship 
rights as a sovereign individual is indeed reflected in his ultimate incapability to 
keep together his private kingdom, as he decides to leave Afikpo and move to La-
gos with his son. As Oye says, “[n]ot every hoose is a hame” (101): and Sunday’s 
non-homely houses, first in Afikpo and then in Maroko, are presented as dystopi-
an sites of corrupted relations, whose actual and metaphorical foundations be-
come increasingly shaky with the relocation in the Lagos swamp, where shacks are 
often “made of sheets and corrugated iron roofing and plastic held together by 
                                                                                                                                     
eviction in the country that concentrates in particular on the infamous 1990 demolition 
of Maroko, see Agbola and Jinadu. 
hope” (4). By means of a tropology of instability and decay, the Maroko shanty 
becomes thus a symbol of relationships that cannot be reconstructed, while of 
course hinting at the precarious living conditions in the slums of a city whose “su-
pernova growth” (Davis 8) was not accompanied by the development of adequate 
infrastructural and sanitary facilities.34 
As Ashley Dawson has observed, the slum Elvis and Sunday inhabit – one 
that the author often refers to as a “ghetto” (7 passim) – has the excremental con-
tours of a “surplus city” inhabited by “the violently evacuated waste products of 
today’s world economy. There is no official scenario for the reincorporation of 
this surplus humanity” (“Surplus City” 21).35 And indeed in GraceLand, human be-
ings are Baumanian “wasted lives,” preferably hidden from view,36 and often re-
duced to “merchandise” (230) within a globalised informal economy whose prac-
tices, as Elvis’s progressive katabasis into the city’s underworld shows, are often 
criminal in character.37 Elvis is soon forced to abandon his unprofitable dream of 
eking out a living as an impersonator of his namesake, the King of Memphis his 
                                               
34 In the 1980s, Lagos grew “twice as fast as the Nigerian population, while its urban 
economy was in deep recession” (Davis 14). Inhabited by 300,000 people in 1950, ac-
cording to one estimate Lagos might reach 23 million inhabitants by 2013 (5-6). 
35 The idea of “surplus humanity” is drawn from Mike Davis’s Planet of Slums, a sociologi-
cal account of the living conditions in the slums of the Global South. See in particular 
Chapter 6. 
36 In this respect, Davis writes that “[i]n the urban Third World, poor people dread high-
profile international events – conferences, dignitary visits, sporting events, beauty con-
tests, and international festivals – that prompt authorities to launch crusades to clean up 
the city: slum-dwellers know that they are the ‘dirt’ or ‘blight’ that their governments pre-
fer the world not to see” (104). 
37 The commodification to which the human is subjected when cast outside the bounda-
ries of humanity is one of the themes that will be analysed in the following chapter, 
through a reading of works such as Abani’s novella Becoming Abigail, Chika Unigwe’s nov-
el On Black Sisters’ Street, and Sefi Atta’s Swallow. 
mother loved.38 After being offered chocolate for one of his performances by a 
“Gargantuan” American tourist sunbathing in Bar Beach (12-13), the boy will ac-
cept his friend Redemption’s offers for occupations whose exploitative character, 
in a climactic succession, becomes increasingly evident. He first works as a gigolo, 
and then starts wrapping cocaine in condoms that will be smuggled to the US by 
drug mules (110), comforted at the idea, of course not quite exact, that “no one 
died for it” (115). Redemption, perhaps unawares, finally involves him in a highly 
profitable business that turns out to be nothing less than organ trafficking. But 
Elvis has not got what it takes to become an “original area boy” like his friend 
(55), and finds himself heaving at the edge of the road when, opening a cooler to 
look for refreshments, he is confronted with the gory sight of human heads, 
hearts and livers. The drugged children they were escorting, Redemption advances 
after their escape, were probably bound to be transported abroad, where their or-
gans, freshly harvested, would be sold to “rich white people so dey can save their 
children or wife or demselves. […] Dis world,” he adds, “operate different way for 
different people” (242): an insider’s comment on those exclusionary global prac-
tices that construct the human differentially, producing, to paraphrase Judith But-
ler, bodies that don’t matter, human beings who are excluded from humanity itself 
and are thus declared expendable – or, rather, ‘purchasable’ in the form of spare 
body parts. 
But such a right to consign to death with impunity is an operation that is no 
longer – if it ever was – the biopolitical prerogative of sovereign power. On the 
                                               
38 This was an activity that allowed him, by manipulating and queering the Presley aes-
thetic, “to circumvent the constraints of heteronormativity” that so painfully prevent Elv-
is from negotiating freely his own sexuality (Omelsky 89).  
contrary, the Lagos of the Colonel is a site where biopower is diffracted at all lev-
els of society into manifestations of violence where private and public interests are 
often inextricable, in “a confusion between power and fact, between public affairs 
and private government” (Mbembe, “At the Edge” 260) that establishes a mobile 
hierarchy of unexpected connivances. This process, as noticed in Chapter One, 
had been clearly visible even in a number of first-wave texts on the Nigerian Civil 
War. Fictionalising the biopolitical activity par excellence, the works examined in that 
context might have been expected to describe primarily ‘orthodox’ biopolitical re-
lationships between a sovereign power and subjects called to arms for its exist-
ence. On the contrary, they often showed how both sovereign and non-sovereign 
actors, Ken Saro-Wiwa’s “bellymen,” employed their power in order to satisfy 
their own personal interests. This phenomenon acquires evidence also in 
GraceLand, a text where state power, still pronounced and recognisable, is accom-
panied by multiple non-state forms of necropower – all of which contribute to the 
portrayal of a society involved in a de facto, if informal, war with itself. 
The Maroko forced eviction, when the slum is razed to the ground in a cha-
os of detritus and bulldozed bodies, constitutes a paradigmatic manifestation of 
absolute military sovereignty, sheer force of fire and sword. Dubbed “Operation 
Clean the Nation” and defined in the newspapers as “a simultaneous attack on de 
centers of poverty and crime,” the clearance of this “pus-ridden eyesore on de 
face of de nation’s capital” (247) is of course not meant to address the chronic 
reasons for the poverty and crime that the shantytown is indeed rife with. It will 
rather, as Sunday says, “cover it all under one pile of rubbish,” thus creating the 
perfect, cemeterial foundations for a “beachside millionaire’s paradise” (248).39 
                                               
39 This stark image of wealth resting, physically, on death, reflects of course a tenet of 
The distance from the ordered society of affluent Lagos and the Maroko dumping 
site is no longer large enough, and “the poisonous effluvia of social decomposi-
tion” (Bauman 78) arising from it have reached areas they were not supposed to. 
The wasted lives inhabiting it is thus compelled to move farther away, to one of 
the many other slums that punctuate the metropolis. This “eyesore” must be, and 
indeed is, erased from the map. Redemption was thus quite optimistic the night 
when, looking from Maroko at the adjacent well-off area of Ikoyi, he expressed 
his love for a city that mocked the rich: “Because though they hate us, de rich still 
have to look at us. Try as they might, we don’t go away” (137). History, in fact, 
proved him wrong.  
Yet, Abani evokes the justness of demanding citizenship rights even from 
within a site that is excluded from the polis and is reclaimed only to be destroyed. 
The Maroko residents’ first attempt to prevent the bulldozing of their homes un-
der Sunday’s leadership does nothing but delay with burning barricades the inevi-
table, apocalyptic defeat that will follow. But when bulldozers and policemen re-
turn, Sunday refuses to leave his house. While he is waiting for death on his ve-
randa, narrative realism is interrupted as he realises he is in the company of Be-
atrice’s ghost and of a leopard – the totem of his forefathers, which has joined 
him in this time of need and attempts to convince him to either leave or, at least, 
“die like a man.” Once, the leopard explains, “people were close to their totems, 
who infused them with their own special attributes, both physical and metaphysi-
cal. Lycanthropy was not unusual in those days when the ancient laws were kept” 
(287). Even as Sunday chases the two spirits away, in his last breath he does in-
                                                                                                                                     
capitalism – one which Bauman has condensed writing that “[f]or something to be creat-
ed, something else must be consigned to waste” (21). 
deed metamorphose into his totem animal, exacting a vengeance against state ter-
ror even as his human body is shot and crushed by the bulldozer:  
Sunday sprang with a roar at the ’dozer. The policeman let off a shout and shot, 
and Sunday fell in a slump before the ’dozer, its metal threads cracking his chest 
like a timber box as it went straight into the wall of his home. Sunday roared, leapt 
out of his body and charged at the back of the policeman, his paw delivering a fatal 
blow to the back of the policeman’s head. With a rasping cough, Sunday disap-
peared into the night. (287)  
This magical realist scene does not only, as one commentator has rightly 
written, constitute a moment “of redemption for Sunday by the forces of the nat-
ural world of his forefathers in an otherwise bleak scenario of state-sanctioned ur-
ban destruction and violence” (Dannenberg 47). Portraying a predatory response 
to the equally predatory terror of the state, whose (partial) defeat is sanctioned 
through the metamorphic animalisation of a man whose right to be human has in 
fact been questioned, it also aims at restoring “the ancient laws,” an ironic form of 
poetic justice. This (literally) animal reaction may thus be viewed as a postcolonial, 
neo-Fanonian recreation of the inevitably violent nature of the subaltern’s re-
sponse to dehumanising oppression – a response whereby the formerly oppressed 
reclaim their agency, history and, through them, their dignity and self-respect.  
However, one cannot but notice that the beauty of Sunday’s rebellion re-
tains evident connotations of undecidability. This is not only due to the obvious 
fact that the slum, like Sunday’s house, are in the end razed to the ground. What 
even more clearly undermines the emancipatory potential of Sunday’s act is that 
it remains unintelligible to the other characters in the novel. If justice can be im-
agined in the slums of the global South, it is one that narratively seems to de-
mand a magical realist mode. But the “transgressive and subversive qualities” 
(Bowers 63) that critics have generally recognised as inherent in the genre are 
here dramatically diminished in that Sunday is the only character in the novel 
who participates in the magical realist world the author conjures up. This epi-
sode is one after which there does not remain “a dead man, and a free man,” as 
Jean-Paul Sartre famously wrote commenting on Fanon’s discussion of anti-
colonial violence (22). On the contrary, there remain two human corpses and a 
leopard that has survived by reconnecting with the wisdom of the ancestors. 
However, when Elvis returns to destroyed Maroko, he cannot figure out what 
happened to the policeman, whose body inexplicably looks as if it has been 
“mauled by some large predator,” while the alleged death of the father provokes 
nothing but uneasy “relief” (305). Although the protagonist is now able to “read 
the city, seeing signs not normally visible” (306), Sunday’s survival in the form of 
his totem animal is forever effaced, hidden even from his son’s perceptive gaze. 
If the Maroko clearance represents a manifestation of violence as sovereign 
prerogative, still the Lagos of GraceLand is a city where the state is often absent, its 
necropower privatised. The diffraction and privatisation of certain sovereign 
rights are ironically suggested through the reference to a ritual that one of Elvis’s 
mentors, Caesar Augustus Anyanwu, known as “the King of the Beggars,” likes to 
perform. Sitting dangerously “on the pedestrian path of the freeway bridge, legs 
dangling over [the slum of] Bridge City below,” the King loves to look down “at 
his subjects, his domain” (116) – at a place that is described later in the novel as 
one where “the only thing to look forward to was surviving the evening and mak-
ing it through the night” (309). This is, of course, hardly a “domain” to be proud 
of: and as the text makes clear, pseudo-sovereign, destitute areas such as Bridge 
City and the many other slums that compose the city are in fact zones of excep-
tion. The implications of the abandonment to which their inhabitants are subject-
ed are exemplified in an emblematic passage recounting the administration of 
street justice, when a man called Jeremiah, an alleged thief, is stoned by a mob and 
then baptised in petrol, while a bunch of policemen watch the scene “with bored 
expressions” (227).  
Jeremiah was spinning around in a circle like a broken sprocket, pleading with each 
face, repeating his name over and over. Instead of loosening the edge of tension by 
humanizing him, the mantra of his name, with every circle he spun, seemed to 
wind the threat of violence tighter, drawing the crowd closer in. […] 
“I beg, Peter. You know I no be tief. I beg.” 
Peter calmly reached into his pocket and pulled out a cigarette lighter. He 
flicked it on and stepped back from Jeremiah, dropping the lighter on the tire neck-
lace. (225-227) 
This scene, which the narrator beautifully describes as “comically biblical, 
yet purely animal” (225), ends as the man is set ablaze, consigned to death by the 
crowd of the dispossessed. Such an “animal” rage constitutes another reminder 
of the problematic interpretation of bare life as coterminous with passive vic-
timhood. As seen in the previous chapters, presuming that the individuals who 
are denied their rights are necessarily non-agents does not only prevent the 
recognition of a capacity for violence that is far from erased with disenfran-
chisement, but also undervalues the resilience that some of them exhibit, their 
active search for love and happiness. These latter aspects are fictionalised in 
Abani’s last section, which is set exactly in Bridge City, where Elvis has become 
a caretaker for younger beggar children and where, in spite of the astonishing 
urban decay, people – or, at least, some of them – are still capable of compas-
sion and love. Elvis’s inability to accommodate to slum life, to find a place with-
in its complex, shifting hierarchy, is however confirmed once and for all, as he 
falls severely ill and, in an incongruent reversal of roles, is attended by the 
twelve-year-old girl, Blessing, he should be protecting. Following Redemption’s 
offer, Elvis thus accepts his fake passport, coming to terms with the simple, but 
painful, truth that he is not bound to survive in his own country.  
The open ending of the novel is one that, deliberately ambiguous, problema-
tises the possibility of upward social mobility even as it presents it as an option. It 
is by no means certain that the US, portrayed ambivalently in the text as a country 
where dreams may come true (25-26), as the racist place of lynching (319), and as 
a threatening, but simultaneously fascinating, symbol of global capitalism and ex-
ploitation, will grant Elvis, finally “reborn in Redemption” (Krishnan, “Beyond 
Tradition” 102), the full and happy life he has not attained in Nigeria.40 What is 
more, the novel, while remarking the impossible incorporation of the individual in 
the Nigerian state, does not offer easy solutions to the impasse that such an exclu-
sion seems to produce in terms of human rights protection. Indeed, contrary to 
Sarah K. Harrison, I would argue that GraceLand does not conform in toto to what 
Joseph Slaughter, drawing from Jacques Rancière, has termed “dissensual” Bild-
ungsroman. Rancière, analysing how French women were able to make public 
claims for inclusion into a regime of rights after the Revolution, has written that, 
although disenfranchised, they “could demonstrate that they were deprived of the 
rights they had, thanks to the Declaration of Rights. And they could demonstrate, 
through their public action, that they had the rights that the constitution denied to 
them, that they could enact those rights.” They could thereby “put together a rela-
                                               
40 Many commentators agree in noticing the ambivalence of an ending that, even as offer-
ing chances of survival to the protagonist, decidedly resists aesthetic closure (Harrison; 
Krishnan “Beyond Tradition”; Dannenberg). For opposite readings, see Adéèkó and An-
drade. 
tion of inclusion and a relation of exclusion,” acting dissensually “as subjects that 
did not have the rights that they had and had the rights that they had not” (304). 
Similarly, Slaughter argues, the postcolonial Bildungsroman is often dissensual in 
character, as it “insists upon the abstract legitimacy of human rights principles and 
expands the effective compass of their universality” (182). However, even as 
GraceLand certainly laments the frustration of incorporation of the individual in 
the Nigerian state, it does not explicitly narrativise a rearticulation of the category 
of the universal. In other words, Elvis’s positioning at the end of the novel does 
not quite attempt such a rearticulation through the “performative contradiction” 
that occurs when “one who is excluded from the universal, and yet belongs to it 
nevertheless, speaks from a split situation of being at once authorized and deau-
thorized,” reclaiming a right to effective inclusion (Butler, “Universality” 48-50). 
In fact, Elvis’s flight circumvents, rather than challenges, the protagonist’s disen-
franchisement – and it does so through illegality, through a Nigerian passport with 
a fake American Visa stamped on it. The fact that Elvis’s only hope rests on ille-
gality, on an attempt at mimicking inclusion rather than demanding it, on an act 
that does not expose the limits of the existing norm but rather aims to assimilate 
to it, constitutes a bleak commentary on the current limits of International Human 
Rights Law in a world where freedom of movement is increasingly limited, or pre-
cluded tout court, to a large portion of humanity that is thereby condemned to 
death. This conclusion thus structurally emphasises how the protagonist has to 
renounce political dissensus in order to survive, even as it implicitly highlights the 
necessity to come to terms with the paradoxes of a regime that is founded on ex-
clusion. 
Notwithstanding these problematic aspects regarding the reasons and means 
through which movement becomes possible in the novel, the author does never-
theless invite to read Elvis’s journey as a potential source of grace. This does not 
so much derive from what his destination might have in store for him, but from 
the very possibility of transit, of transformation, that Elvis has been offered fol-
lowing an unexpected act of (illegal) generosity. Similarly to those criminals of old 
Oye told him about, who were buried standing up, a flowering stake driven 
through their heads, Elvis’s rebirth, ambiguous as it certainly is, has given him “a 
chance to be useful, to feed fruit-bearing trees” (21) in the life that might follow. 
In novels that present post-war Nigeria as steeped in a condition of perpetual ex-
ception, it is highly significant that the memory of the most traumatic moment of 
declared emergency in the country’s history keeps resurfacing, its threatening 
presence looming over those who have outlived it. Passing references to the Nige-
rian Civil War can be found virtually in all contemporary Nigerian literature and, 
as seen in the first chapter, in the last decade the conflict has also been increasing-
ly thematised in both fiction and non-fiction texts. In GraceLand and Measuring 
Time, narratives set in a post-war Nigeria that, as had been predicted in a number 
of first-wave works, is struggling to survive the peace, war, and the Biafran con-
flict in particular, is a powerful leitmotif, which finds its way into the text through 
strategies that deserve careful analysis. In this context, seemingly minor episodes 
achieve great symbolic prominence and require to talk about the war, addressing 
the divisiveness and political turmoil that have not abated since 1970, and reclaim-
ing an awareness of the culture of excess still dangerously inscribed in Nigeria’s 
contemporaneity. I am referring to the narrative threads regarding the lives of two 
emblematic characters, Mamo’s uncle Haruna and Elvis’s cousin Innocent. For-
mer child soldiers, their unexpected return or disturbing disappearance, years after 
the end of the war, in different guises reproduce the silencing governmental poli-
cies that have consigned the event to oblivion, while also suggesting that the car-
nage of the late 1960s is but one, if certainly emblematic, manifestation of a more 
general continuum of violence that has blurred the distinction between war and 
peace. 
It is 1977 when Mamo, recovering from his latest bout of fever on Lamang’s 
veranda, sees an unknown man approaching.  
The man looked wild, his hair was knotty and thick, his beard and moustache 
joined at the sides of the mouth to form a circle. His clothes were tattered and 
looked as if he had been living in them for a long time. His lips, protruding from 
the hair-fringed O, were badly chapped and they bled when he spoke. (43-44) 
Presuming he is a beggar, Mamo rummages in his pocket, looking for a coin. But 
the unknown man identifies himself, pronouncing some of the very few words 
he articulates during his stay at Lamang’s place, before hanging himself to the 
flame tree some months afterwards. He is Lamang’s younger brother, Haruna, 
who had left Keti ten years earlier, as a sixteen-year-old, to join the federal forc-
es, and had been considered deceased since. Mamo offers him a bowl of water, 
and the man drinks, shaking, leaving “a spot of blood on the rim” (44). “It was,” 
the twin later reflects, “like a dead man returning to life” (45). In the days that 
follow, the past is “re-created” (49) by Haruna’s relatives and former comrades, 
and Haruna, often simply called “Soja,” is feted like a hero – so much so that the 
twins decide they will pursue a career as soldiers as well, the only way, they 
muse, to have their deeds forever engraved in the memories of their fellow vil-
lagers. While the others talk, however, Haruna remains silent, an enigmatic pres-
ence whose voice is only heard on the nights when bits of memory come back to 
him: “then all night he’d pace up and down in his room, talking loudly as if there 
was another person in the room with him, and then finally there would be si-
lence” (53). 
It is 1980 when Abani’s Innocent, another former child soldier who had en-
rolled in the Biafran army’s Boys’ Brigade as a thirteen-year-old but who, differ-
ently from Haruna, had come back after the end of the war, calls Elvis in the dead 
of night, a tortured look on his face, asking for some food (209). Elvis’s cousin 
Godfrey, the troublemaker, has disappeared some time before – on the same day 
in which Elvis “thought he saw Innocent looking in the bushes outside. He 
looked unkempt, and even from a distance it was easy to see the blood on his 
clothes. Just then his father’s car nosed out of the gate, and Innocent vanished” 
(174). Godfrey’s murder, as the reader at this point is aware of, had in fact been 
commissioned to Innocent by Sunday and Joseph, an honour killing meant to pre-
serve the family’s supposed good name. Innocent, sitting in Elvis’s kitchen, is now 
shooting “terrified looks” around the room and after a while, with a sigh, he says: 
“I used to be a soldier in de Biafran war” (209) – an (of course, only apparent) 
narrative non sequitur that is conducive to a third-person flashback recounting an 
episode of Innocent’s soldier life. As the narrative returns to the present and Elvis 
attempts to inquire about his cousin Godfrey’s fate, the former soldier “dashe[s] 
out of the kitchen into the rain and darkness.” Elvis, “[p]etrified, […] stared into 
the nothingness in the corner of the room that had spooked Innocent” (215). 
From this day, no one in Afikpo will see Innocent again. 
Although it is undeniable that Haruna and Innocent are two very different 
figures, their life trajectories essentially opposite (as the former is centripetal, the 
latter centrifugal), the two incidents sketched here are no doubt comparable. This 
is not only due to the fact that they similarly occasion the recollection of war ex-
periences – which enables the entry of the civil war theme within the boundaries 
of texts set in its aftermath. What is more, it is possible to discern how, both in 
Habila’s and Abani’s descriptions, the two characters, human beings in flesh and 
blood, tend to assume ghostly traits: while the former has returned from the world 
of the dead, the latter keeps appearing and disappearing, leaving an inexplicable, 
disturbing void of things unsaid. In Abani’s passage, moreover, there is another 
unmistakable spectral presence: that of Godfrey, the murdered cousin, a ‘real’ 
ghost who seems to be after Innocent himself. By means of such a multifaceted 
tropology of spectrality, the authors “dramatis[e] the presence of an absence” (Del 
Villano 2). And indeed, the ghostly, in these passages, signifies a double absence, a 
double silence: not only does it suggest the lack of negotiation, in Nigerian con-
temporary political discourse, on the causes and implications of a conflict that 
haunts the country; it also suggests that the unresolved nature of the war itself 
speaks volumes about the tense socio-political climate portrayed in the novels – a 
signification that, as will be seen below, becomes apparent in Abani’s text. And 
indeed, “haunting,” writes sociologist Avery Gordon,  
is one way in which abusive systems of power make themselves known and their 
impacts felt in everyday life, especially when they are supposedly over and done 
with […] or when their oppressive nature is denied […]. [I]t is an animated state in 
which a repressed or unresolved social violence is making itself known, sometimes 
very directly, sometimes more obliquely. (xvi) 
Innocent and Haruna, alongside Godfrey, are thus ghostly figures (or ghosts 
proper) whose representation asks to come to terms with another, all-
encompassing spectre – that of a pervasive culture of war that has been concealed 
but is in fact “very much alive and present” (Gordon xvi).  
The character of Innocent, a ghost-like survivor who is haunted by his re-
cent victim and is thus both “Innocent” and guilty, without being either, high-
lights the complex, entangled responsibilities of the individual who acts on sover-
eign orders.41 Hence, in Abani’s text the war most clearly emerges as a reminder of 
the disastrous consequences deriving from the excesses of sovereign violence, 
both in its private and public manifestations. The flashback passage, set in front of 
a Catholic church in which Biafran civilians have just been burned to death by en-
emy forces, evokes a sacrificial aura through which the war is juxtaposed to the 
killing of Godfrey – the event that has triggered the remembrance itself – high-
lighting the analogies between the two events. Scenes of human destruction on an 
earth that refuses to soak up more blood; the image of young Innocent playing the 
harmonica and recalling a Catholic hymn on the “soul-cleansing blood of the 
Lamb” (211); the reference to the quasi-cannibalistic consumption of monkey’s 
flesh on the part of his comrades; and finally, the Eucharistic passage where hun-
gry Innocent, drinking the altar wine and eating the hosts, is almost killed in the 
process (“The bastards had booby-trapped the altar”) – all these aspects contrib-
ute to conveying a pervasive sense of human sacrifice, desecration and annihila-
tion in a world where “[t]here is only one God […]: the gun. One religion: geno-
cide” (211). If Innocent is almost sacrificed on the altar of the Father(land), recit-
ing the Agnus Dei and smiling at the line which asks God to grant peace to his 
                                               
41 As many critics have noticed, the majority of the characters’ names in GraceLand are 
evocative, often ambivalently, of the function of the character him/herself. 
children, Godfrey, whose name means exactly ‘peace of God,’ is ironically mur-
dered by Innocent on the altar of patriarchal honour. God the Father has not 
granted peace to his children, and Innocent, who has survived the war, is now ter-
rified, almost paradoxically so, torn by guilt for the horrendous crime he has been 
asked to commit – a crime, however, he has also been paid for. 
The narrative positioning of the flashback structurally adds another semantic 
layer to the concept of war in GraceLand: occasioned by Godfrey’s death, Inno-
cent’s remembrance is indeed followed by a passage recounting Sunday’s reaction 
to his defeat at elections that, as seen above, are presented in the text as a war-like 
confrontation. In a drunken stupor, Sunday tells his late wife’s ghost (another 
ghosts Elvis cannot see): “I know I lost. Dat is the consequence of war, Beatrice. 
Someone wins, anoder loses. But as long as de fight was with honor, both warri-
ors can rest peacefully” (219). A comment that might, in another context, be read 
in metaphorical terms, assumes here literal meaning, while the three events that 
are referred to in the chapter emerge as different, but essentially comparable, 
forms of war, signs of “lingering trouble” (Gordon xix). The spectral and pseudo-
spectral apparitions and disappearances that these two novels portray, thus, bear 
the ghost of a perpetual war that must be addressed: for “no ethics, no politics, 
whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and thinkable and just that does not 
recognize in its principle the respect for those others who are no longer or for 
those others who are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead 
or not yet born” (Derrida, Specters xviii). And the spectre of war, of this violent 
past that is not quite over, is one that not only threatens to produce more unjust 
deaths, other ghosts like Godfrey, but that more generally forces human beings to 
live in the shade of death, constantly at its mercy, zombified: because the disap-
pearances it enjoins, the silences it compels, have the effect of “transgress[ing] the 
distinction between the living and the dead” (Gordon 126): everyone is a potential 
ghost-like human being, invisible bare life.42 
However, as implied by Haruna’s traumatised silence, as well as by the si-
lence surrounding Godfrey’s and Innocent’s disappearances, it is not easy to exor-
cise these ghosts, these hungry and thirsty ghosts, by talking to them, by talking of 
them, out of a concern for the justice to come, as requested by Derrida’s ethical 
injunction. Still, through the representation of silence itself, the two authors draw 
attention to the unsaid, to a state-sanctioned erasure of what everybody can guess, 
and make the silence deafening – so much so that characters who have not found 
an answer on the part of the ghosts look for responses elsewhere, either by inter-
pellating directly the sovereign father, as is the case in GraceLand, or through the 
work of the imagination.  
This is what happens in Measuring Time when Mamo, some years after Ha-
runa’s suicide, attempts to fill the representational lacuna that is Haruna’s life by 
fantasising on an (im)possible articulation of it. Taking as a point of departure the 
only piece of information he has managed to wring out of his uncle, namely, that 
he had travelled with a friend named Chris (54), he imagines his uncle’s peregrina-
tions in the African continent with Biafran hero Christopher Okigbo, the poet-
                                               
42 Avery Gordon’s comment is taken from her illuminating analysis of the ghostly dynam-
ics of Argentinian state terror. As she writes, “[t]he desaparecido always bears the ghost of 
the state whose very power is the defining force of the field of disappearance. The tor-
ture, the agony, the terror, the difficult-to-put-into-words experience of being disap-
peared: the disappeared sustain and convey the traces of the state’s power to determine 
the meaning of life and death” – at the point that the distinction between the desaparecido 
who literally returns and the desaparecido who returns in the form of an apparition is de facto 
erased (127): “[d]isappearance transgresses the distinction between the living and the 
dead” (126). 
soldier who died in military action in 1967. In Mamo’s mind, Haruna and Okigbo 
thus become two deserters, willing to survive after a terrible explosion that has left 
only the two of them, former foes, alive on the battlefield: 
Mali, Guinea, Congo, Botswana, Senegal, Morocco, Kenya, they kept going. On the 
way they passed other wars, other kinds of peace. They witnessed births and wed-
dings and festivals and deaths and burials. Then, exactly ten years after they had 
begun, Haruna told Chris, “My friend, the time has come for me to stop. I am 
home.” (102) 
The brief passage conjuring this imaginary world constitutes a variation of what 
narratologist Gerald Prince has termed “the disnarrated” – a category that, he 
writes, “covers all the events that do not happen but, nonetheless, are referred to 
(in a negative or hypothetical mode) by the narrative text,” either at the level of 
the story, as in this case, or at the level of discourse (299). Mamo’s daydreaming 
must not be seen as a self-defeating retreat into impossibility, but rather as attempt 
to draw attention to dramatic historical events that have been considered best for-
gotten. It is the utopian projection of imaginary past unity, forged with a contem-
porary sensibility that feels the need to conceive of commonality and solidarity be-
tween two representatives of historically opposite factions. The myth of Okigbo, 
who proudly pledged and lost his life for an ideal, is thus here deconstructed in a 
move that suggests the ultimate futility of national ideals that are bearers of death. 
The disnarrated acquires, moreover, subversive overtones as it takes the place of 
the closely linked category of “the unnarratable, or nonnarratable,” which Prince 
defines as 
that which, according to a given narrative, cannot be narrated or is not worth narrat-
ing either because it transgresses a law (social, authorial, generic, formal) or because 
it defies the powers of a particular narrator (or those of any narrator) or because it 
falls below the so-called threshold of narratability (it is not sufficiently unusual or 
problematic). (297) 
In this context, Mamo’s flight of fancy is one that not only envisions what 
should have been, and what should be in the future, but that also defies the si-
lence imposed on what happened and has been declared unnarratable. 
As suggested in the excerpt above, the recollection of the Nigerian Civil War 
in Measuring Time is also accompanied by the acknowledgment of the “other wars, 
other kinds of peace” that occur in the rest of Africa. Such a transnational imagi-
nary of conflict is conveyed in particular through the letters Mamo receives from 
his twin brother, who, naively fascinated by his uncle’s (non-)story, fled his fa-
ther’s household at sixteen to become a mercenary in a rebel group near the Chad 
border. After training in Libya, and fighting on the side of the Tuaregs in Mali and 
in the ranks of a rebel group in Liberia, LaMamo joins Médecins sans Frontières 
with his girlfriend Bintou until the day when, as the war has become too heavy a 
burden (231), he flees to neighbouring Guinea (232). Similarly to Haruna, he re-
turns to Keti after an absence of more than ten years. The dystopian reality he 
faces, however, counters his childhood memories of a halcyon village that could 
be a safe haven where to lay down his weapons after a decade spent on the battle-
field. Keti, half-burned after the eruption of bloody religious riots, resonates with 
gunshots: “the police, keeping the peace” (330). When, the day after his arrival, 
the people rise in revolt against the Mai and his corrupt counsellor, the Waziri, the 
still idealistic LaMamo leads the crowd marching towards the palace and is shot 
and killed by the putative ‘peace-keepers.’ His fight for liberty abroad, thus, ironi-
cally comes to an abrupt end when he gets back to the “home” he used to recall in 
his nostalgic times of quietness around the continent (81, 108, 168, 233). 
In these novels, which speak of the suffering and tragic futility of dying for 
honour, or for an abstract ideal, it is no longer possible to identify winning and 
losing sides. No one can really “rest peacefully” after the battle, as Sunday de-
clares: because this is a battle that perpetuates itself forever. The representatives of 
private sovereignty have nothing to gain from the culture of violence they con-
tribute to intensifying: Eugene, Lamang, Sunday, the three fathers this chapter has 
considered, are vanquished. The representatives of manipulative political power – 
the dictator of Purple Hibiscus, the Waziri of Keti in Measuring Time, and the Colo-
nel in GraceLand – are vanquished as well, often dying grotesque deaths after caus-
ing much pain. But little seems to change in the Nigeria of the novels after their 
deaths: the wars depicted in these texts are wars that, for the time being at least, 
have no real victors. 
 

 
Dreams of escape, and actual escapes from inhospitable homes, have emerged as a 
common motif in the novels taken into consideration in the previous chapters, 
where the postcolonial citizen/subject’s desires for freedom and self-fulfilment are 
perceived as unrealisable in a state that does not always grant the most essential 
forms of rights protection – beginning with the right to life and to not be subject-
ed to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Even as formally at peace, the post-
colony in these texts is described as having the traits of a necropolitical war-scape 
where the value of the human is often diminished to the point of being rendered 
all but imperceptible. And while some of the characters decide, or have no choice 
but, to stay put, either conniving with or resisting the extralegal practices engen-
dered in the perpetual exception, others actively look for mobility, in an attempt, 
on occasions naïve, to better their condition and actualise their aspirations.1 
This chapter discusses three texts recounting the lives of women who, either 
victims or accomplices of illegal practices, do not resign themselves to their de-
clared superfluity within the biopolitical hierarchies produced in the context of 
‘war-scapes’ of unending emergency, but rather attempt to achieve upward social 
and ontological mobility within them. The works under examination might thus 
                                               
1 For an essay concentrating on the textual turn to the US in Helon Habila’s Waiting for an 
Angel, Chimamanda Adichie’s Purple Hibiscus, and Chris Abani’s Graceland, see Adéèkó. 
be considered loose variants of what Dave Gunning has recently termed “narra-
tives of illegality” (141).2 The notion of illegality assumes in this context different 
articulations and different degrees of ethical and legal decidability, as the narrators 
concentrate at times on the depiction of the ‘victim’ side of the exploitative rela-
tion, other times on presumed perpetrators, while on occasions decidedly blurring 
the distinction between the two. The dehumanising violence to which the epony-
mous protagonist of Chris Abani’s novella Becoming Abigail is subjected on the part 
of a male relative who wants to turn her into a sex slave; the fraudulent entry into 
Belgium of the women in Chika Unigwe’s On Black Sisters Street and their activity 
as sex workers in the bars of Antwerp; the possibility of making (not so) ‘easy’ 
money by becoming drug mules, on which the characters of Sefi Atta’s novel Swal-
low ruminate – all these narratives, however dissimilar, offer comparable configu-
rations of the illegal. By imagining, illuminating and reinventing the human that 
lies beyond statistical data on trafficking and smuggling, notoriously difficult to 
secure, and beyond sensationalistic media report, the works invite to reconsider 
the very meanings of moral unacceptability and of illegality as a signifier. 
The texts compassionately recount stories of combative women – women 
who fight for their dignity, women who might be at the mercy of other people’s 
heinous greed, but who are also for their part resourceful, looking for a complete-
ness that, for disparate reasons, they do not find in Nigeria. If these characters can 
be considered mulieres sacrae, still they are certainly not apathetic, submissive, or re-
signed – non-agents bereft of all choice. Even as the authors show how their bod-
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his essay to refer to texts portraying the ethical dilemmas faced by the asylum seeker in 
Great Britain (Manzu Islam’s Burrow, Caryl Phillips’s A Distant Shore and Abdulrazak 
Gurnah’s By the Sea). 
ies are sold, animalised, reduced to commodities or to valueless containers for 
more valuable objects, they also point out that some of them wilfully choose sub-
merged occupations in an attempt to flee debasing poverty, frustrating job mar-
kets, violent families, disastrous love stories. The reasons for unhappiness just 
listed are evidently not solely ascribable to the dysfunctional character of the state. 
All the same, taken together they outline the fragmentation of the narrative of the 
inclusive nation-state by figuring the nation as a non-community, a divided locus 
of exclusions and impossibilities. Indeed, the texts exemplify the “anti-nation[al]” 
trend that Pius Adesanmi has detected in much contemporary African literary 
production, which exhibits a “[d]isavowal of any idea of African citizenship an-
chored in a nation-space with useable pasts and identitarian national narratives,” 
as the integrity and credibility of national identity myths and metanarratives sub-
side as a consequence of the evident crisis of the postcolonial state and of global 
centrifugal forces (Adesanmi “Power Narratives”).  
The “unimagining” of the nation that works such as the ones under consid-
eration here record and simultaneously enact takes place in the “anti-citizenship” 
framework of a Nigerian state that, exhibiting a “diminished ability […] to ensure 
social security,” has been on the whole incapable to process demands of inclusion 
into a regime of rights (Adebanwi, “Citizenship” 43). And in this context, charac-
terised by the generalised absence of a state-society compact, women, Wale 
Adebanwi explains, experience citizenship differently from their male counter-
parts, as they often are the disadvantaged object of gender-based discriminatory 
practices rooted in a number of religious, cultural and legal norms – in primis, in a 
Constitution which is “gender-insensitive, even in its language,” and sanctions and 
maintains gender-based invisibilities (41).3 Abani, Unigwe and Atta’s works are 
tributes to women who resist different forms of invisibility and who counter, 
through ambivalent means, the double jeopardy to which they are subjected – a 
condition that Adebanwi, echoing sociologist Nira Yuval-Davis, calls their living 
on a “‘marginal matrix of citizenship’ resulting in ‘both formal and informal dis-
crimination’” (41). The gendered perspective adopted by these writers to recount 
the struggles for happiness of women who resist their double disenfranchisement 
by constituting themselves as social and political agents provides a reformulation 
of that “women’s war” that, as noticed in Chapter 1, was the focus of those first-
wave Nigerian Civil War works that narrated women’s efforts to survive the 
emergency. 
Elleke Boehmer, in an insightful essay on the counter-discursive strategies of 
representation of self and body in postcolonial nationalist literature, has written 
that “where a national narrative begins to fragment, so does the iconography of 
the body” (Boehmer, “Transfiguring” 274). Narratives of illegality such as the sto-
ries of trafficking and smuggling under scrutiny in this chapter reproduce the vast 
fissures and unbridgeable gaps that have opened in the (unfinished) fiction of the 
nation-state by representing the closely linked commodification to which the ex-
pendable human being is subjected when, abandoned by the sovereign, s/he can 
be reduced to a disjointed entanglement of (self-)sellable body parts. Through nar-
rative, however, the writers considered here gather the (body) parts together, giv-
ing visibility to the otherwise submerged human being who lives, loves and suffers 
                                               
3 For example, Adebanwi notices, “[w]hile a foreign woman who marries a Nigerian man 
can become a Nigerian by marriage, a foreign man that marries a Nigerian woman cannot 
become a Nigerian by marriage” (41). 
within/beyond the body (parts). In so doing, they problematise notions of inevi-
table victimhood, recalling that life, more often than not, exceeds the boundaries 
of the law and of the fictions that are employed to codify it, and that most forms 
of reductionism, even if well-intentioned, are ultimately counter-productive – es-
pecially for the very ‘victims’ they are meant to protect. The human truths that are 
not encompassed in legal narratives find recognition but not resolution in these 
texts, which acknowledge their own limits by avoiding to offer facile responses to 
the complex questions they pose. Still, their very ‘incompleteness’ asks for a dis-
cursive reinscription of the meanings of, and of the relationships between, the po-
litical, the subject and the body, confirming the need for constant reflection on a 
notion, that of the human itself, whose defective, inherently incomplete definition 
must be the source of a future-oriented ethics.  
As will be seen below, some of these works tell stories of trafficked people, 
of “camps on the move,” of movements between camps. Others tell stories of 
wilful migrants, who ask to be smuggled and who, albeit confined to a condition 
of abandonment and invisibility regardless of their physical location, reinvent 
themselves, their own identities, in a quest for a better future – a future which, at 
times, they manage to construct against all odds. Taken together, these narratives 
emphasise the limits and deficiencies of human rights within the context of sover-
eignty, where the stateless and the sans-papiers remain, in Arendt’s formulation, 
subjects whose ‘right to have rights’ is decidedly in doubt. What is more, they sug-
gest that it is from figures such as the ones they portray, who are at the limits of 
the ethical and political categories, that the path for the recasting of a paradigm of 
rights must begin. Whether a potential solution of the current impasse lies in the 
capability of the excluded to claim “citizenship as justice, […] forc[ing] open the 
gates of the city,” as Engin F. Isin has beautifully put it (“Citizenship in Flux” 372, 
383), or whether the texts nod towards the notoriously enigmatic Agambenian 
post-sovereign, post-biopolitical world, where human beings will become a “form-
of-life” – a life that “can never be separated from its form, a life in which it is 
never possible to isolate something such as naked life” (Means without End 3-4) – is 
left unclear. But the importance of these works lies in the fact that, as Annalisa 
Oboe has written commenting on the potential of postcolonial studies in a world 
of obstinate injustice, their analysis allows to “trace the contours of emerging sub-
jectivities and possible worlds” (Oboe “In transito” 383, my translation). They 
thereby configure transient, but not fleeting, “poetics and politics of the future” 
(385) – which, as Oboe reminds us, remains one the most compelling aspects of 
postcolonial literature and thought. 
Fourteen-year-old Abigail “had felt caught in the sheath of men’s plans” (Abani, 
Becoming Abigail 75) when she was forced to follow Peter, her cousin Mary’s hus-
band, to London. In the previous years, other young family members had been 
“lucky” enough to be taken there (62), lured by promises of a better education and 
a higher standard of living before – or so Peter said – ungratefully running away 
with improbable “bad crowds” (66). 
From the time her father and Peter had decided that she needed to come to Lon-
don. There had been the trip to Lagos in the long lean body of a bus. Then the flight 
in the cigar belly of the plane, and now, hurtling through the bowels of London in the 
subway, headed for Peter and Mary’s. (75, emphases added) 
This highly evocative excerpt is taken from the beginning of one of the flash-
backs, “Then”-captioned chapters that compose Abani’s fragmented narrative, al-
ternating with “Now” sections where Abigail, sitting by the Cleopatra’s Needle on 
the Thames Embankment, retrospectively reflects on the many failures of her 
short lifetime, imagining “she could see the ghosts of those who had also ended it 
here” (26). In the passage reported above, migration is configured through a met-
aphorics of ingestion that, beside emphasising Abigail’s powerlessness in the face 
of her male relatives’ will, preludes to her future excretion as waste in London. 
And indeed, as Abigail is swallowed in a spiral of non-choice, buses, planes and 
the London tube, elongated loci of oppression, become symbols of the phallocrat-
ic economy of violence to which she will soon be subjected, experimenting it in 
one of its most debasing forms after resisting Peter’s attempt to force her into 
prostitution. In this context, means of transportation, as Pietro Deandrea has writ-
ten in a recent essay on the artistic representation of the phenomenon of present-
day slavery, emerge as part and parcel of the “concentrationary archipelago” 
(“Contemporary Slavery” 170 passim) that makes up the landscape of late modern 
exceptionalism: a “concentrationary system that has been atomised, vaporised into 
a myriad of ever-changing, ever-shifting sites, thus embodying the features of 
trans-national capitalist modernity” (177). Deandrea’s comments, for their part, 
relate to Nick Vaughan-Williams’s discussion of the Agambenian space of sover-
eign exception as “generalised and diffused,” a “‘generalised border’ where excep-
tional measures, practices and characteristics formerly associated with borders be-
tween states in the conventional sense become routinised and dispersed through-
out global juridical-political space” (108). 
As the narrative draws to a close, Abigail wonders whether “maybe some of 
us are just here to feed others” (117). And indeed Abigail, always taken, always 
appropriated, has become aware of being considered nothing more than an object 
of consumption in the night when Peter, “feral breathing and almost soundless 
smirk” (87), burst into her room with the man who should have been her first 
‘customer.’ She then managed to resist the assault and, as Peter tried to slap her, 
she bit his hand, drawing blood. The description of the punishment that Peter in-
flicts on her is possibly one of the most graphic scenes of violence in the entire 
corpus studied in this dissertation, as the animality that, as has been seen, consti-
tutes a tropological trait d’union running through a relevant number of the texts I 
have analysed is here literalised in a horrific punitive nemesis. Abigail, who bit 
“like a dog” (89), is indeed handcuffed and chained to the kennel in the backyard, 
turned into a beast, spat and peed over, given rancid water and rotting leftovers 
she has to eat “without hands” (91), beaten, repeatedly raped by furious Peter. She 
soon seems to have no more strength to counter such a degrading treatment – at 
least until the day in which the layer of dirt covering her skin threatens to efface 
the scars she has carved on herself. Tracing these lines and dots has been for Abi-
gail an attempt to map out her own identity, so as to “see herself” (45) while at the 
same time “creat[ing] memory” of her late mother – a mother whose name, ap-
pearance and combative nature Abigail, “this Abigail” (44 passim), has inherited. 
The incumbent haunting of Abigail’s mother is indeed one of the main themes 
explored in the “Then” chapters of the novella: the woman, who lost her life in 
childbirth, left her daughter with a sense of guilt for a death she feels responsible 
for, and with the contrasting feeling of frustrating invisibility in the eyes of a fa-
ther who, albeit gentle, cannot overcome the grief for his loss and either does not 
see his daughter or disturbingly assimilates her to his late wife.4 
But when the process of animalisation gets to the point that Abigail can 
hardly see the skin she has so carefully engraved, she attacks Peter “exactly as if she 
were a dog” (Deandrea, “Unravelling Unpersons” 678, emphasis added) – a gory 
liberation through which Abani conceives of a possibility of rebellion even from 
within the dehumanised space into which his character has been forced: 
Fifteen days, passing in the silence of snow. 
And she no longer fought when Peter mounted her. 
Wrote his shame and anger in her. Until. The slime of it threatened to obliterate 
the tattoos that made her. 
Abigail. […] 
One night. 
Unable to stand it anymore, she screamed. Invoking the spirit of Abigail. 
And with her teeth tore off Peter’s penis. (95–97) 
The angel, Mary, who used to warm and comfort chained Abigail in her husband’s 
absence, unlocks her handcuffs. Abigail is free. And yet, the narrator continues, 
“[t]hough the streets were crowded, only a few people noticed this gorgon with 
bloody mouth and hands, and the grisly prize she held up like a torch as she ran” 
(99). 
The invisibility that pained Abigail during her life in Nigeria is thus an op-
pressive cloak that thickens in Europe, not only because of the inhospitable indif-
ference that the hyperbolic passage just quoted conveys, but also, and importantly, 
because of her condition as a sans-papiers, which threatens to plunge her even more 
deeply into the abyss of the unseen. If, at home, Abigail “was more a ghost than 
                                               
4 As Ashley Dawson has noticed, the relationship between Abigail and her father is on 
occasions presented as “something dead and rotting” (20, cf. also 67): “Abigail’s father 
has had a psychological breakdown as his daughter reaches adolescence, and he must 
grapple with the potentially incestuous endgame of his ghoulish desire for his dead wife” 
(“Cargo Culture” 184). 
her mother […], moving with the quality of light breathing through a house in 
which the only footprints in the dust were those of her dead mother” (44), her 
‘disincorporation’ – the fragmentation of her subjectivity and her virtual non-
existence as a person before the law – is completed when the social workers who 
deal with her case discover that there is no record of her presence in the country. 
Even the name she gave, Abigail Tansi, drew a blank. It was like she didn’t exist. 
And she didn’t, because Peter had used a fake passport and a forged visa to bring 
her into the country and she was registered everywhere under that fake name, a 
name she had forgotten. 
She was a ghost. (110) 
Abigail’s patient, painful work of scarification does therefore not cease after she is 
very ambiguously ‘rescued’ by the British social system: if, as Francesca Giommi 
has argued, the ever-present motif of self-mutilation in Abani’s fiction point to the 
characters’ need “for self-punishment and sin-expiation,” while also “stress[ing] 
the[ir] corporeality, to escape the ghost-like existence and social marginalization to 
which most of them are condemned” (“Negotiating Freedom” 168), there is in-
deed no reason for Abigail to interrupt her quest for a readable inscription of her 
story on the surface of her own body.  
Abigail’s misfortunes as described thus far conform to the definition of traf-
ficking provided in the so-called “Trafficking Protocol,” the legal instrument 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in Palermo, Italy, in November 2000 that 
established, after heated debate, an internationally agreed, if much criticised, defi-
nition of the phenomenon.5 It must be remembered that the Trafficking Protocol, 
alongside the two other additional Protocols supplementing the UN Convention 
                                               
5 The “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially 
Women and Children,” entered into force on December 25, 2003.  
against Transnational Organised Crime and dealing respectively with Smuggling of 
Migrants and Trafficking in Firearms,6 is decidedly not a human rights instrument, 
in that it has the purpose of promoting international cooperation in the fight 
against organised crime. Indeed, legal scholar Anne Gallagher has pointed out that 
the failure of the Palermo Protocols to include mandatory protections for traf-
ficked and smuggled persons “provides a strong indication that, for many gov-
ernments, trafficking and smuggling are issues of crime and border control, not 
human rights” (“Trafficking, Smuggling and Human Rights” 12). It is thus the 
state security imperative that has determined the increased relevance of the issues 
of trafficking and smuggling in the international policy agenda, particularly after 
the fall of the Berlin wall and the global war on terrorism – events which have 
spurred the tightening of immigration controls in Western countries whose ‘po-
rous’ borders are perceived as exceedingly vulnerable to migratory ‘invasions.’ The 
definition of trafficking in persons, as per Art. 3 of the Palermo Protocol, consists 
of three elements: first of all, trafficking is considered an action, “the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons”; the Protocol then de-
fines the means through which this action is carried out, namely “the threat or use 
of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over an-
                                               
6 The “Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,” adopted along-
side the Trafficking Protocol in Palermo, entered into force on December 25, 2003. The 
“Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts 
and Components and Ammunition” was adopted on May, 31 2001 and entered into force 
on July, 3 2005. 
other person”7; finally, it specifies that the action must occur “for the purpose of 
exploitation,” which “shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitu-
tion of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”  
No doubt transported to the UK “for the purpose of exploitation,” Abigail 
has been deceived as to her destiny there, and terribly abused with the purpose of 
being rendered completely subservient. She thus seemingly conforms in toto to the 
very restrictive fiction of the victim of trafficking. Still, it is essential that Abani 
does not relegate his character to the stereotype of the virginal, naïve girl “suitable 
for public sympathy […] because of her youth and innocence” who has historical-
ly been the linchpin of the accounts on trafficking provided by human rights and 
religious groups, as well as “neo-abolitionist” feminists (Doezema 34). This myth-
ic discourse, Jo Doezema has shown, reinforces and is reinforced by “fears and 
anxieties about women’s sexuality and independence, and of ‘foreigners’ and mi-
grants” (39), and it is problematic in that it authorises a sanitised, paternalistic and 
disempowered view of the trafficked woman as absolutely helpless. Not only does 
such an iconography constitute a reinscription of the missionary/colonial palimp-
sest of the Other who must be saved; as will emerge most clearly in the analysis of 
Chika Unigwe’s On Black Sisters’ Street, it also downplays the importance of what 
Saskia Sassen has termed the “feminisation of survival” (“Women’s Burden” 506), 
referring to the increasing presence of women in a variety of licit and illicit cross-
border circuits that rely mainly on women labour, “counter-geographies of global-
ization” whose visibility is compromised because of their gendered nature (523-
                                               
7 In the case of children being trafficked, “the requirements relating to means are waived” 
(Gallagher, “Human Rights and the New UN Protocols” 987). 
524). 
The analysis of Abigail’s figure that follows concurs with Ashley Dawson’s 
comments as to the strategies employed by Abani to challenge “facile readings of 
his protagonist as an uncomplicated victim” through the love narrative that domi-
nates the second part of the novella. This is the case even as I do not subscribe to 
his definition of this narrative thread as an “otherwise perplexing” one (“Cargo 
Culture” 188). In fact, I believe it is crucial that Abani’s short-circuiting strategy 
centres exactly on the depiction of the confident sexuality of a sex trafficking vic-
tim as an essential aspect enabling the “becoming” of the title – a development, a 
growing up, that is thwarted because of its (presumed?) legal and moral unaccept-
ability. Derek, the gentle British man Abigail falls in love with, the only man who 
has ever seen her, is introduced relatively early in the narrative, but his identity is 
revealed only after the description of their making love in Derek’s living room 
while his wife is peacefully sleeping upstairs: Derek, “this man-child who was her 
social worker” (54). 
Abigail was giving. For the first time, she wasn’t taken. And she wept for her joy 
and for the loss of Derek’s wife upstairs dreaming the dreams of love amidst all 
that floral wallpaper […]. Abigail, this Abigail, only this Abigail, always this Abigail, 
felt herself becoming, even in this moment of taking. (52, emphasis added) 
But, as Dawson has written, “where Abigail sees an awakening of identity and self-
assertion, the state sees only victimization” (189): Abigail’s protests, her denials, 
her letters remain unheard when the man is fired and charged with sexual abuse of 
a minor, while she is placed once again in state custody.  
Ironically, Abigail’s case can be perceived as an example of a state complying 
exemplarily with the non-mandatory provisions of the Trafficking Protocol as to 
the protection to the victim of trafficking in persons: her “physical, psychological 
and social recovery” is allegedly ensured through “[c]ounselling” and “[m]edical, 
psychological and material assistance” (Art. 6, Par. 3); her “special needs” as a 
child are taken into consideration (Art 6, Par. 4); her “physical safety” within the 
country is provided (Art. 6, Par. 5). However, all this amounts, in Abigail’s eyes, to 
the disempowering disregard of her own will, a silencing violence, the ultimate at-
tempt to erase her subjectivity. In this context, it is evident that this human rights 
failure cannot be ascribed, strictly speaking, to Abigail’s lack of protection as a 
non-citizen, even as the text, as seen above, does indeed comment on her invisi-
bility as an undocumented subject. Rather, the novella more generally exposes 
some of the contradictions which are inherent in the human rights project and 
undermine the ethical validity of the most well-meaning intentions, beginning with 
“the drive from the unflinching belief that human beings and the political societies 
they construct can be governed by a higher morality” (Mutua 202). Indeed, where-
as Abigail’s ‘right to have rights’ – as a human being and a child, and emphatically 
not as a citizen – appears to be granted, its actualisation assumes the form of a 
unilateral, paternalistic imposition that does not meet with her desires as a human 
being who is becoming a woman. The state that should be safeguarding her re-
covery is in fact thwarting her Bildung, foreclosing that “free and full development 
of [her] personality” that has so often been mentioned in this dissertation. In oth-
er words, insofar as Abigail’s choice as to the means through which her becoming 
is to be achieved does not conform to given norms, it remains unacceptable: it can 
only be a misguided action deriving from her incapacity of discernment, both as a 
traumatised human being and as a child whose rationality is by definition in doubt 
(Bhabha, “What Sort of Human”). 
They said they were doing this to protect her. That she didn’t know what choice 
was. But she did. She who had been taken and taken and taken. And now the one 
time she took for herself, the one time she had choice in the matter, it was taken 
away. (117) 
As suggested above, the novella thus also criticises another aspect of human 
rights discourse by recounting how Abigail must remain confined to the role of 
the necessarily passive ‘victim,’ who can receive protection only provided that she re-
mains such, resigning her agency, becoming the docile recipient of the benevolent 
intentions of self-appointed ‘saviours’: as Makau Mutua reminds us, indeed, 
“[w]ithout victim, there is no savage or savior, and the entire human rights enter-
prise collapses” (Mutua 227). In this context, Abigail is therefore literally turned 
into an object of intervention who “cannot engage in the realm of the political” 
(Anderson and Adrijasevic 143), in a move that paradoxically perpetuates the reifi-
cation process that her trafficking had magnified. Abigail’s story, thus intended, 
seemingly confirms Agamben’s criticism of human rights as a discourse which, 
resting on a conception of the victim of abuse as a form of bare life, risks main-
taining “a secret solidarity with the very powers [it] ought to fight” (Agamben, 
Homo 133).  
Abigail, whose right hook is “not inconsiderable,” will hit the social worker 
who tells her that she must not worry, for “that monster [Derek] is going away for 
a long time.” This, however, is not enough of a sacrifice for her loss: as Abani 
writes, the Igbo teach that “[t]he sacrifice is always commensurate to the thing 
wished for. Sometimes a lizard will do, sometimes a goat, or a dog, sometimes a 
cow or a buffalo. Sometimes, a human being” (118). Abigail’s agency is thus once 
and for all reinstated only with her decision to commit suicide, the ultimate form 
of sacrifice, the full measure of her love, an attempt “to save him” (122). This 
ending, however, is ambivalent, and by precluding once and for all the protago-
nist’s becoming, it undermines any possibility of uncomplicated exultation at Abi-
gail’s final assertive stance – even as “second chances are a fact of life for the Ig-
bo” – even “for the dead” (107).8 
Albeit exposing the limits of human rights theory and practice, Abani’s work 
acknowledges the inherent complexity of the ethical interpretation of a story like 
Abigail’s. So, while the novella protests the non-inclusionary discussions about the 
love relationship between Abigail and Derek, to which the protagonist is exposed 
“as if she were a mere ghost,” still it seems to me that it does not deny the im-
portance of the interrogations regarding the “limits of desire[,] [t]he edges beyond 
which love must not cross” (79, emphases added). What is more, although Abigail 
cannot understand how people could call “this thing between Derek and her 
wrong” (79), she nevertheless admits that it is difficult for the hunter to “tell a 
vegetarian lion from the rest,” and does not lay the blame on others for what has 
happened to her (118).  
The reference to the search for the “limits of desire” just mentioned is in 
fact part of a wider interest that is manifested in Becoming Abigail as to the aesthet-
ics and politics of the interstitial. The text suggests the need to find a way out of 
the comforting, but illusory, division of the world into Manichean opposites 
which cannot depict with accuracy the complexities of human life. Through the 
constant allusion to the metaphor of the map, Abani acknowledges the all too 
                                               
8 Ashley Dawson has made the related argument that Abigail’s “acts of scarification cer-
tainly qualify any facile celebration of her agency” and goes as far as asking whether we, 
as readers, are to believe “the narrator’s characterization of this traumatized young wom-
an’s motivations” (189). 
human need to exercise some form of “dominion over things” (71), but at the 
same time he cautions that such a dominion, when not a violent imposition tout 
court, is at least often deceitful. Becoming Abigail is full of lines. In Greenwich, 
Derek and Abigail walk on the colonial line that divides time and space, creating 
worlds apart. The “taut rope” from which Abigail’s father is found hanging se-
cures the distinction between life and death (113). This is also the case of the cable 
of the electric blanket, an umbilical cord thorugh which Mary gives Abigail new 
life while she is chained to the doghouse (92) – and of the chain itself, a cipher of 
Abigail’s animalisation. The lines that Abigail, “the cartographer of dreams[,] [o]f 
ghosts” (72), draws on her skin are an attempt to discern between memory and 
invention, self and other, while the “limits of desire” declared by the law endeav-
our to define the distinction between love and abuse, innocence and guilt. 
But lines, markers, borders, are not enough to understand who Abigail is: 
because “[a] line is a lie. Who can tell what it will open onto?” (113). In this con-
text, the mantra “mind the gap,” the first words Abigail hears when, hesitating, 
she gets off the underground train in London on her arrival there (78), constitutes 
not only a “slogan for the interstitial theme of the novel,” as one reviewer has put 
it (Weaver), but rather becomes an ethical injunction to look into the line, into the 
gap, recognising its fullness, recognising the lives of those human beings who, like 
Abigail, are “trapped forever” between opposites (50), between here and there, 
past and present, identity and alterity, humanity and animality, life and death. The 
novella is thus a not only a meditation on the ‘third space’ of the unseen, but also, 
to paraphrase Edward Said, an invitation to read the archives of human rights dis-
course contrapuntally, listening to the to the silences they produce, with a simulta-
neous awareness both of what is said out loud “and of those other histories 
against which (and together with which) the dominating discourse acts” (51).  
Becoming Abigail thereby demands that new geographies of the human, and of 
the world, be developed, by constructing alternative border imaginaries which 
challenge the arbitrariness of moral opposites as well as traditional cartography 
and modern geopolitical imaginaries. Accepting this ethical challenge might thus 
help us to recognise the diffuse “biopolitical border” (Vaughan-Williams) along 
which the right to life of many human beings is today decided, thereby seeing those 
men and women, like Abigail, who have no place within the political, but are ra-
ther excluded through their own inclusion. In this context, the Agambenian rejec-
tion of a straightforward inside/outside topology through his theorisation of the 
exception as inclusive exclusion and his focus on the production of zones of in-
distinction, notwithstanding the sometimes obscure and unsatisfactory aspects 
that have been spelled out in the course of this dissertation, proves compelling in 
that it “not only has implications for the way we consider the production of sub-
jectivities in world politics. It also has significant ramifications for the way we 
might reconceptualise the limits of sovereign power and develop alternative bor-
der imaginaries” (Vaughan-Williams 107-108). 
Looking into gaps is of course not easy, as it unhinges common assumptions 
as to their apparent emptiness. In this context, the work of the imagination is cru-
cial to give voice to the unsaid, form to the unrepresentable. The writer’s playing 
with words which have the power to reconstruct a life that has been declared un-
worthy of being lived, feelings that have been declared unnarratable, might pro-
duce a fragmented fiction, as is the case in Becoming Abigail. This narrative, howev-
er, has the same function as the little blisters Abigail produces stinging her skin 
with an incandescent needle after making love with Derek. The writer’s words, 
like the blisters, are points that must be connected, and that, only if read alongside the 
gaps, the apparent void that surrounds them, let the human being, like a work of art, 
“emerg[e] in pointillism[,] […] in parts of a whole” (53) – if only one cares to 
watch. 
* 
If the figure of Abigail, notwithstanding her resistance, can be easily constructed 
as coinciding with that of the hapless trafficking victim on the part of the social 
workers who deal with her case, it is because she unquestionably occupies the ex-
ploitative pole in the continuum of violence, abuse and powerlessness along which 
the different life experiences of migrants can be positioned (Anderson and Andri-
jasevic; O’Connell-Davidson “New Slaveries, Old Binaries”).9 Within the econo-
my of the discourse on trafficking, the line dividing ‘deserving’ innocents and ille-
gal migrants is indeed drawn by recognising as members of the first category only 
those (few) ‘genuine’ victims who, like Abigail, are injured and enslaved and, de-
politicised, qualify as objects of protection provided that they remain outside of 
the political (Anderson and Andrijasevic 143). While smuggling is considered a fa-
cilitation of voluntary immigration that violates existing immigration laws, traffick-
ing, as seen above, by definition implies that the trafficked person is either de-
ceived or forced into situations in which s/he is consequently exploited. However, 
as the discussion of Chika Unigwe’s novel will disclose, it is often the case that the 
degree of decidability in the definition of an undocumented migrant’s positioning 
within the above-mentioned spectrum of violence and exploitation is unclear, so 
                                               
9 In the context of the debate on trafficking for sexual exploitation, Anderson and Andri-
jasevic further argue that the experiences of all workers, both in legal and in illegal con-
texts, can be more generally aligned to such a continuum. 
that distinctions between victimhood and agency, constraint and freedom, and 
therefore human trafficking and human smuggling, become fuzzy. In this context, 
those men and women who do not conform to the figure of the ‘pure’ victim be-
come “‘abjects,’ excluded, dangerous or risky others,” relegated to the underworld 
of the illegal also as a consequence of state security practices, such as restrictive 
residency and employment regulations, which provide fertile ground for enhanc-
ing their vulnerability to exploitative labour relations (Aradau). 
The sex workers depicted in On Black Sisters’ Street are a case in point, since 
their precariousness in terms of rights protection is attributable to an intertwined 
set of reasons: not only are they bonded labourers, subject to the payment of the 
migration debt they have incurred; they are also irregular, and hence deportable, 
residents, who are employed in one of the most highly unregulated sectors within 
the sex industry, that of prostitution, doing a job which is often not even consid-
ered as such. Even as it is difficult to determine with certainty the degree of ex-
ploitation and constraint to which Unigwe’s characters are exposed, as most of 
them have deliberately sought to migrate to Europe, aware of what their occupa-
tion would be, there is no doubt that they are granted only limited freedoms: they 
are strictly controlled and their fake passports are confiscated by their Madam; 
they are under constant economic pressure, asked to pay for their expenses in 
Antwerp, which add to the monthly sum they must transfer to the Lagos-based 
pimp, Dele, who arranged their trip to Europe.10 Moreover, what Dele euphemis-
tically calls the “unpleasantness” (42) that may derive from the failure to comply 
                                               
10 The novel is very accurate in reproducing the complex dynamics of Nigerian third-
party controlled prostitution in Europe. For an informed study of the interrelated phe-
nomena of migration, human smuggling and trafficking from Nigeria to Europe, see Car-
ling, “Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking.” 
with this pact becomes an all too palpable reality in the case of Sisi, whose skull is 
smashed by Dele’s right-hand-man after she decides to leave the prostitution cir-
cuit before extinguishing her 30,000 euro debt.11 Still, the women of the 
Zwartezusterstraat do not perceive themselves as victims and, albeit on occasions 
pondering the possibility of reporting their Madam and pimp to the police, they 
refrain from seeking official protection even in the most difficult circumstances. 
Irregular migrants, they indeed are very well aware that, as Rutvica Andrijasevic 
has bluntly put it, “if third parties controlling [their] labour were not denying them 
labour mobility or access to the basic social rights, the state would” (Migration, 
Agency and Citizenship 3).12 
This introduction to some of the themes explored in Unigwe’s novel is 
meant to emphasise the degree to which the text reflects the complex interrelation 
among the discourses on human trafficking, human smuggling, state security, mi-
gration and prostitution – the definition of which in the last decades has been the 
source of considerable debate amongst scholars, policymakers and human rights 
                                               
11 Third-party controlled prostitution is often indicted by anti-trafficking campaigners and 
human rights activists as a slavery-like form of debt bondage. The latter has been defined 
by Kevin Bales as occurring when “a person pledges him or herself against a loan of 
money, but the length and nature of the service is undefined, and the labour does not 
diminish the original debt” (463). However, Unigwe, in accordance with recent studies on 
third-party controlled prostitution, disputes the assumption that debt lasts for an indefi-
nite period of time (cf. Andrijasevic 72). Some scholars have also argued against the ap-
propriation of categories of a discourse of slavery to describe modern forms of (exploita-
tive) labour relations, pointing out that, by concentrating on the criminal role played by 
an exploitative ‘slaveholder,’ such a reading dangerously obliterates the role of the host 
country in producing and maintaining the conditions enabling the exploitative practices 
themselves. See in particular O’Connell Davidson, “Will the Real Sex Slave Please Stand 
Up.” 
12 Indeed, Anne Gallagher reminds us that “[i]n contrast to the Trafficking Protocol, 
states parties to the Migrant Smuggling Protocol [are not] required to consider the possi-
bility of permitting victims to remain in their territories temporarily or permanently” 
(Gallagher, “Human Rights and the New UN Protocols” 997). 
activists.13 As will be noticed below, indeed, the women’s different stories, along-
side their different, and on occasions shifting, perceptions of their respective col-
location within the aforementioned continuum of exploitation, point out the un-
feasibility of the static notion of the self that is presupposed by the very distinc-
tion between victimhood and agency around which the dominant discursive and 
legal regimes of sex trafficking are organised (Andrijasevic 95). 
‘Zwartezusterstraat’ (Black Sister’s Street)14 is the location chosen by the au-
thor for the house that Sisi, Efe, Ama and Joyce share in Antwerp, Belgium, 
where they arrived after leaving Lagos with the ‘help’ of Dele. Elleke Boehmer 
and Sarah De Mul have observed that Unigwe’s choice in terms of setting is sig-
nificant in that it alludes to the Catholic history of the port-city of Antwerp 
through the reference to the Roman Catholic order of the Black Sisters, while at 
the same time suggesting the “possibilities of black diasporic womanhood and 
community formation – ‘black sisterhood’ – in Europe” (2). What is more, 
Boehmer and Mul recall, it was on the Zwartzusterstraat that, on May, 9 2006, 
there occurred the murder of Malian nanny Oulemata Niangadou, and of her two-
year-old Belgian charge, shot for racist motivations by 18-year-old Hans Van 
Themsche. The event is explicitly referenced (111) in a novel which thematically 
                                               
13 Although the definition of trafficking provided in the Palermo Protocol is not restrict-
ed to sex trafficking, research and policy discussion on trafficking has generally revolved 
around the question of sex work – one of the main topics around which the debates dur-
ing the drafting of the Protocol itself revolved (Gallagher, “Human Rights and the New 
UN Protocols”). 
14 The original name of the street in Antwerp is ‘Zwartzusterstraat,’ in the plural, but it 
has been modified by the author into the singular ‘Zwartezusterstraat’ (Tunca, “Redress-
ing”). Unigwe first published a Dutch version of the text, which appeared in 2007 with 
the title Fata Morgana. The latter was however based on an English language manuscript 
that has been in part revised for the publication of the 2009 English version under dis-
cussion here. 
problematises any optimistic notion of multiculturalism, and which, as indicated 
by the title of the initial chapter, tellingly imagines Sisi’s murder taking place only a 
few days after Oulemata Niangadou’s death. 
The text, indeed, (literally) opens on “12 May 2006” (1). Sisi, the character 
around whose absence the whole narrative revolves, is introduced in the first page 
as she thinks that the world is “exactly as it should be. No more and, definitely, no 
less. She had the love of a good man. A house. And her own money – still new 
and fresh and the healthiest shade of green” (1). After meeting Belgian Luc, who 
has become her lover and has convinced her to leave the house on the 
Zwartezusterstraat, Sisi, in between pangs of guilt for abandoning her friends 
without a word, is savouring her newly-found freedom – a freedom that is now 
tangible, as the five hundred euros she was supposed to transfer to Dele have be-
come her own property, allowing her to relish the possibility of entering expensive 
shops she had never thought of venturing into before.  
She pondered how easy it was to spend five hundred euros. How many things one 
could get with it. How happiness could sometimes be bought. Whoever said that 
money couldn’t buy happiness had never experienced the relief that came from 
having money to spend on whatever you wanted. (285-286) 
Ironically, however, Sisi’s first day of liberty is also the day of her death, a day 
which sanctions the impossibility for her to reincarnate again as Chisom – her real 
name – after discarding the identity she forged for her European life in the red-
light district of Antwerp. The news of Sisi’s death envelop the house on the 
Zwartezusterstraat with the uneasy silence of women who are reminded of their 
own mortality (39), confronted with their vulnerability in a country where, hyper-
visible and clandestine at the same time, they cannot rely on anybody but each 
other.15 While trying to reconstruct their ‘sister’’s dreams and aspirations,16 they 
however realise that they know nothing of her, that they have never shared their 
“different memories” (40) of the past. Sisi’s murder thus prompts Efe, Ama and 
Joyce to open up to each other, recounting their lives prior to their encounter with 
Dele. This is indeed the single event around which their stories converge, consti-
tuting the trait d’union between women who are today sitting next to each other, on 
the same sofa, in a room painted an improbable red. The novel, thus, moves 
backwards and forwards in time, illuminating the women’s present of incredulity 
and fear with flashbacks that speak of abuse, necessity, unhappiness, abandon-
ment, ambition, and war. The omniscient narrator reconstructs for the reader also 
another story, one that would otherwise be destined to remain untold: that of Sisi, 
or rather Chisom, the woman who left Lagos after graduating in Finance and 
Business Administration and remaining jobless thereafter, “watching with anger as 
life laughed at the grandiosity of her dreams” (23). 
Sisi, the only daughter of a couple who have put all their hopes of social 
mobility on a girl whose bright future has been prophesised during her naming 
ceremony (246), does not have the right connections to find a job in Lagos. Years 
after her graduation, she feels stuck in a city that, in line with the representation of 
Nigeria emerged in Chapter Three, is like a prison, a site of frustrating stagnation 
(30). She is in love, but love is no longer enough: Peter is a gentle, bright, patient 
man, who is however unacceptably resigned to “muddle through” (46), to drag on 
a life looking forward to better times. Had she taken a nursing degree, she reflects, 
                                               
15 Even as Efe, Ama and Joyce initially believe that Sisi’s murder is racially motivated, 
they will later presumably realise its real causes – the novel ends as Luc knocks at the 
women’s door to get news of disappeared Sisi. 
16 ‘Sisi’ means ‘sister’ in Shona (44).  
she would at least have made a potential wife for those Nigerian emigrants who 
got back home during the Christmas holidays, their wallets full of foreign curren-
cy, to scout for wives: “They said it was easier for nurses to get a job abroad” (29). 
Dele proves an answer to her ambition, to her dreams of mobility, his proposal 
constituting an escape route from “the sitting room with the pap-coloured walls. 
A shared toilet with a cistern that never contained water […]. Her father folded 
into himself […]. Her mother’s vacant eyes” (43). 
Efe, for her part, meets Dele after replying to an advertisement he has 
placed for a job as a cleaning woman. A third job means more money for her son, 
the fruit of a relationship with her forty-five year old sugar daddy, Titus, who 
made her discover sex at sixteen in exchange for money with which she could buy 
some of the things she most desired: “the jeans with the glorious metallic V and 
the handbags that went with all colours and the high-heeled shoes that were so 
glamorous they could have belonged to the governor’s wife” (57).17 With Titus’s 
money, Efe could also contribute to the upraising of her younger siblings, ignored 
by an alcoholic father devastated by the death of his wife after a long illness.18 But 
Titus conveniently disappeared after getting news of Efe’s pregnancy, and when 
Dele, who has proved the most generous of her employers, offers her the chance 
to go to abroad, she has no doubts: “Nobody wanted to stay back unless they had 
pots of money to survive the country. People like Titus and Dele” (82). 
                                               
17 Jørgen Carling has written that “[s]exuality in Nigeria will often include relationships 
that border on what would be perceived as prostitution by many Europeans,” so that, for 
example, it is “common for single women […] to have sexual relationships with older 
men (so-called sugar daddies) who will give them gifts and money” (“Migration, Human 
Smuggling and Trafficking” 18). 
18 Interestingly, the motif of the absent mother that emerged in the analysis of the texts 
discussed in Chapter Four, is central also to Abani’s Becoming Abigail and to a number of 
narrative threads in Chika Unigwe’s novel. 
Ama left her home town, Enugu, the day after being violently insulted by 
her abusive stepfather for failing the examination that would allow her entry in the 
university of her choice. The man, Brother Cyril, was a Christian fundamentalist 
who had begun to rape her in the night of her eighth birthday, stopping only 
when she started her period. Asked to leave, she thus lets herself out of a house-
hold in which her subservient mother, “in a deliberate state of blindness” (133), 
defers to Brother Cyril in all respects, and joins Mama Eko, her mother’s foul-
mouthed, generous cousin, in Lagos, where she starts working in her canteen. Al-
beit grateful for this opportunity to start anew, she however soon gets impatient 
with the monotonous routine of her Lagosian life. And it is then that one of Ma-
ma Eko’s richest costumers, Dele, asks her whether she would like to work in the 
streets of Europe. When Dele tells her he will “sample” her before her departure 
(168), self-assured Ama provokes his orgasm even “before he had a chance to re-
move her skirt.” Her thoughts are “already on a new life far from here […]. And 
once she was a big woman, people would respect her, even Brother Cyril” (169). 
I have dwelt rather at length on these summaries of Sisi’s, Efe’s and Ama’s 
experiences in order to let emerge the variety characterising these voluntary migra-
tory projects, alongside the constitutive factors they have in common – first of all, 
their stemming out of a context where corruption, sexism and oppressive patriar-
chal structures constitute almost inescapable economic and social fetters. The 
economic rationale, no doubt the most relevant, is in this context accompanied by 
familial and affective motivations, all of which must be considered to engage the 
complexity of the characters’ choices. What is more, if money is treated in quasi-
fetishistic terms by the women, who comment on its colour, crispness, and smell 
(1, 50, 65), it is essential that Unigwe does not recount her characters’ turning to 
prostitution because of reasons of sheer survival – which, of course, is a way of 
resisting victimisation, thereby reinstating the characters’ agency. Migration and 
prostitution in the novel rather respond to the need to see a prophecy of success 
come true, to the desire to offer a comfortable life to a beloved son, to the hope 
that is placed in emancipatory wealth.19 The ambitions of these fighting women, 
who do not want to resign to poverty, are recounted with compassion in a narra-
tive that presents a social and emotional war-scape which is decidedly connotated 
in gender terms. Unigwe invites abstention from moral judgement for characters 
who, living in a site characterised by gender inequality, a site of death and sover-
eign abandonment (98, 214), a place in which their existences as women are de-
valued to the point that they can make sense only in relation to a (preferably 
wealthy) male counterpart, legitimately decide to “make the most of the trump 
card that God has wedged in between their legs” (26).  
Joyce’s story, however, is markedly different from the others’ and compli-
cates this already nuanced representation. The passport Dele has forged for her 
reads: “Joyce Jacobs. Nationality: Nigerian. Place of birth: Benin City” (232). But 
Joyce is not Nigerian. And she is not even Joyce. Alek – this is her real name – 
was indeed born in (fictional) Daru, in southern Sudan, forced to leave her village 
after witnessing the killing of all of her family members and being gang raped by a 
group of Janjaweed militias. The fifteen-year-old girl joins an unending line of ref-
                                               
19 I thus do not quite agree with Daria Tunca’s argument that the narrator presents the 
characters “as both innocent victims of, and willing participants in, societies which pro-
mote the idea that happiness can be acquired only through material wealth” (“Redress-
ing”). Even as Unigwe points out that their choices might be conducive to painful, dan-
gerous outcomes, both in affective and in security terms, it seems to me that she presents 
their desires of material wealth as legitimate and rather highlights the structural and gen-
der inequalities that, both in Nigeria and in Belgium, prevent them from acquiring social 
mobility through legal practices and means. 
ugees and reaches a UN camp, “a collection of sad stories” (194) where, unex-
pectedly, she falls in love with Nigerian soldier Polycarp, whom she follows to La-
gos. But, as said above, she is not Nigerian. Even more, she is not Igbo, like Poly-
carp. It is for this reason that the union between the two is resisted by the tradi-
tionalist family of the man. Perhaps really believing that she will have another op-
portunity to start afresh, Polycarp thus arranges her trip abroad, where, Joyce is 
told, she will work as a nanny. Her ambiguous ‘benefactor’ will pay her debt in the 
years that follow, while the young woman, albeit forced to remain on the 
Zwartezusterstraat, will be able to keep all her earnings for herself, treated by 
Madam with special care.  
The evident multivocality of the text is no doubt meant to counter any form 
of essentialised depiction of the phenomena of trafficking, smuggling and migra-
tion, while also confirming Julia O’Connell Davidson’s statement that the presum-
ably indubitable differences among them are in fact “not fundamental, but con-
structed through reference to the imagined line between ‘freedom’ and ‘restriction’ 
and to political judgements about what count as ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ 
forms of exploitation and force” (“New Slaveries, Old Binaries” 245). On the 
whole, however, the representation of sex work in the text tends to suggests that 
the phenomenon is often best read in dialogue with processes of (active) econom-
ic migrancy rather than with a concept of (inevitably passive) trafficking: indeed, 
Unigwe does not embrace the fiction of the pure victim for any of her characters 
– not even for Joyce, who will prove strong and resilient notwithstanding her pre-
dicament and very young age.  
Unigwe’s depiction of prostitution appears therefore to be hardly compatible 
with Kathleen Barry’s definition of it as “the most extreme and most crystallized 
form of all sexual exploitation.” Barry, one of the most authoritative spokesper-
sons of the so-called ‘feminist abolitionist’ analytical trend within the prostitution 
debate,20 adds that “sexual exploitation is a political condition, the foundation of 
women’s subordination and the base from which discrimination against women is 
constructed and enhanced” (11). For abolitionist feminists, Carol Wolkowitz has 
remarked, prostitution is thus necessarily a form of violence that cannot but rein-
state patriarchal codes, producing “a body-self that has been so injured that it 
cannot recognise its true interests” (126). Such a view, Wolkowitz adds, is prob-
lematical not only in that it depicts sex workers as bereft of voice, incapable of as-
sessing or explaining their interests, but also because it “seriously underestimate[s] 
the relative rewards of prostitution as an active choice, whatever the cost” (127). 
And indeed, hardly can this reading provide the lenses for interpreting, for exam-
ple, the above-mentioned passage in which unscrupulous, independent Ama ma-
nipulates Dele’s sexist will to “sample” her before her departure: even as she has 
been imploring him to let her go to Europe, she provokes his orgasm without let-
ting him experience a full intercourse.21  
The book, however, does not fully conform to the so-called ‘sex workers’ 
rights’ perspective either, one which, viewing the body “as a form of property, a 
legitimate object of trade that the subject is, or should be, free to use as she (or 
                                               
20 For an assessment of the feminist debates on trafficking and prostitution, see Lobasz, 
“Beyond Border Security” and O’Connell-Davidson, “The Rights and Wrongs of Prosti-
tution.” 
21 It is however evident that the women exhibit different degrees of independence and 
different capabilities to manipulate the dynamics of patriarchal codes to their advantage. 
Efe, for example, seems to appropriate sexist codes of conduct when she refers to her 
pregnancy as a proof of her being “damaged goods” (75) and is ready to resign love in fa-
vour of a dependant relationship with a wealthy man – if this means having more chances 
of upward social mobility. 
he) wishes” (Wolkowitz 128), counters the abolitionist viewpoint advocating in-
stead the decriminalisation and normalisation of prostitution. In its strictest for-
mulation, this approach posits the essential separation between body and self by 
arguing that what is sold in prostitution is in fact not the woman’s body, but al-
ways and only a service. Chica Unigwe’s women, however, are often torn apart by 
anxieties about the commodification of their bodies, by the fear that their selves 
might be fragmented, appropriated and violated in the process. These doubts are 
voiced in particular through Sisi, who, for example, uncomfortably feels “like a 
slab of meat at the local abattoir” when Madam looks her up and down and tells 
her that she belongs to her (182). 22 Similarly Joyce, leaving Lagos, feels “like a cargo 
with a tag: Destination Unknown” (233). The pervasive tropology of consumption 
and reification employed by Unigwe in the novel does indeed resonate, as Daria 
Tunca has observed (“Redressing”), with the rhetoric of slavery that is often em-
ployed on the part of anti-trafficking campaigners – a connection that is rein-
forced when the reader is confronted with the flash-forward image of Efe, her 
debt repayed, becoming a Madam herself and buying her first two nameless wom-
en during an auction (277-278).  
However, I would argue that the ambivalent, oscillating depiction of the 
characters’ subjectivities does not consign the idea of their labour to an unprob-
                                               
22 A powerful connection between the prostitute (dead) body and food is also made by 
Joyce when, after Sisi’s death, she looks at the jollof rice her late friend had cooked some 
time before, adding cubes of green pepper and three fried snails “curled up, looking like 
ears.” It is still good, she establishes, and she suddenly finds herself thinking about her 
friend’s decaying body, just before wondering how long it took for her family members 
to rot after being massacred. This macabre train of thought emphasises the similarity be-
tween these equally violent deaths, inducing reflection on the power dynamics that allo-
cate low degrees of grievability to lives that, for different reasons, are declared unworthy 
of being lived (288). 
lematised discourse of prostitution as trafficking, as a form of modern-day slavery. 
On the contrary, not only do the women often recall that their current conditions 
derive from a well-informed choice (114, 270); they also describe prostitution as 
an honest job that must be handled with professionalism (211, 242); what is more, 
they point out how their bodies are indeed admired and bought, but only “tempo-
rarily” (245). At the same time however, they are haunted by terrible nightmares 
(1), forced to become people with “forgotten pasts” (237) who “try not to think 
about happiness” (114) but rather concentrate exclusively on the money they are 
making. The author gently evidences the painful consequences of a demanding 
profession on her characters’ selves, and the different, at times contrasting, subject 
positions that she has them adopt highlight the arbitrariness of the ‘victim’ vs. 
‘willing sex worker’ dichotomy along which debates on prostitution have generally 
developed. Such an ambivalent depiction shows that, as Rutvica Andrijasevic has 
put it describing her field work among Eastern European sex workers in Italy, mi-
grant women tend to exceed such a dichotomy, rather asserting “subjectivities that 
are currently not claimable for undocumented migrant women in third party con-
trolled prostitution” (Andrijasevic 113). They thereby inhabit a third space of 
(non-)citizenship which, once again, invites the reformulation of given categories 
of inclusion and exclusion of the non-citizen in the modern nation-state. 
In this context, it is important that the novel highlights the paradoxical 
complicity between the two differently coercive systems of controlled prostitution 
and of the sovereign state in creating and enhancing the characters’ vulnerability 
as undocumented migrants. It is because of such a double disenfranchisement 
that, for example, Sisi’s desires for geographical, social, and affective mobility can 
be viewed as being resolved in a horizontal movement between camps, between 
conditions of exclusion that she does not quite manage to circumvent. Mutually 
reinforcing exclusionary dynamics emerge with evidence in the telling episode 
which recounts how Madam, upon Sisi’s arrival in Antwerp, has her apply for asy-
lum at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even as the motivations for this request 
remain emphatically unexplained in the novel,23 attracting the reader’s attention to 
an event whose unspoken rationale is repeatedly questioned (119, 182), what is 
undoubted, and disturbingly so, is that Madam does not perceive the potential 
granting of refugee status to her “new girls” (182) as hindering by any means her 
control over them. In Sisi’s case, the tearful story about a horrific Liberian past of 
genocide that she is asked to make up (“The more macabre the story the better,” 
Madam says, “White people enjoy sob stories” [121]) does not persuade the immi-
gration officer in charge of her application. After its rejection, Sisi’s vulnerability 
has increased exponentially, as the unpleasant “welcoming ritual” (176) she has 
undergone has enabled the biopolitical inscription of her body as that of a persona 
non grata in a state from whose citizenry she is once and for all excluded: her fin-
gerprints have been taken, along with pictures of herself, and she is requested to 
leave the country in three days (175). In other words, as Madam tells her, Sisi now 
“do[es] not exist. Not here. […] Now you belong to me” (182). Such an officially 
sanctioned deportability will of course become one of the reasons why Sisi does 
not report Madam when naively surrendering to Luc’s insistent, and short-sighted, 
pleas to quit her job.24 
                                               
23 Madam’s request is presumably due to the advantages that would derive for her if Sisi 
were granted the possibility to reside legally in a country where prostitution is legal. 
24 Her decision to remain silent derives also from her awareness that reporting Madam 
would mean implicate the other women (274), presumably causing their deportation. It is 
for this same reason that Efe, Ama and Joyce will not go to the police after Sisi’s death, 
The novel thus invites the reader to consider the multiple causes of undoc-
umented migrants’ vulnerability in an age that, as Jørgen Carling has written, is 
“characterised by involuntary immobility as much as by large migration flows” 
(Carling 5). Illegal migration, a consequence “of the enormous difference between 
the number of people who wish (or are forced) to migrate and the legal opportu-
nities for them to do so” (Gallagher, “Trafficking, Smuggling and Human Rights” 
12) emerges in the text, as it did in GraceLand, as one of the very few chances of 
mobility for those who feel they cannot live happily in a dysfunctional country 
where their rights are negated, their expectations derided. But while some of them 
return, their newly acquired economic power allowing them to realise their dreams 
– be it Ama’s boutique or Joyce’s school (279) – others, like Sisi, will die on for-
eign land, their fights ended in tragedy. Daria Tunca has interestingly written that 
Sisi’s death in Antwerp is reminiscent of the figure of the ‘unknown soldier,’ “an 
association which was initially to be reinforced by the title of the book, since both 
Where Poppies Blow and Between the Crosses were considered at some point” (“Re-
dressing”).25 If the women’s battles are accorded, through narration, the im-
portance, dignity and complexity they are often denied, the question remains, 
then, of finding a way for people like them to survive their wars without risking 
Sisi’s fate. 
                                                                                                                                     
even as they ruminate on the possibility for some time: they are “human beings,” after all 
(289), and they might even get asylum: as Joyce puts it, “Madam has no right to our bod-
ies, and neither does Dele.” However, they are also aware that “Madam has the police in 
her pocket” (290) and in the end will decide against reporting her. 
25 Both are extracts from Canadian John McCrae’s “In Flanders Fields,” a poem which 
lends voices to the soldiers who lost their lives on Flemish land during the First World 
War. 
Tolani started swallowing some time in the mid-1980s.26 It is Lagosian life, she 
will reflect when recounting her story, that made her flatmate and colleague Rose 
and herself tough enough to accept the risks involved in becoming body packers, 
ingesting cocaine-filled pellets wrapped in latex.27 The narrator of Sefi Atta’s novel 
Swallow remembers how she was persuaded that the one thousand five hundred 
dollars they would receive for their first delivery – one year’s salary – was a high 
enough amount to risk one’s life: after all, as Rose told her with her usual scorn, 
one “can die going to work by bus in this place” (205, emphasis added).  
Almost confirming Rose’s provocative claim, the book opens with the de-
scription of the two central characters’ latest “brush with death” (7), when the bus 
they are travelling on almost overturns after swerving dangerously in order to 
spare a slow pedestrian crossing the expressway.28 On that day, Rose will also be 
                                               
26 The narrator’s numerous references to the on-going “War against Indiscipline” (WAI) 
presumably set Sefi Atta’s book during General Muhammadu Buhari’s regime (1984-
1985), when this ultimately unsuccessful reform program was enacted. WAI, which was 
not cancelled but certainly deemphasised during Babangida’s rule (Stock 19), was meant 
to instil in the Nigerian population “a sense of work ethics, patriotism, nationalism, anti-
corruption, patience (waiting in lines for goods and services was a major component of 
one phase of the WAI), timeliness,” while also – importantly for the theme of this section 
– stressing “the importance of urban and environmental sanitation” with the establish-
ment of so-called sanitation days. The reform has generally been criticised for its cosmet-
ic nature, “which tended to conceal the deeper social ills of the country, such as wide-
spread poverty and a lack of basic services, beneath a veneer of orderliness” (Falola and 
Heaton 214), and expanded the already large powers of the police. 
27 The phrase ‘body packing’ refers to the illicit transportation of drugs through internal 
concealment. Body packers are also called ‘swallowers’ or ‘internal carriers.’ See Traub, 
Hoffman and Nelson. For an essay on the central role played since the 1960s by West 
African countries, and in particular by Nigeria, in the international drug trade, see Ellis. 
28 Road accidents have claimed the lives of two characters in the novel, Tolani’s father 
and her colleague Godwin’s fiancée. The image of the unsafe, potholed expressway, often 
interrupted by military checkpoints, is a topos in Nigerian literature. Suffice it to recall, 
for example, the obsession with highway robbery thematised in Cyprian Ewxensi’s Survive 
the Peace and Femi Osofisan’s play Once Upon Four Robbers. More recent examples include 
fired from the Federal Community Bank where she and Tolani work: she has pub-
licly slapped her corrupt, slimy, pot-bellied employer, Mr Salako, after calling him 
“a bloody bastard” for reasons that, albeit imaginable, will remain implicit in the 
narrative (17).29 Even as at this point there is only “a month’s difference from her 
and a beggar” (53), Rose’s troubles do not start on the day she loses her job: “Bad 
things had happened to Rose before. She had handled them by arguing, defending 
herself, drinking beer, or eating a bowl of pepper soup” (71). This time, instead, 
her predicament is resolved with the unexpected generosity of dodgy OC, an ob-
scure character who turns out to be a middleman in a drug trafficking organisa-
tion. And Rose’s troubles start with OC: with a present, with the pair of brown 
loafers he buys for her in Tajudeen Market (69). The relationship between OC and 
Rose will indeed be conducive to her recruitment as a drug courier, and, in a short 
while, to her death on the plane that should have taken her to Great Britain, when 
one of the balloons in her stomach bursts open (246). 
Some weeks after Rose is fired, Tolani’s world is falling apart as well. The 
chaos of a dysfunctional state where people die “unnecessary deaths, avoidable 
deaths, ridiculous deaths. African deaths” (183) has now added to her temporary 
suspension from her job for not submitting to the sexual advances of the very 
same Mr Salako, “Mr Snake of a Salako” (83), who has sacked her friend. What is 
more, she has lent all her savings to her boyfriend, Sanwo, for a business project 
that has ended in a scam, and the ensuing economic insecurity has revived long 
                                                                                                                                     
the car crash that kills most of Bola’s family in Helon Habila’s Waiting for an Angel, or 
Chris Abani’s numerous references, in his GraceLand, to the death of pedestrians who are 
run over while crossing Lagosian expressways. 
29 Even as the reader is told that Salako called her “a nobody” (229), the narrator’s suspi-
cion that Rose might have been a girlfriend of his is neither confirmed nor denied in the 
narrative. 
forgotten, nagging anxieties regarding the identity of her biological father. Person-
al dilemmas, contingent misfortunes and structural, class- and, even more im-
portantly, gender-based inequalities, contributing to a feeling of impending catas-
trophe, see Tolani reconsidering Rose’s proposal to join her in her trafficking trip 
abroad – an option that was unthinkable only a few days before, when she had 
uncompromisingly refused, shocked at her friend’s shamelessness (138-139). Now, 
however, “the prospect of misfortune was more than enough threat, and it was 
around us, killing people, turning them into prostitutes, making them sick, hungry, 
crazy” (205-206). 
The narrator refuses to provide “more stories of bad fortune” in order to 
explain her and Rose’s choice (205): “if anyone claimed that they smuggled drugs 
because they were poor, they were lying. Poor people begged” (206). Similarly to 
the authors considered above, Atta indeed avoids portraying her characters 
through lenses that would produce a tearful victim story and rather describes with 
remarkable humour, and with a gentle touch that was perhaps missing in her an-
grier debut novel, Everything Good Will Come,30 the intertwined lives of ironic narra-
tor Tolani, and aggressive, sardonic Afro-pessimist Rose. Tolani and Rose are 
women whose irreconcilable characters conceal a similar refusal to resign passively 
to the excremental economy that surrounds them. On the contrary, they choose to 
connive with it in the ambivalent and, Atta suggests, ultimately self-defeating, at-
                                               
30 Everything Good Will Come is an ambitious Bildungsroman that recounts the life of Enitan, a 
woman frustratingly caught in the restrictive norms of Nigerian patriarchy, and covers a time 
period of almost thirty years. Commenting on its writing, the author has said, perhaps over-
stating the matter, that the novel “reads like an angry rant in parts”: “I was in my early thirties 
when I wrote [it]. I was very frustrated about what I was seeing in the Nigerian community in 
America and what I had witnessed growing up in Lagos. I just needed to vent. […] I’m in my 
early forties now and I don’t feel the same way. Aging has helped and perhaps writing the 
novel helped too” (Azuah, Atta and Unigwe 112). 
tempt to turn it to their own advantage. Not (yet) “poor and disenfranchised,” but 
rather “broke and struggling” (Atta, “I Write”), Tolani and Rose will ultimately 
take opposite paths in their personal fights against economic distress. None of 
them is presented as successful, and only one of them will survive her choice. 
Achille Mbembe has famously argued that state power in the postcolony 
predicates what he terms an “aesthetics of vulgarity,” most clearly evident in the 
grotesque body of the autocrat: open and obscene, with its gaping mouth, bloated 
belly and perpetually erected phallus, the autocrat’s body is the symbol of an ex-
cessive sovereignty that claims the right to an unlimited appropriation and squan-
dering of resources – either in the form of food, money, or women. If, as he right-
ly points out, “defecation, copulation, pomp, and extravagance are classical ingre-
dients in the production of power, and there is nothing specifically African about 
this” (108-109), yet it is undoubted that in a context characterised by extreme 
scarcity, as is the case in postcolonial Africa, metaphors of ingestion and excretion 
acquire particularly evident representational force and visibility.  
In a 1995 article, concentrating on an analysis of the American colonisation 
of the Philippines, Warwick Anderson has argued that colonial systems of control 
often established an excremental hierarchy through the instrumental construction 
of the body of the colonised as a supposedly unsanitary one which must be disci-
plined by means of the imposition of an orificial order (“Excremental Colonial-
ism”). As Anderson has observed in a recent essay on the refashioning of the ab-
ject in relation to the decolonised state and globalisation, Mbembe’s examination 
of the aesthetics of state power in the African postcolony registers however a pro-
cess that emphatically counters the ‘civilising’ path tracing the destiny of the colo-
nised subject “from abject embodiment to constipated republican subjectivity.” As 
Anderson puts it, Mbembe has indeed shown that “many postcolonial African 
leaders were never inclined to follow any such path” (“Crap on the Map” 171), so 
that “the low qualities once attributed to natives, disqualifying them from citizen-
ship, can now function at least intermittently as part of the managerial repertoire 
of postcolonial states” (172). Such an ambivalence confirms what Joshua D. Esty, 
in his study of scatological imagery in the fiction of postcolonial disillusionment, 
has called the “dangerous mobility of the excremental signifier” (30), which be-
comes in Mbembe’s analysis a symbol of power which is simultaneously disgusting 
and fascinating. 
As has been often noticed in the previous chapters, the works studied in this 
dissertation are replete with images of repulsive Big Men: from Ken Saro Wiwa’s 
“bellymen” to Eddie Iroh’s Chima Duke, from Uzodinma Iweala’s Commandant 
to Chika Unigwe’s Dele and Titus, the repugnant appearance of these fat, sweaty, 
lecherous embodiments of (not necessarily sovereign) power is often the source of 
satirical portrayals indicting them as corrupt, ‘ingurgitating’ contributors to the 
failure of the postcolonial state. In Sefi Atta’s novel, such an iconography is em-
ployed in the description of aforementioned Mr Salawo, the two main characters’ 
employer, who is derisively called “Mr Biggs” by irreverent Rose. In fact, “[h]e 
was not that big,” Tolani points out, “only around his stomach; consequently, his 
trousers were buckled high – almost up to his chest – or below his waist” (17). 
Salawo, albeit evidently not a sovereign actor, nor a figure acting on sovereign or-
ders, nevertheless occupies a privileged position within the excremental hierarchy 
where a minority, including him, eats and excretes, while the rest is surrounded by 
waste to the point of risking annihilation – or rather, as will be seen below, 
drowning. The man, in this sense, is another epitome of those diffused, metamor-
phic forms of postcolonial (pseudo-)sovereignty that, though informal practices, 
acquire the power to administer death at the expenses of those whose lives he de-
clares valueless: “He said that if I lost my job, I would be lucky to find myself liv-
ing in a gutter” (229).  
If Tolani and Rose have been excluded from the male-dominated (dis)order 
of their workplace for not complying with the requests of a foul-smelling petty ty-
rant, they are also more generally part of the lower social strata of the metropolis, 
composed by individuals who seem to have little or no possibility of upward social 
mobility and are rather in the perpetual danger of being consigned once and for all 
to a state of denigrated waste. Evacuated by-products of a postcolonial state de-
void of citizens, their economic disempowerment sanctions their abandonment in 
a sea of refuse – a sea that is not only symbolic, but that also reflects the material 
conditions in urban areas such as the “ghetto” where Tolani and Rose live (155). 
There, the often-mentioned imposition of a monthly ‘sanitation day,’ proclaimed 
within the context of the Fifth Phase of Buhari’s War Against Indiscipline (the so-
called ‘War Against Filth’), is portrayed as having little positive impact on the en-
vironmental cleanliness of public spaces.31  
As Tolani herself admits, women like Rose and herself do not occupy the 
lowest rung of the Nigerian biopolitical pyramid. Still, they teeter on the fine edge 
that divides their own, relatively bearable, condition, from that of the beggar, 
aware that they might easily cross the line into poverty. And this, in a state that 
                                               
31 The lack of success of the WAI Fifth Phase, called the War Against Filth, was due, 
amongst other reasons, to the unfair emphasis it placed on individual responsibility and 
culpability for environmental pollution, which failed to address “the long-standing failure 
of the Nigerian state to provide adequate infrastructure to enable people to maintain a 
healthy environment” (Stock 25). 
provides limited or no social welfare – be it Nigeria or the United States, as the 
author has warningly pointed out (Atta and Anya) – can easily mean homeless-
ness, utter destitution, even death.32 It can mean being turned, literally, into rub-
bish. It is indeed relevant to remember that during the War Against Filth many lo-
cal governments took the opportunity to pursue interests that were not quite tied 
to sanitation priorities, for example through the demolition of illegal structures 
such as unauthorised street-side markets, roadside kiosks and squatters’ dwellings 
(Stock 28).33 The Fifth Phase, Robert Stock writes, brought also “renewed, if fleet-
ing, calls to rid urban environments of beggars and mental patients,” who were 
transferred to supposed rehabilitation centres which were often nothing more 
than detention camps (28). In many respects, therefore, the 1985 sanitation cam-
paigns seemed to be dictated by a bourgeois agenda “that had more to do with the 
cosmetic appearance of cities than the protection of health” (29). In such a con-
text, thus, the characters’ fears about the consequences of being reduced once and 
for all to nothing more than “filth” do certainly not seem to be unjustified, nor are 
they merely symbolic. 
Such an anxiety is nowhere as clearly conveyed in the text as in the detailed 
narration of the episode in which nine-year-old Ayo, one of Tolani’s neighbours, 
                                               
32 Commenting for example on the state of the government-funded hospital where her 
neighbour, matronly Mrs. Durojaiye, works as a midwife, Tolani bluntly says that she 
would never set foot on it: “If I were dying, I would rather die at home” (62). 
33 Even as such demolitions may of course have been, at least on occasions, due to envi-
ronmental sanitation reasons, Robert Stock remarks that “as a rule, questions about the 
legality of structures took precedence over whether such buildings represented a tangible 
threat to public health.” As for the measures taken against street traders, their objectives 
included “revenue generation accomplished by sending as many traders as possible into 
controlled markets, the improvement of the general appearance of the urban landscape 
and of traffic flow, and the encouragement of moving ‘back to the land’ to produce food-
stuffs” (28). 
is thought to have drowned in the septic tank upon which he has often been seen 
playing: “The septic tank had sucked Ayo in, Mama Chidi said.” 
The crowd in our backyard were other tenants. They were gathered around the 
septic tank, carrying kerosene and battery lanterns. When I saw them I became 
conscious of an awful stench, like a sewer. It was the waste in our tank. The ce-
ment surface had a huge hole. Mama Chidi’s husband was dipping a long stick into 
it and seemed to be stirring the contents. […] 
“We need a longer stick,” someone said. […] 
The smell grew stronger. More people filled our backyard as news of the drown-
ing spread on our street. If the body were brought out, it would be a spectacle for 
them. I turned away from the crowd and walked out of the compound. (98-100) 
 Mrs. Durojaiye, a divorced mother of three, is one of the many fearless women 
whose toil Atta celebrates in the novel. A muscular, unsmiling matron who “beat 
her children like no other mother” (64), she has fought her gambling husband, 
who lost all their money, and is now participating in an anti-government strike 
which turns into a proper war when the police intervene with whips and bullets,34 
leaving lifeless bodies around the hospital premises (134). “She was so tough,” 
Tolani reflects, that “the government would be a small foe for her” (64). And yet, 
the news of her son’s death is too much, even for her, and her reaction is recount-
ed in a disturbing mourning scene after which shocked Tolani, imperfect moral 
centre of the novel, begins to wander on the streets around the compound, refus-
ing to take part in the wailing of the obnoxious “grief mongers” who encircle the 
desperate mother (104). 
It is on a dark side road that Tolani discovers that Ayo has not died. The 
boy has run away from home after breaking the surface of the septic tank on 
                                               
34 The animalisation implied by the recurrent use of whips on the part of the police is 
made explicit in the text when Tolani comments on the horsewhipping of disorderly 
crowds waiting for buses: “They had always done that, but the government’s War Against 
Indiscipline gave them a legitimate reason. Now, they could say it was part of their duties 
to ensure the public behaved in an orderly fashion. They treated us like cattle” (21). 
which he was jumping, terrified at the idea of the vicious beating that would no 
doubt follow. Tolani spots him “crouched behind a rusty oil drum, by a small 
rubbish dump. […] He rubbed his eyes as if he’d been crying.” He is hardly dis-
tinguishable from the debris that surrounds him: as Tolani says, “no one but me 
could see the thin legs tucked behind [the drum]. I reached the legs and knelt by 
the boy. […] He smelled of human waste and orange peels. I rocked him” (102). 
If Ayo has survived the septic tank and to his surprise even his mother’s far from 
infuriated reaction, still the crack on the cement surface remains open: Mrs. Du-
rojaiye has no money to fix it. Therefore, the nauseous effluvia emanating from it 
pervade all the apartments in the compound. The tenants are forced to smell the 
stench of their own waste in a city whose sewerage system, similarly to what hap-
pens in a number of urbanised areas in the Global South, is nearly non-existent 
(Gandy), and the foul odours become a metaphor for the economic disempower-
ment and quasi-excremental conditions of the people inhabiting the decaying 
building. 
It is in the light of these considerations that Sanwo’s apparently dispropor-
tionate reaction to Ayo’s incident must be interpreted. When the man visits 
Tolani, some time after the event, he is indeed profoundly upset by the news, and 
so nauseated by the smell that, he tells her rather hyperbolically, he “can’t even 
stand to swallow [his] own spit”: “You won’t see me around here for a long time,” 
he warns (108). Sanwo works for his rich uncle and, albeit ambitious, he does not 
seem destined to succeed as a businessman: very much to the disappointment of 
Tolani, who is attempting to push him into marrying her, he is too generous with 
his sisters and parents; he is not “ruthless enough to be a Lagos hustler and […] 
too fair to cheat” (36). Broken Sanwo cannot afford to marry her, and he cannot 
afford to pay a rent. For these reasons, he is still living in the boys’ quarters of his 
uncle’s house, on Victoria Island, fantasising on his spare time about independent 
business projects. What is particularly relevant for the purposes of my analysis of 
this character is that Sanwo, in the boys’ quarters, has to share a shower and a la-
trine with his uncle’s driver and cook. And he is obsessed with their cleanliness. 
Sanwo complained about the habits of the other two, how they left soap remnants 
on the shower floor, messed up the latrine and never cleaned it. I’d seen worse la-
trines and showers. Their shower wall was at least whitish, sort of, and the floor 
was scrubbed with disinfectant. […] He said the walls ought to be repainted and 
the latrine replaced with a proper toilet. He complained and complained, used his 
own money to buy a light blue paint for the walls; he drew a cleaning roster and 
made rules, like no peeing on latrine floor, no throwing cigarette butts, no dumping 
rubbish, no burning of leaves, no hanging of laundry, except in the designated area 
of the premises. The rules went on for about two pages and he made the other 
men sign them. (154) 
Such a detailed description cannot be read simply as confirming the man’s fussy 
tastes in terms of excremental decorum. On the contrary, Sanwo seems to relate 
the precariousness of his socioeconomic status to an idea of uncontrolled excre-
mentality. In line with critic Delores B. Phillips’s observations regarding the scato-
logical aspects of Chris Abani’s GraceLand, it appears indeed that in Swallow 
“[b]athrooms and toilets trope the powerlessness and impotence characters feel in 
their own country, and become a metaphor for the (in)ability to endure the ‘crap’ 
they see taking place around them” (116). In this context, Sanwo’s will to impose 
a discipline in the use of the shower and the latrine constitutes an attempt to cre-
ate a new excremental order, contesting the assimilation of the lower classes, of 
which he himself is part notwithstanding his diploma in business and administra-
tion, to ordure. In other words, it reflects yet another dream of economic, but also 
ontological, upward mobility. The stench invading Tolani’s flat, instead, is an un-
pleasant, unbearable reminder not only of the country’s inequity, but also of the 
immobility that frustrates his ambition to challenge his own abject condition – or 
at least to put it under erasure.  
It is not surprising that Rose’s wordy endeavours to convince Tolani to be-
come a drug courier rely on the reiteration of scatological imagery: “You sit in a 
compound stinking of shit. You walk down a street stinking of gutters. You’re on 
a bus full of stinking people” (139). Before giving her the chance to complete her 
next sentence, about “a man like Salako with his stinking…,” Tolani interrupts her 
friend and bluntly refuses her offer. She is outraged and afraid. What is more, as 
she has previously said referring to the smell in her flat, “the longer I was around 
it, the more I got used to it” (111). If at this point Tolani thus seems ready to ac-
cept her life as it is, stench and all, weeks later, on the brink of bankruptcy, her 
change of attitude marks her resolution to manipulate the excremental economy 
which rests on, and simultaneously produces, a biopolitical hierarchy founded on a 
wasted humanity. For Tolani and Rose, being paid for swallowing drugs and ex-
creting them in another country means attempting to achieve upward mobility 
within the aforementioned hierarchy. In this context, money is not only tropologi-
cally “re-odorised,” its nature as “polished waste” disclosed, as Esty has argued in 
relation to the satirical portrayal of the comprador class in Ayi Kwei Armah’s The 
Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born (33). In Swallow, money is, literally, faecal matter. In 
other words, by thematising the phenomenon of drug smuggling through the 
practice of body packing in the context of a novel where she makes pervasive use 
of scatological motifs highlighting the disempowerment of her characters, Atta 
exposes the vulgarity of the wealth produced within the context of illegal markets 
such as that of drug trafficking, while also bearing witness to the human debase-
ment and exploitation on which they rest. Africa thus emerges as a site of global 
dumping as well as of global expendability, a site where the profitable extraction 
of raw materials, of organs, of bodies is enabled and made particularly lucrative as 
a consequence of the superfluity of (part of) its population. As seen in GraceLand, 
and confirmed in the texts discussed in this chapter, the trash heap of the post-
colony provides indeed almost infinite resources in terms of disposable humanity 
capable to satisfy the demand of the global North – be it in terms of cheap labour, 
cheap sex, life-saving body parts, or cocaine. The characters’ choices to participate 
in these economies of abjection, aware of occupying the lowest rungs within the 
power hierarchies they engender, can be legal or illegal, more or less free, more or 
less understandable. What is undoubted, and what these novels highlight, is that 
theirs are choices that deeply jeorpardise their security and that can even put their 
own humanity in question. 
The challenges facing Tolani when, practicing for her new job, she attempts 
to swallow her first, garri-filled balloon, are however tougher than expected. 
I’d been vomiting all morning. I had to leave the flat to clear my head. My mouth 
tasted of palm oil. I couldn’t swallow my condom; it was the size of my thumb and 
as hard as a bone. What used to be my throat was now a pipe, my intestines were a 
drain, and my stomach had become an empty portmanteau. […]  
[The condom] wouldn’t go past the back of my tongue, and I still vomited. I 
vomited when I tried to swallow, vomited after I’d spat up. I kept heaving. I finally 
lay on my mattress, exhausted, and watched the water stains of the ceiling. My tears 
ran down my ears and blocked them. (211-212) 
As the digestive system of this wannabe body packer is metaphorically juxtaposed, 
albeit imperfectly, to a sewer, her objectification and debasement are denounced 
by pointing out that the economic empowerment that might derive from her con-
nivance with excremental illegality does not in fact question the declared superflui-
ty of her own existence within its structures.35 And it is of course telling that 
Tolani, in the end, will never manage to swallow her pellet. Her reluctance derives 
initially from her inability to knock down the “invisible wall covering [her] throat” 
(212). After attending a service in her colleague’s Godwin ‘born-again’ church and 
listening to a sermon exalting the sanctity of monetary wealth, her decision be-
comes final: no God of money will ever prompt her to do this.  
Joshua D. Esty has remarked that excrement, as suggested both in psycho-
analytical and anthropological theory, “marks the fuzzy boundary between inside 
and outside, between the self and the not-self.” The depiction of “shit-figures” 
such as Rose and Tolani has thus the potential to complicate moral binaries, tend-
ing as it does “towards complex models of systemic guilt” (Esty 34). It is therefore 
not by chance that Atta, even while highlighting her characters’ vulnerability, also 
draws attention to their corruptibility. The novel seems indeed to move between 
different, contrasting tendencies: on the one hand, it highlights the gender-based 
exclusions which contribute to Rose and Tolani’s choices, and gives voice to 
Tolani’s fascination for Rose’s fearlessness, even as it recognises its (self-
)destructive implications; on the other, the possibility of seeking social mobility 
through illegality is not exempted from moral disapproval. While the narrative 
tends to maintain a certain degree of ethical undecidability in this respect, on oc-
casions it resorts to quasi moralistic tones to describe the characters’ implication 
in the underworld of drug trafficking. When this occurs, Atta runs the risk of ap-
parently resolving the complex ethical quandaries in which her characters find 
                                               
35 This is later confirmed when OC, commenting on Rose’s death, says that she was as “a 
bad investment, a liability” (249). Such a statement recalls Dele and Madam’s reactions to 
Sisi’s flight, and her punitive murder, in Unigwe’s On Black Sisters’ Street. 
themselves in favour of an unproblematic indictment of greed as a feeling that 
compromises one’s moral integrity. For example, on hearing the scathing attacks 
Mama Chidi levels against those drug mules she has read about in the newspapers 
– they are “pure evil” (247), Mama Chidi states, and after all, have they perhaps 
“suffered more than Mrs. Durojaiye?” (246) – Tolani feels “as worthless as spit”: 
“Morality was an easy friend to part with, yet so hard to avoid thereafter. It was 
hard to accept that I’d been a criminal” (247). 
On the night before Tolani’s planned visit to her mother, Arike, OC breaks 
into her flat to give her news of Rose’s death and tell her to leave Lagos for a 
while. Ever since her life has turned to chaos, Tolani has begun to think of her 
mother, “the first person I knew” (190), as a moral reference point, the only per-
son who can resolve her doubts about her father’s identity and help her get 
through this difficult moment. Now, after Rose’s death, it becomes all the more 
necessary for anguished Tolani to go to Makoku, the hometown she associates 
with her childhood, the hometown she has idealised as a site of order and peace. 
In the short second part of the novel, however, Tolani’s sentimental view of Ma-
koku is dramatically disabused: the town is not an ahistorical Utopia, but rather a 
place whose complexity counters any unproblematic nostalgia for a supposedly 
uncontaminated past – whatever this might mean. An albino has recently been 
kidnapped, his exceptional body probably used for juju rites; Peju, the no-
nonsense daughter of a single mother who lives near Arike’s compound, does not 
want to hear tales about speaking tortoises again – in fact, she has “never heard a 
tortoise speak” (267); and Arike sternly confronts her daughter’s silence about the 
reasons that have brought her back home, and criticises her mistaken, arrogant as-
sumptions about the presumed simplicity of her own life. Such a representation of 
village life, coupled with the honest but non-sensationalistic depiction of the hard-
ships of Lagosian existence, develops a distinctively balanced Nigerian “mode of 
self-writing,” to borrow from Mbembe’s well-known essay title. In Swallow, Atta 
registers both the failures of contemporary African politics and the exploitative 
global practices that engulf it, but is adamant about resisting apocalyptic imagery, 
often through irony; at the same time, the novel rejects nativist, exonerative con-
structions of African tradition and of its agents. 
Swallow, as said above, is a novel of combative women. And the reproduc-
tion of the gender conflicts that make up the war-scape of the text acquires in-
creased historical depth with Arike’s tale of her own life in the night in which the 
narrative ends. The reader has already come across Arike’s anecdotes – passages 
of different length that have been alternating with the main narrative line. Arike 
has told the story of her aunt, strong Iya Alaro, a master adire dyer who was 
thought to be a witch because she dared to resist the new Oba’s self-declared right 
to take his wives by force. The reader knows how Arike and her future husband 
met and knows how she managed to convince him to buy her beloved Vespa after 
they got married.36 Arike’s memories speak of love and complicity, but also of suf-
fering and malice. She remembers how she was abused because she failed to give a 
child to her husband. “As usual,” Tolani says, “she spoke with gaps, but the mo-
ment arrived when she said, ‘There is something you haven’t heard before’” (294). 
                                               
36 Nigerian novelist Jude Dibia has argued that the characters of Iya Alaro and Arike 
might be inspired by the figure of Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti, the much grieved mother of 
Afrobeat icon Fela Anikulapo-Kuti. A women’s rights activist and political campaigner, 
Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti is remembered, amongst other things, as the first Nigerian 
woman to drive a car – a detail that indeed resonates with the fascinating Vespa episode 
recounted in the novel. Atta is married to Gboyega Ransome-Kuti, one of Funmilayo 
Ransome-Kuti’s grandsons. 
Tolani, however, has by now learnt to come to terms with what she has always 
suspected, and does not need to hear it out loud – not anymore. She is aware that 
she’s not the drummer’s daughter, and that Arike had a relationship with some 
other man, perhaps with Tolani’s uncle, Brother Tade, so that the drummer’s ste-
rility could go unnoticed. “She could have had more children. She could have ex-
posed him. Instead, she enjoyed freedoms that other women envied, freedoms 
that belonged to her, and for what? The privilege of keeping his secret?” (293).  
Tolani’s doubts remain unvoiced: she interrupts her mother’s tale, as it is 
now her turn to speak. The novel thus ends in circular fashion, inviting its own re-
reading.37 Arike, similarly to Tolani, is aware of what it means to compromise, to 
be forced to live with shame. Like her, she knows what it means not to be granted 
rights that should be yours simply because of your own humanity. Atta does not 
provide recipes for salvation – neither for the salvation of the postcolonial state, 
nor for the salvation of the older and younger women whose lives she has so 
sympathetically put down on paper. What she tells us through this circular ending 
is that these women’s struggles are bound to, and must, continue. But, at least in 
Tolani and Arike’s case, they will continue with the strength and mutual respect 
that come from dialogue and reconciliation. 
                                               
37 Atta has commented on what she has called the “round shape” of this book in an in-
terview with Walter Collins (129). 
 
Legal scholar Costas Douzinas has famously claimed that “the whole field of hu-
man rights is characterised by paradoxes and aporias” (21). This is confirmed in 
primis by the apparently unsolvable, macroscopic contradiction that lies at the very 
heart of human rights discourse: human rights, Douzinas writes, “are internally 
fissured: they are used as the defence of the individual against a state power built 
in the image of an individual with absolute rights” (20). As reformulated by critic 
Greg A. Mullins, Douzinas’ comment reads as a provocative question: “if human 
beings have universal and inalienable rights, why do human beings need to be pro-
tected from the state, and more pointedly, why must they be protected by the very 
state they are being protected from?” (121). Theoretically the natural entitlement of 
every human being for the sole reason of being human, human rights are thus still 
for the most part the positive rights of incorporated citizens. What is more, na-
tion-states, the designated protectors of human rights, remain also the major hu-
man rights violators. Other much-discussed paradoxes regard the twin concepts of 
the human and of the universal, on which the definition of human rights rests, 
which have historically been constituted through systematic exclusions. Numerous 
scholars have further noticed that some of the worst human rights abuses have 
been carried out in the name of human rights themselves. Others have pointed 
out that the human rights project, with its Enlightenment roots, shares the teleol-
ogies of liberty and progress, alongside the rhetoric that accompanies them, with 
Western capitalist and imperialist epistemologies. As such, it often runs the risk of 
upholding, or reproducing, the very exploitative, de-humanising practices it seeks 
to eradicate, for example by predicating the necessary de-politicisation of the ‘vic-
tims’ it aims at protecting, who are reduced to mere recipients of Western benevo-
lent intervention.  
The list that has just been provided is by no means exhaustive, being rather 
meant to recall some of the conundrums that have arisen in the course of this dis-
sertation. The texts I have examined, portraying the unequal encounters between 
the Nigerian sovereign and its subjects, have brought to the fore the many failures 
of human rights in the context of an undemocratic, or dysfunctional, state whose 
(non-)citizens become infrahuman objects of state violence, vulnerable, easily kill-
able bodies that don’t matter. Many of their characters can be considered in this 
context embodiments of the aforementioned ‘core’ paradox of human rights: not 
recognised as right-bearing citizens, their naked humanity proves insufficient a 
reason to guarantee, in Arendt’s phrase, their ‘right to have rights.’  
In human rights discourse, Joseph Slaughter explains, paradox can be de-
fined as “the rhetorical form of self-contradiction that challenges received opinion 
and disturbs the hermeticism of tautological self-evidence to report that, despite 
appearances, man may not in all cases be man” (Human Rights, Inc. 12). Slaughter 
admits that it is not only useful, but on occasions necessary, to publicise human 
rights paradoxes, deploying the ‘politics of shame’ so as to protest their unfulfilled 
promises of egalitarianism. All the same, he continues, rather than simply seeking 
to expose the undoubted limits of human rights discourse, the fissures between 
human rights theory and practice, the violence often codified by the law, the critic 
should ask, following Wendy Brown, how paradox might “gain political richness 
when it is understood as affirming the impossibility of justice in the present and as 
articulating the conditions and contours of justice in the future” (432). And in-
deed, if it is true that, as Douzinas has written, “human rights have ‘only paradox-
es to offer’,”1 it is also the case that, as he is quick to warn, their energy “comes 
from their aporetic nature” (21). 
Such an emphasis on the emancipatory potential of paradox is bound to 
confirm the mutually illuminating relationship between human rights and litera-
ture: for the act of reading “requires to attend to the narrative and rhetorical struc-
tures that produce meaning via paradox, irony, ambiguity, ambivalence, and so 
forth” (Mullins 123). It is thus no coincidence that the works discussed in this dis-
sertation are replete with disturbing contradictions that unhinge facile assumptions 
as to the boundaries of the human and the relationship between subjectivity and 
sovereignty. As has been noticed, they offer oxymoronic images of animalised, 
undignified, ghostly humans; they describe the postcolony as a place caught in a 
condition of perpetual exception, where the abnormal becomes normal and the 
human becomes bare life; they conjure up a world of indistinction that speaks of 
the limitations of clear-cut divisions; they depict ‘victims’ who do not want to be 
considered as such. By integrating different paradoxes in the fabric of the narra-
tive, the authors often propose stories that are structurally open, forever unfin-
ished, and that invite an agonistic, future-oriented reconfiguration of human rights 
and of the relationships between the individual and the state. Thus, if on the one 
                                               
1 The phrase is borrowed from Joanne Scott’s Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and 
the Rights of Man, where it is employed to describe the position of women in revolutionary 
France. Scott, in turn, cites Olympe de Gouges, the author of the 1971 “Declaration of 
the Rights of Woman and of the Female Citizen.” 
hand they protest their protagonists’ exclusion from an effective regime of rights 
and might not seem to suggest alternatives to the brutalisation they narrate, on the 
other they also fruitfully highlight the need to reimagine the foundational catego-
ries of human rights discourse, most evidently by recalling the ethical and political 
importance of resignifying and expanding the concepts of the universal and of the 
human. 
In a recent essay on the necessity of re-articulating the idea of the universal 
in human rights discourse, Domna C. Stanton, while recalling the Spivakian warn-
ing as to “the difficulty of overcoming an imperialist ‘speaking for others’,” has 
observed that rejecting universalism in the name of the particular is for its part 
“neither easy nor necessarily emancipatory,” as confirmed for example by the 
abuse of the idea of the local as “an alibi for human rights violations perpetrated 
with dictatorial impunity” (67). In her contribution to the critical debate surround-
ing the question of universalism, Stanton tentatively introduces the notion of “‘the 
generalizable,’ in an attempt to delineate a process without end – a generalizabili-
zation – for forging commonalities through a contest of meanings” without aspir-
ing to achieve “a final product, a generalization” (76). Her essay thus outlines a 
bottom-up approach that counters the Enlightenment idea of top-down consen-
sus, avoiding “unwarranted generalisations based on inferences,” and involving in-
stead 
a critical, vigilant comparativism focused on gauging what has been excluded or not 
spoken in the universal statements of [the human rights] regime, but also, concur-
rently, on any emergent generalizable issues and claims that need to be inscribed in-
to human rights discourse, and thereby, expand and transform it. A process that 
must be open-ended, generalizabilization can produce provisional universalizing 
statements, propositions that must, of course, be subject to constant re-
examination and revision over time to forge and to sustain intersubjective agree-
ments. (Stanton 77-78) 
The stories of exclusions fictionalised in the works studied here could be 
fruitfully related to Stanton’s discussion. As noticed in the Introduction to this 
dissertation, they no doubt eschew any romanticised vision of the human experi-
ence as universal, showing how the grievability of human life varies depending on 
context. All the same, they emphatically assert the humanity of their not-quite-
human characters, and thus point at the need to reformulate the universal, even as 
admitting that there exist local and global constraints that often prevent such an 
operation. Aware both of the potentialities and of the limits of literary representa-
tion, the authors never resolve the many, disquieting paradoxes they put forth. 
And yet, if the compelling ethical work they enjoin might frustrate the reader’s 
need for a comforting closure, its ‘generalisable’ nature might indeed constitute an 
apt point of departure for the difficult, perennially on-going, and rewarding task of 
reimagining what it means to be human. 
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